

# Economic Report of the President

Transmitted to the Congress February 2006

Together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers

# Economic Report of the President



# Transmitted to the Congress February 2006

together with
THE ANNUAL REPORT
of the
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

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## ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

### ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

### To the Congress of the United States:

The United States economy continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience, flexibility, and growth. Having previously endured a stock market collapse, recession, terrorist attacks, and corporate scandals, this year the economy showed strong growth and robust job creation in the face of higher energy prices and devastating natural disasters. This is the result of the hard work of America's workers, supported by pro-growth tax policies.

In 2005, the Nation's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 3.5 percent for the year, above the historical average. About 2 million payroll jobs were added in 2005, and the unemployment rate dropped to 4.7 percent last month, well below the averages of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Real disposable personal income increased, and real household net worth reached an all-time high. This growth comes on top of an already strong expansion. More than 4.7 million payroll jobs have been added since August 2003.

Compared with the performance of other nations' economies, our economic growth is especially impressive. The United States has added more jobs in the past two-and-a-half years than Japan and the European Union combined. Real GDP growth in the United States has been faster than in any other major industrialized country since 2001, and America is forecasted to continue as the fastest-growing country over the next two years.

Our economy's fundamental strength comes from the ingenuity and hard work of our workers. Productivity—how much workers produce per hour has accelerated since 2000. In the past five years, productivity has grown faster than in any other five-year period since the mid-1960s. The productivity of the United States is increasing faster than any other major industrialized country.

Productivity growth raises our standard of living and plays a central role in our competitiveness in the worldwide economy. Productivity growth will be even more important as new technologies accelerate global economic integration and as the American population ages.

We must now build on this fundamental strength by making robust investments in physical sciences, improving private incentives for research and development, and boosting math and science education and worker training. The American Competitiveness Initiative will help us remain a world leader in science and technology, which means good high-paying jobs for the American people.

We must also continue to pursue pro-growth economic policies and foster a culture of entrepreneurship. To adopt innovations effectively, our companies and workers need the incentives and flexibility that support a thriving free-market economy.

Maintaining a low tax burden is essential for our economic growth and competitiveness. Tax relief has helped our economy, and raising taxes will increase the burden on our families and small businesses. To keep our economy growing, Congress needs to make the tax relief permanent.

Two years ago, I called for cutting the budget deficit in half by 2009 by restraining spending and spurring economic growth. Every year of my presidency, we have reduced the growth of non-security discretionary spending, and last year Congress passed bills that cut this spending. This year, my budget will cut it again, and it will reduce or eliminate more than 140 programs that are performing poorly or not fulfilling essential priorities. By passing these reforms, we will save the American taxpayer another \$14 billion next year, and we will stay on track to cut the deficit in half by 2009.

Controlling discretionary spending alone is not enough, however. We have recently passed significant savings in mandatory spending programs. We need to do more because the only way to solve our Nation's fiscal challenges is to address the explosions in growth of entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. I have called for a bipartisan commission to examine the full impact of the Baby Boom retirement and help us come up with bipartisan answers. The longer Congress waits to act, the more difficult the choices will become.

Working together, we accomplished other significant pro-growth reforms that will help our Nation's economy grow stronger and create more jobs. More remains to be done.

Growth in spending on health care has been more rapid than general inflation, straining consumers, employers, and government budgets. Two years ago, we created Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) to help give patients more control over their health care decisions and to make health care more available and affordable. This year, I am proposing to enhance HSAs to make them more widely available, valuable to consumers, and attractive to small businesses—and to make it easier for people to keep their insurance policies when they change jobs. Last year, we worked with Congress to pass a patient safety bill that will help reduce medical errors. Getting doctors and patients the information they need on the quality, cost, and effectiveness of different treatments will help Americans get the highest quality and highest value care. This year, my Administration will push to make more information about price and quality available to consumers, and move forward on these and other policies to lower the cost of health care.


Our Nation's liability laws allow too many frivolous lawsuits and raise costs for consumers and businesses. A year ago, we worked with Congress to pass bipartisan class action reform to help curb lawsuit abuse. I urge Congress in the coming year to pass other essential legal reforms, including asbestos and medical liability reforms.

Energy prices have risen in the last year, but the underlying causes of high prices are long-standing. Last year, we passed the first major energy bill in over a decade. It encourages new technologies and updates government regulations. Over time, the new law will help increase the reliability of our energy supply and the efficient use of the energy we have. We must continue to find new ways to diversify our sources of energy. I have proposed the Advanced Energy Initiative to help increase research in alternative energy sources and technology and to make America less dependent on foreign sources of energy.

Because 95 percent of the world's customers live outside of our borders, opening international markets to our goods and services is critical for our economy. My Administration will continue to work tirelessly to open markets and knock down barriers to free and fair trade so that American farmers and workers can compete on a level playing field worldwide.

These and other issues are discussed in the 2006 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. This report is prepared by CEA to help policymakers understand the economic context of a variety of issues and trends as our Government makes decisions regarding our economic future. By adopting sound economic policies that build on our strengths, we will keep our economy moving forward and extend prosperity for all Americans.

FEBRUARY 2006



# THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS



### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2006

Mr. President:

The Council of Economic Advisers herewith submits its 2006 Annual Report in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Act of 1946 as amended by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.

Sincerely,

Katherine Baicker

Member



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### Overview

The expansion of the U.S. economy continued for the fourth consecutive year in 2005. The President has laid out an agenda to maintain the economy's momentum, foster job creation, and ensure that America remains a leader of the global economy.

The President is advancing plans to make tax relief permanent; restrain government spending to reduce the budget deficit; strengthen retirement systems; make health care more affordable and accessible; create an economic environment that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship; enhance private incentives for research and development; boost math and science education and worker training; reform the immigration system and strengthen our borders; continue to open markets to American goods and services; and reduce America's dependence on foreign oil by diversifying our energy supply.

This *Report* reviews the state of the economy and the economic outlook, and discusses a number of economic policy issues of continuing importance. The *Report* highlights how economics can inform the design of better public policy and reviews Administration initiatives.

### The Year in Review and the Years Ahead

The economy has shifted from recovery to sustained expansion, having absorbed the effects of the Gulf Coast hurricanes and large increases in energy prices in 2005. Chapter 1, *The Year in Review and the Years Ahead*, reviews the economic developments of 2005 and discusses the Administration's forecast for the years ahead. The key points of this chapter are:

- Real GDP grew strongly during 2005. Most components of demand that accounted for growth in 2004—consumer spending, business investment in equipment and software, and exports—continued to do so in 2005.
- Labor markets continued to strengthen. Employers created 2 million new jobs in 2005, and the unemployment rate dropped to 4.9 percent by year-end.
- Productivity growth remained well above its historical average in 2005.
- Inflation rose substantially at mid-year, but came down by year-end as it reflected the movement of energy prices. In contrast, inflation in the core consumer price index (CPI) (which excludes food and energy prices) has remained in the moderate 2-percent range.
- The Administration's forecast, consistent with consensus private forecasts, shows the economic expansion continuing for the foreseeable future.

### Skills for the U.S. Workforce

Chapter 2, Skills for the U.S. Workforce, discusses the economics of education, immigration, and job training. The key points are:

- Education is a key contributor to economic growth and individual income.
- Advances in education levels have slowed over the past 25 years. The No Child Left Behind Act is working to reverse this trend by making schools more accountable. If, however, we do not continue to improve our schools, the U.S. standard of living could be jeopardized in years to come.
- High-skilled immigrants make up a vital part of the U.S. economy, particularly in the science and engineering sectors.
- Workers need to upgrade their skills continually to adapt to and take part in an ever-changing economy.

Promoting a flexible and skilled labor force—through improved access to high-quality primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, through policies that attract the world's best and brightest to our shores, and through investment in the continuing education and training of our mobile workforce - will ensure that the United States remains a competitive leader in this rapidly changing world economy.

### Saving for Retirement

Over the past few decades, concerns have mounted that Americans have been preparing inadequately for retirement. The main points of Chapter 3, Saving for Retirement, are:

- Most working-age Americans are on track to have more retirement wealth than most current retirees. It is inherently difficult, however, to assess whether these preparations are adequate for most households.
- The decline in an often-cited aggregate personal saving rate may not be cause for much alarm for retirement preparedness. Much of this decline can be attributed to spending triggered by wealth increases from capital gains on housing and financial assets.
- · There are, however, a number of risks to the retirement preparations of Americans. People today are living longer and could face higher health-care costs in retirement than members of previous generations. In addition, Social Security and many defined-benefit pension plans are at risk.
- · Both defined-benefit pensions and Social Security suffer from fundamental financial problems that expose not just retirees but all U.S. taxpayers to risk of substantial losses. The Administration is focused on addressing these problems and protecting the Nation's retirement security.

### Improving Incentives in Health Care Spending

Health care spending in the United States has increased rapidly over the past several decades, rising 44 percent in real per capita terms in the past ten years alone. Some of the reasons for this marked rise reflect higher-quality health care, such as improved technological options for enhancing health and quality of life. Other factors, however, such as poorly functioning markets for health care, may have led to excessive spending and inefficient patterns of medical care utilization.

Chapter 4, *Improving Incentives in Health Care Spending*, reviews the causes and consequences of health care spending growth and discusses how the President's consumer-driven proposals can improve the health care system. The key points are:

- Growth in spending on health care has been much more rapid than general inflation, straining consumers, employers, and government budgets.
- Perverse tax and insurance incentives have led to inefficient levels and composition of spending on health care.
- Promoting a stronger role for consumers is a promising strategy for improving health care value and affordability.

### The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective

All governments face two important decisions. They must choose the scope and scale of public goods and services to provide for their citizens, and they must also decide how to collect the funds to finance those public services. Chapter 5, The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective, examines U.S. choices in the context of other countries. It makes three key points:

- Fundamental choices about tax systems matter because they affect the living standards of citizens.
- The United States has made different choices from other countries. The
  United States has a relatively low tax burden compared to the rest of the
  world, and we finance more of that burden with a tax on personal
  income instead of consumption.
- When viewed in an international perspective, the U.S. system has been significantly improved in recent years but could benefit greatly from additional reforms, particularly those focused on the taxation of capital income.

### The U.S. Capital Account Surplus

The United States conducts an enormous number of trade and financial transactions with other countries. In 2004, the U.S. ran a current account deficit of \$668 billion. This deficit meant the U.S. imported more goods and services than it exported. The counterpart to the U.S. current account deficit was a capital account surplus of an equal amount. This surplus meant that foreign investors purchased more U.S. assets than U.S. investors purchased in foreign assets, and the U.S. received net foreign capital and financial inflows. Chapter 6, The U.S. Capital Account Surplus, makes several key points:

- The size and persistence of U.S. net capital inflows reflects a number of U.S. economic strengths as well as some shortcomings.
- The recent rise in U.S. net capital inflows in part reflects global economic conditions as well as policies in some Asian countries and weak growth in several European economies that led to greater net capital outflows from these countries.
- Encouraging greater global balance of capital flows would be helped by steps in several countries, such as higher domestic saving in the U.S., stronger economic growth in Europe and Japan, and greater exchange rate flexibility and financial sector reforms in Asia.

### The History and Future of International Trade

While economic research and historical evidence show the benefits of trade outweigh the costs, trade liberalization has always brought anxieties in the United States and throughout the world. There have always been temptations to retreat to economic isolationism, but the Administration rejects that notion. The key points in Chapter 7, The History and Future of International Trade, are:

- Over the past 70 years, policymakers across political parties have consistently recognized the importance of international commerce, and have achieved major trade liberalization both here and abroad.
- The net payoff to America from these achievements has been substantial. For example, studies have estimated the annual payoff from U.S. trade and investment liberalization thus far averages \$5,000 per American.
- · A number of barriers to trade remain, especially in services, and the benefits of eliminating these barriers are significant. One study found removing all remaining barriers to trade in services would lead to an additional \$7,000 in annual income for the average American family of four. The Administration is working to open these markets in global, regional, and bilateral negotiations.

### The U.S. Agriculture Sector

In 2005, the Federal government spent approximately \$20 billion on agricultural support payments in a sector forecast to produce approximately \$270 billion of output. In addition, the United States maintains barriers to the import of some commodities, and these barriers raise the domestic prices of these commodities relative to world prices. To what extent do these many payments and trade barriers serve a public purpose? Are they needed to maintain a healthy U.S. agricultural sector? Could alternative policies achieve this goal? Chapter 8, *The U.S. Agricultural Sector*, addresses these and other questions. The key findings of this chapter are:

- Most farmers do not benefit from commodity subsidies.
- Support to agriculture can be provided in many forms that are potentially less market- distorting than existing commodity subsidies.

### The U.S. Financial Services Sector

Most people interact regularly with the financial services sector, such as when they make deposits at banks or obtain loans from them. Nevertheless, understanding what this sector does can be difficult. Why do individuals go to intermediaries like banks for mortgages, rather than skip intermediaries and deal directly with savers? And why do financial service firms ask for so much information before making a loan and, afterward, place so many restrictions on borrowers?

Chapter 9, *The U.S. Financial Services Sector*, explores what financial services do for an economy, how financial development relates to economic performance, and how financial services can be effectively regulated. The key points are:

- The U.S. financial services sector addresses informational problems that can otherwise keep financial capital from finding productive uses. The sector tends to deliver these services in a cost-effective manner.
- Financial services facilitate innovation and thus encourage economic growth. They might also bolster economic stability.
- Financial regulation should protect consumers and ensure the system's safety and soundness. Moving too far in the direction of public regulation, however, can stifle the productivity and innovation necessary for the economy to enjoy fully the benefits of financial services. An effective financial regulatory system appropriately balances the costs and benefits of public regulation.

### The Role of Intellectual Property in the Economy

The founders of this country believed that intellectual property was so important that one of the grants of power to Congress under the Constitution was "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Economic research over the past two centuries confirms the importance of intellectual property. The key points of Chapter 10, The Role of Intellectual Property in the Economy, are:

- Intellectual property rights create incentives for individuals and firms to invest in research and development, and to commercialize inventions by allowing them to profit from their creations.
- · Well-defined and enforced intellectual property rights are important to economic growth.
- The Administration continues to enforce vigorously the rights of American intellectual property owners.

### Recent Developments in Energy

Chapter 11, Recent Developments in Energy, discusses energy marketssystems that connect consumers and suppliers of energy products, where prices are determined by what buyers will pay and what sellers will accept. The chapter reviews developments in markets for crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas, as well as developments in the electricity-generation sector. The key points are:

- Increased scarcity and rising prices over time will encourage conservation, increase incentives for exploration, and stimulate the development of new, energy-efficient technologies and alternative energy sources.
- In the near term, unexpected disruptions to energy supply and distribution networks may continue to affect consumers and businesses. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated that competitive markets play a central role in allocating scarce energy resources, especially during times of natural disaster or national emergency.
- The continued expansion of energy markets through regional and global trade can further increase our resilience to energy supply disruptions.
- · Policies that reduce U.S. vulnerability to energy disruptions, encourage energy efficiency, and protect the environment can be beneficial supplements to markets. These policies can be made more effective and less costly when designed based on economic incentives.

### The Year in Review and the Years Ahead

The expansion of the U.S. economy—having gathered momentum in 2003 and 2004—continued for its fourth full year in 2005. Economic growth was solid, with real gross domestic product (GDP) growing 3.1 percent during the four quarters of 2005 and 3.5 percent for the year as a whole. Near-record prices of energy and damage from several powerful hurricanes threatened to derail the expansion, but growth was well maintained in the face of these shocks and a long series of rate hikes by the Federal Reserve. Productivity growth remained well above its historical average.

This chapter reviews the economic developments of 2005 and discusses the Administration's forecast for the years ahead. The key points of this chapter are:

- Real GDP grew strongly during 2005. Most components of demand that
  accounted for growth in 2004 continued to do so in 2005: consumer
  spending, business investment in equipment and software, and exports.
- Labor markets continued to strengthen. The unemployment rate continued to decline, and employers created another 2 million jobs.
- Inflation rose substantially at mid-year, but came down by year-end reflecting the movement of energy prices. In contrast, inflation in the core consumer price index (CPI) (which excludes food and energy prices) has remained in the moderate 2-percent range, and inflation expectations for the period beyond a one-year horizon remain moderate and stable.
- The Administration's forecast calls for the economic expansion to continue in 2006, with real GDP growth close to its post-World War II average rate and the unemployment rate stable at about its current level. This is expected to continue in subsequent years.

# Developments in 2005 and the Near-Term Outlook

Despite the impacts of rising energy prices and a devastating hurricane season (see Box 1-1), the U.S. economy continued to expand at a solid pace in 2005 and inflation pressures remained contained.

### Consumer Spending and Saving

Consumer spending continued its strong growth in 2005, rising faster than disposable income over the past decade and a half. As a result, the personal

### Box 1-1: Economic Impact of the 2005 Hurricanes

In addition to the tragic loss of life and the massive destruction of personal property, the two major hurricanes (Katrina on August 29 and Rita on September 24) damaged the productive capacity of the American economy. Hurricane Wilma (October 24) also caused sizable losses to life and property, but the damage to the economy as a whole was much less. Both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita passed through offshore areas where oil and natural gas platforms are concentrated and then struck on-shore areas where petroleum is refined and natural gas is processed. In addition to the damage to equipment and structures, the hurricanes separated at least 782,000 workers from their iobs (and displaced many more from their homes).


The direct damage to the capital stock and the displacement of labor probably cut real GDP growth by about 0.7 percentage point at an annual rate in the third quarter. Most of this GDP loss was the direct result of destruction of oil and natural gas operations. Although rebuilding of petroleum and natural gas operations was well under way in the fourth quarter, the continuing disruptions likely subtracted about 0.5 percentage point from the annual rate of real GDP growth in that quarter. Hurricane Katrina shut down about 1.4 million barrels per day of oil extraction and 8.8 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas production when it passed through on August 29. Those operations were well on their way to recovery when Hurricane Rita came along for a second strike on September 24, erasing the recovery efforts up to that date (see the chart below). From Katrina's approach through the Gulf of Mexico until the end of the third quarter, oil extraction was cut by an average of 1.08 million barrels per day below normal levels and by an average of 0.7 million barrels per day during the fourth quarter. Similarly, natural gas production was reduced by an average of 5.4 billion cubic feet per day (roughly 10 percent of U.S. output) from Katrina's approach through the end of the third quarter and by an average of 4.0 billion cubic feet per day in the fourth quarter. Damage to refineries cut output by an average of about 2 million barrels per day during September and forced the demand for refined petroleum products to be met by higher imports and a liquidation of inventories. Most refinery output was restored by early-November, however. (Recent energy developments are discussed further in Chapter 11.)

About 782,000 workers filed claims for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits because of the hurricanes (604,000 under the regular UI program and another 178,000 under the Disaster Unemployment Assistance program). The lost production from these workers also subtracted from real GDP growth in the third quarter (after making an allowance to avoid double counting the lost production of

### Box 1-1 — continued

### Oil and Natural Gas Production since Recent Hurricanes

Hurricanes Katrina (8/29) and Rita (9/24) shut down major amounts of crude oil and natural gas production, and the damage took a long time to repair.



workers in the petroleum and natural gas industries noted earlier). Data from the Current Population Survey indicate the unemployment rate among evacuees was about 12 percent by year end.

According to a Red Cross damage assessment, the three hurricanes destroyed an estimated 213,000 housing units; most of this damage was done by Katrina. Furthermore, 169,000 units suffered major damage (enough to make them uninhabitable), 220,000 had minor damage, and another 235,000 had extremely minor damage. The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates the loss of residential capital stock at about \$67 billion - about \$37 billion of which was insured. The insured structures are likely to be rebuilt (although not necessarily in the same location), and many of the uninsured structures may be rebuilt as well. The pace of reconstruction is uncertain but is likely to take place over a period of three years or so.

In the aftermath of the hurricanes, the President and Congress worked together to provide disaster relief for the affected areas. Two emergency spending bills provided for \$62 billion of disaster relief, including transfer payments to persons and businesses in the affected areas, direct government purchases of goods and services, and grants to State and local governments. These bills also included funding for

### Box 1-1 — continued

the Defense Department and the Corps of Engineers to rebuild military facilities and levees in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Additional legislation authorized a reallocation of about \$6 billion from other programs to disaster relief, established \$17 billion of additional borrowing authority for Federal flood insurance programs, and provided about \$15 billion of tax relief for the affected areas.

In the fourth quarter, the Federal disaster spending together with private rebuilding may have partially offset the still-negative effects of petroleum and natural gas operations. By the first quarter of 2006, these post-hurricane effects are expected to combine to produce a clearly positive contribution to real GDP growth.

saving rate fell to a postwar low this year, turning negative in the second quarter and remaining negative through the fourth quarter. A number of factors contributed to growth in consumer spending in 2005; the most important was the increase in energy prices including the transitory post-Katrina surge. Other factors with sizable effects in particular quarters were motor vehicle incentive programs and the loss of rental income from the hurricanes. Rising household net worth during the late 1990s and again over the past two years has provided a more-persistent boost to consumer outlays relative to after-tax income.

### Energy Expenditures

Consumer budgets continued to be stretched by higher energy prices in 2005. Consumer energy prices increased about 21 percent during the four quarters of 2005, following an 18-percent increase in 2004 (as measured by the consumption price index in the national income and product accounts). Real consumption of energy was fairly flat in 2005, but because of the higher prices, the share of household income allocated to energy purchases increased sharply. Spending on energy goods and services jumped from 4.2 percent of disposable personal income in 2002 to about 6 percent in October and November of 2005 as the average household's energy budget rose by about \$700 during 2005.

### Light Vehicle Expenditures

While annual average sales of cars and light trucks have been remarkably stable over the past six years, much of the quarter-to-quarter volatility in consumer spending generally comes from motor vehicle purchases. Quarterto-quarter variability in light vehicle sales was particularly evident in 2005. In

July, when General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler each introduced incentive programs on 2005 models, the sales of light vehicles peaked at 20.7 million units at an annual rate. However, motor vehicle sales dropped off in the fourth quarter to 15.8 million units at an annual rate with the removal of the incentive programs. Light vehicle sales for the year as a whole averaged 16.9 million units, however, almost identical to the average pace during the 2000-to-2004 period.

### Personal and National Saving

Meanwhile, real purchases outside of energy and motor vehicles grew at their long-standing trend of about 3½-percent growth per year. With energy prices up and other consumption on an unaltered trajectory, most of the funds for these higher-cost energy purchases came from reducing saving. The personal saving rate, which had been generally falling during the preceding 15 years, fell to -0.5 percent for 2005.


Personal saving is only one part of national saving. The personal saving rate does not include corporate saving in the form of retained earnings; but corporate saving adds to the wealth of corporate shareholders and supplies funds for investment. Net private saving, which includes corporate saving as well as household saving, was 4.3 percent of net national income in the first half of 2005, down from 7.4 percent in the 1990s. A still broader measure of saving, national saving, subtracts dissaving by Federal, state, and local governments (in the form of government budget deficits) from private (public plus corporate) saving. The national saving rate was 1.7 percent in the first half of 2005. (Personal and national saving are discussed further in Chapter 3, Saving for Retirement; the international aspects of saving are discussed in Chapter 6, The U.S. Capital Account Surplus.)

### Wealth Effects on Consumption and Saving

A strong rise in household net worth during the late 1990s and again during the past two years coincided with a sizable increase in consumer spending relative to disposable personal income (Chart 1-1). From 1995 through 2000, in large part because of a booming stock market, the wealth-to-income ratio rose well above its historical range, eventually reaching 6.15 years of disposable income, and the fraction of disposable income spent by consumers rose to new heights as well. The wealth-to-income ratio fell sharply in 2001 and 2002 due to the stock market decline. Since its low point in the third quarter of 2002, the wealth-to-income ratio has again risen sharply. By the third quarter of 2005, it had recovered to about 5.6 years of disposable income, well above the historical average of 4.8. Gains in the stock market accounted for about half of the recovery while increases in net housing wealth accounted for another third.

Chart 1-1 Consumption & Net Worth (Relative to Disposable Personal Income)

Consumption gains in 2004 and 2005 were partly supported by increases in wealth, with increases in housing and stock market wealth accounting for most of the increase.



Looking ahead, real consumption growth during the four quarters of 2006 is expected to be somewhere around the 3½-percent trend rate measured during the past three years. Over the near term, the personal saving rate is expected to increase. If energy prices decline in 2006, consumer spending should decline relative to income; to the extent that energy prices remain high, consumer spending may still decline relative to income as consumers reduce energy use and substitute energy alternatives.

### Housing Prices

During the past five years, home prices have risen at an annual rate of 9.2 percent. This increase was largely supported by two factors: first, an increase in housing demand, driven by a rise in nominal per capita disposable income of 3.4 percent per year; second, a decline in the cost of financing house purchases, due to a drop in the monthly payment on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages of 4.3 percent per year. Housing demand was also boosted by increased household formation and a strengthening job market. Supply constraints, due to limits on the supply of buildable land in some areas, also contributed to rising prices over the past five years. After falling during 2004, mortgage rates were roughly flat at 5½ percent in the first three quarters of 2005, and then edged up along with other long-term interest rates in the

fourth quarter. As a result, a well known measure of housing affordability has now fallen to about its average level over its 34-year history.

To gauge the extent to which house price increases have reflected fundamentals, some studies compare housing prices to rents. The rent-to-price ratio is a real rate of return on housing assets in the same way that the earnings-to-price ratio measures the real rate of return on corporate stocks. Viewed as an asset, a home should bear a real return similar to the real return available on alternative assets, such as stocks and bonds. As real interest rates have fallen in the United States and in most other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the rent-to-price ratio for housing has likewise fallen across a broad range of OECD countries. A recent OECD paper concluded that the decline in the rent-to-price ratio in the United States from 2000 through 2004 was roughly consistent with the decline in interest rates over the same period.

#### Residential Investment

In response to strong demand and the consequent rise in prices, builders began construction on more than 2 million new homes during 2005, one of the highest rates of homebuilding on record. Similarly, residential investment, at 6 percent of GDP in 2005, was at its highest level since 1955. During 2005, growth of residential construction contributed about half a percentage point to real GDP growth. Homebuilding in 2005 was slightly in excess of the pace of about 1.9 million starts per year that some economists have estimated is compatible in the long run with U.S. rates of household formation and other demographic influences.

During the next five years, the Administration expects the pace of home-building to decrease gradually because of demographic trends and slowly rising long-term interest rates. A gradual slowing of homebuilding appears more likely than a sharp drop because the elevated level of house prices will sustain homebuilding as a profitable enterprise for some time. On balance, residential investment is not projected to contribute to real GDP growth during the four quarters of 2006; in subsequent years, it is expected to subtract a bit from overall growth.

#### **Business Fixed Investment**

Real business investment in equipment and software grew 8 percent during the four quarters of 2005. This growth is down from the 14-percent year-earlier pace, which was boosted by the end-of-2004 termination of the bonus depreciation provisions of the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act. Equipment purchases grew rapidly in mining and oilfield machinery (18 percent) in response to higher prices for oil and natural gas and the need

to replace hurricane-damaged rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. Equipment investment also grew rapidly in the high-tech fields of computers, software, and communications equipment. Investment in industrial and construction equipment grew only moderately (6 percent and 4 percent, respectively). Investment in light trucks was strong through the third quarter, but fell back in the fourth.

In contrast to equipment and software, investment in structures was weak, growing only 1 percent during 2005, after 2.8-percent growth in 2004. Strong growth in the construction of hospitals, shopping centers, and mines (including oil and natural gas rigs) has been offset by declines in the building of electrical power stations, hotels and motels, and amusement and recreation facilities. Office construction fell for the fifth year in a row; however, the 2005 decline was smaller than previous years as office occupancy rates have begun to increase.

The accumulation of internal funds has been more than sufficient to finance business investment during this expansion (Chart 1-2). These funds, also known as cash flow, are the sum of undistributed after-tax profits and depreciation. In general, funds for business investment can be generated through borrowing (typically from the bond market, commercial paper market, or banks), issuing new stock, the drawdown of liquid assets, or tapping into cash flow. Historically, business investment has been about 21 percent higher than cash flow, with firms raising most of the extra funds in credit markets. In contrast, business investment during this expansion has not kept pace with cash flow. As a consequence, corporate liquid assets have now built up to levels that are well above any that have been seen during the past decade and a half. This buildup in liquid assets implies that financing for future investment should be readily available. However, the buildup may reflect greater overall caution among business executives and owners, a shift in sentiment that could dampen future investment.

During the next couple of years, investment in equipment and software is likely to maintain the same rapid growth as in 2005, as output continues to grow and businesses remain flush with cash. Investment in business structures is projected to accelerate as new oil and gas rigs are built and as continued declines in vacancy rates support the construction of new office buildings.


#### **Business Inventories**

The pace of inventory investment in 2005 was below the 2004 pace and on average subtracted from overall GDP growth during the first three quarters of the year. As sales grew during the year, the inventory-to-sales ratio continued to decline. Indeed, the inventory-to-sales ratio has fallen considerably since the mid-1980s. In 2005, businesses held inventories equal to about 27 business-days' worth of sales—about three days' worth of sales less than they held in 2000, and about seven days' less than in 1985. The trend toward leaner

Chart 1-2 Business Fixed Investment and Cash Flow

Business fixed investment and cash flow tend to move up and down together, although BFI usually exceeds cash flow. During this expansion, in contrast, BFI is not higher than cash flow.

Share of Potential GDP



Note: Potential GDP is the level of GDP consistent with full employment. BFI data available through 2005 Q4, cash flow data available through 2005:Q3. Shaded areas indicate recessions.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Congressional Budget Office.

inventories has been evident in manufacturing since the mid-1980s, and has appeared in retailing and wholesaling since at least 2000. Leaner inventories suggest that new business practices such as just-in-time inventory control in manufacturing and computer- and Internet-assisted supply-chain management continue to become more popular among supply managers.

Inventory investment generally makes little contribution to real GDP growth when the growth of final sales is roughly stable from year to year. (In contrast, inventory investment is important in the early phases of business-cycle recessions and recoveries.) With the economy in the midst of an ongoing expansion, and the Administration expecting fairly smooth growth of final sales during the next several years, inventory investment is not anticipated to be a major contributor to annual GDP growth. The economy-wide inventory-to-sales ratio is expected to trend lower over the projection period.

### Government Purchases

Federal Government purchases as well as transfers and grants (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) contributed to real GDP growth during 2005. Federal purchases contributed 0.2 percentage point at an annual rate to real GDP growth in the first half of the year, and about 0.5 percentage point in the third quarter. Almost all of these contributions were from the defense budget, largely a by-product of the reconstruction and military operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the developments in Iraq and the hurricanerelief efforts, however, Federal spending in fiscal year 2005 (which runs from October 2004 to September 2005) was \$7 billion below last year's projection in the FY 2006 budget. An additional \$62 billion has been authorized so far for hurricane-disaster relief. Although these funds were authorized in FY 2005, the hurricanes struck near the end of the fiscal year, and so most of the funds will be disbursed in FY 2006 and beyond.

Federal Government purchases and the consumer spending that results indirectly from Federal transfers will add to real GDP growth in early 2006. Federal outlays for FY 2006 are likely to increase largely due to hurricanedisaster relief and because of additional funds for reconstruction and counterinsurgency in Iraq.

From FY 2007 forward, however, the impact of Federal outlays is projected to move sharply toward restraint. For example, Federal outlays are projected to shrink by 0.7 percentage point of GDP in FY 2007. The shrinking of the Federal Government's claim on resources should allow private economic activity more room to grow.

## **Exports and Imports**

Real exports grew 5% percent during the four quarters of 2005, about the same as export growth in 2004. This reflects the interaction of two offsetting influences: the somewhat faster growth of our trading partners in 2005, which tends to increase the demand for U.S. exports, and the increase in the exchange value of the dollar, which tends to dampen export demand by making U.S. goods relatively more expensive. Real GDP growth among our OECD trading partners picked up a bit to 2.6 percent during the four quarters of 2005 from a 2.1-percent pace in 2004, as computed from the latest OECD projections. Offsetting the effect of stronger foreign growth on our exports was a 7-percent rise in the value of the dollar against major currencies over the 12 months of 2005.

Data on the destination of U.S. exports show the fastest export growth to the most rapidly developing countries and regions such as Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, our OECD trading partners still account for more than twothirds of our exports.

Growth of our real exports in 2006 and 2007 is likely to be similar to that in 2005, because economic growth in our export markets is likely to be about the same as in 2005. The OECD projects that real GDP growth among our OECD trading partners (2.6 percent during the four quarters of 2005) will be 2.5 percent and 2.8 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Growth of real exports to rapidly developing countries in Asia and Africa will likely continue to be healthy over the next two years as their economic expansion leads them to demand more goods and services from abroad.

Growth in real imports slowed substantially during the four quarters of 2005 to 4.6 percent from 10.6 percent in 2004. Imports grew more slowly than exports during 2005. Import growth was particularly weak in the second and third quarters and was fairly widespread, affecting imports of consumer goods, non-auto capital goods, petroleum products, and services. Imports picked up in the fourth quarter, particularly for petroleum products to replace domestic production lost because of the damage caused by the hurricanes.

The current account deficit (the excess of imports and income flows to foreigners over exports and foreign income of Americans) averaged 6.4 percent of GDP (\$790 billion at an annual rate) during the first three quarters of 2005, up from 5.7 percent of GDP during 2004. Recent increases in the deficit reflect faster growth in the United States than among our trading partners, making our imports grow faster than our exports. The longer-term trend also reflects faster growth of domestic investment than domestic saving with foreign saving filling in the gap in financing.

The United States has been able to buy more goods and services than it sells because foreigners have been investing in the United States. The current account deficit of \$790 billion also represents the net increase in foreign holdings of U.S. assets (either financial assets or direct ownership of corporations) relative to U.S.-owned assets abroad. In the future, the returns from these foreign-owned U.S. investments (that is, interest, dividends, and reinvested earnings) will themselves add to the current account deficit. These ideas are explored more fully in Chapter 6, The U.S. Capital Account Surplus.

## Employment

Nonfarm payroll employment increased by 2.0 million during the 12 months of 2005, an average pace of 168,000 jobs per month. The unemployment rate declined by 0.5 percentage point to 4.9 percent during the 12 months of the year. The average unemployment rate in 2005 (5.1 percent) was below the averages of the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. During the first eight months of 2005, employment growth averaged 196,000 per month, but dropped to only 21,000 per month in September and October immediately after the hurricanes. The Bureau of Labor Statistics expects a slight downward revision to employment growth over the 12 months ended in March 2005.

Job gains were spread broadly across major industry sectors in 2005. The service-providing sector accounted for 88 percent of job growth during the 12 months of the year, a slightly larger contribution than would be suggested by its 83 percent of overall employment. The goods-producing sector accounted for the remaining 12 percent of the gains, notably weaker than its 17-percent share of overall employment. Within the goods-producing sector, over-the-year employment growth was concentrated in construction and

mining, while manufacturing employment decreased for the seventh time in the past eight years.

By educational attainment, the drop in the unemployment rate during 2005 was most pronounced among those without a high school degree; the jobless rate in this group tumbled 0.7 percentage point during the 12 months of the year. By race and ethnicity, the unemployment rate fell the most among blacks and Hispanics, (1.5 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively), in contrast to 0.3 percentage point for whites. By age, the jobless rate fell most among teenagers 16 to 19 years old. By sex, the jobless rate fell more among adult men than adult women. The median duration of unemployment, an indicator that typically follows the business cycle with a substantial lag, declined from 9.4 weeks in December 2004 to 8.5 weeks in December 2005. In general, unemployment rates fell the most in 2005 among those groups with the highest rates at the end of 2004.

The Administration projects that employment will increase at a pace of 176,000 per month on average during the 12 months of 2006—roughly in line with the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank's survey of professional forecasters. The Administration projects the unemployment rate will remain at about 5.0 percent throughout 2006.

## **Productivity**


Labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector has been exceptionally vigorous, exceeding the forecasts of most economists. Productivity (real output per hour worked) grew at a 3.4-percent annual rate during the first three quarters of 2005, following similar or higher growth rates during the three preceding years. Since the business-cycle peak in the first quarter of 2001 (a period that includes a recession and a recovery), productivity has grown at an average 3.6-percent annual rate, notably higher than during any comparable 4½-year period since 1948 (Chart 1-3). Although 1995 has been regarded as a watershed year for productivity because of the acceleration of productivity from a 1.5-percent to a 2.4-percent annual rate of growth, the further acceleration to a 3.6-percent annual rate of growth during 2001 to 2005 is even more striking (the precise time periods are shown in Table 1-2, later in this chapter). The 1995-2001 acceleration may be plausibly accounted for by a pickup in capital services per hour worked and by increases in organizational capital, the investments businesses make to reorganize and restructure themselves, in this instance in response to newly installed information technology.

In contrast, capital deepening (the increase in capital services per hour worked) does not explain any of the post-2001 increase in productivity; in fact, the growth of capital services per hour worked appears to have fallen off slightly in this period. The post-2001 acceleration in productivity, therefore,

Chart 1-3 Productivity Growth During Cyclically-Comparable Business Cycle Intervals

Productivity growth during the first 4½ years since the 2001:Q1 business-cycle peak is as high or higher than during any cyclically-comparable period during the postwar era.

Percent change, annual rate during the 4 1/2 years beginning wth each business-cycle peak




appears to be accounted for by factors that are more difficult to measure than the quantity of capital, such as continuing improvements in technology and in business practices.

One curious aspect of productivity acceleration has been its limited spread. Business-sector productivity growth has been higher in the United States than in any other major industrial economy. (Business-sector productivity growth has also been rapid in Ireland, Greece, Korea, Turkey, the Scandinavian countries, and several transitional east-European countries.) As every industrial economy has access to the same technology, the strong U.S. performance suggests that other structural features of the U.S. economy may also play an important role in productivity growth. Some research suggests that, all else equal, countries with more-flexible, less-heavily regulated product and labor markets are better able to translate technological advances into productivity gains.

Rather than assume that the recent remarkable pace of productivity growth will continue, the Administration believes it is prudent to build a budget based on a forecast somewhat lower than the 3.6-percent pace of productivity growth since 2001. Productivity is projected to average 2.6 percent per year during the six-year span of the budget projection—roughly equal to the average annual pace during the past decade.

#### Chart 1-4 Inflation

Core CPI inflation (which excludes food and energy) has remained moderate and stable in the face of the recent uptick in overall CPI inflation.



Source: Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

## Wages and Prices

As measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), overall inflation increased in 2005 to 3.4 percent from 3.3 percent during the 12 months of 2004. Rapid increases in energy prices (16.6 percent and 17.1 percent in 2004 and 2005, respectively) elevated the level of overall inflation in both years. The four major energy subindexes (gasoline, fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity) all posted large increases in 2005, with prices of natural gas and electricity advancing faster than in the preceding year. Food price inflation, at 2.3 percent, was moderate and little changed from the year-earlier pace. Core CPI prices (which exclude the prices of food and energy) increased 2.2 percent during 2005, substantially below the overall inflation rate and the same as the year-earlier pace.

Labor costs (which comprise about 62 percent of the costs of nonfarm business) have been stable, or possibly trending lower. Hourly compensation for workers in private industry increased at a 3.0-percent annual rate during the 12 months ended in September 2005 down from 3.7 percent during the year-earlier period according to the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which is compiled from the National Compensation Survey (NCS). The deceleration occurred in both wages and salaries (with growth down to 2.2 percent from 2.6 percent in the year-earlier period) and hourly benefits (which slowed to 4.8 percent from 6.8 percent). The slowing in hourly benefits was accounted for primarily by smaller increases in contributions to defined-benefit pension

programs in 2005 than in 2004 according to other tabulations from the NCS. Hourly benefits have increased notably faster than hourly wages and salaries in each of the past four years. Another measure of hourly compensation published by the Department of Labor and derived from the national income and product accounts (NIPA) has increased notably faster than the ECI measure, rising 5.0 percent during the four quarters ended in the third quarter of 2005. The difference between these two measures may be partly attributable to the exercise of stock options which are included in the NIPA-derived measure at the time they are exercised, but are not recorded by the NCS.

With hourly compensation growing in the 3.0 percent-to-5.0 percent range (depending on the index) and labor productivity growth at about 3.0 percent, trend unit labor costs have barely changed, with increases in the range from 0 percent to 2 percent. Because unit labor costs have increased by less than the 2.9-percent increase in the GDP price index during the four quarters through the third quarter of 2005, labor costs do not appear to be putting upward pressure on inflation.

An important determinant of inflation during the next year is likely to be energy prices, whose run-up during the past two years has been the main reason for the increase in inflation. Futures markets suggest roughly stable oil and natural gas prices, which (if they come to pass) will remove some of the upward pressure on the overall inflation rate.


Although some measures of short-run inflation expectations increased around the third quarter of 2005, they fell back later in the year. More importantly, a variety of longer-term measures of inflation expectations have been approximately stable during the past two years, including those derived from the market for Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and the University of Michigan consumer survey (Chart 1-5). History suggests that the stability of inflation expectations promotes stability in actual inflation as well as in the overall economy.

The Administration expects CPI inflation to stabilize at 2.4 percent during the next several years, up only slightly from the 2.2 percent increase in the core CPI during the 12 months through December. The projected path of inflation as measured by the GDP price index is similar, but a bit lower. Inflation by this measure is projected at 2.2 percent during the four quarters of 2006 and 2007, down from the 3.0-percent increase during 2005. These inflation projections are very close to those of a year ago, and are also very close to those of the consensus of professional forecasters.

The "wedge," or difference, between the CPI and the GDP measures of inflation has implications for the Federal budget projections. A larger wedge (with the CPI rising faster than the GDP price index) raises the Federal budget deficit because cost-of-living programs rise with the CPI, while Federal revenue tends to increase with the GDP price index. For a given level

Chart 1-5 Survey and Market Measures of Expected Inflation in 2005 and 2006

Although 1-year consumer expectations spiked around October, consumers' long-term expectations and expectations derived from the TIPS market remained moderate and stable. Percent



Note: TIPS market inflation is measured over the short-term as the expected inflation during the 0- to-5 year period. and long-term forward inflation is measured from 5 years out to 10 years out. The long-term University of Michigan expectation is from 0 to 5-10 years out

Sources: Federal Reserve and University of Michigan survey of consumer sentiment

of nominal income, increases in the CPI also cut Federal revenue because they raise income tax brackets and affect other inflation-indexed features of the tax code. Of the two indexes, the CPI tends to increase faster in part because it measures the price of a fixed basket of goods. In contrast, the GDP price index increases less rapidly because it allows for households and businesses shifting their purchases away from items with increasing relative prices and toward items with decreasing relative prices. Among other differences, the GDP price index places a larger weight than does the CPI on computers, which tend to decline in price (on a quality-adjusted basis). In addition, the CPI places a much larger weight on energy.

During the 13 years ended in 2004, the wedge between inflation in the CPI-U-RS (a historical CPI series designed to be consistent with current CPI methods) and the rate of change in the GDP price index averaged 0.36 percent per year. The wedge was particularly high during the first three quarters of 2005 when the CPI increased 1 percentage point faster than the GDP price index; this difference reflected the roughly 50-percent annual rate of increase in crude oil prices, which have a larger weight in consumer prices than in GDP as a whole. Since domestic production accounts for only about 35 percent of U.S. oil consumption, the weight of oil prices in GDP is roughly one-third of its weight in consumption. As this boost from higher oil prices unwinds over the next couple of years, the wedge between the CPI and GDP

inflation is likely to be lower than average. From 2008, the wedge is projected to average 0.3 percentage point.


#### Financial Markets

The Wilshire 5000 (a broad stock price index) increased 4.6 percent during 2005, the third consecutive year of stock market gains following three years of declines. The 2005 increase was well below the gains of the two preceding years.

Short-term interest rates increased during the year as the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee raised the target Federal funds rate by 25 basis points at each of its eight meetings. As a consequence, rates on 91-day Treasury bills rose 1.7 percentage points during the year.

Despite the increases in short-term rates, yields on 10-year Treasury notes remained low, increasing only 24 basis points during the 12 months of 2005 (Chart 1-6). The low level of long-term interest rates was due, in part, to low and stable long-run inflation expectations. At the end of 2005 the gap between the yield on 10-year Treasuries and the rate on 91-day Treasury bills was only about 0.6 percentage point, noticeably lower than its historical average. (The yield on longer-term Treasury notes is usually higher than on shorter-term notes because the market compensates investors for the extra risk of holding longer-term securities.)

Chart 1-6 10-Year Treasury Yield
Yields on 10-year Treasury notes remained near decade lows during 2005 in the face of sharp increases in short-term rates.



Yields on corporate bonds also remained low and the spread between yields on corporate bonds (which carry more risk) and the yields on more-secure obligations of the U.S. Treasury remained small. Measured relative to Treasury obligations of similar maturities, the yields on corporate bonds rated "BAA" (about average quality) by Moody's Investor Services remained near their lowest levels over the past decade (Chart 1-7). This suggests that the perceived default risk of U.S. corporations remains low.

## The Long-Term Outlook Through 2011

The U.S. economy continues to be well positioned for long-term growth. The Administration projects that real GDP will expand at about its potential rate (between 3.1 percent and 3.3 percent per year) through 2011, inflation will remain low and stable (with the CPI increasing at around 2.4 percent per year), and the labor market will remain firm (Table 1-1). The forecast is based on conservative economic assumptions that are close to the consensus of professional forecasters. These assumptions provide a prudent and cautious basis for the Administration's budget projections.

#### Chart 1-7 Corporate Bond Yield Spreads

In 2005, the spread between the yield on average quality (Baa-rated) corporate securities and Treasury notes were at the low end of the past decade's range.

Percentage points per annum




TABLE 1-1.—Administration Forecast 1

Year	Nominal GDP	Real GDP (chain- type)	GDP price index (chain- type)	Consumer price index (CPI-U)	Unemploy- ment rate (percent)	Interest rate, 91-day Treasury bills <sup>2</sup> (percent)	Interest rate, 10-year Treasury notes (percent)	Nonfarm payroll employ- ment (millions)	Nonfarm payroll employ- ment (average monthly change, Q4-to-Q4 thousands)
	Percent change, Q4-to-Q4				Level, calendar year				
2004 (actual)	6.8	3.8	2.9	3.4	5.5	1.4	4.3	131.5	178
2005 2006 2007	6.4 5.6 5.6	3.5 3.4 3.3	2.8 2.2 2.2	3.8 2.4 2.4	5.1 5.0 5.0	3.2 4.2 4.2	4.3 5.0 5.3	133.6 135.5 137.4	160 176 140
2008 2009 2010 2011	5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3	3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1	2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2	2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5	5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0	4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3	5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6	139.0 140.7 142.2 143.7	139 132 127 126

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Based on data available as of November 15, 2005.

Sources: Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget.

## Growth in GDP over the Long Term

The Administration projects that real GDP will grow at a slowly diminishing rate from 2005 through 2009, decelerating year by year from a forecasted 3.5-percent rate during the four quarters of 2005 to 3.1 percent in 2009, roughly in line with the consensus forecast for those years. The year-by-year pace is close to the estimated growth rate of potential real GDP growth (a measure of the rate of growth of productive capacity). The unemployment rate is projected to remain flat at 5.0 percent. As discussed below, potential GDP growth is expected to slow in the near term as productivity growth reverts toward its long-run trend, and potential GDP is expected to slow further during the 2007-to-2011 period as labor force growth declines.

The projected growth of potential real GDP, 3½ percent during the next two years, is in line with recent experience. Potential growth is the rate of real GDP growth that can be achieved while the unemployment rate remains stable. For example, during the past four years (from the third quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2005) real GDP growth was 3.22 percent at an annual rate while the unemployment rate was unchanged—on net—at about 5 percent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Discount basis.

The growth rate of the economy over the long run is determined by its supply-side components, which include population, labor force participation, the ratio of nonfarm business employment to household employment, the workweek, and the growth in output per hour. The Administration's forecast for the contribution of the growth rates of different supply-side factors to real GDP growth is shown in Table 1-2.

As can be seen in the fourth column of the table, the mix of supply-side factors determining real GDP growth has been unusual since the businesscycle peak at the beginning of 2001, with the exceptionally high productivity growth (3.6 percent at an annual rate) partially offset by declines in the participation rate (line 2) and the workweek (line 8). Also puzzling is the large decline in the ratio of nonfarm business employment to household employment (line 6). This unusual decline reflects the slow growth of employment

TABLE 1-2.— Supply-Side Components of Real GDP Growth, 1953–2011 [Average annual percent change]

ltem	1953 Q2	1973 Q4	1995 Q2	2001 Q1	2005 Q3
	to	to	to	to	to
	1973 Q4	1995 Q2	2001 Q1	2005 Q3	2011 Q4
Civilian noninstitutional population aged 16+       Civilian labor force participation rate	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1
	0.2	0.4	0.1	-0.3	-0.1
Special Structure       S	1.8	1.8	1.4	0.9	1.0
	-0.1	0.0	0.3	-0.2	0.0
5) Equals: Civilian employment :	1.7	1.8	1.7	0.7	1.0
	-0.1	0.1	0.4	-0.8	0.1
7) Equals: Nonfarm business employment	1.6	1.9	2.0	-0.1	1.0
	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1	-0.3	-0.1
9) Equals: Hours of all persons (nonfarm business)	1.3	1.6	1.9	-0.4	1.0
	2.5	1.5	2.4	3.6	2.6
11) Equals: Nonfarm business output	3.8	3.1	4.3	3.2	3.6
	-0.2	-0.2	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4
13) Equals: Real GDP	3.6	2.8	3.8	2.8	3.2

Adjusted by CEA to smooth discontinuities in the population series since 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> BLS research series adjusted to smooth irregularities in the population series since 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Line 6 translates the civilian employment growth rate into the nonfarm business employment growth rate.

Line 12 translates nonfarm business output back into output for all sectors (GDP), which includes the output of farms and general government.

Note: 1953 Q2, 1973 Q4, and 2001 Q1 are NBER business-cycle peaks. Detail may not add to total because of


Sources: Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

as measured by the payroll survey (which asks employers to report the number of employees) relative to the more-rapid growth of employment as measured by the household survey (in which people report the employment status of their household members)—a disparity that has not yet been explained.

The participation rate fell from 2001 to 2005, and is projected to trend lower through 2011. The recent behavior stands in contrast to the long period of increase from 1960 through 1996 (Chart 1-8). The participation rate appears to have topped out in 1997-2000 before declining. The reversal of direction reflects nothing new about the participation rate for men, which continued a downward trend that began shortly after the end of World War II. Rather, the new factor at play is the change in the trend in the female participation rate, which has edged down on balance since 2000 after having risen for five decades.

Another factor in the decline in the labor force participation rate has been the increase in the number of workers collecting insurance for disability retirement. The 0.5-percentage point increase (as a share of the working-age population) since 2000 accounts for about half of the overall decline, and appears to be largely a reflection of increases in the number of workers entering high-disability ages (50+ years old).

Chart 1-8 Labor Force Participation Rate and Disabled Workers Relative to Population Female participation rates have peaked, while men's rates continue downward. Increases in disability account for some of the recent decline in the overall participation rate.



Looking ahead, the participation rate is projected to decline slowly, reflecting the aging of the baby-boom cohorts, leading to more retirements and a likely increase in the share of disabled workers. Baby boomers are currently in their forties and fifties, and over the next several years they will move into older age brackets which typically have lower participation rates. The decline in the participation rate may quicken after 2008 when the first baby-boom cohort reaches Social Security's early retirement age of 62.

## Interest Rates over the Near and Long Term

The Administration forecast of interest rates is based on financial market data as well as results of a survey of economic forecasters. As of November 15, 2005, the date that the forecast was finalized, trading in financial futures suggested that market participants expected short-term interest rates to rise a bit further, and the Administration's interest-rate projections reflect those views. Taking its cue from financial futures markets, the Administration projects the rate on 91-day Treasury bills to increase to about 4.2 percent by 2007 and to about 4.3 percent from 2008 to 2011. At that level, the real interest rate on 91-day Treasury bills will be close to its historical average.

The yield on 10-year Treasury notes on November 14 was 4.61 percent, just 68 basis points above the (discount) rate on 91-day Treasury bills. This difference was very low relative to its historical average, and the Administration expects it to increase gradually during the six-year forecast period. As a result, yields on 10-year notes are expected to increase somewhat further, reaching a plateau at 5.6 percent from 2009 onward.

## The Composition of Income over the Long Term

A primary purpose of the Administration's economic forecast is to estimate future government revenues, which requires a projection of the components of taxable income. The Administration's income-side projection is based on the historical stability of the long-run labor compensation and capital share of gross domestic income (GDI). (GDI is the sum of all income components and differs from GDP only by measurement error—which can be substantial.) During the first three quarters of 2005, the labor compensation share of GDI was 57.6 percent (according to the advance data available when the projection was finalized), slightly below its 1963-2004 average of 58.1 percent. From this jump-off point, the labor share is projected to slowly rise to 58.1 percent by 2011.

The labor compensation share of GDI consists of wages and salaries (which are taxable), nonwage compensation (employer contributions to employee pension and insurance funds—which are not taxable), and employer contributions to social insurance (which are not taxable). The Administration forecasts that the wage and salary share of compensation will be roughly stable during the budget window. One of the main factors boosting nonwage compensation during 2002-2004 was employer contributions to defined-benefit pension plans. As noted earlier, the National Compensation Survey for 2005 shows a moderation of these contributions, suggesting that the period of very rapid catch-up contributions may be behind us.

The capital share of GDI is expected to edge down from its currently high level before stabilizing near its historical average. Within the capital share, depreciation is expected to increase (a result of the strong growth of investment during the past three years). After adjusting for the temporary effects of the hurricanes, profits in the third quarter of 2005 were about 11.6 percent of GDI, well above their post-1959 average.

Book profits (known in the national income and product accounts as "profits before tax") jumped up in the first quarter of 2005 in large part because of the termination of the temporary provision for expensing of equipment investment under the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003. These expensing provisions reduced taxable profits from the third quarter of 2001 through the fourth quarter of 2004. The legacy of these expensing provisions increases book profits from 2005 forward, however, because investment goods expensed during the three-year expensing window will have less remaining value to depreciate. The share of other taxable income (the sum of rent, dividends, proprietors' income, and personal interest income) is projected to fall in coming years, mainly because of the delayed effects of past declines in long-term interest rates, which reduce personal interest income during the projection period. In addition, rental income has been—and is projected to continue—trending down as a share of GDI.

### Conclusion

The economy has shifted from recovery to sustained expansion, having absorbed the effects of the third-quarter hurricanes and large increases in energy prices. The economy is projected to settle into a steady state in which GDP grows at its potential rate, the unemployment rate remains flat at a low level, and inflation remains moderate and stable. Consumer spending remains strong, businesses are continuing to invest, and exports are growing faster than domestic production. Having said this, we must remember that economic forecasting is difficult, and no doubt unforeseen positive and negative developments will affect the course of the economy over the next few years. Given the economy's fundamental strengths, however, prospects remain good for continued growth in the years ahead. Nevertheless, much work

remains in making our economy as productive as possible. Later chapters of this Report explore how pro-growth policies, such as improving incentives in health care, promoting free trade, reforming our retirement and tax systems, and boosting the skills of the U.S. workforce can enhance our economic performance.

## Skills for the U.S. Workforce

Astrong U.S. economy requires a skilled and well-educated workforce that his prepared to meet the challenges presented by a rapidly changing world economy. Research has found, for example, that countries with higher levels of education and higher average math and science test scores experience faster economic growth. For more than a half-century, the United States experienced an extraordinary rise in education levels and still maintains one of the best-educated populations in the world. But in recent years, improvements in educational attainment have slowed. Today, for example, younger Americans are less educated, on average, than their counterparts in a number of advanced countries. In addition, U.S. high school students also score below students in most other advanced countries in their math and science skills. To remain competitive in the global economy, the United States needs to improve the education and skills of its residents and prepare them for jobs that will be available in the future.

This chapter discusses the importance of the education and skill levels of the U.S. workforce, the contributions of legal immigrants to the skills of the U.S. workforce, and the importance of upgrading workforce skills through job training. The key points of this chapter are:

- Education is a key contributor to economic growth and individual income.
- Advances in education levels have slowed over the past 25 years. This slowdown could jeopardize the U.S. standard of living in years to come.
- Legal immigrants make up a vital part of the U.S. economy, particularly in the science and engineering sectors.
- Workers need to continually upgrade their skills if they are to adapt to and take part in a continually changing economy.

By setting its sights on improving the education and skills of U.S. workers, the United States can create a workforce that will thrive in the fast-changing world economy.

## Educational Achievement in the United States

Both economic research and common sense suggest that workers' skills play a critical role in economic growth and individual well-being. In the past, rapid increases in schooling levels helped to raise the U.S. standard of living, but in recent years improvements in educational attainment have slowed. Unless the United States can improve the educational achievement of its residents, it may be difficult to sustain rapid economic growth in the future.

## Workforce Skills and the U.S. Standard of Living

#### Education and Income

Economic research suggests that educational attainment and test scores are important at both the individual and the national level. At the individual level, people with higher levels of education have higher earnings than people with less education. In 2004, workers with a bachelor's degree only (no advanced degree) earned almost \$23,000 more per year on average than workers with a high school degree only (see Table 2-1). These differences have grown over time: In 1975, workers with only a bachelor's degree earned \$14,220 more per year (in 2004 dollars) than high-school educated workers. According to a U.S. Census Bureau study, over his or her lifetime, a worker with only a bachelor's degree earns nearly \$1 million more (in 2004 dollars) than a worker with a high school degree only.

In addition to income, schooling levels are associated with other positive economic and social outcomes. More-educated adults are less likely to be unemployed or incarcerated than less-educated adults. More-educated adults are healthier and have lower mortality rates than less-educated adults. They are also more likely to have college-educated children, thereby passing the benefits of higher levels of education on to future generations.

Studies have also shown that higher test scores are associated with higher wages and more years of schooling. High school students with higher test scores are more likely to attend college and, if they attend, are more likely to graduate. Controlling for individuals' educational attainment and family background, those who score higher on achievement tests in high school have higher wages later in life.

TABLE 2-1.—Average Annual Earnings by Education (2004 dollars)

	1975	1990	2000	2004
Bachelor's degree only	39,065	43,591	54,396	51,568
	24,845	24,968	28,179	28,631
\$ difference	14,220	18,623	26,217	22,937
	57%	75%	93%	80%

Note: Data refer to all workers aged 18 and older.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

### Education and U.S. Standard of Living

Higher schooling levels and test scores do not just improve individual outcomes, they also raise the standard of living for the country as a whole. More-skilled workers are typically better at identifying, adapting, and implementing ideas that lead to higher productivity growth. Productivity growth raises the standard of living because it leads to real increases in workers' wages. Research has found that, all else equal, countries with higher levels of education and higher average math and science test scores experience faster economic growth. A recent study of U.S. growth between 1950 and 1993 found that one-third of productivity growth over this period was due to increased levels of education.

Education and skills are critical for economic growth, but other factors, such as openness to trade and government institutions that protect private property, are also important. The United States tends to score highly in these areas compared with its international peers, which may help to explain why the United States has experienced faster economic growth than most other advanced countries over the last decade.

#### Educational Attainment

For more than a half-century, education levels have been rising in the United States. In 2004, about 85 percent of adults aged 25 and older reported that they had completed high school; 28 percent of adults had attained a bachelor's degree or higher (see Chart 2-1). This is an extraordinary rise since the mid-twentieth century, when only about 36 percent of adults had a high school diploma and around 6 percent had a bachelor's degree or higher.

This rapid rise in educational attainment came about mainly because, for many years, each generation was more educated than the one before: Each generation was more likely than the previous one to have completed high school or attained a bachelor's degree. As older, less-educated workers retired and younger, more-educated workers entered the workforce, the overall education level of the U.S. workforce grew rapidly.

Over the past 25 years, however, this pattern has changed. According to some measures, younger generations have been no more educated than previous ones. The share of U.S. residents aged 25-29 who have completed high school has remained relatively constant over this time, staying within a range of about 85 percent to 88 percent (see Chart 2-1). Over the same period, the manner in which people complete high school has changed. People counted as having completed high school include both those who graduate from high school and those who receive a General Education Development (GED) certificate or another alternative to a regular high school diploma. (The GED is a certificate awarded to applicants who pass a specific, approved, high-school equivalency exam.) Over time, GED recipients have made up an increasing share of this group. In 1999, of 18- to 24-year-olds who had completed high school, about 11 percent obtained a high school credential via a GED, up from 5 percent in 1988. While GED recipients are counted as people who have completed high school, studies suggest that they are not equivalent to high school graduates in their economic outcomes. For instance, GED recipients have lower earnings and are less likely to obtain post-secondary education than are high school graduates. These differences in economic outcomes are of concern given that GED recipients make up an increasing share of those who have completed high school.

Unlike the share of people who have completed high school, the share of people aged 25–29 who have a bachelor's degree or higher has continued to rise. This share, however, is rising more slowly than it was 25 years ago. Over the past 25 years, it rose 6 percentage points, from 23 percent in 1979 to 29 percent in 2004. In contrast, in the 25 years prior to 1979, it increased by about 13 percentage points, or more than twice as much.

Although schooling levels, already relatively high in the United States, cannot grow indefinitely, international comparisons of educational attainment suggest that the United States still has great potential for increases in the schooling levels of its residents. These comparisons show that younger U.S. residents have lower levels of education than their counterparts in a number of other advanced

Percent 90 Share with high school degree or higher, age 25-29 80 Share with high school degree or higher, age 25+ 50 40 Share with bachelor's degree or higher, age 25-29 30 Share with bachelor's degree or higher, age 25+ 1955 1965 1985 1995 2005 Source Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census)

Chart 2-1 Educational Attainment by Age, 1947–2004
Schooling levels are no longer rising as quickly as in the 1950s and 1960s among people aged 25–29.

countries. In 2002, for example, half of young people in Canada and Japan had attained a college degree (an associate's or bachelor's degree or higher), compared with 39 percent of young people in the United States.

Many students exit college without obtaining a bachelor's degree. In 2004, about one-quarter of adults had attended a post-secondary institution but had not completed a bachelor's degree. People who complete some college without obtaining a bachelor's degree are a diverse group. Some attain an academic or vocational associate's degree or certificate, while others drop out of college without completing a single semester. Some attend a four-year college, while others go to two-year community colleges. Among those with some college but no bachelor's degree, many began college immediately after completing high school, while others are older workers who return to school for additional training.

### Educational Attainment by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

Women tend to be more educated than men. Women are more likely to have completed high school or obtained a bachelor's degree or higher. In 2004, for example, about 31 percent of 25- to 29-year-old women had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared with 26 percent of their male counterparts (see Table 2-2). This is a fairly recent trend: Until 1991, men in this age group were more likely than women to have a bachelor's degree or higher.

Educational attainment differs widely by race and ethnicity. More than 90 percent of non-Hispanic white and Asian 25- to 29-year-olds have completed high school, compared with 88 percent of blacks and 62 percent of Hispanics in that age group (see Table 2-2). Racial and ethnic differences are even larger for college completion: Among 25- to 29-year-olds, about 61 percent of Asians have a bachelor's degree or higher, compared with 35 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 17 percent of blacks, and 11 percent of Hispanics.

TABLE 2-2.— Educational Attainment by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 2004

	Share with high school degree or higher	Share with bachelor's degree or higher
Total	87	29
Non-Hispanic white	93	35
Black	88	17
Hispanic	62	11
Asian	96	61
Men	85	26
Women	88	31

Note: Data refer to noninstitutionalized population aged 25-29. Since data exclude incarcerated population, they likely overstate educational attainment of U.S. residents.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

Schooling levels differ between natives and immigrants. In 2004, for example, half of all adult Asian immigrants had completed a bachelor's degree or higher, compared with 28 percent of the overall adult U.S.-born population. Latin American immigrants tend to have lower levels of schooling while their children tend to improve upon the education attained by their parents. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, for example, about 50 percent of Latin American immigrants aged 18-24 had completed high school, while the high-school completion rate was 78 percent among their U.S.-born children of the same age.

### Math, Science, and Reading Skills in the United States and Around the World

Educational attainment is an important measure of the preparedness of a nation's workforce, but it does not tell the whole story: Two people with the same level of education may have very different skill levels. Similarly, a high school diploma may not ensure that a student is competent in all areas. The fact that growth in schooling has slowed in the United States might be less worrisome if it were balanced by an improvement among the U.S. population in other measures of skills.

One way in which the United States monitors the academic preparedness and skills of its students is through standardized tests of math, science, and reading. The United States participates in several national and international tests for elementary and high school students. These tests shed light on how the math, science, and reading skills of U.S. students compare to those of students in other countries.

Table 2-3 ranks advanced countries by students' scores on math and science tests at different ages. The countries are ranked by average score, with the highest scorers at the top. Not all countries participate in every test. So that the country rankings can be compared at different ages, only countries that participated in at least half of the tests are included in the table.

As the table shows, older U.S. students do worse relative to other advanced countries than younger U.S. students do. At ages 9 and 13, the United States generally places above the middle of the rankings on math and science tests. By age 15, however, U.S. students are outperformed by most of their international peers. Among students in their last year of secondary school, U.S. students are at or near the bottom of the rankings. Country rankings from international tests in reading, not shown in Table 2-3, are only available at ages 9 and 15. In rankings of advanced countries similar to those shown in Table 2-3 for math and science, U.S. students score above the middle of the rankings in reading at age 9 but fall below the middle by age 15.

TABLE 2-3.— Rankings of Selected Advanced Countries by Average Score on International Tests

Age 9		Age 13		Age 15		Last year of secondary school	
Math	Science	Math	Science	Math	Science	Math	Science
Hong Kong Japan Netherlands <b>USA</b> Italy Australia New Zealand Norway	Japan Hong Kong USA Netherlands Australia New Zealand Italy Norway	Hong Kong Japan Netherlands Australia USA Sweden New Zealand Italy Norway	Hong Kong Japan Netherlands USA Australia Sweden New Zealand Norway Italy	Hong Kong Netherlands Japan Canada Australia New Zealand France Sweden Germany Norway USA Italy	Japan Hong Kong Australia Netherlands New Zealand Canada France Sweden Germany USA Italy Norway	Netherlands Sweden Norway France New Zealand Australia Canada Germany Italy USA	Sweden Netherlands Norway Canada New Zealand Australia Germany France USA Italy

Note: The last year of secondary school is 12th grade in the United States but varies in other countries. In countries that track students, students in all tracks were tested in their last year of secondary school: the last year may differ within countries for students on different tracks. Students who dropped out of school before the last year of secondary school were not tested. Data are for 2003 except for last year of secondary school (1995).

Source: Department of Education (National Center for Education Statistics).

The United States has also conducted tests of its 9-, 13-, and 17-year-olds in math and reading going back to the early 1970s. These test results show that elementary school student scores have improved since the early 1970s, especially in math, but the math and reading scores of 17-year-olds are essentially unchanged. This discrepancy means that the United States has failed to translate test-score gains among younger students into higher scores among older students. There is little consensus as to why test scores have not improved more among older students, but understanding the mechanisms would be an important step in raising their educational achievement.

## School Accountability and No Child Left Behind

In recent years, as a result of state initiatives and the No Child Left Behind Act, states have implemented plans to enhance school accountability, with the aim of improving student achievement. Under these "strict accountability" plans, schools can be sanctioned (such as through loss of funding or mandatory restructuring) if their students do not meet performance standards. In order for school accountability to work, student achievement must be measured in a quantifiable way that is comparable across students and schools. This measurement is normally done through standardized tests, which are used to quantify school quality in order to identify low-performing schools. These tests allow parents to make meaningful comparisons between schools and make informed decisions about the schools in which to enroll their children.

Rigorous research into the effects of school accountability on student performance is limited, but the results are promising. For instance, a 2004 study found that states implementing school accountability during the 1990s experienced greater increases in students' test scores afterward than states without accountability. This study further found that only strict school accountability led to higher student achievement.

In January 2002, the President signed into law the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, with the purpose of improving the performance of U.S. students. NCLB aims to make schools more accountable for the performance of their students. Under NCLB, each state sets standards for what students in grades 3-8 should know in math and reading. (Science assessments will be added by the 2007-2008 school year.) States must measure students' progress toward those standards through standardized tests. Schools must meet not only an overall annual performance goal but also specific performance goals for subgroups of students, such as racial, ethnic, and income groups. Schools that do not eventually meet performance goals must allow students to transfer to another public school, including charter schools, within the school district and must offer supplemental educational services to students attending schools in need of improvement.

NCLB accountability based on test scores mostly applies to grades 3-8. Testing is now required only once in high school. The President has proposed expanding accountability in high schools by requiring assessments in reading and math for students in grades 9, 10, and 11. Expansion of testing in high schools could help our high school students improve their performance relative to their counterparts in other nations.

# Immigrants in the U.S. Workforce

Legal immigrants are a critical part of the U.S. workforce. Although both low- and high-skilled immigrants contribute to the U.S. economy, this chapter focuses on high-skilled immigrants. Chapter 4 of the 2005 Economic Report of the President covered immigration in greater depth, with a particular focus on illegal immigrants, who tend to be low-skilled, as well as the fiscal impact of immigration, immigrants and the U.S. labor market, and immigration policy and the enforcement of immigration laws.

Immigrants living in the United States can be divided into four groups: naturalized American citizens, immigrants who have become citizens by passing a citizenship test and fulfilling other requirements; permanent residents, immigrants who have "green cards" and the legal right to reside permanently in the United States but have not become naturalized citizens; temporary residents, people admitted to the United States temporarily for a specific purpose, including visitors, students, and temporary workers (referred to as *nonimmigrants* by immigration authorities); and illegal immigrants, people residing in the United States illegally. This chapter uses the terms *immigrant* and *foreign-born* according to the Census Bureau's definition: Any person who is in the United States who was not a U.S. citizen at birth, that is, was not born in the United States or of U.S. parents.

Immigrants are prevalent in every education group but are particularly represented among the least-educated workers (those with less than a high school degree) and among the most-educated workers (those with a doctoral or professional degree). As U.S. workers have become more educated and increasingly work in jobs requiring higher education levels, many low-skilled jobs continue to be filled by immigrants. At the same time, high-skilled immigrant workers are a significant part of the skilled U.S. workforce, especially in the science and engineering fields. Many of the nation's university and private research laboratories rely heavily on immigrant graduate students, post-doctoral students, and researchers.

## Immigrants in Science and Engineering


Innovation is crucial to U.S. economic growth and competitiveness, and the United States is a leading innovator. Innovation depends, in part, on scientific research, which in turn requires smart, creative people proficient in science and technology. One way in which the United States is able to maintain its position as a leader in innovation is by attracting the best and the brightest from around the world. Policies that welcome the world's "best and brightest" can contribute to future U.S. competitiveness. More than one-fifth of America's scientists and engineers come from abroad.

Chart 2-2 shows the share of immigrants among scientists and engineers aged 25–44 by education in 1996 and 2002. Immigrants tend to come to the United States as young adults, not as older workers. As the younger, more-recent immigrants age, they should make up a larger share of older workers as well. Thus, restricting Chart 2-2 to workers aged 25–44 provides a glimpse at the future of the U.S. scientific workforce.

Immigrants make up an increasing share of the scientific workforce (see Chart 2-2). In 2002, immigrants made up about 24 percent of scientists and engineers aged 25–44, an increase from 17 percent in 1996. The higher the education level, the larger the share of immigrants: Among scientists and engineers with only a bachelor's degree, 17 percent were immigrants (up from 11 percent in 1996), while among those with doctoral or professional degrees, 43 percent were foreignborn (up from 38 percent in 1996). Immigrants are especially prevalent in the fields of engineering and math/computer science and in the physical/biological sciences. Among those aged 25–44 with professional or doctoral degrees and working in these fields, immigrants made up about half of workers.

Chart 2-2 Foreign-born Share of Employment by Education among Scientists and Engineers, 1996–2002

Immigrants are over-represented among scientists and engineers.



Note Data refer to people aged 25–44 and exclude post-secondary teachers. The ending year for this chart is 2002 because occupational definitions were changed after 2002, the post-2002 occupational categories are not comparable to earlier data.

Source Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

## International Science and Engineering Students

The United States is a top destination for science and engineering students from around the world. In 2003, almost 150,000 students from abroad were enrolled in science and engineering graduate programs at U.S. universities. Nonetheless, new enrollment of such students has been falling. Between 2001 and 2003 (the latest year available), first-time international graduate student enrollment in U.S. science and engineering programs declined by 13 percent. This decline may be the result of increased training opportunities in other countries and visa restrictions for foreign students and scholars put in place in the United States following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

After completing their studies in the United States, some students return to their countries of origin and others join the U.S. workforce. According to the National Science Foundation, about three-quarters of non-U.S. citizens who obtain science and engineering doctorates from U.S. universities plan to stay in the United States, at least for the short term. In order to remain and work in the United States, these students must get temporary work visas or become permanent residents. This process is described in more detail in the section below.

## Regulation of Legal Immigration

### The H-1B Program

Temporary work visas allow foreigners to work in the United States for a limited period of time. A commonly used temporary work visa for high-skilled foreigners is the H-1B visa. The visa lasts for three years and is renewable once, for a total stay of up to six years. U.S. employers hiring H-1B workers must attest that they will pay the H-1B workers at least as much as similarly employed U.S. workers and that the working conditions of such workers will not be harmed. In order to hire an H-1B worker, U.S. employers must also pay government fees of \$1,435 to \$2,185, depending on the size of the firm, plus an additional \$1,000 fee for faster processing of the H-1B application. These costs help to ensure that employers are unlikely to hire H-1B workers unless suitable U.S. workers are not available.

Almost all workers with H-1B visas have at least a bachelor's degree, and half have an advanced degree. H-1B visas have been particularly important to the high-tech sector, with over half going to scientists, engineers, and people in computer-related occupations. According to one study of H-1B workers, many such workers do not come to work from abroad but are hired as they graduate from U.S. universities.

The number of high-skilled temporary workers is constrained by the caps on the H-1B program. The number of H-1B visas is capped at 65,000 annually for private companies seeking to hire high-skilled foreign workers, after having been temporarily raised to 195,000 during 2001–2003. Since May 2005, an additional 20,000 visas have been available each year for foreigners who have a U.S.-earned master's degree or higher. H-1B workers are not subject to the cap if they are employed at institutions of higher education, or at nonprofit or governmental research organizations.

Since reverting to 65,000, the H-1B cap has been reached earlier and earlier with each fiscal year. The cap for fiscal year 2004 was reached less than five months into the fiscal year. The cap for fiscal year 2005 was filled on the first day of the fiscal year, and in fiscal year 2006, the cap was reached almost two months before the year even started. That the H-1B cap has been reached so quickly suggests that it is no longer sufficient to meet U.S. demand for high-skilled workers.

Some have proposed to increase the number of high-skilled workers by replacing the current H-1B cap with a market-based cap. A market-based cap would increase or decrease with demand for H-1B workers. If the cap were reached in one year, the cap would be increased by a set percentage—say, 20 percent—the following year. If the cap were not reached in a given year, it

would fall by a similar amount the next year. In this way, the number of H-1B workers would depend on demand for such workers. Any such change would require congressional action.

### Employment-Based Green Cards

A temporary visa allows a foreigner to remain in the United States for a specified period of time. To stay permanently requires becoming a permanent resident. In determining who can become a permanent resident, U.S. immigration law prioritizes family- and employment-based immigration. Under family-based immigration, new permanent residents must be sponsored by family members who are themselves U.S. citizens or permanent residents. Under employment-based immigration, most workers must be sponsored by their employer and have at least a bachelor's degree. From 2000-2004, about two-thirds of new permanent residents received their green cards through family-based immigration, about 15% through employment-based immigration, and the remainder through various other programs such as those for refugees.

Caps on employment-based green cards limit the number of high-skilled foreigners who can become permanent residents. The cap is set at 140,000 visas per year, including visas for the workers' spouses and children. Each country's nationals can make up no more than 7 percent of total immigrant visas. These caps have led to long delays for applicants, especially for workers from over-represented countries. For instance, some workers who became eligible in January 2006 for EB-2 employment-based green cards (for workers with advanced degrees or persons of exceptional ability) had applied for permanent residence five years earlier.

A variety of proposals have been advanced for permanent employmentbased immigration to allow for more high-skilled workers and to reduce wait times. Any changes to the cap on the number of employment-based green cards would require legislative action. First, workers' spouses and children could be exempted from the cap, as is currently done for the H-1B program. Spouses and children make up about half of the recipients of employmentbased green cards, so this change would roughly double the number of workers able to get employment-based green cards. Second, the fixed 140,000 cap could be replaced with a flexible market-based cap that would increase or decrease with demand for workers eligible for employment-based green cards. Finally, under current policy, nationals of no single country can receive more than 7 percent of green cards. This share could be raised to reduce the long delays for employment-based green cards for applicants from countries with large numbers of desirable, high-skilled workers. Careful enforcement of limits on foreign nationals' access to sensitive technology would provide continued protection for our national security.

## Skilled Immigration and Innovation

Legal skilled immigrants play an important role in the U.S. economy. They add to the process of scientific discovery, technology development, and innovation, which in turn lead to greater productivity growth. Greater productivity growth improves the standard of living for the U.S. population as a whole.

A recent World Bank study attempted to quantify immigrants' contributions to innovation and the generation of new ideas, as measured by the number of patents applied for or received in a given year. (Patents are a commonly used proxy in studies of innovation.) According to the study, a 10 percent increase in the number of graduate students from abroad, as a share of total graduate students, increases the number of patents granted to U.S.-based universities, firms, and other institutions by about 6–7 percent. Skilled immigrants overall have a smaller but still positive effect: a 10 percent increase in the number of skilled immigrants, as a share of the U.S. labor force, raises the number of patents granted to U.S.-based institutions by about 1 percent. The results of this study may be partly due to a higher concentration of foreign graduate students in the science and engineering fields, as compared to domestic graduate students who are found in a wide variety of fields including humanities and liberal arts.

Skilled immigrants not only contribute to the innovation process themselves, they also help train our own future innovators. The foreign-born make up about one-fifth of science and engineering faculty at U.S. universities, including more than one-third of engineering faculty. As faculty, they teach both undergraduate and graduate students, training the next generation of U.S. scientists and engineers.

U.S. immigration law, by restricting the number of high-skilled immigrants authorized to work and settle in the United States, limits how many foreigners can contribute to the innovation process. Increasing the caps on the H-1B program and on the number of employment-based green cards would allow more high-skilled immigrants into this country. By welcoming more of the best and the brightest from around the world, these changes to the caps would enhance U.S. competitiveness and result in productivity gains for both immigrants and natives, raising the standard of living for the population as a whole.

## Job Training

Education and learning do not stop when someone leaves school. Workers need to continually upgrade their skills if they are to adapt to and take part in a continually changing economy. Skills originally learned as a teenager or young adult in high school or college can quickly become outdated. To

remain competitive, workers need to keep their skills relevant, and job training can be a useful way of doing that.

Job training comes in many forms. Often it occurs on the job, either through formal programs run by the employer or through informal learning. Some employers may also send their workers to post-secondary institutions to receive training. Other workers will attend such institutions on their own to keep their skills fresh for their current job, to improve their skills in order to land a better job, or to upgrade their skills after being laid off.

## The Role of Community Colleges

Workers often obtain training at community colleges, generally two-year post-secondary institutions that offer certificates and associate's degrees. Community colleges play an important role in providing training to workers, both directly and through employers. Of individuals age 30 and older attending college, about half go to a community college, compared with onethird of students of traditional college age. Some employers may reimburse workers for regular courses taken at community colleges, while other employers may contract with community colleges to offer courses tailored to the employers' needs. Workers may also attend community colleges on their own, especially after a job loss. According to one recent study, about 15-20 percent of long-tenured, laid-off workers complete at least one community college course around the time of their job loss.

Given that so much job training and retraining occur at community colleges, it is important to know whether or not community colleges actually help workers raise their earnings. Recent studies have found that community colleges do contribute to workers' earnings. A year of community college raises real annual earnings by around 6 percent. Community college also helps laid-off workers. According to one study, in the long term, a year of community college raises the earnings of long-tenured, laid-off workers by about 7 percent for men and even more for women, compared to similar workers who do not enroll in community college classes. The earnings gains are higher for workers who take technical, scientific, or health-related courses, and lower for workers who take less quantitative courses.

One of the major sources of financing for community college students is the Pell Grant program, a Federal government program that helps low-income students attend college. In 2005, the Federal government spent about \$7 billion on Pell Grants for students in community colleges. In addition, in 2005, in order to help community colleges provide worker training, the President proposed and Congress approved the creation of Community-based Job Training Grants. The program has continued in 2006 with \$124 million in funding.

## Job Training Funding

In 2005, the Federal government spent nearly \$15 billion (excluding Pell Grants) on job training and employment programs. These programs assist many workers in getting the training and other services they need to advance their careers. However, these programs can be strengthened. The \$15 billion in job training money is spread among 9 different government agencies and more than 40 different programs, most with their own rules, eligibility requirements, administrative staff, and overhead costs. Much of this money is not used to support job training programs but instead funds job referral services or job search assistance.

To get more job training dollars into the hands of workers, eliminate unnecessary duplication of services, and improve accountability, the President has proposed consolidating several large job training and employment programs into a single grant that would be used to provide job training vouchers. These vouchers, known as Career Advancement Accounts, would be administered by each state but controlled largely by the worker, who could use the account to pay for education and training. The education and training could take place either at post-secondary institutions or through apprenticeships or other work-based training. These accounts would complement, but not duplicate, Pell Grant resources available to help workers further their career education. States would be required to achieve Federal accountability standards for job placement, employment retention, and earnings. By reducing administrative costs and redirecting more money into job training programs, the Career Advancement Accounts proposal would increase the number of workers who receive the job training they need to upgrade their skills and improve their employment prospects. Career Advancement Accounts would also allow workers the flexibility to choose the training that best suits their needs. They would not tie workers to any particular training provider or location, thus providing workers with maximum flexibility.

#### Conclusion

Historically, high levels of education and skills in the United States have boosted earnings for individual workers and fueled one of the most dynamic, innovative economies in the world. In recent years, though, educational attainment among young people has, by some measures, leveled off. The rapid growth in schooling in the 1950s and 1960s, and the higher levels of education attained by the younger residents in some of our international competitors, prove that the United States can do better. Promoting a flexible

and skilled labor force—through improved access to high-quality primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, through policies that attract the world's best and brightest to our shores, and through investment in the continuing education and training of our workforce-will ensure that the United States remains a competitive leader in this rapidly changing world economy.

# Saving for Retirement

Over the past few decades, concerns have mounted that Americans have been preparing inadequately for retirement. Recent newspaper headlines suggest that Americans have stopped saving and are at risk of sharp reductions in both their private and public pension benefits. To be sure, these concerns have some basis: The aggregate personal saving rate published in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) turned negative in 2005; high-profile bankruptcies in airlines and other industries have led to substantial reductions in retiree pension benefits; the collapse of technology stocks in the early 2000s left many defined-benefit pension plans underfunded; and promised Social Security benefits vastly exceed forecasted revenues. Understanding how these events relate to retirement security is important if public policy is to respond productively. This chapter builds such an understanding. The main points are:

- Most working-age Americans are on track to have more retirement wealth
  than most current retirees. However, it is inherently difficult to assess
  whether these preparations are adequate for most households, given that
  incomes have also grown over time and people may have markedly
  different plans for their retirement length and standard of living.
- The decline in an often-cited aggregate personal saving rate may not be cause for alarm. Much of this decline can be attributed to spending triggered by wealth increases from capital gains on housing and financial assets.
- There are, however, a number of risks to the retirement preparations of Americans: People today are living longer and could face higher health-care costs in retirement than members of previous generations. In addition, Social Security and many defined-benefit pension plans are at risk.
- Both defined-benefit pensions and Social Security suffer from fundamental financial problems, which expose not just retirees but all U.S. taxpayers to risk of substantial losses. The Administration is focused on addressing these problems and protecting the Nation's retirement security.

# What Does "Retirement Preparedness" Mean?

Retirement preparedness is defined here as the accumulation of wealth necessary to maintain a desired standard of living in retirement. Economists tend to agree that individuals want to *smooth consumption* in retirement (i.e., limit the extent to which retirement will decrease their consumption). However, individuals may have disparate views about how much they want to

smooth consumption, when they plan to retire, and how much they intend to work in retirement. Thus, two individuals, even with the same preretirement standard of living, may have markedly different views about how much wealth accumulation is adequate.

For the purposes of this discussion, we divide the wealth that individuals can draw on in retirement into three categories: personal net worth, including defined-contribution pension plans; employer-sponsored defined-benefit pensions; and Social Security. (Retirement wealth also includes other expected benefits, such as retiree health care from employers and Federal programs, but such benefits fall outside the scope of this chapter.) Personal net worth is the sum of the value of financial assets (e.g., stocks and bonds held in and out of retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans, and savings accounts) and durable goods (e.g., houses and cars) less the value of liabilities (e.g., credit card debt, mortgages, and car loans). Net worth grows in part from personal savingthe excess of after-tax income over consumption—and in part from inheritances and capital gains on assets already owned. Some portion of current workers' net worth, however, may be drawn down before retirement. For instance, households may liquidate financial assets or take out homeequity loans to make tuition payments, pay health-care expenses, or offset negative income shocks.

The other two sources of retirement wealth, employer-sponsored definedbenefit pensions and Social Security, are sometimes referred to as retirement income, since payments from both sources are periodic. Employer-sponsored defined-benefit pensions generally increase with years of employment and salary levels, while Social Security payouts tend to increase with retirement age and average lifetime earnings.

The next section of this chapter considers how prepared households are for retirement. Because the definition of retirement adequacy is somewhat subjective, we focus primarily on cross-generational comparisons of retirement-wealth accumulation. Cross-generational comparisons do not speak directly to the adequacy of retirement preparations, but do shed light on the related question of whether retirement preparations have deteriorated.

## Estimates of Retirement Preparedness

This section begins with a brief description of the results from studies that directly address the difficult question of whether retirement preparations are adequate. The section then discusses cross-generational comparisons, beginning with comparisons of net worth and ratios of net worth to income, and then turning to comparisons of retirement income from defined-benefit pensions and Social Security. The section concludes with a discussion of the key limitations of cross-generational approaches.

Studies that directly address the question of retirement adequacy typically define adequate wealth accumulation as essentially that which is expected to smooth consumption according to a particular model of individual preferences. Given that these studies make different key modeling assumptions, and in some cases include different components of expected retirement wealth, they have generated a wide range of results. Nevertheless, some recent studies find that most baby-boom households have been preparing adequately. In any case, conclusions about retirement adequacy based on these studies should be regarded as suggestive only, given the inherent uncertainty surrounding predictions of how much wealth is enough.

Comparing retirement wealth across generations, unlike evaluating the adequacy of any one generation's preparations, can be done without reliance on subjective assumptions. One such cross-generational study of retirement wealth contrasts the net worth (defined as above) of households in the babyboom generation (individuals born between 1946 and 1964) and generation X (headed by individuals born between 1965 and 1976) with that of households in the pre-baby boom generation (headed by individuals born between 1925 and 1945). The study considers the net worth of the heads of these households when they were between 25 and 34 years old. Controlling for age is essential given that individuals tend to save at different rates over their lifetimes.

The study finds that baby-boom and generation-X households tend to have more net worth than pre-baby-boom households had when they were roughly the same age. As shown in Table 3-1, the median net worth of pre-baby-boom households at ages 25-34 was \$6,072 in 1998 dollars. In contrast, the median net worth of baby-boom and generation-X households was, respectively, \$19,504 and \$15,500 in 1998 dollars. The somewhat lower median net worth of generation-X households mainly reflects their higher debt burdens. The table also reveals that baby-boom and generation-X households with heads of all types—low or high education, married or single—were better off than pre-baby-boom households.

We might also want to compare household net worth to income for each generation to see whether saving rates have kept pace with increases in income. Intuitively, households with greater wealth-to-income ratios will be better able to maintain preretirement living standards when they retire. As shown in Table 3-2, the same study also finds that median net worth-to-income ratios are higher for the baby-boom and generation-X households than for the pre-baby-boom households, and these gains were experienced by a wide range of demographic groups.

Finally, we can compare the median expected retirement income of baby-boom households with that of generation-X households. The study finds that median expected retirement income (including predicted defined-benefit pension and Social Security payouts in inflation-adjusted dollars but not personal net worth) for generation-X households is greater than that for

TABLE 3-1.— The Median Value (in 1998 dollars) of Net Worth for Households Headed by a 25- to 34-Year Old-Differences by Homeownership, Marital Status, and Education

	Median		
	Pre-Baby Boom	Baby Boom	Generation X
Homeowners	\$25,594	\$60,521	\$43,100
Nonhomeowners	982	4,699	3,300
Less than high school	815	4,658	2,500
High school graduate	10.044	17,195	17,920
College graduate	23,953	36,569	30,020
Married	9.165	31,677	34,501
Not married.	0	7.160	5.750
All households	\$6,072	\$19,504	\$15,500

Note: Government Accountability Office analysis based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finance. Households between the ages of 25 and 34 in 1962, 1983, and 1998 belong, respectively, to the "Pre-Baby Boom," "Baby Boom," and "Generation X.

Net worth is equal to assets minus liabilities. Assets include IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and other thrift-type plans, as well as savings accounts, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and durable goods. Liabilities are from credit card debt, installment loans, and housing debt.

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

TABLE 3-2.— Median Value of Wealth-to-Income Ratios for Households Headed by a 25- to 34-Year Old-Differences by Homeownership, Marital Status, and Education

	Median		
	Pre-Baby Boom	Baby Boom	Generation X
Homeowners	0.641	1.343	1.044
Nonhomeowners	0.052	0.167	0.151
Less than high school	0.029	0.216	0.159
High school graduate		0.525	0.586
College graduate		0.799	0.743
Married	0.261	0.755	0.742
Not married	0.000	0.299	0.268
All households	0.214	0.562	0.523

Note: Government Accountability Office analysis based on data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Households between the ages of 25 and 34 in 1962, 1983, and 1998 belong, respectively, to the "Pre-Baby Boom," "Baby Boom," and "Generation X."

Net worth is equal to assets minus liabilities. Assets include IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and other thrift-type plans, as well as savings accounts, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and durable goods. Liabilities are from credit card debt, installment loans, and housing debt.

Source: Federal Reserve Board.

baby-boom households. A second, less sanguine, result is that if the Social Security system's expected funding shortfalls are resolved by gradually reducing retirement benefits (notably, not the Administration's proposed solution) and thus lowering benefits for generation X more than for the baby boomers, then the median expected retirement incomes of generation-X and baby-boom households are about the same. This implies that, in terms of retirement income relative to preretirement income, generation-X households have not kept pace with the baby boomers.

The results shown above have a few important limitations. First, cross-generational comparisons fail to adjust for the possibility that current generations may live longer and could face higher health-care costs in retirement than previous generations. As a result, current workers may need more retirement wealth than previous generations. On the other hand, longer life expectancies may encourage current generations to work longer than previous generations, which, all else equal, would lower retirement-wealth needs.

Another limitation of these cross-generational comparisons is that they consider only a relatively early period in each generation's lifecycle (although they allow the inclusion of more recent generations). However, studies that compare somewhat older households from the baby-boom generation to recent retirees find similar conclusions. Nevertheless, retirement preparations of today's Americans may veer off track as they age if they stop saving or if financial-asset returns, house-price gains, or defined-benefit pension and Social Security payouts turn out to be less than expected. The next section of this chapter addresses some of the key risks to retirement preparations.

## The Risks to Retirement Preparedness

Three risks to retirement wealth are discussed in this section: first, the risk to household net worth created by the negative level of the personal saving rate, as measured in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA); second, the risk to defined-benefit pension plans created by underfunding, in part due to investments in risky assets; third, the risk to Social Security from the aging of the population and other structural problems.


# Are Low Saving Rates Putting Household Net Worth at Risk?

The NIPA personal saving rate is the difference between the *household* sector's after-tax personal income (disposable income) and personal consumption, expressed as a percentage of disposable income. As a technical matter,

the household sector includes nonprofit institutions. The NIPA personal saving rate was constructed as a measure of the household sector's contribution to national saving—funds set aside from the economy's current production to finance investment (see Chapter 1, entitled The Year in Review and the Years Ahead, and Chapter 6, entitled The U.S. Capital Account Surplus, for more discussion of the national saving rate). However, the NIPA personal saving rate is widely cited in newspapers as a gauge of retirement preparedness. The discussion here details the NIPA saving rate's limitations as a measure of the extent to which households are adding to their retirement wealth. The goal of the discussion is to assess whether the decline in the NIPA personal saving rate reflects a widespread deterioration in household retirement preparations.

Chart 3-1 illustrates the decline in the NIPA personal saving rate. The saving rate is volatile from quarter to quarter but has been trending down at a relatively constant rate of about 0.5 percent per year since the early 1980s. In the fourth quarter of 2005 (the most recent quarter for which data are available), the NIPA personal saving rate was -0.4 percent, not far above the post-World War II low observed in the third quarter.

Chart 3-1 Personal Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income The saving rate has declined from 10 percent to a bit below zero over the past 25 years.



Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions. Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).

However, the relationship between the personal saving rate and households' wealth accumulation is not always close. Household net worth is what matters for retirement, but the NIPA personal saving rate is not equal to the change in household net worth. First, the NIPA personal saving rate excludes the acquisition of consumer durables, a component of household net worth. Second, while business saving (such as businesses' retained profits) is ultimately owned by households, it is also excluded from NIPA personal saving. Third, and arguably most important, the NIPA personal saving rate excludes capital gains on financial and other assets (e.g., the increase in the value of a house); however, taxes on capital gains, which reduce the saving rate, are included in the computation of personal saving. The exclusion of capital gains is particularly problematic because capital gains may encourage households to consume more, which in turn drives down the measured saving rate. In other words, capital gains may be reflected in the data as reductions in saving, even though these gains add to household wealth on net-though some might argue that these gains can be illusory.


## Do Wealth Gains Explain the Decline in the NIPA Personal Saving Rate?

The *consumption-wealth effect* (i.e., the tendency to consume more as wealth increases) has been the subject of numerous empirical investigations. Studies find that an additional dollar of wealth tends to lead to a permanent rise in the level of household consumption of about 2 to 5 cents. The link between aggregate wealth and spending has proved to be one of the more enduring relationships in macroeconomics.

Estimates of the consumption-wealth effect suggest that it can explain a sizable portion of the decline in personal saving since the mid-1990s. As shown in Chart 3-2, the ratio of household net worth to disposable income has risen from about 440 percent in the early 1980s to about 550 percent in the third quarter of 2005. This measure of household net worth, obtained from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts, is the difference between household assets—including defined-benefit pension wealth—and household liabilities. The ratio moved up and down with the rise and collapse of the stock market in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then rebounded more recently along with rising house prices and stock market gains. An estimate of the impact of these wealth gains on the NIPA personal saving rate is shown below in Chart 3-3. Under the assumption that an additional dollar of wealth leads to a \$0.035 permanent rise in the level of consumption (the middle of the range cited above), the chart shows that the personal saving rate would have declined about half as much since 1980 if household wealth had grown at the same pace as disposable income (keeping the ratio constant) over that period.

#### Chart 3-2 Household Net Worth as a Percentage of Disposable Income


Since the mid-1990s, net worth has increased on balance relative to disposable income.



#### Chart 3-3 Household Saving Rate as a Percentage of Disposable Income

If wealth only grew as much as disposable income since 1994, the saving rate would have declined substantially less.

Percent of disposable income



Note Shaded areas indicate recessions. The difference between the two lines reflects additional consumption triggered by wealth gains. The calculation assumes that a \$1 change in wealth leads to a total of \$0.035 change in consumption over a two-year period.

Sources. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Federal Reserve.

## Are Saving Rate Declines Widespread?

Yet another limitation of the NIPA personal saving rate as a measure of households' wealth accumulation is its aggregate nature; as such, it masks possible differences in behavior by households at different income levels. Understanding the saving dynamics in different parts of the income distribution requires household-level data on saving.

However, household wealth at the individual level is difficult to track over time. One study thus employed an innovative approach to circumvent various data problems and found that the saving rate, using NIPA definitions, for households in the upper two-fifths of the income distribution declined over the 1990s, while the saving rate for households in the middle fifth remained relatively steady, and the saving rate for households in the bottom two-fifths actually increased. Given that high-income households almost certainly experienced the majority of capital gains in the 1990s, these results suggest that the net worth component of retirement wealth may not be at risk. Relatively high-income households may have accumulated net worth from capital gains, while other households may have accumulated net worth by saving.

Overall, the above discussion of household saving suggests that the net worth component of retirement preparedness may not be in jeopardy. The NIPA personal saving rate is a potentially misleading measure of households' wealth accumulation. Moreover, much of the recent decline in the NIPA personal saving rate may reflect consumption increases that were triggered by capital gains on stocks and real estate. Finally, some evidence suggests that the decline in household saving rates has not been widespread but may have been concentrated among higher-income households.

### Policy Reforms

While the net worth component of retirement wealth does not appear to be in jeopardy, policy reforms can still productively reduce impediments to saving. Under current law, interest income is taxed, creating a disincentive for households to set aside funds for retirement. This disincentive is mitigated to some extent by policies that afford favorable tax treatment to various types of retirement accounts (e.g., IRA and 401(k)). However, restrictions on these accounts limit their value as retirement-saving vehicles. To make these accounts more effective, Congress passed legislation that increases contribution limits and makes retirement assets more portable. In addition, the Administration has proposed simplifying the retirement account system in two important ways: (1) creating a single Retirement Savings Account (RSA) to replace the three types of Investment Retirement Accounts (IRAs) currently in place; and (2) creating a Lifetime Savings Account (LSA) that could be used for a variety of purposes, including retirement saving (see Chapter 5, entitled The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective, for

additional discussion of tax recommendations in the President's Budget). Another impediment to saving may be limited financial knowledge. The Department of the Treasury is actively engaged in campaigns to improve financial literacy. In addition, the President has instructed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Treasury Department to work with consumer groups to ensure that financial literacy is widespread.

#### Defined-Benefit Pensions

Historically, defined-benefit pension plans have been an important part of retirement preparedness. These employer-sponsored plans compensate retirees through a specified monthly benefit, which tends to vary with salary and years of service. In addition, most plans sponsored by private employers are guaranteed in part by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and those sponsored by public employers are ultimately backed by the ability of states to levy taxes. As such, "DB" plans may appear more stable than increasingly prevalent "defined-contribution" plans (such as 401(k) plans), which explicitly depend on employee contributions, tie benefits more directly to market performance, and may expose retirees to longevity risk (the risk of outliving retirement resources).

Defined-benefit plans can, nevertheless, carry considerable risk. This risk comes from employers (1) contributing less to plans than what is promised to employees (funding risk), (2) investing contributions in a hazardous manner (portfolio risk), and (3) encountering financial distress (bankruptcy risk) in the case of private employers. When these risks are realized, beneficiaries and taxpayers can be exposed to substantial and oftentimes unanticipated losses.

An early example of these problems comes from the 1960s landmark case of Studebaker Corporation. When this former carmaker defaulted on its defined-benefit plan, it left about 11,000 participants without most or any of their pensions. These losses eventually led Congress to set minimum standards for private pension plans via the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974.

ERISA gave rise to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which now partially insures the pensions of over 34 million workers and retirees. The PBGC largely funds itself with premiums from private-sector sponsors of defined-benefit plans (i.e., employers). When an employer becomes financially distressed, the PBGC may take control of the plan's management and use the plan's assets and its own funds to pay retirees a capped portion of their promised benefits. Employees in contemporary cases like the bankruptcy of United Airlines filed in 2002 are thus less exposed to defined-benefit risks than were employees in cases like Studebaker.

Despite this insulation, employees with defined-benefit pension plans sponsored by private employers remain exposed to considerable risks. As of 2005, for example, the limit on PBGC insurance increased with retirement age, and topped out at about \$46,000 per year. Employees whose plans default can thus incur considerable losses when their promised benefits exceed these limits. United's workers, for example, expect to receive about 80 percent of their earned benefits, and thus stand to lose more than \$3 billion of total promised benefits. In addition, as the following sections show, the combination of inadequate protections and a series of pension defaults has left the PBGC with insufficient funds for paying even these limited claims. Consequently, if losses overwhelm the pension insurance system, Congress may step in and pass the bill to taxpayers.

For defined-benefit plans sponsored by public employers, the taxpayer exposure is even more direct. Recall that the PBGC only insures plans sponsored by private employers. In the event that a publicly sponsored plan's assets are insufficient to pay benefits, absent renegotiation of benefits, such plans could only be made whole with the support of state-level tax revenues.

#### Employee Exposure to Defined-Benefit Risks

Recently, market fluctuations and the rules that govern how employers participate in the defined-benefit system appear to have turned risks into reality. Decreasing interest rates and stock market valuations, coupled with the exposure of pension plan assets to market fluctuations, coincided with a marked increase in the underfunding of defined-benefit plans. Underfunding, in turn, increased expected defaults on pension obligations, putting both workers and the pension insurance program into jeopardy.


In the case of privately sponsored pensions, the value of assets set aside to fund retirement obligations began to decrease in 2000 while the value of promised benefits began to increase. The total underfunding of private pension plans grew from less than \$50 billion at the end of 2000 to over \$400 billion today. At the same time, as Chart 3-4 illustrates, PBGC's capacity to insulate workers from employer defaults turned from a \$10 billion surplus in 2000 into a deficit that now totals more than \$20 billion.

This deterioration can plausibly be attributed to the exposure of pension plan portfolios to coincident decreases in both interest rates and stock market valuations. A decrease in interest rates can contribute to this problem by increasing the measured *present value* of a pension plan's promised benefits. A decrease in stock market valuations can further contribute by weakening the ability of plan investments to pay benefits.

To see this relationship, suppose that an individual wants to buy a new appliance next year for \$500, and consider how much must be saved today to

Chart 3-4 Funding Status of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

The PBGC's funding status has worsened significantly since 2000. Billion \$



Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

fund this purchase. The answer depends on how much interest these savings will earn: As this interest increases, the savings that are necessary to fund the future purchase decrease. Extreme cases are illustrative: One would have to save \$500 today if the interest rate is 0 percent, but only \$250 if it is 100 percent. This example reflects a more general relationship: When interest rates decrease, the present value of future obligations increases.

For pensions, this relationship implies that employers must set aside more funds to meet pension obligations when interest rates decrease. The decrease in interest rates that started late in 2000 thus threatened the funding status of defined-benefit pension plans.

A simultaneous decrease in stock market valuations from the peaks of the late 1990s appears to have furthered this threat. At the same time that interest-rate changes were increasing the value of employers' obligations, a decrease in stock market valuations was diminishing the value of assets that employers had set aside to fund those obligations. Together, these changes coincided with the marked weakening in the funding status of both definedbenefit plans and the PBGC.

While market fluctuations appear to have been an important contributor to these woes, they could be made less so. To see why, recall from above that the PBGC manages the pension plans it receives from financially distressed employers. In doing so, it reduces exposure to interest-rate fluctuations by matching investment payoffs with the timing of employee benefits. The value of plan assets and liabilities will tend to move more closely together under this strategy of duration matching than they would under the strategies that employers appear to have used.

#### Taxpayer Exposure to PBGC's Deficit

The recent spike in underfunding has also exposed taxpayers to the prospect of making up for the PBGC's deficit (recall that this exposure is more immediate for publicly sponsored plans). While the PBGC's liabilities are not explicitly backed by the Federal government, a future Congress might decide that a taxpayer bailout is preferable to a PBGC default. Indeed, taxpayers' exposure to the PBGC's deficit is especially concerning since the manner in which it evolved mimics how the 1980s savings and loan (S&L) crisis developed.

Like the insurance that PBGC offers, the insurance offered to depositors at financial institutions can provide important benefits. But if they are not prudently managed, these insurance programs can fall prey to moral hazard (explained in Chapter 9, The U.S. Financial Sector) and thus expose taxpayers to an undue liability. In the 1980s, for example, loose regulatory oversight let savings and loans overly expose themselves to market fluctuations (such as changes in real-estate values and interest-rates) and ultimately left insufficient funds for paying off depositors. Depositors did not fully bear the burden of this underfundng, however. Instead, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insured depositors in much the same way that PBGC covers retirees.

In an analogous manner to the current pension situation, market fluctuations and regulatory difficulties not only helped increase the rate at which depositors drew on this insurance, they also compromised FSLIC's capacity to pay insurance claims. Like the PBGC, FSLIC was structured to be self-financing. Nevertheless, taxpayers ultimately paid about \$150 billion for the financial losses of failed institutions.

The PBGC faces a situation that is similar to what plagued FSLIC. Waiting to implement productive reforms magnified taxpayers' burden in bailing out the S&L industry. Postponing the issue of underfunded pension plans can likewise make matters worse for pensioners and taxpayers. According to testimony by the PBGC's executive director, the PBGC's present \$23 billion deficit could grow toward \$80 billion over the next ten years. Without prompt and effective action, taxpayers may thus find themselves bailing out yet another "self-financed" public insurance program.

#### Policy Reforms

Prompt action, grounded in good economics and informed by lessons learned from similar financial crises, can keep the current pension problem from becoming even more burdensome. To help the private pension system move in this direction, the administration has proposed to strengthen the requirements for funding privately sponsored pension plans and improve the manner in which plan sponsors disclose information. State-level policies that would address the problems with plans sponsored by public employers are at an earlier stage of development.

Current funding and disclosure rules can allow privately sponsored pension plans to appear healthier than they actually are. Reforms such as restricting the use of "credit balances" could help enhance funding adequacy and transparency. Under present law, employers receive credit for contributions that exceed minimum requirements and can later use those credits in lieu of actual contributions. This treatment is problematic. For example, excess contributions are characterized as earning interest even if the assets in which those contributions were invested lose value. Moreover, credit balances can delay plan sponsors from addressing funding problems and thus let even grossly underfunded employers forgo actual contributions.

Limiting private employers' ability to use an average interest rate to value plan liabilities could also strengthen funding and improve transparency. Recall that, as interest rates decrease, the present value of an employer's pension obligations increases. Current law lets employers use a moving average of these rates spread out over several years, however, and thus mutes the near-term effect of an interest-rate decrease on an employer's contribution requirements.

To see this effect, suppose that employers can use a two-year average, and that interest rates decrease from 6 percent to 5 percent. Using an average rate, employers could discount their future obligations at 5.5 percent. But if employers had to use the current rate of 5 percent, they would have to increase contributions by more, and do so more quickly. Averaging the discount rate can thus cloud the picture of a plan's status.

The Administration has similarly proposed limits on the ability of private employers to smooth reported fluctuations in the value of their plan-assets. Coupled with the related proposal for plans to accurately address the timing of benefit payments, this reform could reduce the portfolio risks that are characterized above as the proximate cause of the system's weakened funding status.

Finally, the administration has proposed to increase funding targets, measure the performance of plans in a uniform manner, and update assumptions like those of mortality. These reforms, like the others discussed above, would enhance the integrity of the defined-benefit system, and should be uniformly applied across plan sponsors. Doing otherwise would give some

economic sectors, or firms within a sector, an artificial advantage. Economic performance could deteriorate as scarce resources flow not to their most productive uses, but to their most politically-favored uses. In addition, exempting certain sectors or firms could exacerbate the underfunding problem by breathing artificial life into risky plans and thus further exposing workers, retirees, and taxpayers to economic risk.

## Social Security

Along with personal savings and employer-provided pension plans, Social Security has long stood as a pillar of retirement security. A response of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration to the Great Depression, the Social Security Act was signed into law on August 14, 1935, and first issued monthly retirement checks in January 1940. At that time, about 200,000 retirees received aggregate benefits valued at about \$35 million. Since then, both the number of beneficiaries and the level of benefits has steadily grown. In 2004, more than 47 million beneficiaries received a total of about \$493 billion through the Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance programs (OASDI).

These benefits are funded by taxes on wage income. In an accounting sense, employers and employees equally share this funding by contributing 6.2 percent of taxable payroll each. Since employers focus on the total cost of labor, however, workers bear most of this combined 12.4 percent tax. For each worker, this tax applies to payroll beneath a ceiling that annually adjusts with the average wage index. That ceiling, which stood at \$90,000 in 2005, increased to \$94,200 for 2006.

## Taxpayer Exposure to an Increasingly Large Social Security Burden

The overall cost of Social Security is substantial. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that Social Security transfers amounted to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2005. During the coming decades, Social Security's share of GDP is expected to increase, reaching 6 percent in 2035.

In the short term, this increase will largely come from the retirement of baby boomers, which begins in 2008. It will persist in the long run, however, due to a combination of relatively low fertility rates and relatively high life expectancies. These factors will push the ratio of workers to retirees down from its current level of 3.3 to 1 to around 2 to 1 by the time that most baby boomers retire.

Since the benefits of those currently retired mostly come from taxes on those currently working, these developments will create considerable pressure to increase payroll taxes. Indeed, the Social Security Administration's actuaries estimate that, starting in 2017, the system's annual cost will exceed its total tax income (which includes taxes on payroll and Social Security benefits themselves).

From an accounting perspective, Social Security can still fully fund benefits at this point because the system has run surpluses since 1984, holding special Treasury bonds as IOUs. Although they are assets to the Trust Fund, however, these IOUs are equally debt to the Federal government, and thus an obligation that faces taxpayers.

The actuaries estimate that without legislative action, the Trust Fund's IOUs will run out by 2041, leaving a system that can fulfill only 74 percent of currently scheduled benefits. Even more, promised Social Security benefits from 2005 to 2080 are expected to exceed the sum of revenues and Trust Fund IOUs by \$4 trillion in present value. Given these mounting costs, taxpayers and workers would be better off dealing with this problem now rather than later.

Social Security reform has been on the national radar for decades (see Box 3-1). Notably, former President Clinton convened an Advisory Council which, in 1996, released several recommendations. Two of the three plans supported by the Advisory Council involved some kind of voluntary personal retirement accounts (through publicly held individual accounts in one case and privately administered personal accounts in another), and the other plan also envisioned moving to a system of advance funding, albeit through government-directed investment in equities. Importantly, the longer it takes to initiate reforms, the greater any changes must be, because they will be shared by fewer generations.

#### Policy Reform: Progressive Indexing

Projections suggest that, under current law, the Social Security system will soon be unable to pay for itself. Many of the proposals to address this problem fall short of a productive and durable reform. Removing the cap on wages that are subject to the payroll tax, for example, would not only increase contributions to the system but also increase the system's promised benefits in the long term. Progressively reducing future benefit growth, on the other hand, may strike an attractive balance by closing roughly two-thirds of the system's longrange annual cash shortfalls while maintaining the system's capacity to act as a social safety net.

Initial benefits for new retirees are currently indexed to wage inflation rather than price inflation. Since wages typically increase at a faster rate than prices (reflecting gains in productivity), wage indexation results in increasingly large benefits in real dollar terms. Progressive indexing would decrease the rate of benefit growth for individuals whose lifetime earnings are the highest (less than the highest 1 percent of all wage earners) by linking their benefit growth to price increases. At the same time, it would maintain the current law's more generous benefit-growth rate for individuals whose lifetime earnings are relatively low. Benefits of retirees in the upper 70 percent of the

#### Box 3-1: Earlier Attempts to Shore Up Social Security

Congress has responded to developing problems with Social Security finances in the past. For example, both 1977 and 1983 saw the signing of significant amendments to improve the system's deteriorating financial condition.

Why were the system's finances deteriorating then, and why are they continuing to do so today? There are several answers. First, the 1972 amendments to Social Security effectively indexed benefit growth for those working at the time to both wage and price inflation, essentially providing two cost-of-living adjustments. This double-benefit indexation was amended in 1977 to establish the current method of wage indexation. But while wage indexation addressed the double-indexation issue, some experts warned that, coupled with demographic changes, it would still require future taxpayers to shoulder larger Social Security tax burdens than is required today.

Second, the economic projections following the amendments of 1972, 1977, and 1983 proved overly optimistic. From 1972 to 1976, for example, real wages grew by nearly 11 percent less than expected, resulting in lower than anticipated growth of the payroll income base on which Social Security taxes were collected. Similarly, from 1977 to 1981, real wages decreased by about 6.9 percent rather than increasing by 12.9 percent as projected. Assumptions made following the 1983 reforms were not as far off as those of 1972 and 1977, but are nonetheless responsible for some of the overstatement of Social Security's financial strength. Consequently, although the year for the exhaustion of the Trust Fund was forecast to be 2063 in 1983, it has been pushed forward and now stands at 2041.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 1983 reforms did not attain sustainable solvency. The 1983 reforms envisioned several decades of Social Security surpluses, followed by several decades of large and growing deficits. This meant that with the passage of time, Social Security would again become financially imbalanced. Even as early as the 1985 Social Security Trustees' report, it could be seen that the system was again heading out of long-term balance. This is one reason why a number of bipartisan commissions have since recommended that future Social Security reforms place the program on a sustainable, as opposed to merely a solvent, footing.

distribution would depend on a combination of price and wage increases. The system would be progressive because benefit growth would slow the most for those with higher earnings. This method of benefit growth would let future retirees enjoy benefits that are higher than those paid today while eventually ensuring that no person who works a full career would retire with a Social Security benefit below the poverty level.

Progressive indexing would slow the benefit-growth rate for high-income individuals in a manner that strongly pushes the system toward solvency. In addition, by maintaining a relatively fast rate of benefit growth for lowincome individuals, progressive indexing would further protect retirement incomes from falling below the poverty level.

#### Policy Reform: Personal Accounts

The traditional Social Security system largely funds retirement benefits by transferring payroll taxes from current workers to beneficiaries. In addition to being subject to the risk of insolvency (which, as explained above, can be addressed in part through progressive indexing), this type of pay-as-you-go system runs the risk of future workers voting to cut back on their contributions. This risk may be considerable, as additional changes needed to restore solvency would leave future retirees with substantially smaller benefits than the current system's promises.

This problem comes in large part from a system that relies on future generations to fulfill promises made today. By letting individuals pre-fund their retirements, personal accounts allow current generations to rely in part on their own savings, rather than solely upon contributions that future generations may be unwilling or unable to make.

Because this issue is separate from that of solvency, personal accounts need not (and under the President's proposals, would not) adversely affect the system's long-term finances. If traditional benefits are offset by the amount that individuals could obtain by investing in low-risk assets, such a reform can be made approximately neutral with respect to the capacity to fulfill remaining traditional benefits. Such offsets are said to be roughly neutral on an actuarial basis because they leave (1) beneficiaries who remain wholly invested in government bonds with the same expected future benefit and (2) the Trust Fund with nearly the same expected long-term balance.

While they leave the long-term balance mostly unchanged, allocations to personal accounts do alter the timing of the system's future obligations. Their basic effect is to take some of the long-term obligation and shift it to an earlier time. Moving a portion of payroll taxes to personal accounts will take money off of the government ledger today, some of which is used to pay for current benefits and some of which has long been used to finance other Federal spending. At the same time, because voluntary personal retirement accounts will replace a portion of unfunded future benefits, they also reduce future strains on the system.

Shifting the future imbalance forward in time could increase transparency by making the system's impending shortfalls less of an abstraction. Financial markets tend to applaud such solutions to fiscal challenges and might do so again in this context by keeping interest rates at productive levels.

Pre-funding a portion of future benefits appears attractive in other dimensions as well. Every dollar of benefits funded today through personal accounts is a dollar of benefits that need not be paid by taxpayers in the future. Because rising benefit obligations would under current law lead to increased tax burdens over time, shifting forward the funding of some benefits could create a more equitable treatment of different generations.

In addition, redirecting assets to personal accounts increases the likelihood that real savings will be accumulated to meet tomorrow's retirement needs. If these assets are owned and controlled by individuals, they will be less available for the government to spend than if these assets are left on the Federal ledger. Finally, personal accounts would provide an opportunity for individuals to diversify their investment in Social Security, which may add to their retirement security.

#### Conclusion

This chapter's first section shows that today's generations are on track to have more retirement wealth than previous generations, though it is unclear whether these wealth gains have kept pace with rising preretirement incomes. Going forward, the relative security of retirement wealth may be compromised by fundamental problems with defined-benefit pensions and Social Security.

Both of these systems could be improved by more-effective funding rules and safeguards that protect against the opportunistic handling of retirement assets. Strengthening pension-contribution requirements, and watching more carefully how those contributions are managed, would go far to mitigate the growing risks to pensioners and taxpayers alike. Progressively targeting the rate of future benefit growth and expanding ownership over payroll contributions, likewise, would help strengthen Social Security for the future. In both cases, waiting to act allows the present problems to grow and increases the costs of adopting effective reforms.

# Improving Incentives in Health Care Spending

Health care spending in the United States has increased rapidly over the past several decades, rising 44 percent in real per capita terms in the past ten years alone. Some of the reasons for this marked rise reflect higher-quality health care, such as improved technological options for enhancing the health and quality of life of the American people. However, other factors, such as poorly functioning markets for health care, may have led to excessive spending and inefficient patterns of medical care utilization. Furthermore, whether this increased spending is of high value or not, it has put tremendous pressures on individuals and the institutions that finance health care spending. Family budgets are being strained as health care costs take up an increasing share of incomes. Government health care expenditures have also been increasing rapidly, burdening both Federal and state budgets. If not curtailed, the increased costs to governments will eventually lead to large tax increases, sharp cuts in nonhealth spending, or both.

This chapter reviews the causes and consequences of health care spending growth and discusses how spending can be more efficient and of higher value in the context of a consumer-driven, market-based system. The emerging consumer-driven health care movement aims to empower consumers with improved information and ability to make choices about their own health care, which in turn can result in increased provider competition to better serve patients' needs at lower costs. The key points of this chapter are:

- Growth in spending on health care has been much more rapid than general inflation, straining consumers, employers, and government budgets.
- Perverse tax and insurance incentives have led to inefficient levels and composition of spending on health care. Some increased spending has produced valuable health improvements, but in a better-functioning health care market these improvements could be attained at lower cost.
- Promoting a stronger role for consumers is a promising strategy for improving health care value and affordability.


## The Growth in Health Care Spending

Spending in the health care sector has steadily grown from under 6 percent of GDP in 1965 to 16 percent of GDP in 2004. If current trends continued, health care spending would be projected to reach 19 percent of GDP by 2014

and 22 percent by 2025 (Chart 4-1). Since 1965, the government share of total health spending has risen from 25 percent to over 45 percent, mainly due to increased eligibility and generosity of Medicare and Medicaid. (Medicare is a Federal government program that pays for health care for senior citizens and those with certain disabilities. Medicaid, financed by both Federal and state governments, is focused on providing health care for the poor.) Medicare spending alone is projected to increase from 2.6 percent of GDP in 2006 to 4.3 percent by 2025. Among those without access to Medicare or Medicaid, most expenditures are financed by private health insurance (64 percent), provided mainly through employers (91 percent of those with private insurance). The rising costs of health care are reflected in premiums (employer plus employee share) for employer-provided insurance that in 2005 averaged almost \$11,000 for a family (Chart 4-2), up from \$6,700 in 1999 (in 2005 inflation-adjusted dollars). Per capita health care spending in the United States has risen from about \$4,500 ten years ago to about \$6,500 today (in 2005 dollars).

The United States today spends roughly twice as much per capita on health care as other industrialized countries, such as the other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This large difference in part reflects higher levels of per capita income and output


Chart 4-1 National Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP National health expenditures have risen dramatically and are projected to continue rising.



and Council of Economic Advisers

Chart 4-2 Family Health Insurance Premiums 1999-2005

Annual premium (2005 dollars)



Source: Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Benefits Survey 1999-2005.

in the United States, since richer countries tend to spend proportionately more on health care, but the United States spends a substantially larger share of GDP on health care than other wealthy countries do. For example, the United Kingdom spends about 8 percent of its GDP on health care, compared with the United States' 16 percent. The U.S. expenditure as a percent of GDP is more than six percentage points higher than the average in OECD countries. Rates of spending growth, however, are much more similar across countries. For example, from 1998 to 2003, average real health care spending increased 4.6 percent per year in the United States as compared to 4.5 percent in the OECD as a whole. This suggests that many of the underlying international spending differences stem from longer-term factors.

When looking at these statistics, it is also important to remember that buying more health care is not necessarily equivalent to buying more health. Health care is one of many different determinants of health status, and for many people marginal increases in health care consumption may be less costeffective than marginal increases in spending on other determinants such as a healthier lifestyle (exercising, not smoking, eating a healthier diet). Evaluating the relative cost-effectiveness of spending on different health determinants can be challenging, however, in part because it is difficult to measure the quality of health services consumed.

## Where Health Spending Has Grown

There have been significant increases over time in all major spending categories, including outpatient, acute inpatient, long-term care, and pharmaceuticals. Both personnel costs and goods costs have increased. Spending has grown for both privately and publicly financed and delivered care.

One might guess that the aging of the U.S. population would explain an important part of the increase in health care costs, especially since about one-quarter of health care in a given year is spent on those who die that year. Research suggests, however, that less than 10 percent of the growth in health spending over the last several decades can be attributed to this factor. Another contributing factor might be America's rising prosperity, because richer individuals and nations demand more health care, but again this factor can only account for a relatively small portion of the health care spending growth. Various studies have speculated about the contribution of other factors such as rising obesity, but there is as yet no consensus on the importance of these factors. There is general agreement, however, that the rapid growth in development and use of expensive new health care treatments accounts for a large share of overall health care spending growth over time.

A useful framework for understanding increases in medical spending breaks these spending increases into three components: (1) changes in the quantity demanded of existing health-related goods and services, (2) changes in the prices of those existing goods and services, and (3) the effects of technological advances that change the available set of health-related goods and services. The next part of this section looks at each of these three factors.

#### Quantity of Health Care Demanded

Do we demand higher volumes of health care today than in the past? While we clearly consume more of some types of care (based on higher incomes, changing medical needs, etc.), health care visits per capita have not increased. The biggest components of health care spending are physician and hospital services. Doctor visits per capita dropped somewhat from 1980 through the mid-1990s, and have increased only modestly since then. The number of hospital discharges per capita and the average hospital length-of-stay, however, have declined dramatically—they were 50-percent higher in 1980 than in 2000. Growth in spending within the United States does not seem to be explained by increased visits to the doctor or hospital.

Moreover, international differences in spending cannot be explained by differences in the quantity of physician and hospital visits. In fact, doctor visits and hospital nights per capita in the United States are lower than in many OECD countries. For example, in 2000 the United States had 0.7 hospital nights per capita, compared to 0.9 nights in the United Kingdom, 1.3 nights in Switzerland, and 1.9 nights in Germany. Service *intensity* in the

United States is very different, however, with U.S. hospital staffing levels at double the OECD median. Thus, while Americans have fewer health care contacts, they appear to receive more services at each contact. This difference explains in part why the average U.S. hospital night costs three times the OECD average.

#### Health Care Prices

The official medical consumer price index (medical CPI), which measures price increases for medical goods and services and is published by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, indicates that health care prices over the last few decades have grown more rapidly than prices of other goods and services in the economy. From 2000 to 2004, the health care component of the CPI grew 19 percent compared to only 10 percent for the general CPI, indicating 9 percent real growth in health care prices. Thus of the 33 percent growth in total per capita health spending over this period, one-quarter apparently derived from increases in the prices of health care relative to other goods and services.

Why would health care prices rise so rapidly? One possible explanation for these recent price increases is that supplier consolidation has led to reduced competition among health care providers, enabling hospitals and physician groups to leverage market power to raise prices. For example, there were about 900 hospital consolidations during 1994-2000 (from a base of roughly 6,000 hospitals). Some of these mergers have appeared to result in monopolistic price increases, and even some major metropolitan areas have become dominated by just two or three hospital systems. It is not clear how important such trends will be in the future, however, in the face of vigorous antitrust enforcement.

Part of the apparent increase in relative prices may, however, be the illusory result of measurement problems. Standard price indices such as the medical CPI may overestimate price growth in health care if they do not adequately account for improvements in health care quality. Price indices are supposed to reflect price changes for a given product. However, because health care quality is constantly increasing, rising prices for a given health care visit may reflect improved quality, rather than just higher costs for a given level of care. For example, the coronary artery bypass graft that the average patient receives today may result in fewer complications and longer and higher quality of life afterward than would have been the case for a patient receiving the procedure 10 years ago—so the higher price paid for the procedure reflects in part the fact that the patient is receiving more "health," not just paying more for the same service.

That said, higher prices for medical services do appear to be an important part of the explanation for why the United States spends more on health care than other OECD countries do. For example, one study of Australia,

Denmark, France, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom found that physician wages in the United States are 77 percent higher than the average across those countries. This does not mean, however, that those countries provide a model that should be emulated: Heavy price regulation in some countries has led to long waiting lists for certain types of medical services. One recent survey found that over half of patients in Canada and the United Kingdom had to wait longer than a month for a specialist appointment, compared to less than a quarter of patients in the United States. Similarly, more than a third of patients had to wait longer than four months for elective surgeries in Canada and the United Kingdom, compared to fewer than 10 percent in the United States.

There is a common perception that drug prices are unduly higher in the United States than in other OECD countries, perhaps due to aggressive price negotiation by European governments, but recent research suggests that this may be misleading for several reasons. First, carefully accounting for manufacturer discounts to insurers in the United States shows price differences to be smaller than simple retail price comparisons would suggest (U.S. prices are discounted by about 8 percent on average). Second, U.S. consumers use a much higher proportion of generic drugs than do consumers in other countries (e.g., 58 percent of units in the United States versus 28 percent in France). When comparing average prices paid for each active ingredient (whether generic or name brand), rather than only prices for selected name brand drugs, the international price differences are further narrowed.

Furthermore, some experts suggest that wealthier countries such as the United States should pay a larger share of drug development costs than should less-wealthy countries, because of both equity and efficiency arguments. Thus, observing lower drug prices in developing countries than in the United States does not generate great controversy. Many people do not recognize, however, that the United States is also substantially richer than most other OECD countries. For example, per capita income in the United States is 22-percent higher than in the United Kingdom. After adjusting for differences in manufacturer discounts, use of generics, and per capita income, average drug prices are in fact higher in many other OECD countries. Research has found that U.S. drug prices relative to income are 7-percent lower in France, but 4-percent higher in Canada, 10-percent higher in Germany, and 25-percent higher in the United Kingdom. Thus, the United States' higher health care spending as a share of GDP does not appear to be explained by higher drug prices.

#### Technological Change

Research suggests that, over time, a major source of health care spending increases has been adoption of new, technologically intensive health care goods and services. For example, one study found that average spending per heart attack case in the United States increased in real terms from \$12,000 in 1984 to about \$22,000 in 1998, and that about half of this spending increase could be attributed to the adoption of more-sophisticated technologies. This does not mean that the higher spending is not of very high value: post-heart attack life expectancy over this same period increased from five years to six years, with 70 percent of that increase attributable to the adoption of better technology.

The United States appears to use some expensive technologies more intensively than do other countries. For example, the United States has more than 50-percent more MRI units per capita than do other OECD countries on average. The United States' more-intensive use of technology partly reflects its higher rate of innovation and earlier adoption of technology. For example, angioplasty was relatively rare outside the United States in 1990, with the U.S. utilization rate three times higher than the next-closest country; Germany finally reached the U.S. level by about 1998, while adoption in other countries continued to lag.

It is worth noting that the adoption of new technologies does not inevitably raise costs. New technologies regularly reduce costs in many other sectors of the economy, such as the semiconductor industry. In the U.S. health care industry, however, the combination of technological change along with muted consumer incentives to demand lower costs is responsible for a significant portion of rising health care spending.

## First-Dollar Insurance Inhibits Consumer Cost-Consciousness

In most markets outside of health care, consumers decide what to purchase by comparing the price of a good or service against the benefit it brings them. By contrast, in the health care sector, consumers often do not learn the prices of goods and services consumed until bills are received weeks or months later, if ever. Instead, physicians are expected to make health care consumption choices for patients, despite the fact that physicians frequently lack the incentive to match the benefits of care with its costs, and may even lack information about the costs themselves. A major reason for this lack of consumer incentive is the fact that many health insurance policies provide close to "first-dollar coverage" of health care costs. That is, people with health insurance typically pay only a relatively small portion of the total cost—or in some cases, literally none of the cost—of the health care services they receive. This section reviews the causes and consequences of first-dollar insurance coverage.

## Causes of First-Dollar Insurance Coverage

Unlike most other types of insurance, health insurance in the United States often includes first-dollar coverage of the cost of even routine, predictable services. By contrast, most other forms of insurance focus on protecting the insured from large and unexpected losses. If automobile insurance had the first-dollar coverage of even routine services that many health insurance policies offer, it would cover the costs of oil changes and new tires, rather than just protecting against unpredictable catastrophes such as automobile accidents.

Health insurance policies have this unusual first-dollar coverage feature in large part because the tax code makes it cheaper for people to purchase health care indirectly through insurance than directly through out-of-pocket payments (see Box 4-1). Another factor underlying first-dollar coverage is the increased use of managed care programs, which spread rapidly during the 1990s. Most managed care plans are characterized by minimal cost sharing, relying instead on gatekeepers to regulate use of resources. Interest in managed care programs has decreased recently, because of public backlash against the cost-containment measures used in these programs.

#### Box 4-1: Tax Preferences for Employer Health Insurance Premiums


Since the 1940s, the tax code has excluded employer payments for health insurance premiums from the portion of workers' compensation subject to taxation (both payroll and personal income taxes). The total value of the tax exclusion is quite large, reducing Federal taxes by over \$200 billion in 2006 (\$133 billion for the income tax exclusion and \$80 billion for the payroll tax exclusion), which is equivalent to about 10 percent of actual Federal tax receipts. This exclusion of health insurance premiums from taxation was a by-product of wage-control legislation during World War II (which established a precedent for treating employee benefits differently from regular wages), and was not intentionally designed to promote health insurance coverage. But this tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance premiums has had important consequences for insurance markets.


First, it has caused the private insurance system to become predominantly employment-based. More than 91 percent of privately insured individuals under age 65 receive their health insurance through their employers. Except for the self-employed, those who purchase insurance on the individual market (that is, not through their employers) must do so with after-tax dollars. The self-employed receive an "above-the-line" income tax deduction for health insurance premiums (equivalent to the income-tax exclusion for employer insurance), though they still owe full payroll taxes on the income used to buy premiums. For someone in the

15-percent income tax bracket and subject to the 15.3-percent payroll tax, a policy with a \$10,000 premium would cost roughly \$7,000 if purchased through an employer, \$8,500 if the person were selfemployed, and the full \$10,000 if the person were not self-employed and purchased the policy individually. This tax treatment has created a strong financial incentive for individuals to purchase health insurance through their employer, even if their first choice of insurance product is not offered by the employer. In addition, as an incentive to buy health insurance, this tax subsidy is larger for people in higher tax brackets (as shown in the chart), despite the fact that a given subsidy amount would reduce uninsurance much more among lower-income households.

Furthermore, the employer premium tax exclusion promotes lowdeductible insurance coverage with minimal out-of-pocket cost sharing. In most cases, while insurance premiums are paid with pretax dollars. out-of-pocket health spending must be paid for with after-tax dollars. For example, \$1,000 of health care services covered by full insurance costs the person with employer-provided insurance only about \$700 in after-tax dollars (assuming a 15-percent income tax bracket and 15.3-percent payroll tax), whereas those same services would cost \$1,000 if paid outof-pocket. Because of the tax penalty for out-of-pocket spending relative to insurance premiums, there is a strong incentive for employers to provide and employees to select first-dollar coverage, even if they would have preferred higher deductibles and lower premiums in the absence of the tax provision. This has, in turn, diminished the role of consumers as guardians against wasteful spending and unduly high prices.

Annual Value of Employer-Provided Health Insurance Tax Exclusion by Income The tax exclusion provides the greatest benefit to those in higher tax brackets





Note Includes federal income and payroll taxes for a hypothetical family of four Calculations are imprecise for incomes within \$10,000 of tax bracket ceiling

## Consequences of First-Dollar Insurance Coverage

The original purpose of health insurance, like other forms of insurance, was to protect individuals from catastrophic and unexpected costs by spreading risk across a larger population. However, as discussed, health insurance in the United States has now also become a vehicle for financing relatively low-cost, routine expenditures. This use of insurance as "prepaid medical care" has three important consequences: (1) It encourages consumers to overuse certain types of health care. (2) It gives little incentive for consumers to search for the lowest-price providers. (3) It distorts incentives for technological change. Rather than focusing research incentives on cost-effective technology, it induces adoption of technologies for which costs exceed incremental benefits, while undermining the development of cost-saving technologies. We discuss each of these points.

First, heavily insured individuals, being insulated from most health care costs, have the incentive to overconsume certain types of care, a phenomenon referred to as moral hazard. An allergy drug may have great value for patient A who has serious symptoms, but little value for patient B who has only mild symptoms. If the two patients faced the market price of \$100/month, then A might decide the drug is worth the cost but B might forgo it, given its negligible benefit for him. With first-dollar insurance coverage, however, B might instead choose to continue taking the drug as long as the expected benefits to him were greater than zero. In this case, B's decision would inefficiently drive up health care spending at a loss to society, since the benefit of the drug would be less than the real cost.

Some would argue that such scenarios are rare because physicians should not prescribe the drug for person B if it would be wasteful or of little practical use in improving his health. But in fact physicians may not have enough information to fully evaluate the benefit to patients, and often have little incentive to limit inappropriate care to highly insured patients. Providing extra services increases their incomes and protects them from the charge that they did not take every action with conceivable benefit to the patient. Box 4-2 discusses the role of medical malpractice liability in increasing medical expenditures.

In order to quantify the moral hazard effects of first-dollar insurance coverage, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment randomized individuals into health insurance plans with different co-insurance levels. (Co-insurance refers to the percentage of health insurance spending above the deductible an individual must contribute.) A higher co-insurance level gives both the patient and the doctor greater incentive to avoid the use of drugs or procedures that are costly and have low expected benefit. The study found that changing the structure of health insurance does affect the behavior of patients and their

#### **Box 4-2: Medical Liability Costs**

Substantial costs in the U.S. health care system are associated with the medical liability system. This affects health care spending in several ways. First, the cost of malpractice damage awards, the legal costs of malpractice lawsuits, and the costs of underwriting malpractice insurance policies are passed on to providers through malpractice insurance premiums and then to patients through out-of-pocket payments and insurance premiums. Second, defensive medicine-ordering tests and procedures solely to quard against potential malpractice claims—may have an even bigger effect on health care spending than the direct costs associated with malpractice suits.

The President has called on Congress to pass liability reforms to make the system fairer and more predictable while reducing wasteful costs. The trend toward greater consumer decision making in health care may have complementary effects in reducing liability costs associated with defensive medicine. Consumers with first-dollar insurance coverage have little incentive to decline many of the tests and procedures suggested by physicians, even if they and their physicians understand that there may be very little health benefit from the increased spending. But as consumers pay for a greater portion of noncatastrophic care, they may decide to forgo expensive and unnecessary tests and procedures suggested by physicians primarily to avoid lawsuits rather than to improve patients' health.

doctors. Specifically, individuals with first-dollar coverage had 45-percent higher health expenditures than individuals who were randomly assigned insurance plans with 95-percent co-insurance up to a catastrophic out-ofpocket maximum level (the out-of-pocket maximum was about \$3,500 in today's dollars). Importantly, the extra care received in the first-dollar coverage plans produced no discernible extra health benefits in the studied sample as a whole. There were, however, some health benefits for select subpopulations of low-income and chronically ill individuals, suggesting that care should be taken not to expose lower-income families to excessively high cost sharing relative to their income, and that certain preventive measures such as chronic-disease management are important to exempt from cost sharing. For most services consumed by the majority of the population, however, the RAND study showed that higher cost sharing can be a powerful tool to induce consumers to take responsibility for focusing their health care spending on only those products and services with the highest value.

A second consequence of first-dollar insurance coverage is that consumers are less sensitive to the prices of health care consumed, an outcome that dulls the competitive forces that keep prices down in most other markets. Many insurers attempt to reduce the range of choices available to enrollees through mechanisms such as selective contracting and preferred provider networks, but such practices are even more effective when the consumer is also pricesensitive. Imagine two hospitals that provide the same service, but hospital A charges \$1,000 and is located in an older facility while hospital B charges \$2,000 but is located in an updated facility with a wide array of amenities and equipment on site. Given these choices, a consumer facing the actual price may prefer hospital A, but in a world of first-dollar coverage, most people would choose hospital B, even if the extra amenities of hospital B provided only modest benefit. As a result of this structure of incentives, health care providers may compete for patients by providing greater convenience or amenities with little incentive to control costs. This lack of price sensitivity on the part of the consumers of health care is one of the major forces underlying the rapid growth of health care costs.

A third consequence of first-dollar insurance coverage is distorted incentives for technological development. One type of distortion is that new technologies may be developed and marketed even when they are of low incremental cost-effectiveness relative to other available options. For example, if a new drug is even slightly more effective than an existing drug, a person with first-dollar insurance coverage may demand the new drug even if it is priced well above existing satisfactory and effective alternatives. When consumers have dulled price incentives pharmaceutical companies will invest in bringing a new drug to market even if it provides little new value. In a world in which most consumers had high-deductible insurance and were sensitive to the full cost of drugs, the pharmaceutical company might choose not to spend the large amount of resources necessary to complete clinical trials and bring the drug to market if they knew its incremental improvement over existing drugs would be small.

Likewise, dulled price sensitivity on the part of consumers reduces the incentive to develop cost-reducing technologies. In many other sectors of the economy, such as computer memory chips, technological progress results in cheaper and more cost-effective products each year as producers look for more-efficient manufacturing processes and product innovations to keep them ahead of their competitors. In health care, this type of technological innovation is much rarer, since few consumers have the incentive to adopt a cheaper product, particularly if it has even slightly lower effectiveness. If more health care consumers were to become price sensitive, the health care sector would have the incentive to pursue more such cost-reducing technologies that could, over the long term, help reduce the rate at which health care spending is growing.

Some observers have expressed concern that changes to the current system might be harmful if they result in reduced innovation, but these observers have often failed to distinguish cost-effective from cost-ineffective innovations. Life expectancy at birth has increased from 70 to almost 78 years since 1962. In addition to living longer, we are also enjoying more years in better health and with fewer disabilities. While some of these health improvements have been due to lifestyle changes, some can clearly be traced to medical technologies, such as those that have reduced infant mortality, improved survival rates after heart attacks, improved treatment of depression and other mental illnesses, and improved the management of chronic illnesses. Research suggests that on average our spending on new medical technology has indeed been cost-beneficial. This indicates that, as a society, we would not want to return to the health spending levels of 1960, for example, if doing so also meant returning to the types of medical care available in 1960. But economic efficiency depends on each ("marginal") individual new technology being cost-beneficial, not just the average of all technologies. The fact that on average our investment in medical technology has paid off does not preclude the possibility that our system contains significant inefficiencies, and that some of the new technology may have contributed little compared to the amounts spent on it. If consumers were given the information they need about the actual costs and benefits of various treatments, as well as the incentives to compare those costs and benefits, it might be possible to eliminate some of that wasteful spending.

## Consequences of Inefficient Health Care Spending

Rising health care spending is a burden to employers, consumers, and taxpayers. Employers who offer insurance complain that rising premiums strain their labor relations and threaten their balance sheets. Rising premiums make health insurance less affordable, contributing to the ranks of the uninsured. Those who are insured face rising out-of-pocket costs and lower cash wage growth. And taxpayers must finance the rapidly increasing costs of publicly provided health care for seniors, the disabled, and the poor.

## Private Spending


As consumers spend more of their budgets on health care, they must spend less on other goods and services. Since 1980, for example, the share of consumer spending that has gone to medical care has increased from 10 percent to 17 percent, while the shares of spending on items such as food and clothing have decreased. Of the \$7.5 trillion increase in personal income

since 1980, \$1.5 trillion has been devoted to health care. Similarly, of the \$2.19 real increase in hourly compensation over the past five years, \$0.54 (25 percent) has gone toward higher health insurance premium costs. Thus, take-home pay has grown more slowly than total compensation (including health insurance and other benefits) (Chart 4-3).

The costs of health care would be of less concern if most health care spending reflected optimal decisions by consumers weighing the costs and benefits of the services they buy. For example, the fact that consumer spending on DVDs increased 31 percent in 2004 alone has not alarmed anyone nor led to calls for government intervention. But spending on private health care is different, because health care is considered a "merit" good deserving of government support for those that cannot afford it, because of the government's extensive role in the health care market, and because of the forces that interfere with the efficient allocation of resources.

Employers have also been affected by increasing health care costs. In particular, firms that have promised generous health benefits to retirees have borne increasingly heavy costs. The economic consequences of this may include the need for restructuring of some of these firms, loss of expected benefits for some retirees, and potential costs to taxpayers if some of these retirees increase their reliance on public health insurance. Rising costs for current employees have also affected employer behaviors. Some employers have tried to reduce their insurance costs by hiring more part-time workers (who are generally

Chart 4-3 Real Hourly Compensation of the Civilian Population Health insurance spending growth exerts downward pressure on wages.



Note Middle line shows simulated wages if health insurance premiums grew at rate of inflation Includes workers in the private nonfarm economy excluding household employees and the public sector Source Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics)

ineligible for insurance benefits), asking employees to contribute more to premiums, reducing the generosity of the plans they offer, or discontinuing health insurance benefits altogether.

In the long run, however, it is not the employers but rather the workers who bear the burden of rising health insurance costs. Economists have shown that even though employers may make the bulk of the payments to cover the health insurance premiums of workers, these payments are treated just like wages or any other component of workers' total compensation. This total compensation depends on worker productivity and labor-market supply and demand. Rising insurance premiums may thus change the mix of workers' compensation by increasing health benefits and decreasing wages, but if they do not affect workers' productivity they will not lead firms in competitive markets to raise total compensation. Institutional factors such as minimumwage laws and sluggish wage adjustment may mean that health insurance premiums affect employer profits in the short run, but in the long run most or all of increases in health insurance costs are shifted to employees in the form of wages that are lower than they otherwise would have been.

## Public Spending

When per capita spending on health care rises rapidly, the pressures on government programs become particularly intense. First, if the standard of care received by enrollees in government programs is not to differ too radically from that of the general public, the costs of helping those already enrolled in the programs will rise as well. Second, rising insurance premiums may cause some people to drop private insurance and to rely instead on public insurance such as Medicaid or on safety-net providers (e.g., uncompensated hospital care) subsidized by taxpayers. Not only does rising uninsurance lead to higher government costs, but uninsured people often consume health care resources inefficiently—for example, by failing to obtain preventive care, delaying necessary care, or overusing emergency rooms relative to less-costly clinic settings.

The largest government programs that finance health care for those not otherwise insured are Medicare and Medicaid. These programs are becoming increasingly expensive to taxpayers. For example, according to projections, if current trends were to continue unchecked, Medicare costs would increase from the current share of 2.6 percent of GDP to 6.9 percent by 2050. Medicaid, jointly financed by the Federal and state governments, is also becoming an increasingly large share of budgets, with just the Federal portion of spending projected to increase from 1.5 percent of GDP today to 2.5 percent by 2050. The costs of these public programs are unsustainable under any reasonable projections. Closing the currently projected 75-year deficit in just the Hospital Insurance (HI) portion of Medicare would require

tax increases of 107 percent or benefits reductions of 48 percent. Ultimately, the benefits paid by these programs must be significantly pared back, the taxes dedicated to their support must be increased, or major reforms must be enacted that slow the rate of growth in health care spending.

## Strengthening the Role of Health Consumers Through Public Policy

This chapter has discussed the central role of first-dollar insurance coverage in dulling the incentives for consumers to shop carefully for cost-effective health care. By giving consumers both the incentives and the information needed to become better shoppers for health care, public policy can help control the growth in health care costs and improve the efficiency of the use of health care resources.

The President has proposed a wide-range of measures to help make health care more efficient and accessible, such as improving community health centers, reforming medical liability laws, creating Association Health Plans for small businesses, allowing insurance to be more portable and purchased more easily across state lines, and many other reforms. This section will focus specifically on proposals that help improve incentives for consumers.

An important policy advance has aimed to reduce the bias toward firstdollar insurance coverage by allowing more out-of-pocket health care expenditures to be paid with pretax dollars through the innovative mechanism of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). Complementary initiatives to improve information available to consumers for making appropriate health care choices can help facilitate the movement toward HSA-based consumerdirected health care.

The potential benefits of reforms that slow spending growth could be great. Consider a scenario in which new policies successfully reduce future national health spending by one percentage point per year, through a combination of short-run quantity decreases, medium-term price decreases, and long-run increases in cost-reducing technological change. If spending were to grow by 6 percent per year, instead of by 7 percent per year as currently projected, by 2025 the expected health share of GDP would be reduced from 22 percent to 18 percent, a substantial difference.

## Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)

HSAs are tax-favored accounts to which individuals can contribute funds they can then use to pay current and future out-of-pocket medical expenses. These accounts were signed into law by the President in 2003 and went into effect in 2004. HSAs represent a major improvement over previous taxpreferred medical spending accounts such as Flexible Spending Arrangements (which must be exhausted each year, a factor that limits their use) and Health Reimbursement Accounts (which are owned by employers, not consumers). In contrast, HSAs are owned by individual consumers regardless of employer, and unused account balances can be retained and grow from year-to-year without penalty. HSAs are designed to be used in conjunction with highdeductible health plans, defined as plans having minimum deductibles (currently \$1,050 for individuals and \$2,100 for families) with annual outof-pocket limits (currently no more than \$5,250 or \$10,500 for individuals and families, respectively). Deductibles and out-of-pocket limits are indexed to adjust over time with inflation. Certain types of preventive care may be provided with first-dollar coverage if deemed appropriate by the insurer.

HSA enrollees with qualifying insurance plans may contribute annually up to the lesser of the plan deductible or \$2,700 (individuals)/ \$5,450 (family). These contributions are excluded from income taxes both at the time of deposit and at the time of "qualifying" withdrawal; the funds may be used to pay for out-of-pocket medical expenditures, rolled over indefinitely, or withdrawn after age 65 (in which case they are taxed as ordinary income if not used for health expenditures).

A key benefit of HSAs is that they lower the previous tax bias toward low-deductible or first-dollar health insurance relative to higher-deductible policies with higher out-of-pocket spending. To illustrate this point, consider a sample health insurance purchaser facing the choice of a low-, medium-, or high-deductible plan. Table 4-1 illustrates how this person's premiums depend on the plans' deductibles, according to actuarial estimates for a representative person. The premium for a \$250 (low) deductible policy with a \$2,000 out-of-pocket limit would be \$4,000, but that premium could be lowered by \$1,600 (or 40 percent) by moving to a catastrophic policy with a \$2,500 (high) deductible and an out-of-pocket limit of \$5,000. Suppose that this person had no health expenditures in the first year of coverage, but a \$15,000 catastrophic event in the second year. How is her total two-year spending on health care under these plans affected by the tax code?

- If there are no tax preferences: If she buys the traditional (low deductible) plan, her spending is \$4,000 in premiums in each year plus \$2,000 out-of-pocket in year two, totaling \$10,000. If she buys the catastrophic (high deductible) plan, her spending is \$2,400 in premiums in each year plus \$5,000 out-of-pocket in year two, totaling \$9,800. Thus, she would be slightly better off financially under the catastrophic plan in the absence of tax preferences.
- If insurance premiums (but not out-of-pocket spending) are tax-preferred: Under the traditional plan, if she is in the 30-percent marginal tax

TABLE 4-1.— The Premiums Charged for Three Sample Health Insurance Plans with Different Patient Cost Sharing

	Examples of Three Insurance Plans		
	Low Deductible	Medium Deductible	High Deductible
Premium	\$4,000	\$3,500	\$2,400
Deductible	\$250 20% \$2,000	\$1,000 20% \$3,000	\$2,500 20% \$5,000

The premiums in this table represent the actuarial value of each plan for a representative enrollee.

bracket, she receives a \$2,400 tax subsidy (over two years), but under the catastrophic plan she only receives a \$1,440 tax subsidy. Thus, the tax subsidy makes her prefer the traditional plan where she might otherwise have preferred the catastrophic plan.

• If tax-preferred HSAs are available: If she contributes the maximum \$2,500 to the HSA in both years, she would receive a new \$1,500 tax subsidy by using the HSA to pay her out-of-pocket expenses in year two with tax-free dollars. This mitigates the previous tax-induced bias against catastrophic plans, again making her better off financially under the catastrophic policy.

This illustration of course simplifies many dimensions of the comparison between policies. For example, it ignores the fact that catastrophic events are rare, so that most people would be able to accumulate many more years of premium and HSA savings, further increasing the attractiveness of the HSAqualified plans. In addition, the example ignores the moral hazard effect of reduced health care utilization in the catastrophic plan, as the patient now has increased incentive to shop carefully for health care.

Not all individuals will benefit equally from moving to a high-deductible policy. First, some poorly informed consumers may forgo recommended care, such as preventive services—care that they might have received under a traditional low-deductible policy. The HSA provision that allows plans to waive the deductible for preventive care is designed to mitigate this possibility. Second, some chronically ill individuals with persistently high spending may be relatively worse off, to the extent that high-deductible policies lead to less cross-subsidization from healthier people in their risk pool. This could be mitigated while preserving the beneficial effects of cost sharing, for example, through improved insurance benefits for the chronically ill, differential premium cross-subsidies in employer insurance, or targeted high-risk-pool subsidies in the individual market. Third, credit-constrained enrollees and those in lower tax brackets will benefit less from provisions allowing tax-free HSA contributions and accumulation. This is also true of the tax exclusion for employer health insurance premiums. These concerns must be balanced against the potential benefits of greater price sensitivity by health care consumers: As more consumers shift into high-deductible plans, there is greater potential for slowing price growth and long-run increases in cost-reducing technology, which could benefit even consumers in traditional insurance plans.

Since the inception of HSAs in 2004, the number of people enrolled in high-deductible HSA-qualified plans has increased rapidly. The new tax benefits that further lower health costs for high-deductible plans have made them attractive not only to the uninsured and small businesses, but to large firms as well. Although HSAs are new enough that comprehensive data are difficult to obtain, as of January 2006, at least 3 million people were covered by HSA-qualified plans sold by insurance company members of the industry group America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP). Of the people covered by AHIP-related plans, about half purchased their plans in the individual market and 14 percent through small businesses.

Additional tax-code changes could make high-deductible HSA-qualified plans even more attractive and affordable, further strengthening incentives for more consumers to be well-informed, cost-conscious health care decision makers. The President's 2007 budget aims to expand HSAs through proposals that include:

- Raising the HSA contribution limits up to the plan out-of-pocket maximum. Current law allows contributions only up to the deductible level, which is often less than half of the out-of-pocket maximum. This change would further limit the tax-induced bias against out-of-pocket spending for medical care. It would also increase the attractiveness of HSA-qualified plans, in particular for the chronically ill who have a higher probability of out-of-pocket spending above their deductible.
- Further reducing disparities in tax treatment of HSA contributions versus insurance premiums. Currently, individual contributions to HSAs are excluded from income taxes but not payroll taxes (employer contributions are excluded from both). The President proposes to provide a new income tax credit equal to the payroll taxes paid on the HSA contribution amounts. This will further remove distortions that have encouraged first-dollar insurance coverage. When combined with the first new proposal discussed above, Americans with HSAs would be able to pay all of their out-of-pocket expenses with pretax earnings.
- Equalizing tax preferences for purchasing HSA-qualified insurance in the employer and individual markets. The President proposes to exclude from income taxes the value of HSA-qualified insurance premiums if

purchased on the individual market. In addition, taxpayers purchasing these policies on the individual market would receive a new income tax credit equal to the payroll taxes paid on the premium amounts. Thus, all taxpayers would receive the same tax treatment of HSA-qualified insurance premiums, even if working for one of the 40 percent of employers that do not offer health benefits.

- · Helping the chronically ill. In addition to allowing all out-of-pocket expenses to be paid tax-free through an HSA, the President also proposes allowing employers to make larger HSA contributions for their chronically ill employees so that employers can make HSA-qualified plans equally attractive to all employees regardless of health status. Finally, the President proposes \$500 million in annual grants to states to test innovative solutions to subsidize insurance for the chronically ill, in order to enhance the functioning of markets for individual insurance. For example, states could use the funds for risk-adjusted premium subsidy programs, or for creative enhancements of state high-risk pools such as funding HSA accounts for enrollees.
- Enhancing affordability via a tax credit for low-income people purchasing HSA-qualified insurance in the individual market. The credit would be worth up to \$1,000 for one adult, \$2,000 for two adults, or \$3,000 for families (not exceeding 90 percent of the premium). It would phase out at incomes of \$30,000 for individuals and \$60,000 for families. The credit would be advanceable, paid directly by the government at the time of insurance purchase.

### Informed Consumers Are Better Consumers

It is important to provide incentives for consumers to choose health care providers and services sensibly, but providing those incentives does not guarantee that consumers will in fact be able to make good choices. Consumers must also have access to the information they need to make good health care decisions. Key information includes:

• Provider prices. Few medical providers today advertise their prices in a way that allows for comparison shopping. Several insurers have taken an important step by beginning to make available schedules of physician fees to their enrollees. Hospital fees raise more-difficult issues, since prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers are frequently subject to confidentiality agreements, despite the fact that consumers eventually observe the prices on bills presented to them after the fact. Of even greater use to consumers would be information on "package prices" for complete treatments of medical bundles or episodes. For example, a knee replacement without unusual complications might have ten major components of care, each of which is now billed separately. A package price for the entire treatment would provide an estimated cost for the entire operation, hospitalization, and follow-up treatment. This information could be combined with revised billing procedures, which would allow patients to identify more easily the costs associated with the treatment they had received. The President strongly supports efforts to increase price transparency in the health care market. He has called for hospitals, physician groups, insurers, employers, and other health groups to cooperate in speeding the transition toward a market in which Americans can easily obtain user-friendly and comparable information on prices when shopping for health care.

• Data on provider quality and value. Price information by itself is not sufficient for good decision making in the absence of comparative quality data. There is growing interest in providing accurate and usable measures of the quality of care offered by individual health care providers such as hospitals and physician groups. Great progress has been made by researchers in improving the methodology for developing reliable measures, and insurers are now helping to improve the effective dissemination of such data. Measures that combine price and quality data into indicators of overall value are not yet as well developed, but would be another useful decision-making tool.

Better information would also be of use to providers of medical services, who would then be better able to help their patients make sound, cost-effective decisions. Examples include:

- Practice guidelines. One key barrier to more-efficient health care spending is the lack of a research base on the appropriate treatment in many medical situations. There is a clear role for government in this area. For example, the Agency for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ) is sponsoring comparative effectiveness research studies relating to medical practice, as authorized under the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act. Such research can produce high returns in terms of improved health care efficiency. Further work to translate such guidelines into educational materials for health care consumers would also greatly enhance the ability of consumers to make wise health care choices.
- Cost-effectiveness studies. If the usage of expensive but low-value technologies is to be reduced by the actions of better-informed consumers in consultation with their doctors, then more information is needed about the cost-effectiveness of various technologies and procedures, and about how cost-effectiveness depends on particular factors such as the patient's age and specific condition. Private insurers sponsor some such studies, but the private sector will tend to underinvest in this type of "public good" research. Government support for research in this area, such as the research being conducted by agencies such as AHRQ, has a strong economic justification.

### Conclusion

As the United States grows richer and older and as new life-saving technologies develop, Americans are likely to continue to spend a rising share of their growing incomes on health. Indeed, our health care spending overall has returned good value, with Americans living longer and healthier lives. We could achieve this improved health at lower cost, however, by promoting a greater role for consumer decision making in health. Health Savings Accounts provide one tool for doing so, by leveling the playing field for people who prefer to save money by moving toward higher-deductible health insurance policies. As health researchers, the insurance industry, and government work to develop better consumer decision-making tools, more consumers will be able to benefit from moving to such plans. In the long run, the payoff to allocating health care resources toward higher-value and more cost-effective care would be great.

# The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective

All governments face two important decisions. They must choose the scope and scale of public goods and services to provide for their citizens, including national defense, public safety, education, law enforcement, and social insurance. They must also decide how to collect the funds to finance those public services, including what things to tax and at what rate to tax them. These tax policy decisions affect job creation, the allocation of resources, economic efficiency, economic growth, and ultimately the living standards of their citizens. In this chapter, we examine U.S. choices in the context of the varied choices of other countries around the world.

Recent calls for fundamental tax reform reflect long-standing public frustration with the complexity of the U.S. system and dissatisfaction with its economic effects. Last year's *Economic Report of the President* outlined the need for tax reform and evaluated several prototypes for reform. The President created a bipartisan Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform that spent the year evaluating the current tax system and recommended two options for reform. This chapter provides a broader context for evaluating these and other potential reforms.

This chapter makes three essential points:

- Every country makes fundamental choices about its tax system: what level of overall tax burden to impose, what to tax, and what tax rates to apply. These choices matter because they have important economic consequences that affect the living standards of their citizens.
- The United States has made different choices than other countries: We have a relatively low tax burden, and we finance more of that burden with a tax on personal income instead of consumption.
- When viewed in an international perspective, the U.S. system has been improved by some significant changes but could benefit greatly from others, particularly those focused on reforming the taxation of capital income.

## Fundamental Choices in Tax Systems

The two fundamental questions that must be answered in designing a tax system to raise revenue for government expenditures are what to tax (the "base") and how much to tax it (the "rates"). Public discussion of tax policy often also focuses on the distributional consequences of these decisions, which

are certainly important. However, economists point out that the answers to these two fundamental questions have equally important implications for the economic decisions made by individuals and small and large businesses, and thus for the overall performance of the economy. In this section we discuss these tax policy choices and their effects on economic decisions.

## Designing a Tax System

Governments choose the size and scope of the public services they wish to provide and the corresponding level of spending required. At the same time, they choose how to finance that spending, through a combination of taxation and borrowing. The use of borrowing (deficits) to finance government spending has varied over time, and the optimal level depends on many factors. For example, economists have argued that it is reasonable to borrow to finance temporary increases in spending (e.g., during times of war or to provide aid after a disaster) or temporary declines in revenue (as in a recession). In any case, the cost of government borrowing must ultimately be financed by tax revenues, and so we focus here on the tax system.

Every tax system is defined by two factors: the tax base and the tax rate structure. The base defines what is subject to taxation and the rate determines what portion is taken in tax. We begin by considering two of the most common tax bases used: income and consumption.

A tax system with a pure income tax base is designed to tax all of the resources that increase a taxpayer's ability to consume, regardless of what that taxpayer actually does consume. Taxable income under this system includes all wage and salary income, interest income, and dividends, and also can include increases in wealth such as unrealized capital gains and noncash income such as the implicit rental value of owner-occupied housing. In short, under a pure income-based tax system, all income plus all increases in wealth can be subject to taxation.

A consumption-based tax system, in contrast, taxes only the share of income that is consumed, exempting the share that is saved. Examples of consumption-based tax systems, such as a national retail sales tax, a valueadded tax, a consumption-based Flat Tax, or a consumed-income tax, were presented in Chapter 3 of the 2005 Economic Report of the President, which addressed "Options for Tax Reform."

The U.S. tax system is neither a pure income tax nor a pure consumption tax, but rather a hybrid of the two. Although nominally based on income, the U.S. system excludes significant portions of the return to savings from the tax base (e.g., interest earned on assets held in a 401(k) employment-based retirement plan or an Individual Retirement Account). The U.S. system also excludes other forms of income from the tax base, two key examples being the premiums paid by employers for employee health insurance and the implicit rental value of owner-occupied housing.

Another central aspect of designing a tax base is the treatment of international activity, both of foreigners acting within U.S. borders and of U.S. citizens and corporations conducting business abroad. Currently, the United States applies its income tax, in principle, on a worldwide basis, taxing all income earned by U.S. residents on their economic activity in the United States and the rest of the world, and allowing a limited credit for taxes paid to foreign governments. Taxing on a worldwide basis means the U.S. applies its tax to all economic activity in the country (regardless of the nationality of ownership) and to all activity of U.S. residents and U.S.-owned companies (regardless of the country in which that activity occurs). The United States could, alternatively, tax on a territorial basis, taxing all income earned within U.S. borders regardless of the nationality of the person or corporations earning the income, but not taxing income earned abroad. Territorial tax treatment would exclude from the tax base all foreign earnings of U.S. residents (both individuals and corporations). With increasing competition among the United States and other countries for economic activity, this choice also has important implications for economic growth and efficiency.

In addition to choosing the tax base, the tax authorities must also determine the tax rate structure. This choice has significant effects on both the efficiency and the equity of the tax system. Countries might choose one tax rate to apply to the entire tax base, or a progressive schedule of tax rates, with higher rates applying to those with greater resources. A key determinant of the effect of the tax system on the efficiency of the economy is the tax rate that is applied to the incremental use of resources—such as an additional dollar of income or an additional dollar of consumption. This marginal tax rate is important because it affects the taxpayers' incentives, and thus their economic behavior, inducing them to make decisions that are different from those they might have made in the absence of the tax. These "distortions" of behavior (relative to the no-tax benchmark) are the major channel through which the tax system affects the efficiency of the economy.

## Taxes Distort Economic Decisions

Virtually all forms of taxation distort economic decision making because they change the cost of allocating resources to different uses. Those distortions have a real economic cost that goes beyond the burden of the tax being paid. The reduction in economic efficiency generated by the changes in economic behavior that a tax induces is called the *excess burden* of the tax. The excess burden imposed by a tax increases dramatically as the marginal tax rate increases. A standard demonstration in economics textbooks is that excess

burden is proportional to the square of the tax rate, so that doubling the marginal tax rate roughly quadruples the excess burden of the tax. This relationship between marginal tax rates and economic efficiency is the reason that tax systems with broad bases and low rates are generally considered the most efficient way to raise revenue.

Of course, the tax rate specified in statute may not correspond with what businesses and individuals actually pay in taxes because of exemptions, deductions, and credits that reduce their tax burden. The effective tax rate that people pay (and that drives their behavior) may thus be lower than the statutory rate. Designing a tax system involves choosing the statutory tax rates, defining the tax base including any exemptions and deductions, and specifying tax credits. The combination of those choices determines the effective tax rate that people and firms pay, and that can alter their behavior and cause distortions in the economy. In the next section we discuss the distortions created by different tax systems.

## Tax Systems and Economic Distortions

The complexities of modern tax systems can change many decisions made by individuals and businesses alike. For example, individuals choose how much they work, the forms of compensation they receive (such as wages or health insurance), how much they save, and whether they own or rent a home. Businesses must choose how many workers to hire, where to locate workers and capital assets around the world, the types of assets in which to invest, and the means of financing these assets (e.g., debt, equity, or retained earnings). Taxes can affect all of these decisions.

The choice between an income-based and a consumption-based tax system affects the labor market decisions of workers, the savings decisions of families, and the behavior of entrepreneurs. For example, a worker facing a marginal tax rate of 40 percent on income (who would thus take home only \$6 for an additional \$10 earned) may decide to work less than someone who faces a marginal tax rate of 20 percent (and would thus take home \$8 for an additional \$10 earned).

Relative to a consumption tax base, the use of an income tax base increases the costs to individuals of saving for the future, as detailed in Chapter 3 of the 2005 Economic Report of the President. A tax system with the property of static efficiency does not distort the choices that people make about how to allocate resources today (for example, it does not affect their decision about whether to consume apples or oranges). A system with the property of dynamic efficiency does not distort the choice of how to allocate resources between today and tomorrow (it does not affect the choice between consuming apples today and consuming apples in the future).

Consumption-based taxes are more likely to be dynamically efficient than income-based taxes. Someone earning a higher return on a savings account can expect to consume more in the future for each dollar saved, and is thus likely to save more. Taxing savings (as is done in a pure income-based system) makes future consumption relatively more costly, which leads people to save and invest less, with adverse consequences for economic growth.

Further distortions are introduced into the U.S. economy by the separate taxation of corporate income, rather than integration of taxation of corporate and personal income. Corporate profits are essentially taxed twice, first under the corporate income tax and again under the personal income tax when corporate profits are paid out as dividends. The result is a higher tax on income earned in the corporate sector than that earned elsewhere in the economy. For corporate income that is paid out as dividends, the combined tax rate can be remarkably high: as much as 35 percent at the corporate level and another 15 percent through the individual income tax, considering Federal taxes alone. Including state tax rates and accounting for deductibility, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates the U.S. combined tax rate can be as high as 50.8 percent. This double-taxation of corporate income creates both static and dynamic inefficiencies. It is also inconsistent with either a pure income tax base or a pure consumption tax base.

The U.S. tax code also makes it costlier for firms to make some kinds of investments than others, leading to additional distortions of economic decision making. For example, investment financed from prior earnings (equity) and investment financed from borrowing (debt) are taxed differently, various assets are subject to different depreciation rules, and dividend income received by shareholders is taxed differently from capital gains. There are also ways that U.S. firms can reduce their effective tax rate by deferring their tax payments. Each of these differences affects the choices that businesses make about where and how much to invest.

Finally, the U.S. application of a worldwide tax base affects firms' decisions about where to locate and where to make investments. Foreign-sourced income of U.S. companies is taxable, but the credits taxpayers receive for foreign taxes paid are not applied uniformly. There are limits to the amount of foreign tax credit a firm can claim, which can create incentives for firms to change their investment and business activity patterns across countries based on international tax rates. Under this worldwide system, U.S. firms operating in a foreign country may eventually be liable for not just that host country's taxes, but also for U.S. taxes under some circumstances. Competitors from countries taxing on a territorial basis are not subject to this U.S. tax, and therefore may have a competitive advantage, all else being equal.

More generally, the tax treatment of the foreign-source income of U.S. multinationals under the current worldwide system is widely thought to be one of the most complex aspects of U.S. taxation. This complexity itself imposes a burden on these companies, causing them to allocate substantial resources to tax planning and compliance. With globalization and the increasing importance of international capital flows, the distortions and complexity generated by the current U.S. system are increasingly costly to the U.S. economy.

## U.S. Tax Policy in International Perspective

In this section we examine the choices the United States has made about the size of the national tax burden, the forms of taxation to employ, and the tax rates applied. We compare these choices to those made by other countries and show that the United States has a relatively low overall tax burden, and its choices about which tax sources to rely upon differ substantially. Recent reforms in other countries are highlighted.

## International Comparison of Overall Tax Burdens

A common measure of the overall tax burden is the ratio of total taxes paid to all levels of government to the gross domestic product (GDP). This share represents the fraction of the total output of the economy that is taken in taxes in any given year, or the average tax rate. This measure of overall tax burden is particularly useful for international comparisons. First, it is unaffected by international differences in national versus subnational government responsibilities. Second, it adjusts for differences in the overall size of the countries' economies.

Among countries in the OECD, the United States has a relatively low total tax burden (including Federal, state, and local taxes). Total taxes in the United States at all levels of government amounted to 26.4 percent of GDP in 2002, substantially lower than the OECD average of 36.3 percent. This share is also below the European Union (EU) average of 40.6 percent.


Chart 5-1 uses OECD data from 2002 to illustrate the average tax rates (total taxes as a share of GDP) for the 15 largest countries of the OECD. Only Mexico, Korea, and Japan had total tax burdens smaller than that of the United States in 2002. OECD countries such as Sweden and Denmark, on the other hand, had tax burdens that were as much as 20 percentage points of GDP higher than that of the United States.

The United States faces a significant fiscal challenge in keeping the overall tax burden low in the future. Growth in Federal entitlement spending if not checked, threatens to require substantial increases in taxes, significantly altering the tax choices the United States has made in the past. Box 5-1 provides an overview of this fiscal challenge and its implications for tax policy.

Chart 5-1 Tax Revenues as a Percent of GDP for the OECD Countries in 2002

The United States has a relatively small total tax burden and uses personal income taxes to collect a larger share of total revenue than most other countries.





Note. The countries shown have the 15 largest economies in the OECD. Mexico's personal and corporate tax revenues are combined, as they were not available separately.

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

## International Comparison of Tax Bases and Rate Structures

Beyond different choices about the scope and size of government, the OECD countries have also made different choices about the tax systems used to raise funds. Almost all of the OECD countries use some mix of personal income, corporate income, payroll, sales, and other taxes (e.g., estate and excise taxes), but they differ significantly in their degree of reliance on each. Chart 5-1 illustrates the composition of each country's tax revenue sources: personal income taxes, taxes on goods and services (consumption taxes), social security taxes, corporate income taxes, and other taxes.

The United States relies more heavily on personal income taxation than other OECD countries do. Indeed, in 2002 the United States collected 37.7 percent of its total taxes through the personal income tax compared to an OECD average of 26.0 percent. Given this difference, one might then ask how other countries finance their spending. The primary alternative tax base is consumption. OECD countries collected an average of 31.9 percent of total revenues from taxes on goods and services, mainly through value-added taxes (VATs). A VAT is a tax applied to the gross receipts earned by sellers of products, but sellers receive a tax credit for taxes paid on the inputs they use, so the tax effectively applies only to the value that they themselves added in the

#### Box 5-1: Fiscal Challenges Ahead

U.S. Federal tax revenues and Federal expenditures have remained fairly stable as a share of national output (GDP) over the past four decades. Despite this overall stability, substantial changes have occurred in the composition of both revenues and expenditures. These expenditure trends in particular foreshadow a major fiscal challenge facing the United States.

Total Federal revenues have averaged 18.2 percent of GDP since the 1960s, with only modest variation around that average, although the composition of revenues has shifted toward payroll taxes and away from excise and corporate income taxes. As discussed in this chapter, the income tax base and rates have changed many times during this period, but the overall contribution of income taxes to total revenues has been fairly stable.

Total Federal outlays since the 1960s have also remained close to the long-run average of about 20.4 percent of GDP, despite many changes in the economy and the mix of government programs that have occurred since 1962. This stability masks important underlying trends, however, in the composition of expenditures. The share of GDP and of the government's budget allocated to spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security has risen steadily, while the share devoted to defense has fallen. If the growth of spending on these programs goes unchecked, there will soon be a major break in the generally stable fiscal situation that the United States has enjoyed for most of the postwar period.

The cost to the Federal government of these three entitlement programs is expected to rise from 8.0 percent of GDP today to about 15.6 percent of GDP in 2045. In 2005, all other spending programs of the Federal government, excluding interest payments on the national debt, amounted to 9.0 percent of GDP. With this growth, and other programs remaining constant as a share of GDP, in 2045 the Federal budget excluding interest on the debt will consume 24.6 percent of the GDP, compared to 17.0 percent today, with continuing increases beyond that date. Adding back interest on the national debt could make the share of GDP absorbed by the Federal budget even larger.

The implications of these trends are grave. If the major entitlement programs grow as forecast, future generations will be forced to choose between massive tax increases, near-elimination of all government programs outside of entitlements (including defense and essential services), or some combination.

making of the product. Only 17.6 percent of U.S. tax revenues came from taxes on goods and services in 2002, primarily through state and local sales and excise taxes. Recall, however, that the personal income tax is actually a hybrid income-consumption tax, so that some of the taxes collected through the U.S. income tax system, and those of other countries, might be thought of as taxes on consumption.


The United States has also made different choices about the marginal tax rate structure to impose on its tax base. Chart 5-2 shows the top marginal personal income and corporate income tax rates in various OECD countries, including the 15 largest OECD economies and Ireland. The black bars illustrate the personal rate and the gray bars illustrate the corporate rate. The chart shows the OECD's "all-in" definition of the top rate, which includes taxes collected by all levels of government and the employee portion of the social security tax. The top marginal personal income tax rate of 43 percent in the United States is comparable to that of several of the OECD countries such as the United Kingdom (41 percent), and slightly lower than those in France (47 percent) and Japan (48 percent), which matches the OECD average (48 percent), and significantly below the rates in Germany and the Scandinavian countries (all 55 percent or higher). At the same time, the United States has a combined (Federal and state) marginal corporate income tax rate of 39 percent, well above the OECD average of 30 percent, and second highest to that of Japan.

Chart 5-2 illustrates several important points. First, while the U.S. top individual income tax rate is comparable to those of other OECD countries, its top corporate rate is relatively high. Second, except for Mexico, each country's top personal rate is higher than its top corporate rate. Third, there is no clear correlation between the top personal and corporate tax rates. Ireland, for example, has a moderately high personal rate but a very low corporate rate, while Germany has high rates in both cases.

The United States has also chosen to tax on a worldwide basis, as discussed above, unlike some other countries. In 2003, 13 of 30 OECD countries taxed on a worldwide basis, including Japan, Korea, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. The majority of OECD countries (17 countries in 2003) tax on a territorial basis, including Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.

Finally, the United States has made different choices about the integration of personal and corporate income tax structures. The United States uses a classical system, which taxes corporate and personal income separately, based on the status of corporations as separate legal entities. This results in the double taxation of income earned in the corporate sector. Other countries using this system include Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Alternatives to the classical system provide some form of dividend tax relief, thereby avoiding

Chart 5-2 Top Marginal Personal and Corporate Tax Rates for the OECD Countries in 2004 The United States has a relatively high top corporate tax rate and a moderately low personal income tax rate in comparison with other large economies in the OECD.



Note: The countries shown include the 15 largest OECD economies plus Ireland, which is interesting because of its relatively low corporate tax rate. The personal rates are the OECD's "all-in" (top marginal) tax rates, which are calculated as the additional central and subcentral government personal income tax, plus employee social security contribution. resulting from a unit increase in gross wage earnings. The corporate rates are the OECD's top combined central and subcentral government rates, with the deductibility of subcentral government taxes taken into account. Source. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

or reducing double taxation. Under the imputation system, shareholders are given a personal income tax credit for tax paid by the corporation on that portion of its profit. Countries using imputation systems (wholly or partially) include Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Another alternative is the dividend exclusion method, under which a portion of dividends paid to individuals is excluded from tax at the individual level. Countries using this method include Germany, France, Finland, and Italy. A final method that can be used to avoid double taxation of dividend income is to apply a two-rate system. Under this approach, distributed corporate profits (paid out in dividends) and undistributed profits are taxed at two different rates with undistributed profits taxed at a higher rate. The extent to which this approach eliminates the double taxation of dividend income depends on the rates chosen.

## Recent International Tax Reforms

We begin by reviewing several common trends in recent tax reforms that have been adopted by a diverse set of nations. We then examine the implications of these reforms for international tax competition and for reform of the U.S. system.

## International Tax Reform Trends

According to the OECD, most countries making changes in their tax systems since 1999 have lowered personal and corporate income tax rates. Those rate reductions were often financed, at least in part, by base broadening. Within this overall pattern of lower personal and corporate income tax rates, there are four discernible trends.

One clear trend among OECD countries is reducing the taxation of wage and salary income. These taxes have been reduced through both rate reductions and increases in taxable income thresholds. The OECD average "all in" tax rate for a full-time production worker fell from 25.6 percent in 2000 to 24.8 percent in 2003. The corresponding marginal tax rate fell from 35.4 percent to 34.3 percent. Among G-8 countries since the year 2000, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States have all lowered personal income tax rates that apply to wage and salary income. Changes in the tax brackets and rate structures generally made these tax systems less progressive, although accompanying changes in exemptions, deductions, and credits complicate the distributional picture.

A second trend is *reducing the tax rates applied to corporate income*. The OECD average corporate income tax rate fell from 33.6 percent in 2000 to 30.8 percent in 2003. As in the case of wage and salary taxation, these rate reductions have typically been accompanied by base-broadening measures. Since 1999, the G-8 countries of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan all reduced their corporate tax rates.

A third trend is *reducing the taxation of capital income* (especially capital gains and dividends) under the personal income tax. Top marginal tax rates on dividend income (corporate plus personal) fell over the period 2000-2003 among OECD countries from 50.1 percent to 46.4 percent. Reforms in Italy, Japan, and the United States, in particular, all reduced the personal income tax rates applied to interest, dividends, or capital gains. Six of the G-8 countries have also altered their tax systems to better coordinate their personal and corporate income taxes. Several countries of the EU, including France, Germany, and Italy, applied partial dividend exclusions, and Russia lowered its dividend tax rate.

A fourth trend is the increasing popularity of *flat rate* income tax schedules. Since the mid-1990s, eight Eastern European countries, including Russia, have adopted income taxes with flat rate structures. The personal tax rates among these eight reform countries range from a low of 12 percent in Georgia to a high of 33 percent in Lithuania, and average 20.6 percent. On the corporate income side, the tax rates range from a low of 10 percent in Serbia to a high of 24 percent in both Estonia and Russia, and average 17.9 percent. Countries adopting these flat income tax structures tend to also apply value-added taxes at relatively high rates, typically 18%.

## Evidence on International Tax Competition

Evaluating the U.S. tax system in relation to other national tax systems is particularly important in a world where nations compete for business and mobile capital (including physical, financial, and human capital) by making their tax systems more attractive. A recent review of evidence on international tax competition suggests a systematic change in the pattern of tax rate setting. From 1982 to 1999, there was a substantial increase in international capital mobility, reflected in the amount of foreign direct investment (purchase of buildings, machinery, and equipment) and other measures of the flow of international capital. At the same time, statutory corporate tax rates (tax rates established in the law) declined all around the world and corporate tax bases were broadened, resulting in little change in effective average rates. An exception to that general rule is that effective tax rates for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms located in small countries fell sharply between 1992 and 2000.

While the United States reduced its top combined corporate tax rate from 50 percent in 1982 to 39 percent in 2005, as measured by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, other countries have made even more significant reductions. The United States now has the second highest combined corporate income tax rate among OECD countries, behind only Japan. With international tax rates falling overall, and a convergence between rates applied by large and small countries, the United States risks becoming less competitive in attracting capital. As capital becomes more mobile, it is increasingly easy for companies to move their productive activities, including physical capital, export/import operations, research and development activities, and other forms of knowledge creation, around the world in response to tax incentives. (Chapter 7, The History and Future of International Trade, discusses the role of global engagement in firm performance.) In the current environment of international tax competition, the United States will be increasingly challenged as the destination of choice for internationally mobile capital and jobs.

## U.S. Tax Reforms: Past, Present, and Future

Reform of the U.S. tax system can play a critical role in improving economic efficiency and the competitiveness of U.S. firms In this section, we examine past tax-reform efforts in the United States, starting with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), and project potential future reforms. We focus in particular on reform of the U.S. tax base and on the taxation of savings or the return to savings, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains.

## Twenty Years of Tax Reform

The U.S tax code has many provisions that give preferential treatment to certain types of income. In some instances, these preferences may improve efficiency, such as incentives to increase retirement saving or investment in new equipment that offset distortions introduced by the income tax system. In other cases, tax preferences intentionally distort economic decisions in order to promote certain kinds of economic activity, such as the introduction of tax credits that subsidize advanced education, labor market participation, research and experimentation, or the employment of disadvantaged workers. These provisions narrow the tax base and result in higher marginal tax rates for at least some taxpayers. They also add complexity to the tax code. The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform illustrated the trade-off between tax rates and the tax base in the current U.S. tax system. Their calculations suggest that with a broader tax base, tax rates in all tax brackets could be reduced by about a third. Multiple changes to the tax base in the last two decades reflect this tension.

## The Effect of Recent Reforms on the Tax Base

We have ample evidence from the last two decades that tax policy is always evolving. The last comprehensive U.S. tax reform was the Tax Reform Act of 1986. That reform was revenue-neutral, broadening income tax bases and lowering marginal tax rates dramatically. TRA86 actually built on reductions in marginal tax rates that began in 1981 when the top rate was reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent. Under the base-broadening provisions of TRA86, marginal tax rates were reduced further, with the top rate cut to 28 percent. Rates applied to different types of income were also made more uniform. For example, one study estimated that effective capital tax rates (taking into account depreciation schedules and other tax provisions that differ across types of capital) prior to TRA86 ranged from a 45.6 percent tax on income from industrial buildings to a 3.3 percent subsidy of income from general industrial machinery. After TRA86 those effective tax rates converged to 37 percent and 38 percent, respectively. Leveling the playing field in this way reduces the distortions to investment across various forms of capital. While TRA86 made effective tax rates more similar across types of capital income, it also raised the overall cost of capital, which likely discouraged investment and reduced dynamic efficiency.

Since TRA86, there have been more than 100 different acts of Congress making nearly 15,000 changes to the tax code. These changes have altered both the individual and the corporate tax bases. Some changes have narrowed

the tax base (such as the 1997 repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax for small business and the 2001 increase in the standard deduction for joint filers), while others have broadened it (such as the 1990 and 1993 limits on itemized deductions and the 1993 expansion of the taxability of Social Security benefits). Other reforms have changed the tax rates applied to this base, such as the rate reductions enacted in 2001 and accelerated in 2003. The introduction and expansion of numerous tax credits, such as the Child, HOPE, Lifetime Learning, Welfare to Work, and Renewal Communities credits, have narrowed the base and introduced disparities in tax rates applied to different types of income.

Disparities in effective marginal tax rates on capital are once again quite large, varying with the method by which capital is financed and by the type of asset. A recent study finds that the effective tax rate on corporations ranges between a tax of 36.1 percent on equity-financed activity to a subsidy of 6.4 percent of debt-financed activity. Furthermore, that study finds that the effective marginal tax rate varies from a high of 36.9 percent to a low of 9.2 percent, depending on the asset type. The current piecemeal tax system is thus both complex and inefficient. In the following section, we examine potential reforms to address these issues.

## Potential Reforms to the Tax System

The increasingly globalized business environment in which U.S. investors and firms operate makes the design of an efficient and competitive tax system particularly crucial. Two central issues in the current tax reform debate are the choice of tax base along the income-consumption spectrum and the coordination of personal and corporate tax rates. Recent U.S. tax reforms have lowered the tax rates on capital income. Comprehensive reform could uniformly lower the level of capital income taxation, and could thus reduce the distortions of the current tax system and support greater potential economic growth.

## Comprehensive Business Taxation

One shortcoming of the U.S. tax system, discussed above, is the double taxation of corporate income, which subjects capital income to a high effective rate. Since 2003, the United States has taken steps to reduce this problem by applying a substantially lower (15 percent) individual tax rate to dividend and capital gains income, thereby implicitly applying a two-rate system. The President has recommended making permanent these lower tax rates on capital.

Over the years, several comprehensive reforms to integrate corporate and personal income taxes have been proposed. The Treasury Department developed a proposal for a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) in the 1990s. The proposed system was designed to give equal tax treatment to

corporate debt and equity, tax corporate and noncorporate businesses alike, and reduce the tax distortions between retained and distributed earnings. The CBIT still provides a relevant prototype for integration within the context of an income tax system. Alternatives have also been proposed that move away from reliance on an income tax by implementing a cash-flow business tax (see Box 5-2, for example).

#### Box 5-2: Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System

## Recommendations of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform

The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform was charged with evaluating the current Federal tax system and developing alternatives that achieved improvements in simplicity, fairness, and growth potential. They were asked to make at least one recommendation based on the current income tax system, to make their recommendations revenue-neutral, and to preserve incentives for charitable giving and home ownership. In addition, the panel chose to design their recommendations to preserve the current distribution of tax burden. Their 2005 report recommends two alternatives to the present income tax system: a Simplified Income Tax (SIT) and a Growth and Investment Tax (GIT). The SIT plan is a simplified version of the current income tax system. The GIT plan moves to a modified consumption tax that retains some income tax elements.

These two proposals have several features in common. They both have fewer tax brackets and lower top marginal tax rates for individuals and families than the current system. Both plans would repeal the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) for families and corporations. Both simplify the tax treatment of savings and lower the tax burden on productivity-enhancing investments by businesses. Either plan would be substantially simpler than the present tax system, and both plans maintain the present distribution of tax burden across income groups.

The two plans diverge primarily in their taxation of business and capital income, using different bases for business taxation. The SIT plan retains a simplified income tax applied to corporations, while the GIT plan would apply a cash-flow tax to all businesses (not just corporations). While they both lower the effective tax rate on capital income, they use different approaches to do so. The SIT plan excludes dividends paid to individuals from the individual income tax base and excludes 75 percent

#### Box 5-2 - continued

of corporate capital gains from U.S. companies, while the GIT plan applies a uniform 15 percent tax to interest, dividends, and capital gains at the individual level. The SIT plan adopts a simple accelerated depreciation method for investments, while the GIT plan would permit full expensing of investment. The plans also tax foreign income differently. The SIT plan taxes income on a territorial basis (with foreign-sourced income untaxed), while the GIT cash-flow tax is destination-based (with exports untaxed).

Either of these two recommendations represents a significant step forward in making the U.S. tax system simpler, fairer, and growthenhancing, but each would involve substantial transition costs. They deserve serious consideration and more comprehensive analysis.

## The President's Tax Reform Panel

The broader goals of any comprehensive tax reform should be the creation of a system that is simple, is fair, and promotes economic growth. The President's Tax Reform Panel sought to design revenue-neutral and distribution-neutral plans to achieve these goals. The panel proposed two prototypes for reform: a Simplified Income Tax (SIT) and a Growth and Investment Tax (GIT), summarized in Box 5-2. Both of these proposals fundamentally alter the tax bases for individuals and businesses as well as the treatment of capital income. Either of these reforms would represent a large change and involve important transition issues. While each plan embodies features that are attractive from the point of view of efficiency, fairness, and simplicity, comprehensive review of these plans and policy debate is needed before making such substantial changes to the tax system.

## Conclusion

Every government faces choices about how to design its tax system in order to finance the services it provides for its citizens. Because virtually all forms of taxation distort economic decision making, each country faces the challenge of designing a tax system that raises needed revenue and achieves distributional and other goals while distorting economic decisions as little as possible. By taking into account the effects of tax rules on the economic behavior of individuals and firms, governments can provide a tax environment that fosters the most-efficient allocation of resources and the best economic performance possible.

The United States has chosen to impose an overall tax burden that is low relative to most other industrial countries and to rely most heavily on the personal income tax. Governments of other advanced economies rely less on personal income taxation and more on consumption taxes, such as valueadded taxes, in order to finance a larger public sector. Given the U.S. reliance on the personal income tax, we face the continuing challenge of keeping the income tax base broad and the rates low in order to keep the economic burden of taxation as small as possible.

Global tax reforms have changed the tax landscape substantially in recent years. Other advanced economies have generally reduced taxes on wage and salary income, reduced taxes on capital income under the personal income tax (in particular, capital gains and dividends), and reduced taxes on corporate income. While our personal income tax rates are comparable to those of other countries, our corporate tax rate is now the second highest among OECD countries. These international differences could endanger the ability of the U.S. economy to attract capital in a world where capital is increasingly mobile. Any reform of the U.S. tax system should aim to improve the performance of the U.S. economy and to spread the burden of financing government spending simply and fairly.

## The U.S. Capital Account Surplus

The United States conducts a large number of trade and financial transactions with other countries. These transactions are recorded in the U.S. balance of payments accounts. The balance of payments consists of two subaccounts. One subaccount is the current account. The current account consists largely of the trade balance, which records U.S. imports and exports of goods and services. The second subaccount is the capital and financial account (hereafter called the capital account), which records U.S. net sales or purchases of assets—stocks, bonds, loans, foreign direct investment (FDI), and reserves—with other countries during the same time period.


In 2004 (the most recent calendar year for which data exist), the United States ran a current account deficit of \$668 billion. This deficit meant the United States imported more goods and services than it exported. The counterpart to the U.S. current account deficit was a U.S. capital account surplus. This surplus meant that foreign investors purchased more U.S. assets than U.S. investors purchased in foreign assets, investing more in the United States than the United States invested abroad. By economic definition, a country's current and capital account balances must offset one another. Therefore, the U.S. current account deficit was matched by a capital account surplus of \$668 billion (including \$85 billion in net statistical discrepancies within the capital account, which are included in part to ensure the accounts sum to zero).

Because foreigners invested more in the United States than the United States invested abroad, the United States received net foreign capital and financial inflows (hereafter called net capital inflows). Countries like the United States that run capital account surpluses and current account deficits receive net foreign capital inflows. In contrast, countries that run capital account deficits and current account surpluses experience net foreign capital outflows.

Between 1980 and 2004, the United States ran a capital account surplus and a current account deficit in all but three years. More recently, net capital inflows to the United States have risen sharply (Chart 6-1). The \$668 billion in net inflows received in 2004 was nearly \$300 billion greater than the level of net inflows received only three years earlier. As a percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), net capital inflows rose from 1.5 percent in 1995 to 4.2 percent in 2000 to 5.7 percent in 2004. In 2005, U.S. net capital inflows are likely to have exceeded 6 percent of GDP and ranged from \$700 to \$800 billion in dollar terms.

Chart 6-1 Net Capital Inflows to the United States

Net U.S. inflows have risen in recent years in absolute terms and as a percent of GDP



Note: Includes net inflows on the capital-financial accounts. Net statistical discrepancies in the financial account. Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis)

Recent growth in U.S. net capital inflows has sparked debate about the causes of these inflows. As this chapter discusses, a variety of factors explain recent trends in U.S. capital inflows. One of these factors is the pattern of national saving (hereafter called domestic saving) and domestic investment in the United States and other countries. This perspective on foreign capital flows—linking domestic saving and investment balances—is consistent with, but somewhat different from, analyses that explain U.S. capital inflows by focusing narrowly and exclusively on the U.S. trade deficit. In a view that emphasizes trade flows, U.S. net capital inflows result directly from the excess of U.S. imports over U.S. exports. In contrast, a view that emphasizes domestic saving and investment balances highlights a wider range of factors within countries that can lead them to experience net capital inflows or outflows. Key points of this chapter are:

• The size and persistence of U.S. net capital inflows reflects a number of U.S. economic strengths (such as its high growth rate and globally competitive economy) as well as some shortcomings (such as its low rate of domestic saving).

- The recent rise in U.S. net capital inflows between 2002 and 2004 in part reflects global economic conditions (such as a large increase in crude oil prices) as well as policies (such as China's exchange rate policy) and weak growth in several other large economies (such as Germany) that led to greater net capital outflows from these countries.
- The United States is likely to remain a net foreign capital recipient for a long time. However, the magnitude of future U.S. net capital inflows is likely to moderate from levels observed in recent years.
- Encouraging greater global balance of capital flows would be helped by steps in several countries. The United States should raise its domestic saving rate. Europe and Japan should improve their growth performance and become more attractive investment destinations. Greater exchange rate flexibility in Asia, including China, and financial sector reforms could increase the role of domestic demand in promoting that region's future growth.

In addition, the chapter makes two broader points. First, global capital flows—the flow of saving and investment among countries—should be analyzed from a global perspective and not by considering U.S. economic policies alone. Global capital flows are *jointly* determined by the behavior of many countries. To understand why the United States receives large net capital inflows requires understanding why countries like Japan, Germany, China, and Russia experience large net capital outflows.

A second point is the need to distinguish between market-driven and policy-driven capital flows. For example, recent capital outflows from Germany have largely reflected market forces and private sector behavior. In contrast, China's recent net capital outflows largely reflect policy decisions. In the United States, capital inflows have reflected a combination of market forces and policy behavior. Separating market from policy-related sources of capital flows is important for understanding capital flow patterns and to consider how these flows may change in the future.

This chapter is structured in five parts. The first part explains the distinction between countries that are net capital importers (receiving net capital inflows) and countries that are net capital exporters (experiencing net capital outflows). One key theme is the link that exists between saving and investment balances within countries and capital flows among countries. The second part of the chapter examines recent trends in global capital flows. Next, the chapter examines four countries that were the world's largest net capital exporters in 2004—Japan, Germany, China, and Russia—to understand some of the factors driving their capital outflows. The chapter then examines recent U.S. capital inflows and their determinants. The final section discusses whether the United States can continue receiving net capital inflows indefinitely.

## Global Capital Flows—Principles

Global capital flows reflect the matching of saving and investment opportunities in the global financial system. In any given period, countries can be classified as net capital exporters or net capital importers. Net capital exporters have supplies of domestic saving (which includes households, firms, and the government) that exceed domestic investment opportunities that are expected to be profitable. Because of their excess saving, these countries export some portion of their saving to other countries through net purchases of foreign assets—stocks, bonds, loans, FDI outflows, and reserves. In contrast, countries that are net capital importers have more domestic investment opportunities that are expected to be profitable than they can fund with their supply of domestic saving. These countries have excess demand for saving and import foreign saving through net sales of assets to foreign investors. Broadly speaking, therefore, global capital flows reflect the interaction between countries that are net capital importers and net capital exporters.

Stated differently, countries that are net capital exporters run capital account deficits and current account surpluses. Conversely, countries that are net capital importers run capital account surpluses and current account deficits. A country's capital account balance reflects its net sales or purchases of assets with other countries. Its current account balance reflects its net sales or purchases of goods and services with other countries along with net flows of income and transfer payments. The current account and capital account must exactly offset one another. This means the value of a current account surplus will be mirrored by the value of a capital account deficit, and a current account deficit will be mirrored by a capital account surplus of equal value.

Capital flows provide benefits to both groups of countries. For capital exporters, net outflows allow them to earn a higher return on their savings by investing abroad than they expect to earn by investing in their own countries. For capital importers, drawing on foreign savings allows domestic investment to be maintained at a higher level than would otherwise be possible given their level of domestic saving. Maintaining a high level of capital investment is critical for promoting future growth.

Changes in the rate of domestic saving or domestic investment will cause changes in a country's capital and current account balances. For example, a rise in domestic investment relative to saving will, all else equal, cause the capital account surplus to rise and the current account balance to fall. In this case, net capital inflows will increase (or, for countries already experiencing net capital outflows, net outflows will decrease). Conversely, an increase in domestic saving relative to investment will cause the capital account balance to decrease and the current account balance to increase. In that case, net foreign capital outflows will increase (or net capital inflows will decrease). Therefore, one way of assessing changes in current and capital account balances is to examine changes in domestic saving and investment rates (see Box 6-1).

#### Box 6-1: Analyzing the Current and Capital Account Balances

There are two ways to analyze the current account balance. The more widely used perspective measures a country's imports and exports of goods, services, net income flows, and net current transfer payments. Net capital flows, which are recorded in the capital account, reflect financing from foreigners needed to pay for net import purchases on the current account. By accounting necessity, the current account and capital account must sum to zero. Therefore, a current account deficit will be matched by a capital account surplus of equal magnitude.

The table below shows the U.S. current and capital accounts in 2004. The current account deficit of \$668 billion was offset by an equivalent capital account surplus (including net statistical discrepancies, previously noted). Line items within the capital account specify the ways that foreigners invested in the United States. The largest net capital inflow component was portfolio investment (\$763 billion in gross inflows and \$103 billion in gross outflows, equaling \$660 billion in net inflows). Because the United States has a floating exchange rate, changes in its official reserve assets were small. For countries with fixed exchange rates, changes in reserves are typically much larger because reserves are bought or sold through foreign exchange intervention that is undertaken to manage the value of their exchange rate.

Goods	- \$6	665	Net capital transfers	-	\$2
Services	+ \$	48	Net foreign direct investment	- 5	145
Net income	+ \$	\$30	Net portfolio investment	+ \$	660
Net current transfers	- \$	81	Net banking and other flows	+	\$67
Total	- \$6	668	Net statistical discrepancies	+	\$85

Capital Account (billion dollars)

Net change in official reserve assets +

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics

Current Account (billion dollars)

Another perspective on the current account compares domestic saving with domestic investment. When domestic investment exceeds domestic saving, a country has excess demand for saving that is met by drawing on other countries' saving. Foreign capital inflows may reflect expectations by foreign investors that they will realize a higher

+ \$3 + \$668

#### Box 6-1 - continued

return by investing in other countries than they will earn by investing in their own countries. In this case, capital inflows broadly reflect the attractiveness of investing in one economy relative to other economies.

The table below shows U.S. domestic saving and domestic investment in 2004. Because domestic investment exceeded saving, a current account deficit and capital account surplus resulted. The total sums to the same amount regardless of whether the current account is looked at through trade flows or through saving and investment flows.

#### U.S. Savings and Investment - 2004 (billion dollars)

 Gross domestic saving
 + \$1,572

 Gross domestic investment
 + \$2,301

 Net other flows
 + \$61

 Total
 \$ 668

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis


## Global Capital Flows—Recent Patterns


What is the current pattern of net capital inflows and outflows across countries? How has this pattern changed in the past decade? Chart 6-2 shows the United States was the largest net capital recipient in 2004. Spain, Great Britain, Australia, and Turkey were also net capital recipients. Japan, Germany, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia were the largest net capital exporters.

Between 1995 and 2004, global saving and investment patterns changed in a number of respects. Some of the more important changes were:

- Declining concentration among net capital exporting countries. Falling concentration means that a wider range of countries experienced net capital outflows. In 1995, the world's largest net capital exporter (Japan) accounted for 39 percent of global net capital outflows and the five largest net capital exporters accounted for 70 percent of net outflows. In 2000, the largest net capital exporter accounted for 24 percent of net outflows while the five largest net exporters accounted for 48 percent of net outflows. In 2004, the largest net exporter accounted for 20 percent of net outflows while the five largest net exporters accounted for 52 percent of net outflows.
- Rising concentration among net capital importing countries. Rising concentration means that a smaller number of countries received a larger

Chart 6-2 Largest Net Capital Importers and Exporters- 2004





Note Assumes net statistical discrepancies are in the capital and financial accounts. Source. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2005.

share of total net capital inflows. Most of this change reflected higher U.S. net capital inflows. The United States received 33 percent of global net capital inflows in 1995, 61 percent in 2000, and 70 percent in 2004. The five largest net capital recipients received 57 percent of global net capital inflows in 1995, 78 percent in 2000, and 86 percent in 2004.

- A change in net capital flow positions for some large countries. Germany experienced the largest change in its net capital flow position. In 1995 and 2000, Germany received \$30 billion in net capital inflows but had \$104 billion in net outflows in 2004. Saudi Arabia also went from small net capital inflows in 1995 (\$5 billion) to large net capital outflows in 2004 (\$52 billion).
- A change in the regional composition of capital flows. Developing Asian and Middle Eastern countries also became large net capital exporters. In 1995, developing Asian countries had net inflows of \$42 billion, but had net outflows of \$93 billion in 2004. China had \$2 billion of net capital outflows in 1995, \$21 billion of net outflows in 2000, and \$69 billion in net outflows in 2004. Rising crude oil prices also caused many oil-producing countries to become large net capital exporters. Middle Eastern countries had net capital inflows of \$1 billion in 1995 and \$103 billion of net outflows in 2004.

- Net capital outflows from developing countries. In 1995, developing and emerging market countries as a whole received \$84 billion in net capital inflows. In 2000, they experienced \$91 billion in net outflows. In 2004, they experienced \$367 billion in net outflows. While these countries remained net recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, they became large net purchasers of foreign reserve assets. These purchases, made primarily by central banks, represent a capital outflow because domestic resources are being invested abroad rather than within these countries.
- Rising global foreign reserve levels. The value of global foreign reserves (held primarily by central banks) rose from roughly \$1.5 trillion to \$3.9 trillion between 1995 and 2004—a 160 percent increase in a period when the value of global GDP increased by roughly 40 percent. Global reserves increased by more than \$1.3 trillion in 2002-04 alone. Three countries accounted for nearly 60 percent of this reserve increase— Japan, China, and South Korea.

## Global Capital Exporters

To understand global capital flow patterns, we can examine in more detail saving and investment patterns in some of the largest capital importers and exporters. The world's four largest net capital exporters in 2004 were Japan, Germany, China, and Russia. In total, these countries exported more than \$400 billion of domestic savings to other countries through their net purchases of foreign assets. Net capital outflows from these four countries represented 46 percent of outflows among all net capital exporting countries in 2004.

While these countries exported large amounts of their saving to other countries, they also differed in several respects. Recent capital outflows from Japan and Germany, for example, have been associated with weak growth while Russia and China have experienced rapid growth. Germany's capital outflows largely reflect private sector, market-driven behavior whereas China's outflows reflect policy behavior. Japan and Germany have run fiscal deficits while Russia has had a fiscal surplus. Japan and Germany have had falling rates of domestic investment while China has had a rising rate. What these countries have had in common, however, were supplies of domestic saving that exceeded their domestic investment.

## Japan—Deflation and a Falling Investment Rate

With net capital outflows of \$172 billion, Japan was the world's largest net capital exporter in 2004. Between 1995 and 2004, Japan was the world's largest net capital exporter every year, "pushing" more than \$1.1 trillion in excess saving into the global financial system. Moreover, the level of Japan's net capital outflows increased each year from 2001 to 2004.

Recent growth in Japan's net capital outflows has resulted primarily from a falling domestic investment rate rather than a higher saving rate. Between 1995 and 2004, Japan's domestic saving rate fell from 30 percent to 28 percent of GDP. During this same period, Japan's domestic investment rate fell from 28 percent to 24 percent of GDP. This widening gap between saving and investment—Japan's excess supply of saving—led to higher net capital outflows and a corresponding rise in its current account surplus. Japan's current account surplus rose from 2.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2000 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2004.

Japan's investment rate has fallen for several reasons. A declining population and slowing growth in its labor force has reduced Japan's need for physical capital. Japan also arguably suffered from a large excess of capital investment in the late 1980s. This previous experience with overinvestment, growth in bad loans among Japan's banks, and the slow growth Japan has experienced since the early 1990s following the collapse of its "bubble economy" have made Japanese firms more cautious about undertaking new domestic investment. Deflationary pressures (a decline in the overall price level) have also weakened private investment since firms are often more reluctant to initiate new investment when future prices are expected to fall.

The key source of Japan's rising saving-investment imbalance has been its corporate sector. Between 1995 and 2004, Japan's corporate sector went from being a net borrower of funds (investing more than it saved) between 2 percent to 3 percent of GDP to a net lender of funds (saving more than it invested) equivalent to nearly 15 percent of GDP. During this same period, the rate of net saving in Japan's household sector fell by roughly 70 percent (from 10 percent to about 3 percent of GDP) while Japan's public sector was a large net borrower of funds. Therefore, rising net savings by Japanese firms explain much of the recent growth in Japan's net capital outflows.

After a long period of slow growth, Japan's economy showed some signs of improvement in 2005. Financial ratios among firms improved, and growth prospects appeared to improve. Japan's central bank forecast that deflation is likely to end in 2006. Business confidence strengthened and commercial bank lending began to resume. Japan's labor market also showed some signs of strength. The re-election of Prime Minister Koizumi strengthened prospects for future economic reform. To the extent Japan can achieve sustained growth, its future net capital outflows are likely to slow. Stronger growth in Japan will encourage a larger share of its savings to remain at home rather than being invested abroad.

## Germany—Structural Rigidities and a Falling Investment Rate

With \$103 billion in net capital outflows, Germany was the world's second largest net capital exporter in 2004. Between 1990 and 2000, Germany received total net foreign capital inflows of \$175 billion. Between 2001 and 2004, in contrast, Germany experienced net capital outflows of more than \$200 billion. Germany's rising net capital outflows have been mirrored by its rising current account surpluses. Between 2001 and 2004, Germany's current account surplus rose from 0.2 percent to 3.8 percent of GDP.

Like Japan, Germany's rising saving surpluses and net capital outflows have stemmed from a falling rate of domestic investment rather than a rising rate of domestic saving. At 21 percent of GDP, Germany's saving rate has been broadly stable over most of the past decade (though it did rise from 2003 to 2004). Domestic investment during this period, however, fell from 22 percent to 17 percent of GDP—the second lowest investment rate among G8 countries (the world's most advanced economies).

Why has Germany's investment rate declined? One factor has been structural rigidities in its economy that have slowed Germany's rate of growth and opportunities for profitable investment. These rigidities result in part from legal and microeconomic barriers that limit economic flexibility. Inflexibility can prolong periods of slow growth because an economy is less able to adjust effectively to changing conditions in its labor and product markets and achieve full levels of employment. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), barriers to new business formation and investment are higher in Germany than the OECD average. A World Bank "employment rigidity index" scored Germany's labor market at 55 (scaled from 0-100, with higher scores implying greater rigidity) compared to 17 for Australia, 14 for Great Britain, and 3 for the United States. Germany's standardized unemployment rate is high (9.5 percent in 2005) and its longterm unemployment rate (measuring workers unemployed for a year or more) was more than 50 percent higher in 2004 than the average OECD rate.

Germany has taken some recent steps to reduce unemployment and accelerate its growth. Laws limiting temporary and part-time work have been relaxed. Passage of "Hartz IV" labor reforms in 2004 was aimed at reducing long-term unemployment by requiring unemployed workers to seek work more actively. Unit labor costs, which are one widely used indicator of competitiveness, have recently fallen relative to several other European countries. It is also hoped that Germany's new government, which took office in November 2005, may strengthen other growth incentives. Like Japan, stronger growth in Germany will encourage a larger share of its domestic savings to be used at home rather than invested abroad.

## China—Exchange Rate Management and a Rising Saving Rate

With \$69 billion in net outflows, China was the world's third largest net capital exporter in 2004. China's role as a net capital exporter may seem surprising given the large foreign investment inflows it experiences. While China does receive substantial foreign investment, it experiences even larger capital outflows due to foreign reserve accumulation by its central bank that results from its foreign exchange regime. As China's reserves have risen in recent years, its capital account balance has moved toward larger deficits and its current account toward larger surpluses. In 2004, China's current account surplus was equivalent to 4 percent of GDP (note that in December 2005, China increased the estimate of its 2004 GDP, which is likely to reduce the size of this current account surplus relative to GDP). Current projections indicate China's current account surplus is likely to have exceeded 6 percent of GDP in 2005.

China's reserves have increased due to its rising current account surpluses, net private capital inflows, and tightly managed pegged exchange rate system. China first adopted its currency peg in 1994, linking its currency (the renminbi) to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 8.3 renminbi-per-dollar. To maintain this peg, China's central bank has purchased large amounts of foreign currency assets in recent years to prevent its currency from appreciating. Even after modifying its exchange rate peg in July of 2005, however, (linking the renminbi to a basket of currencies rather than the U.S. dollar alone) China's foreign reserves have continued to rise. By the end of 2005, China's foreign reserve level exceeded \$800 billion and may rise to \$900-\$1000 billion by the end of 2006. Between 2000 and 2005, China's foreign reserves increased by more than \$600 billion.

In terms of its saving and investment balance, China's net capital outflows have resulted primarily from a rising saving rate. While China's rate of domestic investment has also been rising (projected 46 percent of GDP in 2005 prior to its GDP revision), its saving rate has risen even more rapidly. At roughly 52 percent of GDP, China's saving rate is the highest in the world.

Several factors contribute to China's high saving rate. China's "one child" policy, enacted to control its population growth, has contributed to its aging population by reducing the share of younger groups within its population. Because older workers typically earn and save more than younger workers, China's saving rate has increased as its workforce has aged. The absence of a strong social safety net (including adequate public pensions and health care) increases the need for precautionary household saving. The absence of well-developed financial markets and consumer credit mechanisms contribute to high saving by forcing many people in China to save large amounts of cash before making purchases rather than by taking consumer loans that can be repaid gradually. China's tightly managed exchange rate and foreign exchange

intervention to limit currency appreciation also contribute indirectly to its high saving rate. Saving is encouraged, in effect, because consumption is discouraged by China's exchange rate policy. With a stronger currency, the global purchasing power of China's currency would rise, raising its income (in global terms) and consumption share, and thus reducing its rate of domestic saving.

Greater exchange rate flexibility would encourage China's productive resources to move toward domestic rather than export production. Greater financial development would help to raise consumption spending (and reduce saving) by providing credit mechanisms for purchases that are currently paid for with cash. A reduction in China's saving rate and greater reliance on domestic demand are essential for China to sustain its future growth. At roughly 45 percent of its GDP, China's domestic investment rate could create future risks for its economy (see Box 6-2).

## Russia—Growth in "Petrodollars" and a Rising Saving Rate

With \$60 billion in net outflows, Russia was the world's fourth largest capital exporter in 2004. Russia's net capital exports have been closely linked to higher export revenues resulting from rising oil and natural gas prices. Oil export revenues are sometimes referred to as "petrodollars." With oil sales accounting for over 40 percent of its exports, Russia's export revenues rose by more than 50 percent between 2002 and 2004 (\$107 billion to \$183 billion) while its current account surplus rose to more than 10 percent of GDP.

In terms of its domestic saving and investment balance, Russia's growing net capital outflows have resulted primarily from higher saving. Between 2002 and 2004, domestic saving rose from 29 percent to 31 percent of GDP. A higher saving rate has been reflected by rising fiscal surpluses. Between 2002 and 2004, Russia's fiscal surplus rose from 1 to 5 percent of GDP while its rate of net private sector saving declined from 8 to 5 percent of GDP.

Large petrodollar increases have also occurred in other oil producers. Chart 6-3 shows current account surplus levels among 12 of the world's largest oil exporters, whose combined current account surplus and net capital outflows rose by 134 percent between 2002 and 2004.

## The United States and Net Capital Inflows

### Overview

The United States received \$668 billion in net foreign capital inflows in 2004 (including \$85 billion in net statistical discrepancies recorded in its capital account). This capital account surplus was the counterpart to the U.S. current account deficit. This section examines four questions about the U.S.

#### Box 6-2: High Saving and Financial Sector Inefficiency

Can a country save too much? While a higher saving level might always seem beneficial, higher saving can create costs if those savings are poorly used. Excess saving can sometimes lead to overinvestment that reduces the quality and efficiency of new capital investment and can sometimes create problems in a country's banking system by increasing the share of non-performing loans (NPLs).

An NPL is a loan that cannot be fully repaid by a borrower. Higher NPL ratios imply that investment spending may be inefficient because loans are not being fully repaid. High NPLs can create a number of problems. One problem is that banks often become more cautious about new lending as NPL ratios rise. New loans are unlikely to be approved if previous loans are not being repaid. Slower bank lending, in turn, can slow economic growth more broadly.


Another more direct problem can result when NPL ratios become so high that banks themselves face bankruptcy due to widespread loan defaults and falling bank capital adequacy ratios. In this case, governments must sometimes recapitalize weak banks or pay off insured depositors of banks they close. The cost of closing U.S. savings and loan institutions that failed in the 1980s was \$150 billion, or roughly 3 percent of GDP. In Chile, bank failures in the early 1980s cost more than 40 percent of GDP. Spain paid costs equivalent to nearly 20 percent of its GDP following a banking crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

High saving rates can increase NPLs by encouraging banks to take imprudent risks. For example, lending standards may be reduced. Loans for weak borrowers that otherwise lack creditworthiness are more likely to be approved when saving is high and interest rates are low. If interest rates later rise, however, borrowers whose rates rise may not repay their loans, causing NPL ratios to rise. If in contrast interest rates that borrowers pay remain fixed, then banks can again suffer losses because they must pay higher rates to their depositors but cannot charge higher interest rates on loans to their current borrowers.

Japan arguably experienced a large capital overhang in the 1990s after a long period of high saving and investment as well as the emergence of its "bubble economy" in the late 1980s. Average saving and investment rates in Japan were roughly 35 percent of GDP in the 1970s and 30 percent of GDP in the 1980s. China, however, likely has even higher saving rates. Not surprisingly, China's NPL ratio is also believed to be high. While China's official statistics report NPLs are roughly 10 percent of outstanding loans, unofficial estimates suggest China's NPL ratio may be closer to 25 percent (by comparison, NPLs among U.S. banks are less than 1 percent).

Chart 6-3 Current Account Balances of Oil-Producing Countries

Oil producers have experienced large recent increases in their current account surpluses



Note, Includes Algeria, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2005

capital account: (1) How do U.S. capital inflows compare with other countries? (2) Has the U.S. share of global capital inflows changed? (3) Has the composition of U.S. capital inflows changed? (4) What factors encourage foreign capital flows into the United States?


Most of this section focuses on the final question. One conclusion is that a high rate of growth relative to many other advanced economies has contributed to U.S. net capital inflows. Among advanced economies, capital flow patterns in the past decade have tended to be positively correlated with growth performance. Countries with higher rates of growth have tended to run current account deficits (and received net capital inflows), while countries with lower growth rates have tended to run current account surpluses (and experience net capital outflows—Chart 6-4).

## Net Capital Importers—International Comparisons

Since 1995, three countries have been consistent recipients of net capital inflows—the United States, Australia, and Great Britain. Average annual net capital flows to Australia have been largest (4.6 percent of GDP), second largest for the United States (3.3 percent of GDP), and third largest for Great Britain (1.6 percent of GDP). Spain also received average annual net capital inflows (2.5 percent of GDP) during this period. Australia has the longest

#### Chart 6-4 Annual Growth and Current Account Balances - 1995-2004

Among advanced economies, countries with higher rates of growth have tended to run current account deficits.



Source. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2005.

record of capital account surpluses (and current account deficits), receiving net foreign capital inflows every year since 1974.

Between 2001 and 2004, net capital inflows increased for most of these countries. Spain's net inflows rose by 1.4 percent of GDP (to 5.3 percent of GDP). U.S. inflows rose by 1.9 percent of GDP (to 5.7 percent of GDP). Australia experienced the largest increase, where net inflows rose by 4.1 percent of GDP (to 6.4 percent of GDP). Net inflows to Great Britain slowed slightly (to 2.0 percent of GDP).

# U.S. Share of Global Flows and the Asset Composition of U.S. Capital Inflows

The U.S. share of net global capital inflows has risen over the past decade. The United States received 33 percent of global net capital inflows in 1995, 62 percent in 2000, and 70 percent in 2004. The composition of net foreign capital inflows to the United States has varied. Between 1995 and 2004, foreign official sector holdings of U.S. assets averaged 14 percent of foreign asset holdings (ranging from a high of 16 percent to a low of 11 percent). Gross foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States, representing larger foreign equity purchases, averaged 26 percent of foreign holdings in this period (ranging from a high of 33 percent to a low of

22 percent). Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities averaged 15 percent of foreign holdings (ranging from a high of 21 percent to a low of 11 percent).

# Causes of U.S. Capital Inflows

What factors encourage large and persistent U.S. foreign capital inflows? Several factors, which reflect U.S. economic strengths, encourage these inflows. In particular, a high rate of U.S. growth encourages foreign capital to be "pushed" toward the United States. In contrast, one U.S. shortcoming that "pulls" foreign capital to the United States is its low rate of domestic saving.

# Low and Declining U.S. Saving

At 13 percent of GDP, the U.S. domestic saving rate is the lowest among the advanced economy countries (Chart 6-5). Moreover, the U.S. domestic saving rate has declined in recent years. With a domestic investment rate equivalent to 20 percent of GDP, low U.S. saving requires the United States to draw on foreign saving to fund a part of its domestic investment. This excess U.S. demand for saving is reflected by the U.S. current account deficit.

Chart 6-5 Gross National Saving Rates - 1995-2004

The United States has had the lowest rate of national saving among advanced economies since 2002.

Percent of GDP 35% Japan 30% 25% German Canada 20% 15% United States Great Britain 10% 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995 2000

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, September 2005.

When we disaggregate the decline in U.S. domestic saving into its three parts—personal saving, corporate saving, and public saving—we see the personal saving rate has declined from 3.4 percent of GDP in 1995 to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2004 (for more discussion, see Chapter 3 in this report on Saving for Retirement). This decline in personal saving is mirrored by a rise in personal consumption spending, whose share of GDP has risen from 67 percent to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. U.S. corporate saving has remained relatively stable at between 18 and 19 percent of GDP.

Public sector saving also declined. Between 2000 and 2004, the federal budget balance went from a surplus equivalent to 2.4 percent of GDP to a deficit equivalent to 3.6 percent of GDP. Fiscal deficits represent dissaving, or net borrowing, which requires the public sector to draw on domestic private sector resources (firms and households) and the foreign sector. While a growing fiscal deficit has contributed to U.S. demand for foreign saving, and thus affected the U.S. current account deficit, the extent to which it has done so is unclear (Box 6-3).

### Box 6-3: The Link Between Fiscal and Trade Deficits


Most economists agree that fiscal deficits will, all else equal, lead to an increase in a country's trade and current account deficits. Fiscal deficits are a form of "dissaving," so fiscal deficits reduce the availability of domestic saving to fund investment. Unless this decline is matched by an equal decline in domestic investment, net demand for foreign saving will rise. Fiscal deficits will thus cause net capital inflows to increase.

However, the effect of fiscal deficits on trade and current account deficits may be considerably less than dollar-for-dollar. For example, one study by the Federal Reserve has estimated that each dollar change in the fiscal deficit leads to a change in the trade deficit of approximately 20 percent. This means that reducing the U.S. fiscal deficit by \$100 billion would reduce the trade deficit by only \$20 billion.

The relationship among fiscal deficits, the current account, and the capital account is complex because the current and capital accounts also depend on private sector behavior. In Japan and Germany, for example, recent current account surpluses and capital outflows have been associated with large fiscal deficits because private saving balances in those countries have been large and outweighed public sector dissaving.

#### Box 6-3 — continued

As the chart below indicates, U.S. fiscal and current account balances have sometimes moved in the same direction and other times in different directions. For example, between 1997 and 2000 the U.S. Federal public sector balance moved from a deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP to a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP. During this same period, the current account deficit widened from 1.7 percent to 4.2 percent of GDP. In the early 1980s and early 1990s, the United States came close to current account balance even though the public sector ran large fiscal deficits because a large private sector saving surplus existed then.



# High U.S. Economic and Productivity Growth

Other factors that attract foreign capital inflows to the United States reflect strengths of the U.S. economy. One factor is the high rate of U.S. growth. Between 1995 and 2004, annual real GDP growth in the United States averaged 3.2 percent compared to 1.1 percent in Japan, 1.4 percent in Germany, and 2.3 percent among Eurozone economies (the group of 12 European countries with a common currency). In the most recent years within this period, these growth differentials widened further.

Higher growth tends to attract foreign capital for two reasons. First, higher growth leads to a higher rate of import growth. All else equal, higher import growth will lead to a decline in a country's trade balance and increase its demand for foreign saving. Second, higher growth attracts foreign capital inflows because growth contributes to higher potential corporate earnings and investment returns.

# High Productivity Growth

High U.S. growth and capital inflows are supported by high productivity growth. The broadest measure of productivity is *multi-factor productivity* (which broadly measures the efficiency with which capital and labor inputs are used). OECD data comparing multi-factor productivity across countries for the period 1995-2003 indicate that the United States and Australia had relatively high rates of productivity growth, Canada, Great Britain, and Germany had more modest rates of growth, while Japan had a low rate of productivity growth.

## Favorable U.S. Business Climate and Global Competitiveness

A sound business climate can also support high growth and foreign capital inflows. A sound business climate can enhance efficiency by strengthening competition. It can reinforce profit maximizing incentives and effective corporate governance. A sound business climate can also encourage entrepreneurship by reducing the administrative burdens of new business formation. It can enhance the flexibility of industries through laws that facilitate rapid restructuring or liquidation of bankrupt firms. In addition, it can promote efficiency and specialization by reducing international trade barriers.

Several organizations compare business climates across countries. The World Bank publishes an annual "Doing Business" survey that compares legal frameworks and business practices. Countries are ranked in part by an "ease of doing business index." Results from the World Bank's most recent survey ranked New Zealand 1st, the United States 3rd, Australia 6th, Great Britain 9th, Japan 10th, Germany 19th, Spain 30th, Russia 79th, and China 91st. Another competitiveness survey is published by the World Economic Forum (WEF). In the WEF's most recent survey, the United States ranked second in overall competitiveness (Finland was first). The report ranked Japan 12th, Great Britain 13th, Germany 15th, China 49th, and Russia 75th.

## Financial Market Size

The size of U.S. financial markets also attracts foreign capital by encouraging investors to hold dollar-denominated assets. Large and efficient financial markets reduce transaction costs and liquidity risk (the risk that assets cannot be sold at fair value on short notice) and increase the ability to diversify asset

holdings. In 2004, U.S. financial markets comprised 32 percent of global financial markets compared to 26 percent for Eurozone countries and 15 percent for Japan. U.S. stock market capitalization represented 44 percent of global equity markets compared to 16 percent for Eurozone countries. U.S. bond markets represented 39 percent of global bond markets compared to 27 percent for Eurozone countries.

## Global Role of the U.S. Dollar

Widespread use of the dollar in the global economy also contributes to U.S. capital inflows. The dollar's role can be seen in terms of the three classic functions of money. First, the dollar serves as a medium of exchange. Private firms in different countries use dollars to settle transactions. Second, the dollar serves as a unit of account. Globally traded goods like oil are denominated in dollars. Many global debt securities are also dollar-denominated. A number of countries also use the dollar either as their own currency or as an exchange rate peg to which their own currencies are tied. Third, the dollar is a store of value. Private firms hold dollars to help hedge financial risks. Central banks hold dollars as reserves to intervene in foreign exchange markets, meet foreign currency demand for debt servicing payments, or help maintain general financial confidence.

In recent years, the dollar's future role as a global reserve currency has been debated. Some have argued this role may diminish. One argument is that the dollar will face competition from the euro. However, recent estimates indicate the dollar's role as a reserve currency has been broadly stable over the past decade. In 1995, 59 percent of global reserve holdings consisted of dollardenominated assets. In 1999, this figure rose to 71 percent and then declined to 66 percent in 2004.

# U.S. Capital Flow Sustainability

In principle, the United States can continue to receive net capital inflows (and run current account deficits) indefinitely provided it uses these inflows in ways that promote its future growth and help the United States to remain an attractive destination for foreign investment. The key issue concerning U.S. foreign capital inflows is not their absolute level but the efficiency with which they are used. Provided capital inflows promote strong U.S. investment, productivity, and growth, they provide important benefits to the United States as well as to countries that are investing in the United States.

To evaluate the sustainability of these inflows, economists often evaluate a country's external debt burden. This debt burden can be seen in terms of a stock and a flow burden. One stock measure that is sometimes examined is a country's net foreign asset position. Net foreign assets measure the value of a country's foreign assets relative to the liabilities it owes to foreigners. When foreign assets exceed liabilities, a country is a net foreign creditor. When foreign liabilities exceed foreign assets, it is a net foreign debtor. Net capital inflows contribute to net foreign debt because some share of these inflows reflect foreign purchases of debt instruments. A rising level of net foreign debt may be a warning sign that debt could become unsustainable in the future.

U.S. current account deficits in recent years have caused its level of net foreign debt to rise from negative 4 percent of GDP in 1995 to negative 22 percent in 2004. Other countries vary in their net foreign asset or debt positions. For example, Japan is a net foreign creditor (foreign assets exceeding foreign liabilities) with net foreign assets equivalent to 38 percent of its GDP. In contrast, Australia is a net debtor with net foreign debt equivalent to 64 percent of its GDP. Great Britain's net foreign debt is equivalent to 13 percent of its GDP. While net foreign debt or asset positions can be a useful indicator, however, these figures must be interpreted cautiously since what constitutes an "excessive" amount of net foreign debt is far from clear.

One *flow measure* of the external debt burden is a country's *net foreign income*. Countries either receive or pay foreign income depending on their foreign asset and liability levels as well as the rate of return they earn and pay on these assets and liabilities. When a country receives more in interest, dividends, profit remittances, and royalties on its foreign assets than it pays on its foreign liabilities, it is a *net foreign income recipient*. When payments exceed receipts, a country makes *net foreign income payments*.

One striking feature of the U.S. balance of payments accounts is that the United States has continued to earn net foreign income despite its rising level of net foreign debt. For example, the United States earned \$30 billion in net foreign income in 2004 despite a stock of net foreign debt equivalent to \$2.5 trillion. By comparison, Japan received \$86 billion in net foreign income payments in 2004 despite the fact that it held \$1.8 trillion in net foreign assets. Between 1995 and 2004, the United States earned over \$200 billion in net foreign income despite current account deficits that totaled more than \$3 trillion during this period. Therefore, U.S. external debt has not appeared burdensome by this measure because its net foreign income flows have remained positive.

While U.S. capital inflows can continue indefinitely, recent levels of net inflows received are likely to moderate in the future. At more than 6 percent of GDP, U.S. net capital inflows are unusually high by historical standards. While no specific "critical value" exists beyond which a country can no longer necessarily receive net foreign capital inflows, recent growth in U.S. net inflows has attracted substantial attention. The key questions concern the rate and magnitude by which U.S. net inflows moderate in the future. In one scenario, U.S. net capital inflows might drop quickly. In another "soft

landing" scenario, the adjustment process would occur in a more gradual manner. While a large share of U.S. net capital inflows reflects foreign private sector investment that believes a higher risk-adjusted return can be earned by investing in the United States than can be earned by investing elsewhere, some policy adjustments (see below) in the United States and abroad could nonetheless help to increase the likelihood of a soft landing.

# Conclusion

This chapter has emphasized the interdependent nature of the global financial system. To understand U.S. net capital inflows, one must also understand factors that underlie net capital outflows from countries like Japan, Germany, China, and oil-producing and exporting countries like Russia. Global capital flows reflect a wide array of conditions in many countries rather than developments in the United States alone. In some instances, global capital flows reflect expectations among market participants who invest in countries where they expect to earn the highest level of risk-adjusted returns. In other instances, capital flows reflect policy decisions by central banks to manage their exchange rates.

In both instances, global capital flows provide important benefits for net capital importers as well as net capital exporters. Net capital importers like the United States benefit because they can maintain a level of domestic investment they would otherwise have to reduce given their levels of domestic saving. Net capital exporters benefit because they can earn higher returns on the saving they invest abroad than they expect to earn by investing in their own countries.

The interdependence of the global financial system implies that no one country can reduce its external imbalance through policy action on its own. Instead, reducing external imbalances requires action by several countries. Specifically, at least four steps may help to reduce these imbalances.

First, the United States must work to raise its domestic saving rate. Higher U.S. saving will reduce U.S. demand for other countries' savings. To increase saving, the United States should continue its efforts to reduce its fiscal deficit and raise its personal saving rate. Sections of the U.S. tax code that discourage saving should be reformed as appropriate. Health care, social security, and other entitlement programs will require reforms given their large projected impact on future public spending.

Second. China and other Asian countries should reduce their excess saving through policies and reforms that promote higher domestic demand. Financial systems can be reformed and modernized to help expand consumer credit and reduce the need for high levels of precautionary saving. Managed

exchange rate regimes should be liberalized more fully. Greater exchange rate flexibility would provide China with a useful policy tool to help stabilize its business cycle. It would also help China to reorient its future growth away from net exports and toward higher domestic demand.

Third, Japan, Germany, and several other large countries should reduce their supplies of excess saving by promoting higher private domestic demand and improving their economic growth performance. Raising private domestic demand will require the implementation of further structural reforms in these countries that strengthen incentives for private consumption and private investment. In turn, higher consumption and investment will help to reduce their external surpluses. While structural reforms are often politically difficult to enact, they are essential if long-term growth performance in these countries is to improve.

Finally, oil producing and exporting countries could increase their domestic investment levels. At least some of this spending could be used to expand oil sector production that would reduce excess saving in these countries, enhance the future productive capacity of these economies, and help to ensure adequate future supplies of oil for the global economy.

# The History and Future of International Trade

Por many decades, the United States has worked to break down trade barriers across the globe through a wide range of institutions and agreements. Both the United States and our trading partners have derived substantial benefits from greater global economic integration. Many American consumers, firms, and workers are better off because of these efforts.

While the economic research and performance of this time period show the benefits of trade outweigh the costs, trade liberalization has always brought anxieties. This has been the case both here in the United States and throughout the world. Temptations to retreat to economic isolationism often occur when trade agreements are negotiated and current negotiations are little different in this regard. Therefore, this chapter provides a retrospective on U.S. trade policy and an evaluation of the payoff from greater trade and investment liberalization that has been at the forefront of this country's international economic policy for the last 70 years.

The key points in this chapter are:

- Over the past 70 years, policymakers across political parties have consistently recognized the importance of unfettered international commerce to America's standard of living and economic growth, and have achieved major trade liberalization both here and abroad.
- The net payoff to America from these achievements has been substantial. Many American consumers, firms, and workers have benefited from increased trade.
- A number of barriers to trade, especially in services, remain, and the
  potential gains to the United States and other countries from further
  liberalization are still significant. To move beyond trade liberalization in
  goods, the United States is pursuing greater economic cooperation and
  more-open markets with our trading partners in order to stimulate
  economic growth.

# A Retrospective on Trade

The country's historical influence in promoting global trade liberalization can be traced back to the early part of the twentieth century, and it spans both political parties. The early 1930s proved to be a critical turning point in the evolution of modern American trade policy and heralded the first major

American trade liberalization effort. In the decades following, the United States has spearheaded multinational, regional, and bilateral negotiations in the interest of advancing trade liberalization. This retrospective illustrates the undeniable progress toward trade liberalization in the United States. Revenues from tariffs (a tariff is a tax levied on imports coming into the United States) in the early 1900s accounted for about half of Federal revenues compared to less than 2 percent today. From the inception of this country until the Civil War, tariff revenues were a major source of government revenue. The addition of the sixteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 broadened the tax base by introducing the personal and corporate income tax. This change began the shift away from indirect taxation (import duties and excise taxes) toward direct taxation on personal and corporate incomes, thereby reducing this country's dependence on import duties as a form of revenue.

Before the 1930s, U.S. trade practices fluctuated between trade-promoting and trade-restricting policies. Prior to World War I, President Woodrow Wilson pursued an internationalist foreign policy that resulted in import tariff reductions through the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913. The economic depression and subsequent reversion to isolationism that followed the 1929 stock market crash led to a rejection of Wilsonian policies in favor of greater protectionism. The Tariff Act of 1930 (otherwise known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff) significantly raised average duties on selected imports to an all-time high of 59 percent. Such protectionism was designed to reduce unemployment and increase domestic output. By reducing export markets, however, the heightened tariff and nontariff trade barriers (such as quotas or quantitative import restrictions) exacerbated the Great Depression. The collapse of world trade from 1929 to 1933—a decline of more than twothirds in just four years—followed in the wake of protectionist policies as countries depreciated their currencies, raised tariffs, and imposed quotas. These isolationist policies contributed to a spiraling contraction of world trade and a collapse of domestic demand.

The historic Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 marked a turning point in modern trade legislation. The 1934 Act departed significantly from previous protectionist policies, and it began the historic shift toward lower U.S. and foreign trade barriers and greater global economic engagement. Signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Act passed Congress with overwhelming support. The 1934 Act was the first of many steps over the twentieth century leading to America's relatively liberal trade stance today. Table 7-1 shows that key milestones in American trade history have been consistently achieved by a number of administrations.

The Trade Act of 1934 changed U.S. trade policy. The 1934 Act made trade a shared Congressional and Executive Branch responsibility, and instituted a so-called bargaining tariff. Up to that point, trade policy had been primarily

TABLE 7-1.—Important Milestones in American Trade History

Milestone (years of negotiation)	Year Signed into U.S. Law	Administrations involved
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 Kennedy Round (1962–1967) Tokyo Round (1973–1979) Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1986–1994) North American Free Trade Agreement (1990–1993) Trade Act of 2002 and Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (2001–2002)	1934 1962 1979 1994 1994 2002	Roosevelt Kennedy, Johnson Nixon, Ford, Carter Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton G.H.W. Bush, Clinton G.W. Bush

a product of the legislative exercise of its Constitutional authority over foreign commerce. This Constitutional authority left Congress open to the protectionist demands of specific industries and special interests. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized this vulnerability and worked with Congress to enact this reciprocal trade program to make lower tariffs more politically durable. With the enactment of the Trade Act of 1934, Congress suspended passage of product-specific trade laws and delegated specific tariff-setting to the Executive Branch. Doing so formally changed the way Congress handled trade issues by insulating elected representatives from the pressures that had led to protectionism in the past.

The 1934 law also instituted the so-called bargaining tariff. This concept linked tariff setting to international negotiations, whereby U.S. tariff cuts were extended in bilateral negotiations to countries that offered reciprocal tariff reductions benefiting U.S. exporters. In this way, the bargaining tariff helped to shift the balance of trade politics by engaging the interests of U.S. exporters. The system effectively allowed the United States to reduce its own trade barriers and to persuade the rest of the world to reciprocate. In the aftermath of World War II, policymakers correctly predicted that postwar trade expansion would help to usher in a remarkable era of world prosperity and contribute to conditions for a stable peace.

A commitment to the Wilsonian notion that prosperity and peace go hand in hand is at the core of postwar trade liberalization for both political parties in the United States. An extension of the reciprocal trade agreement, which Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both had recommended as a keystone of the country's postwar international economic policy, passed Congress with strong support in 1945. The enabling legislation put the Administration in a position to begin in earnest the process of dismantling global trade barriers. President Harry S. Truman signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, bringing the United States into the multilateral trade regime by executive agreement. The GATT took effect in 1948 and served as

a forum for trade negotiations whereby every signatory country could enjoy the concessions of every other signatory (otherwise known as most-favorednation status). Membership in the GATT not only brought the United States into the multilateral trade regime but also provided a vehicle to rebuild the postwar economies of Europe and Japan. The lessons of Smoot-Hawley contributed to broad support for freer trade that was to become a critical component of U.S. international economic policy. This political consensus marked a shift toward a broadly accepted liberal market and free-trade philosophy that set the stage for the various multilateral negotiating rounds that were to follow.

The next major acknowledgment of the necessity of liberalizing trade came in the 1960s. President John F. Kennedy led the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which was approved with substantial support in Congress. The Act authorized the U.S. government to negotiate tariff cuts of up to 50 percent, which persuaded other countries to actively participate in the Kennedy Round (1962-1967) of multilateral trade negotiations. Congressional support was partly due to the inclusion of legislation to assist workers affected by trade, also known as Trade Adjustment Assistance. At the time, the Kennedy Round signified the most ambitious series of trade negotiations ever attempted under the auspices of the GATT. The Round included negotiations on agriculture for the first time, and reduced barriers to exporters for developing countries.

The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) led to further tariff reductions and provided new disciplines on nontariff barriers. The Tokyo Round included "codes of conduct" that were designed to curtail the use of such barriers as instruments of protection. Launched under President Richard M. Nixon, continued by President Gerald R. Ford, and signed into law by President Jimmy Carter with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Round demonstrated a strong, consistent bipartisan commitment toward freer trade.

As trade liberalization negotiations moved increasingly beyond tariff reductions in nonagricultural products, progress toward greater liberalization became more difficult for many countries. The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) launched under President Ronald Reagan nearly collapsed in 1990 over disagreements about lowering barriers on agricultural products. Following a redrafting of the agreement by GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel, President George H.W. Bush spearheaded efforts to complete negotiations of the Uruguay Round, and in 1994 President Bill Clinton signed legislation implementing the final agreement. The Uruguay Round achieved the most fundamental reform of global trade rules since the creation of the GATT. The Round established the World Trade Organization (WTO), extended international trade rules beyond goods to include intellectual property rights and trade in services, and greatly improved procedures for countries to resolve disputes over international trade.

At present, the United States is actively engaged in the current Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations that began in 2001. This round aims to liberalize agricultural trade, lower remaining barriers in nonagricultural goods trade, and reduce trade barriers in services. The Round focuses on increasing market access for developing countries as a means to encourage economic development. Progress has been slower than anticipated, but the eventual success of the previous Uruguay Round suggests that a favorable outcome from Doha will emerge.

In addition to multilateral trade liberalization, over the past two decades the United States has signed a number of bilateral and regional trade agreements. The protracted nature of multilateral negotiations has been one factor that has led the United States to aggressively pursue other avenues toward free trade outside of the major negotiating rounds. Under President Reagan, the United States signed its first bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with Israel in 1985. The United States and Canada signed a bilateral FTA in 1988 after three years of negotiations. The Bush Administration initiated negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1991, which President Clinton signed into law in 1993 and went into effect the following year. In addition to trade, NAFTA explicitly recognized the benefits of investment liberalization and included provisions designed to extend national (i.e., nondiscriminatory) treatment, among other protections to investors.

The United States has recently embarked on a renewed series of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. The ability of the United States to negotiate trade-liberalizing agreements was strengthened significantly when the President signed the Trade Act of 2002 into law. That legislation provides the Executive Branch with the ability to negotiate international agreements that are subject to an up or down vote, but not amendment, by Congress. The President's leadership was vital in securing this important authority to pursue a full trade agenda including multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements. The President has implemented bilateral FTAs with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, and Australia. The Administration also has concluded FTAs with an additional ten countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic (the Central American-Dominican Republic FTA, or CAFTA-DR), Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and Peru. The United States is currently engaged in negotiations with the United Arab Emirates, the five nations of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland), Thailand, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador. The adoption of CAFTA-DR is the latest chapter in America's trade book, which demonstrates the country's ongoing commitment toward trade liberalization and economic development.

Decades of U.S. trade liberalization achieved on a number of fronts have had a dramatic impact on U.S. openness to trade. Chart 7-1 shows how average U.S. tariffs have fallen since 1930. The average tariff on dutiable goods approached 60 percent at the height of the Great Depression and has dropped to 4.6 percent. The current average U.S. tariff on all goods (both dutiable and nondutiable) is just 1.4 percent.

Trade expansion has reached an important juncture, and resistance both here and abroad to further trade and investment expansion could jeopardize increased domestic and international economic growth. The retrospective presented above illustrates America's historic achievements in trade liberalization, and, as the next section demonstrates, Americans, on average, have accrued immense gains along with our trading partners from this liberalization. The United States has a large stake in the current multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round. The gains from prior trade agreements provide grounds to stay the course on trade liberalization.

Chart 7-1 Average U.S. Tariff on Dutiable Goods, 1930-2005 Since 1934 the United States has moved consistently towards freer trade.



# The Payoff to America from Global Economic Integration

Trade liberalization remains a controversial subject because competition invariably raises both anxieties and opportunities. Reducing obstacles to trade can help economies grow more rapidly and efficiently in the long run and create better, higher-paying jobs, while global competition can lead to hardships for others in the short run. (Impacts of international trade on labor markets are discussed in Box 7-2 later in the chapter.) The appropriate social and political response to these hardships is a critical issue. For instance, at the macro level, pro-growth government policies can help set the environment for economic growth and job creation. Constructive policies that help displaced workers train for and find new work and increase the portability of pension and health benefits can also ease adjustment.

The gains from trade liberalization are more widely dispersed than the losses and often not readily apparent. These gains are evident in lower consumer prices and the greater variety of products available to consumers. International commerce helps countries focus resources on strengths and forces firms to innovate and to set prices more competitively. Studies show that firms that are engaged in the international marketplace tend to exhibit higher rates of productivity growth and pay higher wages and benefits to their workers. An economy with higher overall productivity growth can support faster GDP growth without generating inflation. And higher productivity growth means higher sustainable living standards. Taken together, the net benefits from increased economic integration (greater trade and investment liberalization) historically have been positive for the United States.

## Benefits to Consumers

## Lower Prices


International trade fosters competition, which in turn restrains cost. There is now ample evidence across many countries that greater trade openness and the resulting exposure to foreign competition reduces the ability of a country's firms to charge high markups above production costs. Pressures for lower prices arise from the direct impact of cuts in trade barriers being passed through to cuts in prices. They also arise from the broader impact of raising market contestability.

At the detailed product level, many studies have linked lower prices and/or price-cost markups to measures of trade openness such as tariff rates. Chart 7-2 presents broader evidence of how trade helps lower prices. It presents indices of U.S. consumer prices and U.S. import prices since 1990. There is a clear difference between the two indices: Overall consumer prices, which

include not just imported goods and services but largely nontraded goods and services, have risen much more than have import prices. The average annual growth in U.S. import prices for the period 1990–2004 was just 0.6 percent, compared to a 2.2-percent rise in overall consumer prices. In real terms, total U.S. imports grew threefold during this same period, from \$553 billion to \$1.5 trillion (in 2004 dollars).

In addition to the pro-competitive effects of trade, other important contributors to price restraint are technology advances and innovation. This has been especially true for consumer electronics and information technology (IT) products. For instance, in just the past eight years, consumer prices of color televisions are down 50 percent, and Americans today pay 60 percent less for camcorders and mobile phones. It can be difficult to empirically separate observed price declines into the relative contributions of trade, technological change, and other forces. But a simple approach to assessing the role of international trade in price changes is to compare price changes between more- and less-traded products. Consistent with the aggregate evidence in Chart 7-2, a clear divergence in price trends emerges when products are split in this way. Internationally traded products tend to experience lower inflation rates—even real price declines—while nontraded goods tend to exhibit price increases. Between 1997 and 2004, real prices fell for an array of highly traded goods, such as audio equipment (-26%), TV sets (-51%), toys (-34%), and clothing (-9%). In contrast, real prices rose for

Chart 7-2 Consumer and Import Price Growth, 1990-2004 Consumer price growth has outpaced import prices.



largely nontraded products, such as whole milk (+28%), butter (+23%), ice cream (+18%), peanut butter (+9%), and sugar and sweeteners (+9%).

Exactly which Americans most enjoy the benefits of lower prices depends on which products enjoy the largest cuts in trade barriers. Box 7-1 discusses the regressive nature of the current U.S. tariff schedule.

### Box 7-1: The Regressive Nature of U.S. Tariffs

While the average tariff applied to U.S. imports is relatively low at 1.4 percent, there are peaks within the U.S. tariff schedule that fall most heavily on lower-income consumers. Studies have shown that, on balance, U.S. trade barriers are regressive because they disproportionately raise the relative price of goods consumed by lower-income Americans. Some of the most restrictive trade barriers persist on everyday consumer products such as textiles, apparel items, and footwear.

Tariffs disproportionately affect the poor in two ways. First, many tariffs are highest on products that represent higher shares of income expenditures for lower-income households. Staple consumer products such as shoes and clothing face import taxes over 30 percent, some of the highest tariffs in the U.S. tariff schedule. Footwear represents 1.3 percent of income expenditures for lower-income households (1.5 percent for single- parent households) compared to just 0.5 percent for higher-income households. Similarly, lower-income households (and single-parent households) spend roughly 6 percent of their disposable income on apparel, while upper-income households spend just 4 percent.

Second, within these high-tariff product categories, tariffs are often most pronounced on the cheapest products. That is, products that are more commonly purchased by lower-income consumers are subject to higher import taxes than are those commonly purchased by upper-income consumers. For example, lower-priced sneakers (\$3–\$6 per pair) are marked up with a 32-percent tariff, while higher-priced sneakers, such as \$100 track shoes, are subject to a 20-percent tariff.

How did the structure of the U.S. tariff schedule become so regressive? The cause was not a concerted effort to maintain relatively high import taxes on cheaper products. Movement toward increased trade liberalization tends to occur more slowly in labor-intensive industries where greater liberalization may be viewed negatively. The situation may reflect a classic political-economy challenge to liberalizing trade. The beneficiaries of trade protection are often a much more concentrated, well-organized group of individuals or firms than the millions of households across the country that bear the costs. However, the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations offers an opportunity to eliminate these tariffs and other trade barriers, provided other WTO members reciprocate.

## Greater Product Variety

International trade also allows consumers to choose from a broader variety of goods and services. One study shows that that the number of imported product varieties has increased by a factor of four over the last three decades, reflecting an important source of gains from trade. Welfare gains from variety growth alone have been estimated to be a remarkable 2.8 percent of GDP, which translates into gains of over \$4,000 for the average American family of four.

International trade allows year-round availability of seasonal and perishable food items such as fruits and vegetables. For example, U.S. consumers today enjoy grapes and peaches from Chile, limes and avocados from Mexico, mandarin oranges from China, and cashews from India, many during the offseason for U.S. production. Trade also provides U.S. consumers with greater variety and choice for agricultural products that the U.S. does not produce in large quantity. For example, Americans enjoy coffees from all over the world, including from Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

## Benefits to Firms and Their Workers

Firms can be linked to the global marketplace through many channels: exporting, importing, investing abroad, or receiving investment from foreign firms (foreign direct investment, or FDI). Stronger linkages to the global economy provide export opportunities for U.S. firms, allow firms to realize economies of scale, and provide the ability to establish and expand global production networks to lower prices and boost productivity. These opportunities can raise U.S. living standards by allocating national resources toward areas in which we have a comparative advantage and by raising firm productivity.

Firms exposed to global competition are exposed to the world's best practices in areas such as supply management, production processes, technology, and finance. Studies show that firms exposed to the world's best practices demonstrate higher productivity through many channels, such as learning from these best practices, and also creating new products and processes in response to this exposure. A number of U.S. industries have been compelled to adjust and innovate as a result of foreign competition via trade and FDI in the United States.

For instance, by the late 1970s, many Japanese carmakers were outperforming U.S. companies in overall assembly productivity, and U.S. imports of Japanese cars were rising sharply. America's leading automakers initially focused their response on trade protection. But competitive pressures from Japanese firms continued, in particular through foreign investment in the United States in the 1980s. This foreign investment established and expanded "transplant" production facilities in the United States that soon achieved

productivity levels on par with Japanese plants. These transplants proved to be a major spur to stepped-up innovation and performance among American firms. In the steel industry, a combination of foreign competition and the growth of the highly productive mini-mill sector has compelled U.S. integrated-steel producers to improve their performance.

Various studies show that globally engaged firms have higher productivity growth and tend to innovate more than their purely domestic counterparts. For instance, evidence from the United Kingdom shows that from 1998 to 2000, just 18 percent of domestic firms reported either product or process innovations compared to 45 percent of globally engaged firms. In recent years in the United States, over 80 percent of total private-sector R&D spending has been accounted for by multinational companies (i.e., by the combination of U.S. parents of U.S.-headquartered multinationals and U.S. affiliates of foreign-headquartered multinationals). Sales per employee, one simple measure of productivity, is up to one-and-a-half times larger in exporting plants than in others. Value-added per employee, another measure of productivity, is up to one-and-a-third times larger in exporting plants than in others. Exporting plants adopt new technologies more frequently and intensively than nonexporting plants; they also report more significant benefits from doing so.

The different channels through which international trade and investment contribute to productivity growth are very important for long-run U.S. living standards. Since 1995, the United States has enjoyed an acceleration in labor-productivity growth. From 1973 to 1995, output per worker hour in the nonfarm business sector grew at 1.4 percent per year. From 1995 to 2004, this rate accelerated to 2.9 percent per year—with rates averaging over 3 percent since 2000. Productivity growth of just 1.4 percent per year means average living standards take 50 years to double. At the faster rate of 2.9 percent per year, living standards take just 24 years to double.

Many researchers have concluded that IT hardware has been at the core of this productivity acceleration, citing both faster productivity growth among IT-hardware firms and greater investment in IT hardware throughout the economy. It is important to note that these highly successful IT-producing U.S. firms are among the most globally engaged firms in the U.S. economy. Exports and imports in the IT sector represent over 70 percent of sector output, compared to an economy-wide average of 10 percent. In recent years, IT firms have grown stronger by expanding their global production networks through increased international investment and trade, with output that entails multiple production stages across multiple countries. Indeed, today the United States runs large trade *deficits* in core IT sectors such as computers and office products (see Chapter 10).

American workers, like firms, also benefit from stronger linkages to the global economy. Studies show that workers in U.S. multinationals receive wages and benefits up to 18 percent higher on average than their peers in purely domestic firms. International investment plays an important role, too. Evidence suggests that wage premiums are 19 percent and 13 percent for blue- and white-collar manufacturing workers, respectively, in foreign-owned multinational firms. For American workers in multinationals with foreign investment backing the wage premiums are 7 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. The productivity advantages of globally engaged firms benefit American workers, insofar as high and rising labor productivity is the foundation for gains in real wages economy-wide.

# Taking Stock of the Benefits of Trade to America

The decades of American efforts to advance trade liberalization described above have generated substantial gains for the country overall. On the consumption side, households have enjoyed lower product prices and greater product variety. On the production side, firms have more efficiently allocated resources by focusing on areas in which they have a comparative advantage. Those firms directly engaged in international commerce tend to be more innovative, more productive, and pay higher wages and benefits to their workers. Overall, there is substantial evidence that trade has contributed to high and rising living standards for the average American.

Having discussed the different ways through which freer trade benefits America, the bottom-line question is how much has America benefited in total from decades of trade liberalization? Studies have estimated that the annual payoff from U.S. trade and investment liberalization to date, including from the Tokyo Round, Kennedy Round, and Uruguay Round, NAFTA, and other FTAs, is over \$5,000 per capita or \$20,000 for an average American family of four. These gains arise through many channels: higher long-term levels of trade exposure in goods and services that come from trade and investment liberalization; increased product variety; more efficient allocation of resources; and better transportation and communication technology. Some economists have conjectured that trade liberalization alone has accounted for about half of these gains, which implies that the annual income gain from trade liberalization to date is over \$10,000 for an average American family of four.

Box 7-2 includes a discussion of the impacts of international trade on labor markets. The effects of trade on the environment are discussed in Box 7-3.

#### Box 7-2: Trade and Labor

Job growth in America is driven largely by demographics—population growth and choices about labor-force participation—and by macroeconomic policies that affect, in particular, the business cycle. As the chart below shows, total employment has closely tracked the number of people in the labor force (employable people) since 1960, which in turn has closely tracked the overall U.S. population. Import competition has the potential to generate job losses where firms fail to adjust their operations to meet new competitors. International trade can also create better, higher-paying jobs in other industries. As discussed in the chapter, American jobs in globally-engaged firms (firms that are engaged in international trade or investment) are on average better and higher-paying than are jobs in purely domestic firms.

The dynamic U.S. economy creates and eliminates millions of jobs each year. The enormous turnover in the U.S. labor market is a reflection of the continuous stream of entry, exit, and resizing of firms in our ever-changing economy. On average over the past decade, the economy has had a net creation of nearly 2 million jobs each year. This net increase has been the result of approximately 17 million jobs created and 15 million jobs eliminated each year. International trade is one of the factors behind job turnover, along with changes in consumer tastes, domestic competition, productivity growth, and technological innovation. Survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show in layoffs of 50 or more people between 1996 and 2004 less than 3 percent were attributable to import competition or overseas relocation. Moreover, studies have shown that the rate of job creation in globally engaged companies is faster than the overall private-sector rate, and that trade-related dislocations on average do not involve longer unemployment duration or lower re-employment earnings than do dislocations from other causes.


Any job loss involves hardship, and any job change can involve challenge. The President has outlined ways to help people gain new skills in fields where jobs are being created.

It is often asserted that international competition pressures American earnings. In today's economy, education is valued more than ever and is a key determinant of worker earnings. Since the late 1970s, the returns to education have been rising in the United States, despite the fact that the supply of educated workers has also grown rapidly,

#### Box 7-2 - continued

Labor Force and Employment, 1950-2004

Employment closely tracks the number of people in the labor force.



suggesting that the demand for skills and education has grown even faster than supply. There is now a large body of empirical research exploring the causes of rising wage inequality across skills. There is broad consensus that trade has marginally contributed to rising wage inequality by placing a higher premium on skills and education. This contribution has been small compared to other factors such as the advent of new technologies that demand higher levels of skill.

It is important that the United States help our workers thrive in a competitive world. The President has said he will not be satisfied until everyone who wants to work can find a job. At the macroeconomic level, monetary policy can aim to achieve maximum sustainable employment with low inflation-irrespective of the trade situation. At the microeconomic level, constructive policies can help students and workers, including displaced workers-regardless of the cause of displacement-train for and find good work in the 21st century. The President has proposed a number of measures to improve job training, Community-based Job Training Grants and Career Advancement Accounts (for further discussion, see Chapter 2).

#### Box 7-3: Trade and the Environment

A nation's environmental policies are largely determined by domestic factors. The most direct mechanism through which trade liberalization could affect environmental quality is through changes in the composition of industries or the scale of industrial or agricultural output. Trade means greater specialization, potentially increasing the concentration of polluting industries in some countries (so-called pollution havens) and decreasing it in others. On the other hand, multinational corporations from industrialized countries that set up operations lesser-developed countries often bring a higher level of environmental performance with them. There is little or no empirical evidence directly linking trade liberalization to environmental changes.

Trade can affect the environment indirectly as well, both positively and negatively. Increased trade can lead to higher incomes, and as incomes rise, the demand for improved environmental quality rises. Another indirect effect is the influence of trade on the rate of economic growth, which could either decrease pollution (due to the use of cleaner technologies through capital stock turnover fueled by economic growth) or increase pollution (due to increased consumption).

While it is widely recognized that international trade policy measures are usually not the best method for achieving environmental objectives, recognition of the importance of the issue has resulted in a number of significant policy and institutional responses, both nationally and multilaterally. For instance, the environmental side agreements of NAFTA established the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation to undertake capacity-building projects and to put procedures in place that help to monitor each country's effective enforcement of environmental laws. Active participation by governments and institutions is a necessary component of the success of such efforts.

FTAs can provide a basis for enhanced bilateral cooperation on environmental issues. Environmental provisions in NAFTA and U.S. free trade agreements require each country to effectively enforce its own environmental laws, and strive to ensure that failure to enforce these laws does not affect trade or investment. These agreements are accompanied by separate environmental cooperation agreements or arrangements intended to take advantage of the closer economic ties and broadened environmental cooperation that goes beyond the trade sphere. Although some criticize trade agreements for a failure to do even more to advance environmental policy objectives, others acknowledge the significant benefits associated with the core obligations and cooperation mechanisms.

# The Policy Scene Today: Avenues to Further Liberalization

Trade liberalization to date has had substantial benefits. Still, barriers to international trade and investment remain and limit growth opportunities for many countries. With the United States accounting for just 5 percent of the world's population, 95 percent of the potential consumers of U.S. goods and services live outside our borders. The prospective gains from further liberalization, particularly in services (e.g., finance, insurance, information technology, and professional and business services), are substantial for the United States and our trading partners through greater efficiency of production and higher national incomes. The extent to which different countries experience gains depends on both the range of sectors that are liberalized and the extent of liberalization within each sector. The United States is pressing for freer trade, especially in services, through bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements.

# Prospective Gains from Further Liberalization

## Prospective Gains for the United States

The prospective gains for the United States from further trade reform are substantial. One study suggests that global free trade in manufacturing and agriculture would generate annual economic gains of over \$16 billion for the United States, or roughly \$220 for the typical family of four. The gains from removing all remaining barriers to trade in services are substantially larger, amounting to about an additional \$520 billion for the United States, or over \$7,000 for the average American family of four. This is additional income each year that will not be available in the absence of trade reform. These income gains would be fully realized in about a decade from the date of liberalization. These large gains reflect the United States having a comparative advantage in services sectors and the high barriers to services trade in other countries, which are often investment restrictions that effectively block the main conduit for trade in services. These restrictions include limits on the number of service providers, minimum local-content requirements that limit the participation of foreign firms, nontransparent and burdensome standards and licensing procedures, and discriminatory access to distribution networks.

# Prospective Gains for the Rest of the World

Further liberalization in trade would bring significant global economic gains, particularly for developing countries. One study reports that the reduction of all remaining barriers to trade in services would generate over \$1.5 trillion in income for the world. For full trade liberalization in agriculture and manufactured goods, the World Bank reports that reducing trade barriers would generate about \$290 billion of additional income to the world economy each year once the full effects of liberalization are realized, about a decade out. The income gains are even higher at \$460 billion with more generous assumptions of trade's effect on economic growth. Nearly half of those income gains would go to developing countries. Various studies find that at least half of the developing-country gains would be obtained from agriculture trade reform by industrialized countries (including the United States), including tariff reductions and the elimination of subsidies and domestic support programs. (Agricultural trade reform is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.)


Debt relief and foreign aid can help to reduce poverty, but trade is a more powerful tool. For instance, in 2004, industrialized countries spent over \$78 billion on development assistance to poor countries and industrialized countries are currently considering debt relief of \$56 billion. Even the conservative estimate of the \$140 billion effect of trade liberalization to developing countries exceeds both assistance and debt relief combined. Studies show that reducing barriers to global trade has the potential to lift hundreds of millions out of poverty. Agriculture liberalization is particularly important since roughly 75 percent of the world's poor live in rural areas and farmers constitute the majority of the poor in developing countries.

The gains from integrating developing countries into the global economy are not one-sided. As developing countries increasingly participate in the global economy, industrialized countries benefit from increased export and investment opportunities in those markets. Over the past decade, U.S. export growth to developing countries exceeded the rate to industrialized countries. Yet tariffs and other trade barriers in developing countries remain high (Chart 7-3). Realizing these market opportunities and encouraging development in these countries requires further trade liberalization efforts while promoting transparency, good governance, and sound institutions, all necessary building blocks for economic growth.

Persuading developing countries to reduce trade barriers continues to be an important objective for the United States. As developing countries become more active participants in the global economy, they experience higher rates of economic growth and are better able to reduce poverty. Studies show that over the past two decades, developing countries that have been more open to free trade have experienced higher rates of economic growth. During the 1990s, per capita GDP in developing countries that liberalized more increased 5 percent compared to 1.4 percent growth in other developing countries. China's integration into the world economy is discussed in Box 7-4.

Chart 7-3 Average Tariffs Across Countries

Developed countries, on average, have lower tariffs than developing countries.



Note. Tariffs are applied average rates.

Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2005

### Box 7-4: U.S.-Asia Trade Relationship

The robust postwar economic performance of many Asian countries has driven the strong U.S.-Asia trade and economic relationship. In recent years Asian economies have experienced some of the world's highest growth rates and will continue to be key export markets for U.S. firms. Outside of South Asia, trade with the Pacific Rim region represents about 30 percent of U.S. trade with the world. The United States imports different items from the Asian region than it exports. The top imports from the Pacific Rim include electrical machinery, automobiles, toys, furniture, clothing, and footwear. The top U.S. exports to that region include aircraft, chemicals, plastics, agricultural products, automobiles, and pharmaceutical products.

#### U.S.-China Trade

Since 1995, U.S. trade with China has represented an increasing share of U.S. total trade, reflecting some substitution away from other Pacific Rim trading partners toward China. The United States imports different items from China than it exports to China. In 2004, top import items from China included a wide range of consumer goods, such as toys, sporting goods, apparel, and footwear. Top U.S. export items to China included a number of intermediate components and machinery,


#### Box 7-4 — continued

aircraft, soybeans, and cotton. Many imports from China now take the place of goods previously imported from other countries. China increasingly is a large and growing market for U.S. goods and services. As the chart below shows, since China's accession to the WTO, U.S. exports to China have risen faster than exports to the rest of the world.

#### Engaging China

The U.S.-Asia trade and economic relationship offers vast opportunities for citizens in all of these countries to prosper, however, China's integration into the global economy will not come without challenges. For instance, WTO membership has offered China new benefits, such as Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the United States and access to the WTO's rules-based dispute-settlement mechanism. China's WTO membership also brings new responsibilities, such as improving the protection of intellectual property, full compliance with trade agreements, and continued progress toward a flexible, market-based exchange-rate regime. China has made strides toward economic reform at all levels of government, but there are areas that require further progress. The United States will continue to work with China to assist its integration as a responsible stakeholder in the international economy and to ensure that bilateral economic relations are mutually beneficial.





Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census).

## Avenues for Further Liberalization

Countries are increasingly employing negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels to achieve further liberalization. These avenues are not mutually exclusive. The United States employs a multi-faceted approach, and in recent years has signed a number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. These agreements set rules for trade, increase market access for firms, and strengthen the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights and environmental and labor laws. Other trading partners such as the European Union (EU) have pursued an even greater number of bilateral and regional agreements. The WTO nevertheless remains the most important forum for trade liberalization due to its global reach and the interdependence of the world economy.

The general consensus on the WTO among academics and practitioners is that the organization has facilitated increased trade and openness. By establishing a rules-based system, the organization provides a forum for all members to resolve trade disputes and offers a greater voice to developing countries in the establishment of global trade rules. These rules help to foster better business climates, particularly among developing countries, which can help to reduce corruption and attract more foreign direct investment. The United States fully supports the role of the WTO in promoting a rules-based global trading system, opening markets, and encouraging economic growth.

The 149 WTO members are currently engaged in the Doha Development Round of negotiations, which recognizes that global trade expansion can make a significant contribution to spurring economic growth and reducing global poverty. The Doha Round focuses on better integrating developing countries into the international trading system and enabling them to benefit from increased trade.

# Moving Beyond Goods Trade Liberalization

To date, most trade liberalization has been in the form of reduction in barriers to goods trade. Using existing trade agreements and partnerships, trade and investment ties can be strengthened to include services and other nontariff measures that limit international commerce. This section discusses how the United States is pursuing deeper economic cooperation across North America and with the European Union.

## Services Liberalization

From telecommunications and finance to health and education, services are the single largest sector in most industrialized and many developing countries. Not only do services provide the bulk of employment and income in many countries, but services provide critical input for the production of other goods and services. An in-depth look at financial services illustrates many of the key issues involved in liberalizing trade in services.

The unprecedented growth of global financial markets in recent years has given prominence to the issues associated with financial services liberalization. Liberalizing international trade in financial services can be a market-based means to strengthen financial systems. It is often an important catalyst in improving the quality of capital flows through exposure to foreign competition and in strengthening financial systems—particularly in developing and transitioning economies. Enhanced financial services trade can improve technology transfer and encourage better risk management across borders. Foreign competition challenges domestic firms to improve the quality of their financial services through broader opportunities for trade and portfolio diversification. This results in more consumer choice and competitive pricing.

Financial services liberalization for developing countries offers many possibilities for strengthening weak domestic financial systems through trade openness, competition, and sound regulation. Countries with fully open financial service sectors grow on average one percentage point faster than other countries. Foreign-backed financial institutions in developing countries often possess a greater ability to lend to those countries during economic downturns and thereby stabilize capital flows in times of crisis. Foreign banks that can extend credit to local businesses can be critical for stabilizing developing-country economies in the absence of more limited capacity of domestic financial intermediaries.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO is the most comprehensive framework to date that supports national programs of financial services liberalization within an international context. Insurance, banking, and financial services trade exists primarily in two forms: cross-border trade and commercial presence. In cross-border trade, domestic consumers purchase services from a foreign supplier abroad. In the case of commercial presence, a foreign supplier establishes itself in a country through direct investment.

## U.S.-EU Economic Initiative

Trade and investment ties between Europe and the United States have been crucial in each region's economic growth for several decades. Trans-Atlantic trade is mostly free in terms of border taxes, with the exception of the agricultural sector. However, there remain a host of nontariff measures and regulatory divergences that hinder U.S.-EU trade and investment. In 2005, the United States and the European Union launched a trans-Atlantic economic initiative, which aims to promote regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition of standards, enhance trade in services, stimulate open and competitive capital markets, and promote innovation, among other economic-cooperation goals.

In order to enhance trade in services, the initiative calls for U.S. and European authorities to work with regulators and professional associations to identify sectors where the potential exists to achieve mutual recognition of professional qualifications. For instance, an agreement in architectural services might allow American architects to provide their services to European developers without having to navigate a complex and often nontransparent regulatory and licensing process. Underlying these goals to promote trans-Atlantic commerce is a commitment to greater cooperation beyond the reduction of traditional trade barriers.

# Strengthening Economic Cooperation Across North America

NAFTA achieved important trade liberalization across the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and has laid the foundation for further economic cooperation in trade, investment, and other mutual interests such as immigration and security. Through the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership, the United States is working with the governments of Canada and Mexico to promote such economic cooperation. This "NAFTA-plus" initiative aims to eliminate nontariff barriers, streamline regulatory processes, expand duty-free treatment by liberalizing the rules of origin, and promote free and secure electronic commerce. Heightened security concerns since September 11, 2001, have resulted in greater port inspections, longer shipment times, and more-frequent delays. The imposition of security fees and increased inspections on NAFTA commerce can increase trade costs, adversely affecting businesses that have integrated their operations on a regional basis (such as the auto industry). This initiative also aims to harmonize safety standards for trade, streamline checkpoint operations, and make the movement of legitimate and low-risk traffic across North American borders more secure and efficient.

## Conclusion

The expansion of international trade and investment over the past two decades has created an increasingly interdependent global economy. Achievements in trade liberalization have had substantial payoffs for the United States and our trading partners. With just 23 members (or "contracting parties") in 1948, the purview and membership of the GATT have grown dramatically. Today the WTO (the formal international organization of the GATT) has 149 members with many countries eager to join. While this increased engagement by countries in international commerce presents immense opportunities for U.S. consumers, workers, and firms, reaching consensus among all these countries on further reductions in trade barriers can be difficult. Like many other countries, the United States has pursued multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements to achieve its goals. These avenues all lead to the same destination of more-open markets and greater economic growth. Existing trade partnerships and formal agreements can be platforms for further economic cooperation in areas such as services and investment. Recognizing the payoff to date and the prospective gains from further liberalization, the United States is committed to working with all countries to open markets and create favorable conditions for economic growth both here and abroad.

# The U.S. Agricultural Sector

In 2005, the Federal government spent approximately \$20 billion on agricultural support payments in a sector forecast to produce approximately \$270 billion of output in 2005. In addition, the United States maintains barriers to the import of some commodities, and these barriers raise the domestic prices of these commodities relative to world prices. To what extent do these payments and trade barriers serve a public purpose? Are they needed to maintain a healthy U.S. agricultural sector? Could alternative policies achieve this goal? This chapter addresses these and other questions.

Today's agricultural commodity support programs are rooted in the landmark New Deal legislation that followed the agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s. These programs were designed to sustain prices and incomes for producers of cotton, milk, wheat, rice, corn, sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and other crops, at a time when a large portion of the U.S. population was engaged in farming. Changing economic conditions and trends in agriculture since then suggest that many of the original motivations for farm programs no longer apply. For example, the increasing reliance of farm families on income earned from sources other than their farms and a shift toward market-oriented farm policies have made farms and commodity markets less vulnerable to adverse price changes than before. These changes imply that moving away from traditional commodity support programs today would have a much smaller impact on farm household income than in previous decades. Nonetheless, substantial government support of agriculture remains.

A more economically efficient farm policy would reflect contemporary economic conditions, environmental needs, and public values. Economic efficiency would be served by policies that are cost-effective and that give farmers greater opportunity to respond to market signals. Revising government policy to better meet these objectives would help unleash more of the innovative energy that has long characterized American agriculture. U.S. agriculture can successfully compete in a global marketplace that has been freed of domestic support and barriers to trade. The key findings of this chapter are:

- Most farmers do not benefit from commodity subsidies.
- Support to agriculture can be provided in many forms that are potentially less market- distorting than existing commodity subsidies.

# The U.S. Farm Sector Has Evolved Dramatically Over Time

In the 1930s, farms accounted for a sizable share of U.S. employment and gross domestic product (GDP), but per capita farm income was only onethird the per capita income of the remaining population. Commodity programs were intended to reduce this disparity by sustaining farm household income, particularly in the face of adverse changes in agricultural prices. For instance, in the early 1930s farm household incomes were at the mercy of year-to-year fluctuations in farm prices. Commodity price support programs, which provided price floors (minimum prices) for agricultural producers, effectively insured them against adverse price swings. Proponents of these programs argued that they had macroeconomic benefits because they maintained rural purchasing power in times of general economic weakness. Many of today's basic Federal farm policies were established in the 1930s, and at the time, they were reasonably matched to this overall economic picture. Since that time, however, the U.S. agricultural industry has evolved dramatically.

As Table 8-1 shows, in the 1930s farm households accounted for 25 percent of the U.S. population and generated approximately 8 percent of GDP. Today they account for only 1 percent of the population (25 times lower than in 1930, as a percentage of total population) and generate approximately 1 percent of GDP. Over the same period, the rural share of the population has fallen far less (approximately two times lower than in 1930, as a percentage of total population), suggesting that rural areas are less dependent on farming's contribution to the rural economy. Our agricultural sector is still vital to our country, but due to both growth in other sectors of the economy and rapid gains in agricultural productivity that have lowered the prices of agricultural products, it has become a smaller share of the U.S. economy.

Astonishing progress in agricultural productivity growth likely explains much of the structural change in U.S. agriculture (Chart 8-1). Growth in agricultural total factor productivity averaged 2.1 percent annually between 1950 and 2002. In comparison, productivity growth in private nonfarm business over the same period averaged 1.2 percent annually. Technological progress and growth in farm productivity permit a smaller labor force to supply the agricultural needs of the country at ever lower cost. As a result, agriculture's contribution to total U.S. GDP has declined over time even though physical production has been rising (Chart 8-2).

TABLE 8-1.—100 Years of Structural Change in U.S. Agriculture

	1900	1930	1945	1970	2000
Number of farms (millions)	5.7	6.3	5.9	2.9	2.1
Average farm size (acres)	146	151	195	376	441
Average number of commodities					
produced per farm	5.1	4.5	4.6	2.7	1.3
Farm share of population (percent)	39	25	17	5	1
Rural share of population (percent)	60	44	36⁵	26	21
Farm share of workforce (percent)	41	22	16	4	2
Farm share of GDP (percent)	na	8	7	2	1°
Off-farm labor'	na	100 days	27%	54%	93%

na= not available.

'Off-farm labor measures the extent to which members of farm households work in other sectors besides farming. 1930, average number of days worked off-farm; 1945, percent of farmers working off-farm; 1970 and 2000, percent of farm households with off-farm income.


Data for 1950.

Data for 2002.

Sources: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service) and Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis).


Chart 8-1 Farm Sector Inputs, Output, and Total Factor Productivity

Gains in farm productivity have driven increases in farm output and exceed nonfarm productivity gains. Index, 1950 = 100



Sources: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service) and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

Chart 8-2 Farming Output and Share of U.S. GDP Farm output has increased, while farming as a share of U.S. GDP has declined.



# The Average Farm Payment Recipient Is No Longer Poor

Fifty years ago, average household income for the farm population was approximately half that of the general population. Today, however, the average farm household tends to be better off than the average American household; in 2004, farm households earned about 35 percent more than the U.S. average household income.

While on average farm households earn more than other Americans, the relative contribution of farm income (income from farming activities, including crop, livestock, and other farm-related income, and government farm support payments) to total farm operator household income (income from all sources-farm and nonfarm-that is earned by a household that operates a farm) varies by farm size. Households operating the "rural residence farms" (Table 8-2 shows the farm size classifications) earn more than the U.S. average family income even though their net cash income from farming is negative (that is, the expenses from operating the farm exceed the gross revenues) on average. The income from these farms is unlikely to be sufficient to support a family, and households operating these farms receive their income from other sources. Households operating intermediate farms have on average positive net cash income from their farming operations, but most household income comes from sources other than farming. Households

operating commercial farms have average household income over three times higher than the U.S. average family income in 2004, with most of their income coming from farming.

# Production and Government Payments Are Concentrated on Large Farms

The structure of farming continues to move toward fewer, larger operations producing the bulk of farm commodities, complemented by a growing number of smaller farms earning most of their income from off-farm sources. As Table 8-3 shows, most farms in the United States are still small farms or "rural residence farms," but they produce only a small share of total agricultural output and receive only a small share of direct agricultural subsidy payments. Most production and government payments are now associated with intermediate and commercial farms, particularly the latter, which account for a relatively small percentage of the total number of U.S. farms but receive over half of direct payments.

TABLE 8-2.— Farm Income and Farm Operator Household Income by the USDA Farm Size Classification, 2004

ltem	Rural residence farms	Intermediate farms	Commercial farms	All farms
Farm operator households (total number)	1,373,956	529,071	157,795	2,060,822
operator household (dollars)*	15,343	73,053	751,696	86,540
	Percent of average gross cash farm income per farm operator household by source			
Crop, livestock, and other farm-related income Government payments	91.8 8.2	92.7 7.3	95.5 4.5	94.5 5.5
	Average per farm operator household (dollars)			
Total cash farm expenses	15,980 -638	58,423 14,630	525,655 226,041	65,902 20,638
Farm operator household income <sup>5</sup>	75,316	64,789	191,115	81,480

Source: Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Resource Management Survey).

Intermediate farms. Small farms with sales less than \$250,000—whose operators report farming as their major occupation. This category excludes farms classified as limited-resource farms, even if their operators report farming as their major occupation.

Commercial farms. These comprise farms with annual sales of \$250,000 or more.

<sup>\*</sup>Gross cash farm income is income from crop, livestock, and other farm-related income, including agricultural subsidy payments.

<sup>\*</sup>Farm operator household income is income from all sources, farm and nonfarm related, earned by the farm household.

Note: Rural residence farms. Small farms with agricultural sales less than \$250,000—whose operators report they are retired or have a major occupation other than farming. Rural residence farms also include limited-resource farms, regardless of the occupation of their operator. (Limited-resource farms have sales less than \$100,000 and are also operated by households with low household income during the two previous years.)

TABLE 8-3.— Distribution of Agricultural Production and Government Payments by the USDA Farm Size Classification, 2003<sup>a</sup>

ltem	Rural residence	Intermediate	Commercial
	farms	farms	farms
Farms (number)	1,429,953	502,771	188,095
	67	24	9
	9	19	72
	17	32	51

Source: Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Resource Management Survey).

The United States is not the only country in which subsidy payments are concentrated among a relatively small portion of farms receiving commodity subsidy payments. Data on the distribution of payments by farm size are relatively hard to come by for most European Union (EU) countries. However, in 2001 in France, farms of approximately 500 acres or more represented 2 percent of farms and received 11 percent of direct payments for arable crops (grains and oilseeds), while small farms (25 to 50 acres) represented 19 percent of farms but received 7 percent of direct payments for arable crops. While the EU is currently in the process of converting most of its various forms of direct farm payments into "single farm payments" that will be largely independent of production, the direct farm payments will be based on payments historically received by a farm. Hence, it is likely that direct payments to European farmers will remain concentrated among a relatively small portion of farms.

# Issues in Current U.S. Farm Policy

In the United States, producers of bulk commodities, such as cash grains (wheat, rice, and corn), cotton, oilseeds, and peanuts, and producers of several other minor crops are eligible for commodity support in various forms, including fixed direct payments, countercyclical payments, and marketing loan program benefits (whose particulars will be discussed in a later section). Dairy, sugar, and (until 2004) tobacco prices are also supported through production and import control programs.

# Agricultural Production and Farm Program Benefits Are Increasingly Concentrated


Because of differences in farm size and types of commodities produced across farms, the distribution of government payments is unbalanced. Among the factors affecting the allocation of government payments are farm size (acreage), location, and types of commodities produced.

See bottom of Table 8-2 for the definitions of the USDA Farm Size Classifications, but with the inclusion of farms organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives, as well as farms operated by hired managers.

Less than half of the Nation's 2.1 million farms receive government payments—only 40 percent received government payments (including income support and conservation payments) in 2003. Direct government payments on crops eligible for commodity support reach only about 500,000 farms (around 25 percent of all farms). Even for farms that receive payments, government payments typically represent a small share of gross farm income (revenue from farming activities, including crop, livestock, and other farm-related income, and government farm support payments) and an even smaller share of farm operator household income. Government payments accounted for only about 5 percent of receipts for commercial farms (Table 8-2).

Most program payments go to larger farms, because program commodity production is concentrated on larger farms. While commercial farms received approximately half of government payments in 2003, they accounted for only 15.5 percent of farms receiving payments, and the average household income of their operator is almost three times higher than U.S. average household income. The largest of the commercial family farms (those with gross annual sales of \$500,000 or more) received 27 percent of payments even though they account for 5.5 percent of farms receiving payments. Some of the largest farms in terms of value of production produce livestock or fruits and vegetables and thus may not receive any government program payments. As Charts 8-3 and 8-4 show, both production and program payments have become increasingly concentrated over time, with notable shifts toward larger farms even over the last decade.

Chart 8-3 Value of Agricultural Production by Farm Size (1989 versus 2003) Agricultural production is shifting toward larger farms.




Size of farm, by agricultural sales (2003\$)

Note: Non family farms comprise those farms organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives, as well as farms operated by hired managers.

Source: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service)

Chart 8-4 Government Commodity Payments by Farm Size (1989 versus 2003)

Government commodity payments are shifting toward larger farms.



Size of farm, by agricultural sales (2003\$)

Source: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service)

The share of program participants is highest in regions where production of corn, oilseeds, wheat, rice, and cotton is concentrated. Cotton and rice farms reported the highest average payment level. In 2003, cash grain (wheat, rice, corn, barley, oats, and sorghum) and soybean farms received 49 percent of total payments even though they represented only 21 percent of the value of total agricultural commodity sales. Farms that receive no payments typically specialize in the production of nonprogram commodities such as meats, vegetables, fruits, and nursery products.

# Farmers Today Have Many Options for Managing the Risks They Face

Farmers face many risks. The uncertainties of weather, crop yields, prices, government policies, global markets, and other factors can cause wide swings in farm income. Furthermore, farm income is more variable than income from off-farm activities.


Risk management involves choosing among many options for reducing the financial effects of such uncertainties. In addition to participating in government commodity programs that are available for certain commodities, farmers today have private options for managing risk that were not available when commodity price support programs were introduced. For instance, the

growth of futures and options markets provides a market-based method for farmers to protect themselves against short-term price declines. Other private means to stabilize farm incomes include saving, borrowing, diversifying among different types of crops and livestock, contracting farm output with processors at assured prices, crop insurance and total revenue insurance, utilizing a wide range of farm management practices that reduce crop loss (e.g., irrigation, pesticide use), leasing out farmland, and taking advantage of expanded opportunities for earning nonfarm income.

The sources of income for farm households are increasingly diversified, which means many of them are less vulnerable to the volatilities of farm income. By 2000, 93 percent of farm households earned off-farm income, including off-farm wages, salaries, business income, investments, and Social Security. Off-farm work has played a key role in raising farm household income, which, as already noted, now exceeds the national average. Chart 8-5 shows the increasing importance of nonfarm income for farm households in the United States.

While farm household incomes have become more diversified, farm operations have become increasingly specialized: In 1900, a farm produced an average of about five commodities; by 2000, this average had fallen to about one per farm. This change reflects not only the production and marketing efficiencies gained by concentration on fewer commodities, but also the effects of farm

Chart 8-5 Composition of U.S. Farm Household Income by Source (household average) The ratio of off-farm income to on-farm income has been rising over time. Dollars (nominal)



price and income policies that have reduced the risk of depending on returns from only one crop or just a few crops. Farms would likely cope with decreases in commodity subsidies by increasing the number of different commodities they produce and by the other income stabilizing strategies already discussed.


# Economic Costs of Commodity Support Programs


Despite the decreasing share of agriculture in U.S. GDP, the decreasing share of farm income in total farm household income, and despite the fact that the average farm household is no longer poor, U.S. farmers continue to receive billions of dollars in subsidy payments from U.S. taxpayers every year (Chart 8-6). Total payments to farmers from the Federal government were approximately \$20 billion in 2005 and are projected to be approximately \$21 billion in 2006. This constitutes about 6 percent of the U.S. Federal budget deficit for 2005 of \$319 billion.

In addition, these subsidy payments can cause market distortions by stimulating more production than would occur without the subsidies. To the extent that payments are tied to production and prices, they send market signals to farmers that differ from those they would receive from a market operating free from government intervention. These distorted price signals lead to an economically inefficient allocation of resources both within the agricultural sector and across other sectors of the economy. The link between agricultural support payments and markets varies among programs. For instance, fixed direct payments (FDPs) are based on a farm's historic production and are fixed lump-sum payments. Countercyclical payments (CCPs) are based on historic production but the per acre payment varies with changes in the current market price. Marketing loan benefits (MLBs) are calculated based on current production and prices. Although there is some debate over the relative levels of the market distortions caused by these direct payments, FDPs are generally believed to be minimally market-distorting per dollar of expenditure, followed by CCPs, and finally MLBs, which are generally perceived to result in the most market distortion per dollar of expenditure.

While these domestic support policies increase costs to taxpayers, they are only part of the support that agriculture receives and these other forms of support can also cause market distortions. In particular, for some commodities, market price supports such as tariffs impose additional costs on U.S. consumers of commodities by raising their domestic prices relative to world prices and thus reducing consumer purchasing power. Such support is especially high as a percentage of the value of the commodity in the case of sugar. Because of the U.S. tariff rate quota system on sugar imports, the domestic price of sugar has been approximately double world sugar price over the last few years. An estimate by the OECD found that the cost of U.S. sugar policies to U.S. sugar consumers due to increased sugar prices was \$1.5 billion in 2004.

Chart 8-6 Net Direct Payments to Farmers





Source: Department of Agriculture (Farm Services Agency).

In general, U.S. commodity support programs promote overproduction of commodities in the United States and hurt countries that could benefit from exporting these commodities to the United States. The existence of these U.S. programs in turn has prompted some U.S. trading partners to insist that we reduce these market-distorting programs in exchange for concessions important to United States trade in services and manufacturing. At the same time, as discussed in the next section, U.S. agriculture increasingly depends on the availability of foreign markets.

This section focused on distortions of market for land-based food resources. For an example of government policy that increases economic efficiency through market-based management of marine food resources, see Box 8-3 at the end of this chapter.

# Trade Policy Issues

The potential economic gains from further trade liberalization in agriculture as well as in manufactured goods and in services are large (see Chapter 7, The History and Future of International Trade, for more information). Trade ministers are working at the World Trade Organization to resolve differences about how to reform various protections for agriculture, a key issue that must be

addressed before negotiations in other areas can proceed. Areas of significant policy interest are the economic impacts of agricultural trade liberalization and the potential impact on the environment and the supply of amenities.

## Trade Is Essential to the U.S. Agricultural Sector


Trade is important for all major sectors of the U.S. economy, and agriculture is no exception. The quantity of agricultural goods exported from the United States has grown dramatically over the last half century, and is approximately eight times higher today than in 1950. With the productivity of U.S. agriculture growing faster than domestic food and fiber demand, U.S. farmers and agricultural firms rely heavily on export markets to sustain prices and revenues. U.S. export revenues have accounted for 20-30 percent of U.S. farm income during the last 30 years and are projected to remain at this level.

# Nonsubsidized Commodities Now Account for Most of U.S. Agricultural Exports

Historically, bulk commodities—wheat, rice, coarse grains, oilseeds, cotton, and tobacco-accounted for most of U.S. agricultural exports. Because of a cost advantage due to favorable land resources and capital-tolabor ratios, the United States is comparatively better at producing these crops than many other countries. The adoption of biotechnology and consolidation of farm operations have further boosted productivity. Stagnant import demand in some major markets, however, has resulted in a shift in U.S. exports of grains and oilseeds. Over the last decade, the share of U.S. bulk commodity exports shipped to developed countries dropped from 43 to 34 percent. Fast-growing developing countries are the prospective future markets for U.S. bulk crops and other farm exports. China, for example, is now the largest importer of U.S. soybeans, having surpassed the EU.

In the 1990s, U.S. exports of high-value products—meats, poultry, live animals, meals, oils, fruits, vegetables, and beverages—showed steady growth, while exports of bulk commodities tended to fluctuate more widely, particularly in response to changes in global supplies and prices (Chart 8-7). As population and incomes rose worldwide in the 1990s, U.S. exports of highvalue products (HVPs) expanded in response to demand for greater diversification of diets. In fiscal 1991, HVP exports exceeded exports of bulk products for the first time (in terms of value). Notwithstanding that producers of HVPs receive little in the way of commodity subsidy payments compared to producers of bulk commodities, HVP exports have continued to exceed bulk exports, regardless of overall growth of U.S. agricultural trade.

Chart 8-7 Value of U.S. Agricultural Exports of Bulk and High-Value Commodities High value commodities are now a greater share of U.S. agricultural exports.



Note: Bulk commodities are wheat, rice, coarse grains, oilseeds, cotton, and tobacco High-value products are meats, poultry, live animals, meals, oils, fruits, vegetables, and beverages.

Source: Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service).

# Trade Agreements Promote Reform of U.S. Commodity Support Programs

The November 2001 declaration of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides for negotiation on a range of subjects, including the reform of agricultural and trade policies among all 149 members. This 2001 declaration was further supported by the March 2005 ruling of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against certain U.S. cotton program subsidies.

The United States has implemented free trade agreements with several countries, and has negotiated and is currently negotiating free trade agreements with various additional countries (see Chapter 7, The History and Future of International Trade, for further information); all of these agreements call for increases in market access, both for agriculture and for other goods and services. As an example of the impact of these types of agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in 1994, has spurred market integration among businesses and communities in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, with research showing that NAFTA boosted agricultural trade substantially above levels that would have occurred without the agreement. Trade negotiations provide an opportunity to remove market distortions and increase market access for U.S. exports including agricultural exports.

## Benefits of Agricultural Trade Liberalization

At a global level, agricultural land and other resources are used most efficiently when farmers in each country face the same price signals. Prices are the market's way of indicating how much of each crop is produced, how it is produced, and where it should be produced in order to achieve the most efficient production patterns and the best, least-cost outcomes for consumers. Trade barriers, export subsidies, and domestic support programs distort the price signals that farmers receive and limit the potential economic gains that consumers and producers can obtain from trade. Trade liberalization that removes or at least lowers these distortions is motivated by the prospects of economic gains from trade (as in the example in Box 8-1 on New Zealand's experience with trade liberalization).

Empirical evidence suggests that global agricultural policy distortions impose substantial costs on the world economy. One study finds that agricultural tariffs, domestic subsidies, and export subsidies could leave world agricultural prices about 12 percent below levels otherwise expected in an intervention-free market. Because U.S. tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies are relatively low compared to some other OECD countries, most of the benefits for the United States would come from our trade partners' policy reforms. A new study shows that global reform of agricultural and food trade policy would provide roughly 60 percent of the global gains from merchandise (agricultural and manufactured goods) trade reform—\$180 billion of a total of approximately \$290 billion (in 2001 dollars) by 2015. Even though agriculture is a relatively small portion of world output, agriculture is more protected than other sectors, which accounts for the significant contribution of agricultural trade liberalization to the benefits of total trade liberalization.

U.S. agriculture will continue to be competitive if global agriculture policy distortions are eliminated. According to the same study, with removal of all global agriculture policy distortions U.S. farm exports would increase by 12 percent in volume and the value of U.S. agricultural exports would continue to exceed the value of farm imports to the United States. With global agriculture and food reform, average annual agricultural production growth in the United States would continue to be positive.

Even though the net gains from removal of domestic supports would likely be positive, their removal would likely come with some costs. For example, a portion of domestic support payments are included in the value of farmland and other farm assets, thereby distorting their values. These asset values can decrease in sectors where the subsidies are reduced. However, if the marketdistorting subsidies can be replaced by less-distorting payments—in particular, payments that are not closely tied to market prices or quantities, such as lump sum payments—the adverse impacts on farm asset values should be minimized.

#### Box 8-1: New Zealand's Abolition of Agricultural Subsidies

The farming sector in New Zealand now has negligible subsidies. Historically, assistance to New Zealand farmers was low until the 1970s, when it started to increase dramatically. The support policies of the seventies and early eighties shielded the rural economy from adopting efficient practices, increased transaction costs, and undermined the farm sector's capacity to adjust successfully to international market demands.

Within a broad package of reforms to New Zealand's economy in the 1980s, subsidies to agriculture were abolished in 1985. The reforms had an immediate and widespread effect on agriculture and the rural economy: farm incomes fell, farm input costs (particularly fertilizers) increased, farm profitability declined, the farm debt burden rose, and land values fell. Farmers' problems were compounded by low international prices for some agricultural products during the middle and late 1980s and increasing interest rates. The slower pace of reform for the manufacturing sector and the ensuing appreciation of the real exchange rate made the adjustment process of rural households more acute than the withdrawal of agricultural support would have caused on its own.

Within five years, however, the economy picked up, farm incomes had fully recovered and fears of a rural collapse never materialized. Rural population and farm households proved resourceful in adapting to the changes that swept the sector. Despite the early problems, few farmers were forced to leave their land. The rural economy and the agricultural sector as a whole have become more efficient, and competitive. Farmers have had to become more responsive to world price signals and have shown that they are able to explore and develop new niche markets. A research paper estimated that the annual rate of productivity growth was approximately 50 percent higher during 1985-1998, compared to that of 1972-1984. The level of producer support in New Zealand is now the lowest across member countries of the OECD, domestic and world prices are aligned, and government payments are only provided for pest control or relief against climate disasters. Even with low levels of government support, it is estimated that agriculture accounted for 7 percent of New Zealand's GDP over 2002-2004 compared to 8 percent over 1983-1985, and with a post-liberalization high of 9 percent in 2001. Agriculture accounted for 43 percent of New Zealand's total exports in 2004.

With the removal of global agriculture policy distortions, U.S. consumers would face higher prices for those commodities that currently receive domestic support, such as grains, because their production would fall. U.S. consumers would face lower prices for a few products, such as sugar, that are currently protected by border measures and that will face increased competition from imports.

The recent study estimates that nearly half of the global income gains of approximately \$290 billion would go to developing countries. Global reform thus becomes an effective supplement to, and in some cases a substitute for, less-effective development aid. Several recent studies conclude that global agricultural trade reform would reduce rural poverty in developing economies, both because in the aggregate these countries have a strong comparative advantage in agriculture and because their agricultural sector is important for income generation.

Trade liberalization would be particularly beneficial for the poorest countries, with several studies finding the potential of trade liberalization for manufactured and agricultural goods to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Debt relief and foreign aid can also help to reduce poverty, but trade is a far more powerful tool. One study finds that the payoff from agricultural trade liberalization to developing countries alone would be \$54 billion (in 2001 dollars) by 2015, roughly equal to the current debt relief proposal of \$56 billion. Furthermore, development aid does not always trickle down to the underprivileged. Agricultural liberalization is particularly important because roughly 75 percent of the world's poor live in rural areas, and because farmers and other low-skilled workers constitute the vast majority of the poor in developing countries. An open global market for agricultural goods would lead to greater crop specialization, increased agricultural exports, and higher farm incomes in poor countries.

## Alternatives to Commodity Subsidies

Support to agriculture can come in many forms, not all of which are equally market-distorting. For example, some countries (including the United States) offer fixed payments to farmers, irrespective of what they produce. Decoupled payments are lump-sum income transfers to farm operators that do not depend on current or future production, factor use, or commodity prices. From an economic perspective, the best way to provide agricultural support would focus on forms of support that interfere less with market forces while achieving the desired policy objectives.

The WTO's Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture encourages countries to "decouple" support from the production of specific commodities by creating a "green box" category for agricultural support. The main criterion for a support program's eligibility to be included in the green box is that the program is "not more than minimally trade-distorting." Unlike the WTO's categories for support that is more trade-distorting, the green box is not subject to spending limits. Note that the term "green box" refers to potential trade-distorting impacts and not to environmental issues, although environmental programs may be included in the green box.

Besides including lump sum payments not tied to present or future prices or output, the green box includes payments for "doing something," such as conserving the soil. For instance, support can be shifted from payments based on commodity output to agri-environmental programs such as the U.S. Environmental Quality Incentive Program, which has provisions to pay farmers to adopt environmentally benign management practices. Payments can also be made for activities that benefit the entire farm sector. For example, investments in public goods like infrastructure for rural development (e.g., roads), agricultural research, market promotion, extension and teaching, as well as collecting and diffusing agricultural statistics and market information, are also included in the green box. Government support for activities that boost agricultural productivity in the United States relative to that in other countries can help to increase competitiveness of U.S. agriculture in world markets. The exemption of these decoupled payments from WTO payment ceilings provides members of the WTO with the flexibility to transfer income to their agricultural producers, but in a manner presumed to have minimal potential to distort production and trade.

While green box payments are not currently constrained by global trade rules, many countries argue that some of them distort production and trade and that their use should be limited. A recent study of the U.S. experience with decoupled payments finds that these payments have improved the well-being of recipient farm households, enabling them to comfortably increase spending, savings, investments, and leisure but with minimal distortion of U.S. agricultural production and trade.

# Environmental Aspects of Agricultural Subsidies

In the 1980s, agri-environmental programs began to play a larger role in Federal farm policies, in part due to greater concern about environmental damage from agricultural production. While U.S. agri-environmental policies have long addressed the negative externalities of agricultural production, agrienvironmental policy in a number of developed country members of the WTO is increasingly giving attention to the positive by-products of agriculture. Major US agri-environmental programs can be categorized as either incentive programs or cross-compliance mechanisms (see Box 8-2).

Agri-environmental incentive programs can be further categorized as follows:

• Land retirement programs remove land from crop production. In exchange for voluntarily retiring land, producers receive rental or easement payments plus cost sharing and technical assistance to aid in the establishment of permanent cover on the land. Economic use of the land is limited under retirement programs (e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetlands Reserve Program). The bulk of U.S. agri-environmental programs expenditures fall in this category.

#### Box 8-2: Policy Mechanisms for Addressing Agri-environmental Issues

The United States and many other developed countries utilize a combination of programs to address agri-environmental issues:

- Voluntary incentive-based programs. Agri-environmental incentives are payments made to the farmer for the adoption of environmentally sound practices or to retire environmentally sensitive land from production. The advantage of incentives is that they increase the likelihood that farmers will adopt the desired practices or retire land. The disadvantage of incentives is the cost to taxpayers. Incentives can also have the effect of expanding production, so even if the disamenities (negative by-products of agricultural production) produced by each farm (or on each field) decrease, more farms (or fields) may now produce disamenities. For example, a business that would be unprofitable when subject to a tax may be made profitable through the payment of an incentive or a subsidy. While a tax may drive a business out of a competitive industry, an incentive may increase entry and induce expansion in competitive outputs. Nonetheless, while economic theory may suggest that taxes are the most economically efficient instrument to reduce pollution, they have seldom been used in agri-environmental programs at the Federal level in the United States. Note too that assessing taxes on the level of agricultural pollution is difficult due to its *nonpoint source* nature (that is, the originating source(s) of agricultural pollution cannot be easily pinpointed).
- Regulation. Regulatory requirements or standards represent an involuntary or mandatory approach to improving agri-environmental performance. Unlike policy choices in which farmer participation is uncertain, regulations require that all farmers participate. This feature can be particularly important if the consequences of not changing practices are drastic or irreversible. On the other hand, regulatory requirements are a blunt tool and can be the least flexible of all policy instruments. This regulatory instrument requires that producers reach a specific environmental goal or adopt specific practices without regard for cost or environmental effectiveness, which may vary significantly across farms, but are seldom known by regulators. Consequently, regulation can be less flexible and less efficient than economic incentives. Regulatory requirements are used sparingly in both the United States and the EU.
- Cross-compliance. Cross-compliance requires a basic level of environmental compliance as a condition for farmer eligibility for other government programs that farmers may find economically desirable, such as producer payments. Technically, cross-compliance is a voluntary instrument, but in practice it may not strictly be perceived by

#### Box 8-2 - continued

farmers as voluntary, particularly when the existing subsidy represents an important share of total farm income. Namely, it may be difficult for a farmer to forgo cross-compliance when the value of the existing subsidies exceeds the farmer's costs of adopting the mandated practices. An advantage of cross-compliance programs is that less government spending is required than with subsidies to address environmental problems. Disadvantages are that it will have a lesser impact on farms that are not traditional participants in commodity payment programs or in situations when program payments are lower than the costs to farmers of complying.

- Working land conservation programs support adoption and maintenance
  of land management and structural conservation practices on
  agricultural land, including crop and grazing land, and in some cases,
  forestland, in exchange for cost-shares or incentives (e.g., the Conservation
  Security Program and the Environmental Quality Incentive Program).
- Agricultural land preservation programs help retain land in agricultural production by purchasing the landowner's right to convert land to other uses (e.g., the Farm and Ranch Land Protection Program).

A requirement for agri-environment programs to be included in the WTO green box is that they have not more than "minimally" trade-distorting effects. With the exception of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and other land retirement programs that likely reduce U.S. production, current U.S. cost-sharing, incentive payment, and technical assistance programs have a minimal effect on production, given that the focus of such programs is on environmental improvements rather than altering production. In contrast, the focus of complaints brought before the WTO to date on agricultural subsidy programs has been on programs that may have a tendency to increase production, not reduce it.

If new WTO negotiations produce an agreement to further reduce trade-distorting domestic support, countries may find it necessary to shift support from programs that are subject to reduction to programs that are exempt. This may include agri-environmental programs that qualify for inclusion in the WTO green box. Nonetheless, great care needs to be taken in designing programs to ensure that they indeed have only minimal trade-distorting effects (in particular, production-increasing impacts tend to be a source of international contention); there is no reason to assume that environmental programs will automatically fall in the WTO green box.

### Conclusion

While the income of farm operator households is higher than the U.S. average, their household income is more variable than that of the average U.S. household because farm income is more variable than income from off-farm sources. Management of the risks faced by large commercial farms who receive the biggest share of U.S. subsidy payments—may be best served by crop or revenue insurance and forward pricing through participation in futures and options markets. And if one of society's goals for agricultural subsidies is to support the nonmarket benefits of agriculture, then there are more efficient instruments than those that are coupled to commodity production.

If the intent of commodity support programs is to assist low-income households, then these programs are failing in this task today because the bulk of payments go to farm households with incomes above the U.S. nonfarm average. Furthermore, as world trade in agricultural products increases, food security for U.S. consumers becomes less dependent on domestic production and, consequently, on domestic commodity subsidies programs. Not only are domestic commodity policies—domestic support, market access, and export subsidies—not targeting vulnerable populations in the United States, these policies, as used by the United States and other countries, reduce farm income in poor countries.

### Box 8-3: A Market-Based Approach to Reduce Overfishing

The Nation's marine fisheries are valuable resources, contributing \$31.5 billion in value added to U.S. GDP, supporting 82 million recreational fishing trips, and providing 9.5 billion pounds of protein-rich food. Unfortunately, many of these fisheries suffer from overfishing, excessive harvest capacity, and low profitability. Limited Access Privileges (LAPs)—which give individual commercial or recreational fishermen, cooperatives, or communities the exclusive privilege of harvesting a share of the total allowable catch—are a market-based approach to addressing these challenges.

Under traditional management approaches, fishermen compete for a share of a common resource. This leads to a "race for fish" that results in short fishing seasons, higher harvesting costs, lower profits, overcapacity, poor product quality, and environmentally damaging fishing

#### Box 8-3 - continued

practices. Traditional approaches often mandate certain fishing gear, specify short fishing seasons, and impose other restrictions to limit overfishing. These restrictions are difficult to enforce, do not provide incentives for fishermen to reduce their catch, and impede the development of innovative technology and fishing practices.

LAP programs, which include individual fishing quotas (IFQs) as well as allocations to fishing cooperatives, communities, and potentially, recreational fishermen, do not suffer from these same problems. LAPs with transferable quotas provide fishermen with the incentive to harvest fish at minimal cost, thereby reducing fleet overcapacity and increasing profitability. Each fisherman in a LAP program cannot harvest more fish than his individual quota permits. This means that fishermen can adopt new fishing practices to reduce bycatch (i.e., unwanted or unintentional catch) without concern that they will lose target catch to competitors, and have a lot more choice about when to fish, allowing them to avoid hazardous weather and sea conditions and improve their profitability by fishing when prices are best.

LAPs have been implemented in eight U.S. fisheries since 1990. Commercial fishermen in these fisheries have seen increased profits, decreased harvesting costs, and a safer and more stable industry. For example, due to improved product quality under a LAP program, the Alaska pollock catcher/processor cooperative fleet harvest in 2001 yielded 49 percent more products per pound than in 1998, the last year of the "race for fish." IFQs in the Alaska halibut and sablefish fishery ended the race for fish and increased season length from less than 5 days to 245 days per year. Profits have increased due to lower operating costs and higher product prices, which have more than doubled because halibut now arrive to market fresh rather than frozen, thereby benefiting consumers. Harvesting costs in the mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery have fallen by 46 percent since implementation of an IFQ system.

In September 2005, the President proposed legislation reauthorizing the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act that would implement key elements of the President's 2004 Ocean Action Plan, including encouragement for fishery managers to use marketbased management, such as LAPs. At the same time, the Administration pledged to work with regional fishery management councils to double the number of LAP programs by 2010, bringing at least eight new fisheries under market-based management. The Administration is also working with regional fishery managers to create guidelines for planning and implementation of future LAP programs.

# The U.S. Financial Services Sector

Everyday life tends to expose people to the financial services sector. For Example, people make deposits at banks and obtain loans from them. Nevertheless, understanding what this sector does can be difficult. Why do individuals go to intermediaries like banks for mortgages, rather than skip intermediaries (and their costs) and deal directly with savers? And why do financial service firms ask for so much information before making a loan and, afterward, place so many restrictions on borrowers?

This chapter explores what financial services do for an economy, how financial development relates to economic performance, and how financial services can be effectively regulated. In particular, it develops the following conclusions.

- The financial services sector addresses informational problems that can otherwise keep financial capital from finding productive uses. Moreover, the U.S. financial services sector tends to deliver these services in a cost-effective manner.
- Financial services facilitate innovation and thus encourage the economic growth that is necessary to increase living standards over time. They might also bolster economic stability.
- Financial regulation should protect consumers and ensure the system's safety and soundness. Moving too far in the public regulation direction, however, can stifle the productivity and innovation that are necessary for the economy to enjoy fully the benefits of financial services. An effective financial regulatory system appropriately balances the costs and benefits of public regulation.

### The Economic Roles of Financial Services

Financial services address information problems inherent in lending and investing. This section explains this and other benefits, and presents evidence that the United States enjoys a comparative advantage in producing financial services.

# Financial Services Address Information Problems in Lending and Investing

#### Adverse Selection

In general, information problems can hinder efficient economic behavior. Consider an example from the used-car market. In this market, sellers are

likely to have better information than do buyers about the cars being sold. A buyer might have general information about the quality of a certain model, but the seller likely enjoys additional information about the particular car that is being considered. In this and related cases, information is said to be distributed asymmetrically across the transaction's parties.

Economic theorists have shown that, absent a tool for reducing information asymmetries, only the worst-quality cars will be sold. In the case of the used-car market, given the general nature of the buyer's information, he or she may be willing to pay only the average price that the model under consideration tends to command. But sellers may then only offer cars that are below average in quality-i.e., "lemons." Indeed, a seller would incur a loss by selling an above-average car at a price based on the value of the average car. Consequently, high-quality cars might never make their way to the market.

This tendency for sellers of lemons to adversely select themselves creates difficulties in a number of markets, including those for financial capital. For example, just as a used car's owner has relatively good information about that car's quality, a manager likely has better information about his or her business projects than does an outside supplier of financial capital. This information asymmetry, in turn, can encourage "low-quality" projects to adversely select themselves into the financial market. As in the automobile example, relatively well-informed sellers (managers) may want to withhold highly valued assets (the right to share in the proceeds of a new project) if the general nature of available information lets buyers bid only an average price. An economy may thus forgo the very projects that are important for its performance.

#### Moral Hazard

The above discussion shows that, when information is asymmetric before a transaction takes place, the side with relatively good information can adversely select itself. The prospect of this strategic behavior can discourage the financing of otherwise valuable projects. But even if parties to a potential transaction can address this problem, information can still be asymmetric after a transaction takes place. This latter type of asymmetry is known as moral hazard and, left untreated, it too can hinder economic efficiency.

Like adverse selection, moral hazard is problematic for a number of markets. For example, because insurance customers have better information about their behavior than do insurers, an individual who buys insurance can subsequently take on too much risk. Here, an insured driver might enjoy the benefit of driving faster (e.g., the value of time saved) while passing at least some of the costs on to the insurance agency (e.g., the value of an expected claim).

A similar phenomenon plays out in more narrowly defined financial services. Indeed, just as insurance customers tend to have better information about their behavior than do insurance sellers, businesses and households tend to have better information about how they use loans than do lenders.

Lending contracts, like insurance contracts, may thus be plagued by moral hazard problems. A manager might, for example, pursue a project that is more risky than what was agreed upon when the loan was made. In doing so, the manager enjoys the benefit of projects that ultimately perform well, but passes the cost of poorly performing projects onto the firm's lenders. Absent an institution that would discourage managers from acting in this manner, suppliers of financial capital will be reluctant to offer financing. Again, the problem of asymmetric information can lower an economy's level of productive activity.

### Financial Services Can Mitigate Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The above discussions show that information problems can impede the efficient use of financial capital. Because these problems can stand in the way of better outcomes for *both* demanders (i.e., businesses, households) and suppliers (i.e., savers) of financial capital, opportunities exist for a third party to reduce informational obstacles. Financial service providers frequently play this important intermediary role.

Financial service firms can, for example, build expertise in evaluating and monitoring borrowers. Understanding what is, and what is not, a productive project can check the problem of adverse selection. An effective monitoring program can then keep borrowers on task with agreed-upon projects and thus limit moral hazard problems.

Demanding collateral can help mitigate information problems in this regard. To see how, suppose that a low- and a high-quality applicant ask for a loan and notice that, while information about quality is important for deciding whether to grant a loan, low-quality applicants may not want to divulge that information. In terms of the above discussion, lenders are worried about low-quality individuals *adversely selecting* themselves into the pool of applicants.

Asking for collateral can address this problem by encouraging applicants to truthfully (rather than strategically) reveal this information. Here, high-quality applicants are more willing to post collateral because they are more confident that they will not lose it. In this manner, collateral requirements can induce applicants to truthfully separate themselves into distinctive types of borrowers (rather than strategically masquerade as more attractive types).

Likewise, asking for collateral can mitigate the problem of *moral hazard*. Recall from the above discussion that borrowers may find it attractive to opportunistically increase a project's risk. Collateral requirements can mitigate this problem by essentially exposing the borrower's own capital to such risk taking.

In each case, financial service firms reduce informational obstacles that can stand in the way of lending. A good project can benefit both the project's manager and lenders. But because managers tend to have better information about projects, both before and after the projects are underway, passive lenders

will be reluctant to offer the requisite funding. By specializing in setting collateral requirements and evaluating and monitoring projects, financial service firms can play the important economic role of reducing such asymmetries.

### Financial Services Reduce the Cost of Collecting Information

A well-developed financial system not only mitigates information asymmetries, it does so in an efficient manner. Notice from the above example that individual savers could, in principle, mitigate these asymmetries themselves. In doing so, however, they would unnecessarily reproduce the same information a number of times. The relatively high cost of collecting information in this manner would still leave an economy with considerable information asymmetries and thus prevent financial capital from being matched with its most productive uses.

A reputable car dealer illustrates this point. After carefully examining a car, a dealer might offer a guarantee. In that case, prospective buyers can take some confidence from the guarantee itself, as opposed to having to reproduce information about the same car through repeated examinations. In a competitive environment, the associated cost savings can make their way to consumers. By essentially delegating the process of information discovery to experts, savers can likewise benefit from having financial service firms examine prospective investments on their behalf. In both cases, intermediaries not only facilitate mutually beneficial trades by reducing information asymmetries, they produce these benefits in a relatively low-cost manner.

#### Other Benefits of Financial Services

### Diversifying Investment Risks

In addition to being concerned with asymmetric information problems, individuals are concerned with the fundamental risks to which their savings are exposed. Indeed, independent of information problems, the return on investments can be very uncertain. This type of risk can also discourage financial capital from finding productive uses. Financial services can address this problem by economizing on the costs of investing in diversified pools of loans.

By saving at a bank, for example, individuals do not expose themselves to the risk of any one investment. Instead, they can participate in the return from a pool of investments, some of which will perform better at times than do others. On average, then, savers can reduce the volatility that they would otherwise face in an undiversified portfolio while maintaining a relatively high rate of return.

### Transforming Long-Term Investments into Liquid Assets

Financial services can economize on the cost of providing liquid access to even long-term investments. Individuals tend to save because they want to expand their consumption opportunities in the future. But while investments in assets like long-term loans might be good at expanding these opportunities, they are typically not good at facilitating exchanges. It is much easier to buy groceries, for example, with currency than it is with a long-term loan. Absent a mechanism that can readily transform loans into more readily usable forms of money, savers will again be reluctant to invest in projects that could otherwise be mutually beneficial.

Financial firms provide savers with liquidity. Banks, coupled with Federal deposit insurance (discussed in the Policy section below), can fund long-term business projects while fulfilling the transaction demands of depositors. Absent such a service, savers may be reluctant to commit their capital for longer periods of time. But innovative projects frequently need long gestation periods to build themselves into productive endeavors. By giving savers ready access to the proceeds of even long-term investments, financial services again encourage capital to find its best uses.

### Providing Cost-Effective Means of Payment

The financial sector also furthers economic well-being by economizing on the costs of producing payment services. The most widely used means of payment, cash, is a good way to make small purchases, but creates difficulties for larger transactions and those made from a distance. Financial services have found innovative ways to make life easier here.

Services like processing checks and conducting electronic funds transfers, to name a couple, can enhance the speed, safety, and convenience of transacting. In addition, means of payment like these can open up opportunities to better match consumers with the producers of goods and services that they demand. Finally, the potential to expand these already considerable benefits is large. By moving even further toward an electronic payment system, for example, the savings in postage costs alone could reach into the billions of dollars.


# The United States Enjoys a Comparative Advantage in Financial Services

The U.S. financial services sector has been making increasing contributions to GDP over the past several decades. The growing importance of this sector to the U.S. economy owes, in part, to the U.S. global comparative advantage in the production of financial services.

Chart 9-1 shows how financial services, such as central banking, taking deposits, and making loans, have accounted for a growing share of U.S. nominal GDP. This contribution has increased steadily from about 2 percent in 1977 (the first year for which data are available) to about 4 percent in 2003 (the most recent year for which data are available).

Chart 9-1 Share of GDP from Financial Services

The contribution of finance to GDP has risen about 68% since the late 1970s.



The growing importance of the financial services sector is consistent with U.S. workers having a global comparative advantage in the production of financial services. For example, financial firms open offices in other countries to serve foreigners (i.e., to export their services). Since 1997 (the first year for which these data are consistently available), exports of financial services have outpaced imports, with exports increasing by about \$15 billion and imports increasing by only about \$5 billion. In 2004, financial service exports totaled \$27 billion while imports of financial services were only \$11 billion.

# Economic Growth and Stability

The above discussion highlights the potential for financial services to mitigate information asymmetries and economize on transactions costs. Recent research cites these attributes as important channels through which financial services can increase living standards and promote economic stability. This section elaborates on the general economic benefits that financial services can generate in this regard.

# Financial Development and Economic Growth

Well-developed financial markets are important for economic growth. Equipped with a comparative advantage in reducing information asymmetries

and transactions costs, financial service firms can productively identify and guide promising entrepreneurs, and thus pave the way for scarce resources to find innovative projects. Innovations, in turn, can help turn a fixed amount of resources into more output, and thus facilitate increases in living standards.

This funneling of resources to productive projects can also encourage the replacement of outdated and inefficient technologies. Absent productive financial services, for example, individuals can pursue innovations only when they have enough resources to get their projects off the ground. "Idea-rich" but "capital-poor" innovators pose little threat to a market's incumbents, who can become complacent and set the stage for poor performance to entrench itself. By easing the way for newcomers to participate in the economy, financial services can hasten the replacement of bad ideas with growing opportunities. Box 9-1 discusses the role of financial intermediaries in the development and implementation of particularly innovative ideas.

#### **Box 9-1: Venture Capital and Innovation**

Venture capitalists raise funds, search for profitable investments, and then guide investments until sufficient proceeds can be returned to the original contributors. Working through this process, venture capitalists can be especially successful in identifying and guiding productive innovations. An influential study finds, for example, that a dollar of venture capital produces about three times more patents than does a dollar of corporate research and development (R&D). In addition, patents that ultimately emerge from venture capitalization tend to be of high quality.

The previous section of this chapter showed that asymmetric information can slow, or even preclude, mutually beneficial transactions from taking place. In this way, information problems can prevent financial capital from flowing to its most-productive enterprise. These problems can become even more difficult when the project that seeks funding is an innovative one. Indeed, the features of innovative projects tend to be intangible, and thus expand opportunities to strategically act on informational advantages. Without a mechanism for dealing with these advantages, an economy may thus forgo projects that would contribute most to its growth.

Venture capital firms are one such mechanism. Their expertise in identifying productive ideas and creating incentive structures that productively guide development therein lets them attract the type of long-term steady funding that is necessary to see innovations through from start to finish. This necessity for commitment creates risks that do not let other intermediaries succeed. Here, for example, even the most innovative borrowers may lack the credit or business track record that

#### Box 9-1 - continued

would make them attractive prospects to conventional lenders. Venture capitalists overcome such obstacles by taking extraordinary measures to examine prospective projects and maintaining a hands-on approach after making an investment. One study indicates that by discovering worthy projects and shepherding them to fruition, venture capitalists are able to annually attract upward of \$100 billion in funding, and channel this capital in a manner that accounts for about 14 percent of U.S. innovative activity.

Consistent with the argument that financial services encourage growth and discourage entrenchment, one study finds that industries that tend to lack their own funding (and thus rely heavily on external sources to finance projects) grow significantly faster when they are located in countries that have well-developed financial intermediaries (such as banks). In addition, studies show that countries that maintain well-developed financial systems tend to grow their economies at relatively high rates.

This relationship between financial development and economic performance also shows up in data from U.S. states. The relaxation of multi-state branch banking restrictions since the mid-1970s, for example, appears to have improved the quality of U.S. bank lending (as measured by a decline in nonperforming loans). Evidence suggests that the entrepreneurial sector responded to this enhanced development by leading state-level economies onto higher and more stable growth paths. Looking at data at the firm- and economy-levels, as well as across countries and U.S. states, researchers have thus found evidence to suggest that an economy's living standards and growth prospects depend to a considerable degree on its financial development.

### Financial Services and Economic Stability

The above discussion suggests that economic growth increases with the development of financial markets and services. Fortunately, such long-term benefits need not compromise short-term stability. Indeed, financial development may contribute to a reduction in the volatility of economic activity.


The reduction in economic volatility over the past several decades is well documented. As indicated in Chart 9-2, the volatilities of real output and consumption growth (measured by their standard deviations over 20-quarter periods) have both trended down since 1950. This remarkable decline in aggregate volatility, coined "The Great Moderation," appears to have set the

stage for a stable macroeconomic landscape that better avoids the inefficiencies that might emerge from increased economic uncertainty.

The evolution of the financial system may have played an important, though not exclusive, role in the Great Moderation. One change in the financial system that may have contributed to the Great Moderation was the removal of regulations that created volatility. Evidence suggests, for example, that Regulation Q, which limited the maximum interest that banks could pay on deposits until its repeal in 1980, depressed lending in high-interest-rate environments. As a result, banks may have created volatility by translating financial shocks into real ones.

The Great Moderation may also reflect the financial system's development of more sophisticated ways of managing and sharing risk. For example, banks now use *derivative securities* to insulate their balance sheets from interest-rate risk. Derivatives are contractual arrangements that specify payments between parties, where the payments are usually tied to some observable and verifiable measure (e.g., an interest rate or stock market index). Banks may also use derivatives to essentially purchase insurance against the defaults of large loans. In addition, banks have developed new methods for selling loans to investors through *securitizations*, the process of pooling loans and selling claims on these pools to dispersed investors.

Chart 9-2 Long-Term Decline in Volatility of Macroeconomic Indicators
The volatility of macroeconomic variables has declined over the past several decades.



Further, innovations in consumer financial products offered by banks, such as cash-out-mortgage refinancing (COMR), may have helped to moderate economic fluctuations. This role was evident in 2001, the year of the most recent recession, when households reportedly extracted \$83 billion of home equity, up from \$26 billion in the prior year. In addition, the widespread distribution of consumer credit has almost certainly allowed many individuals to insulate themselves from short-term economic shocks.

# Policy Issues

The financial services sector appears to favorably affect economic growth and may also reduce economic volatility. As the above discussions about financial mechanisms such as collateral and monitoring illustrate, private financiers do a lot to facilitate financial development. However, public policy plays a productive role. In particular, the desire to protect consumers and ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system has motivated policies in this area.

### Consumer Protection

Policies protect consumers in a number of settings. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, requires producers to disclose certain nutritional content and other information about their products. In the financial services sector, the Truth-in-Lending Act also requires informational disclosures. The Act requires that consumers be made aware of information about the amount and rate of interest that they are paying on a loan.

A consumer-protection issue of current interest is identity theft. To conduct their operations and reduce the risks of lending, financial service firms rely heavily on the Nation's credit-reporting system to both assess risk and verify the identity of credit applicants. Identity thieves prey on this system by using another consumer's personal information to obtain credit in the consumer's name.

*Identity theft* is a considerable problem. In 2005, banks, credit card companies, retailers, and data brokers were involved in high-profile security breaches that affected up to 50 million account holders. The entity whose security is breached generally bears the costs of direct losses from identity theft. However, consumers bear significant indirect costs of verifying fraudulent charges and correcting the damage to their credit profiles.

The Administration has taken substantial steps to protect individuals from identity theft. In 2003, the President signed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, which allows all Americans free access to review credit reports annually to ensure the security and accuracy of their credit reports and to protect against identity theft. In 2004, the President signed the Identity Penalty Enhancement Act, which defined a new crime of "aggravated identity theft" and increased penalties for identity fraud. Congress may enact additional protective measures, and the Administration has recommended that it consider extending to brokers and other entities the consumer safeguards that govern the way financial institutions secure their databases. The Administration also supports narrowly tailored legislation requiring companies to notify consumers if the security of their information has been breached in a manner that creates a significant risk of identity theft. Enacting this legislation would result in uniform national rules for dealing with identity theft, rather than the current patchwork of inconsistent state and local regulations. Of course, some regulations can be overly burdensome if not carefully crafted (see Box 9-2 for additional discussion).

#### **Box 9-2: Regulation Is Not Costless**

While regulation can improve economic performance, it can also have the opposite effect if not carefully crafted. For instance, if consumer-protection laws for some transactions are unduly burdensome, financial service firms may stop engaging in those transactions altogether. Therefore, regulations must carefully assess the overall benefit to consumers to be sure the regulation's benefits outweigh its costs.

Excessive regulation can increase the cost of producing financial services. The now-repealed Glass-Steagall Act is illustrative. The Act prohibited banks from producing commercial and investment services under the same roof. This prohibition addressed the concern that a bank's investment arm (where banks sell financial securities, like stocks) could opportunistically sell low-quality investments, and then use the proceeds to shore up bad loans from its commercial arm (where banks take in deposits and turn out loans). However, by decreasing the scope of activities in which banks could engage, research has argued that it pushed out economical ways of producing financial services. The costs of regulation, in this case, could very well have outweighed the benefits.

Finally, regulation can work against the ability of financial services to encourage capital to find productive uses. As described in the previous section, research has found that historical restrictions on banks opening new branches in other states decreased the quality of loans. When banks make bad loans, financial capital may not find its most productive use. Consistent with this argument, state-level economies grew at faster and more stable rates after they relaxed bank branch restrictions.

### Safety and Soundness

Another policy concern, the financial system's safety and soundness, has deep historical roots. Until the 1930s, the banking sector was largely unregulated. As such, it was susceptible to bank runs, whereby depositors raced to withdraw funds in anticipation that others would do so first. Bank runs are problematic because banks cannot quickly turn loans into cash in order to repay depositors. Indeed, faced with a deposit run, a bank may be forced to sell loans at a discount, which could leave depositors toward the end of the run with little or no money.

To address this problem, the Federal government began to insure deposits. Depositors have little reason to run on a bank when their funds are guaranteed by the government. However, given that this insurance can expose the U.S. taxpayer to potentially large losses, the Federal government has an obligation to ensure that banks operate in a safe and sound manner.

Federal banking agencies have sought to achieve safety and soundness through supervision and the setting of capital requirements. Agencies supervise banks much like banks would monitor their loan customers. Bank capital requirements dictate the amount of capital or liquid assets that banks must hold as a cushion against potential losses.

#### The Basel Accords

Capital requirements have found guidance over the past two decades from two international agreements known as the Basel Accords. These agreements were created under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (which is organized and operated by the G-10 countries) within the larger Bank for International Settlements (BIS) located in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Accords aim to produce general principles and guidelines rather than promulgate binding law.

Basel I was instituted in 1988, and Basel II was issued in June 2004 (but has not yet been implemented). Basel II was designed to improve upon its predecessor, Basel I, in the areas of risk management and capital adequacy. And while the Accords are intended for large international banks, a number of countries are using them to guide domestic banking industries.

In addition to protecting depositors, Basel I and II aim to mitigate global systemic risk: the risk that an event will trigger significant adverse effects on the economy through loss of economic value and confidence in the global financial system. Systemic risk is normally associated with spillover effects, in which the original shock spreads contagiously to other parts of the global financial system and disrupts output and employment. The adverse effects of systemic problems can arise from disruption of credit and capital flows. The failure of a major international bank due to inadequate capital financing provides one example of the type of "event" that could trigger adverse shocks.

Prior to Basel I, countries operated under very different regulatory capital regimes for their banks. Over time this arrangement raised competitiveness and financial soundness concerns, prompting banking supervisors in the industrialized countries to establish common approaches to defining regulatory capital and setting minimum regulatory capital requirements. Still, under Basel I, minimum capital requirements can lack sensitivity to the underlying riskiness of a bank's business activities. This encourages bank investments in higher-risk assets for which regulatory capital charges are too low, and fails to reward improvements in the bank's underwriting and risk-management processes. The lack of risk sensitivity also reduces the effectiveness of statutorily mandated, prompt corrective-action policies in the United States, which are tied to a bank's regulatory capital ratios. In recent years, financial innovations, such as securitization and credit derivatives, and the greater sophistication and complexity of risk-management techniques have rendered the current regulatory capital framework, and related bank-reporting and disclosure policies, increasingly outmoded for large, internationally active banking organizations.

On September 30, 2005, the four Federal banking regulators (the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision) announced their intent to issue in 2006 a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the U.S. implementation of Basel II. The banking regulators plan to implement only the so-called "advanced" Basel II approaches, under which minimum capital requirements would be much more closely aligned with a bank's actual risk taking by linking these requirements to the bank's own internal risk assessments. This new framework introduces three "pillars" intended to make reported regulatory capital ratios better indicators of a bank's financial condition and to make a bank's risk taking more transparent to both supervisors and the general public. Pillar 1 sets a bank's minimum capital requirement based on capital formulas whose basic inputs are derived from the bank's internal risk-management systems. Pillar 2 establishes a process through which supervisors and senior bank management will review a bank's overall capital adequacy in relation to its business activities and plans. Last, Pillar 3 attempts to enhance transparency through requiring expanded public disclosures of a bank's risk positions. Under the plan announced by the banking agencies, qualified U.S. banks could begin transitioning to the advanced Basel II approaches in January 2009.

Within the United States, only a few banks are expected to apply this new framework. It will be mandatory only for the largest, internationally active U.S. banks under the belief that the advanced risk-measurement and management standards are most appropriate and cost-effective for these institutions. However, any U.S. bank may elect to adopt the new framework voluntarily.

To address potential competitiveness concerns that might arise from banks being subject to different capital standards, the Federal banking agencies also are considering possible modifications of the U.S. capital rules that would apply to those banks not adopting the advanced Basel II approaches. Broadly, such modifications would be designed to make the rules applicable to the vast majority of banks more risk sensitive, but without sacrificing overall simplicity of the current capital framework.

As discussed above, capital standards for large banks are motivated by the need to protect depositors and limit systemic risk. Concerns about systemic risk extend beyond the traditional banking sector to other sectors, such as government sponsored enterprises (GSEs).

### Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)

The Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, more popularly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that are organized by the Federal government for the purpose of supporting the secondary market for residential mortgages. The original congressional intent behind the formation of these institutions was to provide stability and liquidity in the mortgage market and to promote home ownership, particularly among low-income families, by reducing the costs of mortgages. (The government also pursues these objectives through the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system.)

Fannie and Freddie primarily run two businesses: mortgage securitization and portfolio management. In their securitization program, Fannie and Freddie buy home mortgages from banks and other mortgage loan originators, package them into pools, and sell claims on these pools to investors as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). To augment investor demand, Fannie and Freddie guarantee the interest and principal on the underlying mortgages. These securitization programs provide liquidity to mortgage markets by expanding the range of investors who hold mortgage assets. The portfoliomanagement function of Fannie and Freddie arises because they purchase and hold MBS on their balance sheets. The combined assets on the balance sheets of Freddie and Fannie rose from \$132 billion (5.6 percent of the single-family home-mortgage market) at the end of 1990 to \$1.38 trillion (23 percent of the home-mortgage market) by 2003.

The market perception that the U.S. government backs GSE-issued debt has facilitated the growth in Fannie and Freddie's portfolios. Although GSE debt is not guaranteed by the government, the balance of evidence suggests that most investors perceive that the Federal government would step in to prevent a GSE default. This perception allows GSEs to issue debt at an estimated 40 basis points (i.e., 0.40 percent) below the rates of their peer institutions. With access to relatively inexpensive funds, the GSEs can easily finance expansions of their portfolios.

The growth in GSE portfolios is accompanied by prepayment risk. Prepayment of mortgages is problematic because GSEs tend to raise funds at fixed interest rates, and prepayments tend to occur when interest rates fall. Raising funds at fixed interest rates implies that GSE debt issued to finance a purchase of mortgages is fixed until the debt matures. However, if interest rates fall and, as a result, prepayments occur, the GSEs must reinvest the funds from the prepayment in the now-lower interest-rate environment. Typical methods for hedging prepayment risk (without assuming additional credit risk) include the use of interest-rate swaps to turn fixed-rate debt obligations into floating-rate ones, and the buying of Treasury securities. Both methods generate income when interest rates fall, helping to offset the decline in income caused by prepayments.

While all mortgage investors may face prepayment risk, the size of the GSEs makes this risk of particular concern to financial markets and regulators. Given the large size of their portfolios, it might be very difficult for the GSEs to quickly adjust their portfolios if hedges turned out to be less than perfect. The sudden failure of one of these enormous providers of mortgage liquidity could severely diminish the liquidity of the mortgage market and create severe financial stress for holders of GSE securities. Prepayment risk is also compounded by the low level of GSE capital. The capital-to-asset ratios (measures of the financial cushion available to absorb portfolio losses without becoming insolvent) of Fannie and Freddie are roughly half the average capital-to-asset ratios at comparable financial institutions.

The Administration's policy proposals have attempted to minimize the systemic risks posed by GSEs, while preserving the benefits for low-income home owners and the liquidity that GSEs provide to mortgage markets. In particular, the Administration has proposed that the GSEs focus on the business of mortgage securitization. As a result, market liquidity will be enhanced for a wider range of mortgages, and the home owner and liquidity benefits associated with the GSEs will be maintained. Moreover, the resulting reduction in the sizes of the portfolios will make the portfolios easier to hedge, decreasing the likelihood of systemic problems with little adverse impact on the liquidity of the market. Indeed, at the behest of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), Fannie's portfolio has declined by \$75 billion in the first half of 2005 without any noticeable effects on the MBS and home mortgage markets. Apparently, there was ample MBS demand from other investors, including banks and insurance companies.

The Administration has also recommended that regulators be allowed a free hand in setting minimum and critical capital levels for the GSEs, and that a clear and credible receivership process be established for the GSEs. This extension of regulatory authority should have little impact on the liquidity-generating activities of the GSEs (i.e., their securitization activities), but would help to mitigate the likelihood of systemic events.

### Conclusion

Information tends to distribute itself asymmetrically—e.g., borrowers tend to have better information about how they will use funds than do lenders. The potential to exploit such advantages can stand in the way of mutually beneficial transactions. Financial services are important for economic performance because they can check this potential in an efficient manner. While they do not make tangible goods, these organizations can play an integral role in expanding economic possibilities.

Public policy can improve upon unregulated outcomes, but must do so in a cost-effective manner. Moving too far on deregulation could compromise consumer protection and system soundness. But moving too far on public regulation can weaken economic performance. A well-developed financial system is thus one that balances the costs and benefits of public regulation. Systems like that in the United States appear to have found this balance, and thus tend to support strong economies.

# The Role of Intellectual Property in the Economy

Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time. It is equally certain it ought not to be perpetual; for to embarrass society with monopolies for every utensil existing, and in all the details of life, would be more injurious to them than had the supposed inventors never existed... How long the term should be is the difficult question.

—Thomas Jefferson, 1807

The founders of this country believed that *intellectual property* was so important that one of the specific grants of power to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution was the power "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." This grant gives Congress the power to define and to protect intellectual property through measures such as the issuance of patents and copyrights.

Other powers granted to Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution include taxation, regulating interstate commerce, coining money, borrowing, and naturalization. (For more on the early history of intellectual property rights in the U.S. see Box 10-1.)

Economic research over the past two centuries confirms the Founders' wisdom regarding the importance of intellectual property. This chapter examines how intellectual property differs from other, more tangible, forms of property, the justification for having a formal system for its protection, and its role in economic growth. The chapter also looks at certain policy challenges in ensuring that intellectual property protection continues to promote U.S. economic growth and development. The key points of this chapter are:

- Intellectual property rights create incentives for individuals and firms to invest in research and development, and to commercialize inventions and other creations by allowing individuals and firms to profit from their creative activities.
- Well-defined and enforced intellectual property rights are an important element of the American economy and can contribute to the economic growth of all countries.

• The Administration continues to vigorously enforce the laws that protect the rights of American intellectual property owners.

# Knowledge Is Different from Other Types of Goods

Economists generally recognize that intellectual property (such as knowing how to make bread) differs from physical property (such as a loaf of bread) in two basic attributes:

- 1. Can more than one person use the good at a time? Physical property, like a slice of bread, can be effectively used for only one purpose at a time, and that use precludes other uses. For instance, a slice of bread used to make a ham sandwich for one person cannot be used to make a grilled cheese sandwich or a ham sandwich for another person. This makes bread a good that is rival in consumption, which means that one use or one person's use of the product partially or wholly prevents another use or another person from using it.
- 2. Can other people be effectively prevented from using the good? The owner of physical property, such as a slice of bread, can prevent others from using that slice with relative ease. This makes physical goods like bread excludable, which means that others can readily be prevented from using the good.

Something that could be intellectual property, such as bread-making knowledge, differs from physical property in both of these attributes. Unlike a slice of bread, any person can use bread-making knowledge without diminishing the practical usefulness of that knowledge to anyone else. This makes breadmaking knowledge, like all knowledge, a good that is nonrival in consumption.

In addition, it is very difficult to exclude others from using knowledge such as the knowledge of bread-making once it is created and publicized. If someone wanted to reap the economic rewards for his creation of such knowledge, his only option may be to not disclose the information at all. Even this approach may not be sufficient if others take active measures, such as reverse engineering, to learn how the knowledge was used to produce a product. Once others learn such knowledge, the person who developed it will be unable to prevent others from using it. Under the rules that apply to physical property, this makes knowledge a nonexcludable good.

Most knowledge also differs from physical goods in that the costs of developing knowledge are upfront, fixed costs that do not vary with the number of times the knowledge is used. Once it is produced, knowledge can be replicated repeatedly at effectively no cost. For a firm to have an incentive

to create new forms of knowledge, such as a formula for a new drug or a software program, it must be able to recoup its initial costs of development. It may not be able to do this if the knowledge becomes publicly available and competition forces prices down to the level at which they reimburse the seller only for the material costs of the products produced using this knowledge.

# Treating Knowledge as Intellectual Property

Because knowledge is nonrival in consumption and nonexcludable, any person who incurs the fixed cost of developing a new or better product or process will soon find that others, including competitors, are using that knowledge. Competition could drive the price of the product down to the cost of the physical inputs used to make one unit of the product. The innovator would receive little or no financial return for paying the cost and undertaking the risk involved in developing such knowledge. Without the potential to profit from such innovation, most individuals will be unwilling to incur the fixed costs and financial risks associated with creating new knowledge.

This is not to say that there is no innovation without the potential for profit. Some innovations might occur as a by-product of the normal production process. Other innovators might still invest in research and development but try to prevent the use of their discoveries by keeping them secret. For many types of innovations this is likely to be costly and ineffective. However, if innovators cannot control the knowledge they have developed, they are significantly less likely to invest in developing such new knowledge.

An intellectual property system creates an incentive to develop certain types of knowledge by granting exclusive rights, enforceable through government action and a well-functioning legal system, to use that knowledge. These exclusive rights enable individuals to profit from their inventions by excluding others from using the innovation. Most intellectual property systems offer innovators an exchange. The innovator is given the right to exclude others—for a limited time—from the use of the innovation, but must provide the public with the complete details of the innovation. This public disclosure furthers the development of the knowledge base by enabling others to build on the knowledge embodied in the intellectual property and avoids the duplication of research efforts.

# The Social Costs of an Intellectual Property System

Social costs could arise from making intellectual property protection too strong. These costs go beyond the obvious bureaucratic costs of intellectual property systems. Economics tends to focus on two of these social costs: the potential for creating monopoly power and the restrictions on exploiting useful technologies.

### Box 10-1: Intellectual Property in the Early American Republic

While the phrase "intellectual property" is the product of more modern times, the concept in American thought harkens back to the Constitution. The gradual recognition of intellectual property rights in early America predates the Constitutional Convention, where it was formalized in the Constitution. By 1787, every state but one had passed copyright laws and many had already begun granting patents to inventors. Two delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Madison and Charles Pinckney, were ardent advocates of assigning copyrights and patents to promote and protect the rights of the authors and innovators. The Framers of the Constitution assented to giving Congress its mandate in Article I, Section 8 to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."

This is not surprising. The founders, among them Jefferson and Franklin, were deeply influenced by the British common law system and the preeminence of scientific achievements throughout the Age of Enlightenment. Copyright and patent rights in early America, while distinquishable from their English predecessors, were justified on the same basic premise that defense of property rights precipitated economic growth. George Washington noted in his first inaugural address that the ownership of intellectual property is a necessary means of encouraging "exertions of skill and genius" to foster technological development.

Article I. Section 8 (Clause 8) provided the necessary authorization for Congress to extend intellectual property rights in the form of the patent statutes of 1790, 1793, 1800, 1836, and 1839 that were in effect until the Civil War period. Manufacturing productivity at the firm level in early nineteenth-century America has been documented to have varied directly with the level of patent protections afforded to inventors. Spurred by their belief in individual enterprise and the maximization of social returns through private protections, the early policymakers of the American Republic were prescient in their recognition of the importance of intellectual property rights in a market economy.

As Thomas Jefferson noted in the passage quoted at the start of this chapter, the power to exclude, depending on its length, has the potential to create monopoly power. Modern economic analysis supports this conclusion. The holder of intellectual property has a monopoly over the use of that intellectual property, but this control may not result in monopoly power in any meaningful sense. The potential for monopoly power is related to the breadth

and length of the power to exclude others from making use of the intellectual property. If this power is narrow or for a short duration, others can enter the market and compete in a timely manner, and the innovator will have little or no market power. Overly long or broad grants of exclusivity potentially limit the ability of others to compete and create a greater possibility of market power.

Economic research over the past two decades suggests that another social cost of an intellectual property system is that the power to exclude may deter others from advancing the state of knowledge by building on protected intellectual property since permission to use the property may be too expensive or may not be granted. Finally, the expiration of intellectual property protection after a specific time period may also spur firms to continue to innovate to ensure continued market success.

# Intellectual Property Rights Basics

Intellectual property protection allows individuals to profit from their innovative or creative activities thereby creating an incentive to innovate and promote technological progress. Balanced against this benefit are the potential costs of giving the innovator monopoly power and limiting the ability of subsequent innovators to build on that invention. In crafting the existing intellectual property laws, Congress and the states have considered these associated costs and benefits and have granted differing levels of protection for four basic types of intellectual property: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. In recognition of the potential social costs of intellectual property protection for some kinds of knowledge, Congress has refused to allow individuals to claim intellectual property protection for certain types of knowledge.

The boundary between what can and cannot be protected is sometimes difficult to define. However, it is generally understood that intellectual property rights cannot protect things like intellectual concepts, mental processes, and basic laws of nature. While many justifications have been offered for these exclusions, one possible explanation, consistent with an economic understanding of the social costs of intellectual property, is that allowing ownership of any of these types of knowledge will create broad restrictions on innovators and will slow technical progress. To prevent stifling of innovation, intellectual property rights are granted only after fulfilling specific legislatively defined criteria and protect only a *particular* implementation, expression, or representation of an idea.

# Patents: Protecting a Particular Implementation of an Idea

Thomas Jefferson wrote the original statute defining what may be patented. The language was brief and has changed little since the passage of the original patent act. "[A]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof" may be patented. Patents protect what is normally called an invention but not the idea the machine or process is implementing.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to establish the requirements an inventor must satisfy before a patent is granted. Under current law, Congress requires that an inventor submit plans describing the invention to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). To be granted a patent, the invention or innovation must satisfy a patent examiner under a "preponderance of the evidence standard" that the invention is useful, novel, and nonobvious. Once a patent is granted, its holder can exclude others from making, selling, or using the patented invention or substantially similar inventions for up to a Congressionally mandated 20 years after the patent application was initially filed. (A subset of patents called "design patents," which protect an ornamental design of a product, provide patent protection for only 14 years.) The scope of this right to exclude depends on the legitimate breadth of the patent's claims. In general, the more novel and innovative a patented product is, the broader are its claims and its protection.

# Copyrights: Protecting the Expression of an Idea

Copyrights protect a particular expression of an idea and are generally associated with a variety of creative works including books, music, movies, magazines, paintings, sculptures, and any other expressive work. The key factor for obtaining a copyright is originality, and only a minimal amount of that is necessary. Registering a work with the Copyright Office in the Library of Congress provides some important litigation benefits-including the ability to obtain monetary damages when suing for infringement—but such registration is not necessary. A copyright exists the moment an expressive work is created and, except for work for hire, becomes the property of the author creating the work.

A copyright entitles the holder to exclude others from performing, publishing, or otherwise copying the work. It also entitles the holder to exclude others from producing "derivative works," such as a movie adaptation of a book or its translation into a foreign language. Copyright protection generally lasts the life of the author plus 70 years. In the case of work for hire or anonymous works, copyright lasts 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter.

# Trademarks: Protecting the Symbol of an Idea, Product, or Service

Trademarks can be words, phrases, designs, colors, sounds, or any combination of these that are used to distinguish the products or services of one entity from those of another. Trademarks reduce consumer search costs because they make it easier for consumers to identify and find products and services. Trademarks also protect consumers by providing an assurance of quality or attributes that can be expected with the trademarked product. Because the key function of a trademark is to uniquely identify a company, a product, or a service, the qualifying factor for a trademark is distinctiveness. Generic terms for a product and, in some cases, even descriptive terms cannot be a trademark.

Trademarks do not have to be registered with the USPTO but such registration provides the benefit of a legal presumption of nationwide ownership and exclusive right to use the mark for the goods or services identified in the registration. However, a trademark only becomes intellectual property when it is used in commerce to identify a product, service, or company. Trademarks give the holder the ability to exclude others from using that mark to identify any similar product and, in some cases, exclude others from using their mark if that use dilutes or weakens consumer association of the product or service with that mark. Validity of the trademark lasts as long as the trademark continues to identify the product or the company, which in some cases may be for centuries. The oldest U.S. registered trademark still in use today is for Samson Rope and was registered in 1884. However, trademark protection may be lost if the mark becomes associated with a product generically rather than a particular brand as occurred with the term "escalator," which was once a trademark for escalators sold by the Otis Elevator company.

# Trade Secrets: Limited Protection for Knowledge Kept Secret

Trade secrets consist of any information possessed by a firm that the firm takes reasonable measures to keep secret, is legitimately kept secret, and has commercial value because it is secret. This information may include information that could be protected as other forms of intellectual property but also includes knowledge that cannot be so protected, including customer lists, contracts, and other information whose value is diminished if it becomes publicly available.

Trade secrets are not formally protected in the way other intellectual property is protected. Protection is provided under state, rather than Federal, law. For example, protection occurs through the enforcement of the firm's confidentiality provisions in contracts and the use of the legal system to block those who

have improperly or illegally obtained a firm's trade secrets from using or disclosing them. In general, however, a firm has no legal recourse to prevent others from using its trade secrets if they become publicly available. Trade-secret protection lasts only as long as the firm can maintain secrecy. One of the most successful trade secrets in this regard is the formula for Coca-Cola.

# Intellectual Property, the American Economy, and Economic Growth


Intellectual property played an important role in the growth of the American economy from a primarily agrarian society through an industrial economy to the current information age. One researcher notes that even in the early part of the nineteenth century, the American patent system granted effective intellectual property rights that led to the development and diffusion of new technologies that fueled economic growth and prosperity. Today intellectual property protection plays an important role in many industries in which the United States has a comparative advantage and contributes to the size, growth, and exports of the American economy.

# Intellectual Property and the American Economy

Industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, information technology, and transportation are highly dependent on patent protection to provide the incentives to innovate. Some industries, such as software, entertainment, publishing, broadcasting, and other broadly defined communication industries, are highly dependent on copyright protection to ensure that the creators of such content are fully compensated for their efforts and continue to have the incentive to create such works. The combination of these patent and copyright-dependent industries and any such support industries that are necessary for these industries to function can be grouped together as intellectual property industries. Chart 10-1 shows the total economic activity generated by this group of industries. In 2003, these industries represented approximately 17.3 percent of total U.S. economic activity and approximately one-fifth of private economic activity. Their combined activity exceeds the total economic activity of all levels of government in the United States.

The estimate in Chart 10-1 represents the income generated in intellectual property industries. Equally important is the stock of intellectual property assets that generates these returns. Intellectual property is one of many intangible assets a firm may hold. Other intangible assets include brand value, organizational efficiencies, and firm-specific human capital. It has been estimated that approximately 70 percent of the value of publicly traded companies comes from intangible assets.

Chart 10-1 Intellectual Property Industries' Share of 2003 Gross Domestic Product In 2003, intellectual property and IP support industries represented 17.3% of total value added.



Note: 2003 GDP equals \$11 trillion.


Source: "Engines of Growth: Economic Contributions of the U.S. Intellectual Property Industries" (2005) by Stephen E. Siwek.

Chart 10-2 shows the total asset value of U.S. publicly traded firms broken out by the value of tangible assets, the value that can be inferred for various types of intellectual property, and the value of other intangible assets. Intellectual property accounts for approximately 33 percent of the value of U.S. corporations—with software and other copyright-protected materials representing nearly two-fifths of this value, patents representing one-third, and trade secrets representing the rest. In all, U.S. intellectual property may be worth more than \$5 trillion.

The one type of intellectual property excluded from the estimate in Chart 10-2 is trademarks. While there is no doubt that trademarks represent an important element of any firm's assets, it is difficult to separate the value of a trademark from the value of the rest of the value of branding. However, the sources used to create Chart 10-2 also suggest that the combined value of branding and trademarks represents approximately 14 percent of the total value of publicly traded U.S. firms. In some instances, this value may be a company's most important asset.

Other studies have indicated that intellectual property-related industries tend to grow at approximately twice the rate of the economy as a whole and are an important contributing factor not only to the productivity growth of the intellectual property-related sectors of the economy but also to the growth of all sectors of the economy. These industries also represent a growing share

Chart 10-2 Share of Assets in Current Market Value of Public U.S. Corporations Intellectual property assets represent approximately one-third of the value of American corporations.



Note Total value of publicly traded U.S. corporations on 09/06/2005 was \$15.2 trillion. Sources: Council of Economic Advisers' calculation based on "The Economic Value of Intellectual Property" by Shapiro and Hassett (USA for Innovation) and "Measuring Capital and Technology" An Expanded Framework." Table 3 by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (Finance & Economics Discussion Series 2004-65, Federal Reserve Board).

of exports. Chart 10-3 shows the annual growth rates for the exports from U.S. copyright-based industries from 1991 to 2002. In all but one of those years (1995), exports from copyright industries grew at a faster rate than total exports. Indeed, on average, U.S. copyright exports grew faster by approximately six percentage points than total exports and have become an increasing share of our total exports.

This analysis, however, obscures an important point about the role of intellectual property in the economy and undervalues its contribution. There are many industries that are not counted among the intellectual property industries but generate innovations and rely on patent and other intellectual property protection to create incentives for innovation and growth. More importantly, many innovations from the past have led to significant productivity advances in industries such as medicines, textiles, railroads, steel manufacture, and farm equipment. The capital value of these innovations was dissipated as the intellectual property protecting these innovations expired and the innovative knowledge and information entered the public domain. Even after these innovations become public knowledge, however, the country still benefits from the productivity gains the innovations produced. Any complete consideration of the overall importance of intellectual property to the American economy should include the value of these advances. Such a consideration is beyond the scope of this chapter but would suggest that the

Chart 10-3 Growth Rate of U.S. Exports

-10%

1991


1992

1993

1994

1995

Since 1991, the growth rate of copyright industries has exceeded the growth rate of overall exports.



1996 Sources: International Monetary Fund, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Copyright Industries in the U.S. 1998, 2004.

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

estimates discussed above underestimate the importance of intellectual property to the American economy.

# Intellectual Property Protection and Economic Growth

The protection of intellectual property rights plays an important role in inducing technological change and facilitating economic growth. Intellectual property protection does not directly lead to growth, but it helps create an incentive structure that encourages research and development, which in turn leads to increased innovation. Increased innovation generates greater rates of economic growth.

The link between improved intellectual property protection and increased innovation can be seen at the firm level for companies in developing and developed countries. One study showed that 80 percent of 377 firms surveyed in Brazil would invest more in internal research if more legal protection, such as improved intellectual property-right protection, were available. A similar study of U.S. firms showed that the availability of patent protection in the United States was a critical factor in research and development decisions. Using a random sample of 100 U.S. manufacturing firms, this study found that had it not been for the availability of patents, 60 percent of the inventions in the pharmaceutical industry and nearly 40 percent of the inventions in the chemical industry would not have been developed.

A number of other recent economic studies have shown a more direct link between greater intellectual property protection and capital investment. One study of the relationship between patent protection and investment in research and development found that countries with the lowest level of patent protection invested less than one-third of 1 percent of their GNP in research and development while countries with the highest level of protection invested six times as much. Likewise, another study suggests that increasing intellectual property protection increases capital and research investment. As intellectual property protection makes investment in research and development more attractive, the supply of knowledge is increased, lowering the cost of innovation. The increase in innovation leads to an increase in the rate at which new products are introduced, resulting in greater economic growth.

Intellectual property protection alone does not drive economic growth. There must be an existing research base in the country, a relatively unconstrained trade regime, a stable macroeconomic environment, the rule of law, and well-functioning institutions that grant, monitor, and enforce the intellectual property rights.

# Intellectual Property Policy Challenges

Technological and economic change sometimes expose weaknesses in existing intellectual property laws and necessitate modifications of those laws to ensure their continued effectiveness in protecting intellectual property and ensuring economic growth. The Administration has continually reviewed and implemented policies to improve the intellectual property laws to ensure the efficiency of the patent review process, to protect the intellectual property of American firms engaged in international trade, and to prevent potentially dangerous counterfeit products from entering U.S. and foreign markets.

# Ensuring the Integrity of the Patent Process

As noted earlier, patents have broader protection than copyrights or trademarks and, of these three, patents have the only formal review process prior to being granted. The effectiveness of the patent system in fostering technical progress and economic growth is tied to the efficiency of this review process. Patents granted in error may create market power without any offsetting benefit of inducing innovation. If a patent increases the cost of using existing technology, it may deter innovation or simply cause a firm to use a less-efficient technology. In 2004, the USPTO issued 187,170 patents. Occasionally a very small percentage of patents are challenged or overturned, and it is this particular process within the patent system that is examined below.

Challenging a patent's validity can be costly and time-consuming. Estimates suggest that median litigation costs average \$4 million each for the plaintiff and defendant when more than \$25 million is at stake in a patent suit. Research has found that on average it takes approximately three and a half years to challenge a patent through litigation and that the typical patent challenge is initiated after the patent has been in force for approximately eight and half years. An unwarranted patent could be in force for more than twelve years of a twenty-year term before the legal system would find it to be invalid.

Challenging a patent's validity can also be financially risky. Generally a firm cannot sue to have a patent invalidated. It must first infringe on that patent, wait for the patent holder to sue, and then claim patent invalidity as a defense to infringement. Firms that do this incur a great financial risk because intentional infringement of a patent may result in triple damages. Patents are presumed to be valid and an accused infringer must prove it is invalid by "clear and convincing evidence" to overturn this presumption. This is greater than the burden that a patent application must satisfy before a patent is issued. Despite the hurdles faced by a firm challenging the validity of a patent, researchers have found that 46 percent of the fully litigated patent challenges between 1989 and 1996 ultimately resulted in the patent being judged to be invalid.

In recent years, businesses and commentators have noted substantial increases in the number of patent applications received by the USPTO. This trend, combined with an increased availability of patents in areas such as business methods, has led some to question whether wrongly issued patents might affect the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Patent policy can foster innovation, but must also be balanced with the consumer protection provided by competition in the marketplace.

Because of increased interest in how best to balance patent and competition interests, in 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), together with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), held extensive hearings with testimony and written comments from investors, entrepreneurs, antitrust organizations, and scholars. While hearing participants praised many aspects of the current patent system, many participants expressed concerns about poor patent quality and legal standards that may inadvertently create market power and reduce innovation.

In 2003, the FTC issued a report based on the information gained in the hearings conducted in the prior year. This report contained several recommendations to alleviate the problems discussed above. Two of these recommendations were also supported by a subsequent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences.

The first recommendation was to create an administrative post-grant appeal procedure that would allow firms to challenge the validity of a questionable patent within a limited period after it has been issued. This procedure could

significantly shorten the time period in which a wrongly issued patent is in force and reduce the risk of some patent challenges. The second recommendation was to reduce the firm's risk of triple damages in cases in which firms infringe a patent with knowledge of that patent. This change would encourage firms to read their competitors' patents more frequently, to develop noninfringing business plans, and to reduce wasteful duplication of effort.

# Intellectual Property and International Trade

As intellectual property became a more important element of international trade starting in the 1980s, differences in the level of protection for intellectual property across various countries started to lead to an increasing number of trade disputes about the use and alleged misuse of the intellectual property belonging to others. These trade frictions had the potential to disrupt the benefits of increased worldwide trade. In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations from 1986 to 1994, the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiated an agreement to introduce more order and predictability into the international protection of intellectual property rights. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is the first comprehensive and enforceable global set of rules covering intellectual property rights.

The TRIPs Agreement helps alleviate trade frictions by reducing nontariff trade barriers related to differing intellectual property protection regimes and by setting minimum intellectual property rights standards for all WTO members. The agreement established transparency standards that require all members to publish laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative findings that affect the treatment of intellectual property. The agreement also requires nondiscrimination between nationals and non-nationals and for the first time applies the Most-Favored Nations (MFN) obligation (prohibiting discrimination across trading partners) to international intellectual property rights.

The TRIPs Agreement took effect in 1995, but only industrialized countries had to ensure that their laws and practices conformed to it by January 1, 1996. Developing countries and transition economies were given five years, until 2000, and the least-developed countries were given 11 years, until 2006 to comply. The 2006 deadline applicable to least-developed countries was recently extended to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents and July 2013 for other obligations. Questions remain, however, about the extent to which some developing countries are in compliance with their TRIPs obligations, and many least-developed countries are unlikely to be in full compliance by July 2013. In addition, many developed countries have implemented a variety of cost-containment efforts that greatly reduce the value of intellectual property. Thus, an apparent strong patent protection stance may, in fact, not be a completely accurate representation, at least across all industries. Consequently, the level of intellectual property-rights protection varies across countries.

### Developing Countries Tend to Have Weaker Intellectual Property Regimes

Economists have developed a number of indices to determine the strength of various countries' intellectual property protection regimes. While the results of the research using these indices are not uniform, they suggest that the level of intellectual property protection increases with a country's real gross domestic product per capita. Economists have offered some explanations for this relationship. Rising income increases the demand for higher-quality, differentiated products. This increase in demand leads to growing preferences for the protection of intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, which provide an innovator with certain protections when producing such products.

Countries with lower per capita gross domestic product may prefer intellectual property regimes with little or weak intellectual property protection because they believe it allows free access to information that would otherwise have to be paid for. These countries may also believe that lack of intellectual property protection allows them to access technological development through imitation and domestic efforts to build upon the existing stock of worldwide knowledge. However, the lack of intellectual property protection may slow development in these countries by inhibiting the development of domestic innovative and creative industries that generate much of the economic growth in more-developed countries. Furthermore, the ubiquity of counterfeit products that is generally associated with weak intellectual property protection may have health and safety implications because it is difficult for consumers to be certain of the origin and efficiency of medicines, machine parts, and other critical products.

Countries like the United States, with greater levels of intellectual property protection and with comparative advantages in knowledge-intensive goods and services, place a high priority on intellectual property-rights protection. Most indices of the strength of intellectual property protection tend to show that the United States is among the countries with the highest level of protection. More objective measures also suggest that the United States has a comparative advantage in knowledge-intensive goods. The United States holds one of the highest shares of global patents and has a trade surplus in intellectual property-dependent services and in royalties and license fees.

# Economic Costs of Intellectual Property Theft in Foreign Markets

Theft in foreign markets of intellectual property belonging to American companies is significant. In China alone, industry estimates suggest that in 2003 and 2004 the piracy rate was 90 percent or more, which means that at least 90 percent of the existing copies of a particular work (such as CDs and DVDs) in China were produced without the copyright holder's permission. Industry estimates show that the piracy rates in Latin America were more than

60 percent and the global software piracy rate was approximately 35 percent. Some of these pirated copies are exported to the United States. Piracy is an especially serious problem for American companies because of the strong comparative advantage they hold in intellectual property-related goods.

Turning these estimates of piracy rates into estimates of lost revenues involves consideration of two factors: (1) how many copies would have been sold by legitimate producers in the absence of the pirated copies, and (2) the price that would have been charged for those copies. Without the competition from pirated copies, the legitimate holder of the copyright might have been able to sell the product for a higher price and earn higher revenues. In addition, because pirated products are generally sold at a much lower price than what a legitimate producer charges, fewer copies might have been sold if consumers had to pay the higher prices for the legitimate copies. Many estimates assume that sales of intellectual property-protected goods would correspond to the current sales of the infringing goods. Under this assumption, industry estimates suggest that in 2004 software piracy alone cost U.S. developers at least \$6.6 billion.

### Preventing Global Intellectual Property Piracy

The Administration is strongly committed to addressing the issues of piracy (unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials) and counterfeiting (unauthorized reproduction of trademarked or patented goods) without sacrificing the benefits to be gained through trade and specialization. To accomplish these goals, the White House initiated the Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) in October 2004. The STOP! initiative brings together nine federal agencies, including the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department. Under STOP!, these agencies and departments have and continue to develop new tools to help U.S. businesses better protect their intellectual property, increase efforts to seize counterfeit goods at our borders, pursue criminal enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting, and aggressively engage our trading partners to join our efforts. Through STOP!, new forms of federal assistance are being provided to U.S. companies, increased law enforcement resources are being provided, and the Administration has developed an international law enforcement network to increase criminal enforcement abroad.

Domestically, the Department of Justice has created a Task Force on Intellectual Property and increased from 5 to 18 the number of Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Units in U.S. Attorneys' Offices across the country. This increased to 229 (one in each Federal district) the number of specially trained prosecutors available to focus on intellectual property and high-tech crimes.

Internationally, the United States has conducted several hundred intellectual property rights enforcement and technical assistance projects around the world. The Administration has established a "Global Intellectual Property Rights Academy," located within the USPTO, to consolidate and expand intellectual property training programs for foreign judges, enforcement officials, and relevant administrators. These programs are designed to foster respect for intellectual property, encourage governmental and rights holders' efforts to combat infringement, and promote best practices in the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The Administration is also expanding its intellectual property attaché program at our embassies in China, India, Brazil, and Russia. These attachés will assist American businesses, advocate U.S. intellectual property policy, and conduct intellectual property rights training. STOP! objectives have also been endorsed in numerous multilateral forums including the G-8, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the U.S.-EU summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation sphere.

The Administration also created a new senior-level office of the Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement. This office will coordinate the strategies of the Federal Government to use its capabilities and resources to provide an internationally secure and predictable environment for American intellectual property.

# Technological Change and Intellectual Property Reform

As technology has advanced, it has become cheaper for legitimate producers to produce many types of intellectual property-related products, including medicines, CDs, DVDs, automotive and airplane parts, and other products. Technology also holds the promise for new, more efficient means of distribution of intellectual property-related products, including digital music and video content. Producers of these products have a great opportunity to take advantage of changing technologies and a great challenge to limit the use of these technologies to legitimate producers of these products. Based on current distribution preferences, intellectual property holders have lost some control over the distribution of their products.

There are many manifestations of this loss in control. For instance, some peer-to-peer networks provided technology that enabled individuals to freely download copyrighted music from the computers of other individuals on these networks. Moreover, current technology can less expensively and more faithfully reproduce some intellectual property-protected materials than previous technologies could. These illegal copies are difficult to detect. In the United States and internationally, this has resulted in a significant increase in the production and sale of counterfeit products. These counterfeit copies may directly harm consumers through the sale of fake medicines and defective products, such as batteries, automobile parts, and airplane parts. Furthermore, in the long run, counterfeiting

harms all consumers by reducing the profitability of and the incentive to produce new and interesting innovative products and creative works.

#### Box 10-2: The Free Software Licensing Movement

In the early stages of computing, a number of software developers wanted to put their work in the public domain, but also wanted to prevent individuals who modified the software from limiting its accessibility. This resulted in the development of free software licensing, sometimes called open source, wherein software is licensed for free use and modification but requires that any subsequent modifications also remain available for free use and modification by others. Many of the developers of free, or open-source, software are individuals in academic environments where open and cooperative development projects are especially important. Others are hobbyists or companies that are in the business of providing computing support services to third parties.

General Public Licenses (GPLs) and other free software licenses differ from traditional commercial licenses by granting to their users the freedom to run, study, improve, and redistribute copies of the program. A GPL uses traditional copyright law to ensure that these freedoms are retained in derivative works by requiring those works to also be licensed under GPL terms. Many advocates of these types of licenses believe that they increase network benefits by creating a pool of commonly accessible work and requiring any improvements made to the original software code to be contributed to that pool. These advocates believe that by having an unlimited number of developers viewing the source code and working to modify and improve it, the quality and testing of software are improved.

GPL licensees are permitted to charge for copying or distribution of their works. Further, nothing prevents software from being licensed under both GPL and traditional licensing. Dual-licensing was developed to respond to consumers of free software who were unwilling or unable to accept the reciprocity requirements of an open-source license and were willing to pay to avoid them. Open-source licensing such as GPL licenses is just another business model of software development that has been embraced by such companies as Sun Microsystems, Intel Corporation, and IBM.

Traditional and open-source development models currently compete in the market. Different developers are motivated by different aims and have different target customers. A system that neither favors nor discourages either licensing model would best serve a market consisting of diverse customers and developers. Competition on a level playing field would ensure that the better licensing system becomes the most successful. If each system has different advantages, it is likely that both systems will survive and find success.

In November 2005, the Administration forwarded proposed legislation to Congress that would implement some of the changes necessary to respond to these technical developments. The Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2005 would strengthen intellectual property protection, toughen penalties, and increase the range of investigative tools in both criminal and civil intellectual property-law enforcement.

In the past, it might not have been necessary to sanction criminally certain types of actions because they had little impact on the level of the counterfeiting of intellectual property. For instance, while there are criminal sanctions for selling a counterfeit good, there are no criminal sanctions against giving it away. It has only recently become profitable for a company that engages in, or contributes to, infringement to give a counterfeit product away and profit from the sale of auxiliary products and services. Technically, these actions are not criminal violations, but they still diminish the value of the intellectual property to its owner. The Administration's proposed legislation provides for criminal sanctions for distributing any infringing materials for the purpose of commercial advantage, including the selling of complementary products.

Because the production of a large number of copies is now cheap and easy, it is much easier for a counterfeiter to flood the market with illegal copies. Because current intellectual property law was designed when such an action was not easily accomplished, merely possessing a large number of infringing products with the intent to sell does not necessarily constitute a crime. Only the sale of the good itself is a criminal violation. Infringers are now capable of flooding the market and imposing significant financial harm on the intellectual property holder before criminal sanctions can be applied to limit the damage from this activity. The Administration's proposed legislation modifies the law to criminalize the possession of infringing materials with the intent to sell and will help stop the sale of counterfeits before they have an injurious impact on intellectual property holders.

# Conclusion

Well-defined and well-enforced intellectual property rights are an important component of the U.S. economy and an important element in fostering continued economic growth. Intellectual property differs from other more tangible property in at least two key characteristics: it is nonrival in consumption and nonexcludable. An intellectual property system creates an incentive to innovate by rewarding the developers of new inventions with the right to exclude others from using that innovation for a limited period of time. In this way, inventors can benefit financially from their innovation. Economic research supports the conclusion of the American founders that a well-defined

intellectual property system rewards innovation and fosters economic growth. By continually adapting to economic and technical change, the American intellectual property law system will continue to foster economic growth in the United States and throughout the world.

# Recent Developments in Energy

Energy is essential to the U.S. economy. It provides light and heat for our homes and businesses, brings our computers and appliances to life, and powers life-saving medical devices. It propels the automobiles, buses, and trains that carry us to home, work, and school, and the aircraft that fly us from city to city. It fuels the tractors that harvest our food, the machines we use to turn raw materials into final products, and the trucks, trains, and ships that carry these goods across our Nation and around the world. All told, the United States spent about \$870 billion on energy in 2004, an amount equivalent to 7.4 percent of GDP, and was on pace to spend an estimated \$1.1 trillion on energy in 2005, or about 8.6 percent of GDP.

Over the past several decades, the U.S. economy has seen a steady decline in its energy intensity—that is, the ratio of total physical units of energy consumed per dollar of real GDP. Nonetheless, households and businesses remain keenly aware of the prices they pay for energy products and the impact of rising energy prices on their budgets and bottom lines. When prices change gradually, households and businesses have time to adapt their energy consumption levels, fuel choices, and purchases of energy-using products to new price levels. Sometimes, however, disruptions to our energy production and distribution infrastructure, such as those caused by the recent hurricanes Katrina and Rita, result in temporary but sharp price increases to which households and businesses cannot adjust quickly.

This chapter discusses energy markets—systems that connect consumers and suppliers of energy products, where prices are determined by what buyers will pay and what sellers will accept. The chapter reviews recent developments in energy markets for crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas, as well as recent developments in the electricity-generation sector. It considers these developments in the context of historical experience, and offers an economic perspective on energy market, policy, and technological innovations that benefit the Nation.

The key points in this chapter are:

- Crude oil prices have risen steadily over the past several years due to growing world demand, leading to rising prices for gasoline and other refined petroleum products and stimulating further development of alternative energy sources. Recent price increases have occurred more gradually than in the past.
- Disruptions to energy supply and distribution networks can lead to sharp short-term price increases. Recent hurricanes Katrina and Rita

- demonstrate that competitive markets connecting energy producers, distributors, and consumers play a central role in encouraging conservation and allocating scarce energy resources, especially during times of natural disaster or national emergency.
- The continued expansion of natural gas and other energy markets through regional and global trade can improve our economic security by increasing access to low-cost energy resources and mitigating the impacts of local energy shortages and price increases. Innovative market instruments designed to insure against market volatility can also help lessen these impacts.
- Absent policy, individual energy market participants may not have an
  incentive to tackle certain problems associated with their energy production and consumption. Carefully targeted policies that reduce U.S.
  vulnerability to energy disruptions, encourage energy efficiency, and
  protect the environment can therefore be beneficial supplements to
  markets. These policies can be made more effective and less costly when
  designed based on economic incentives.

The first section below provides an overview of U.S. energy sources and uses. The second section discusses the world market for crude oil. The third section examines markets for refined petroleum products, including the impact of crude oil prices on refined product prices. The fourth section considers the expansion of natural gas markets from limited geographic regions to a more global level. The fifth section describes challenges and recent changes in the electricity-generation sector, and the final section concludes with a look toward the future.

# Energy Sources and Uses

One British thermal unit (Btu) is the amount of energy required to raise the temperature of one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit. The United States used approximately 100 quadrillion Btu of energy in 2004 (see Table 11-1)—the energy equivalent of about 17 billion barrels of oil or 60 barrels of oil per person. Eighty-six percent of this energy came from fossil fuels, including 40 percent from petroleum, 23 percent from coal, and 23 percent from natural gas. The remaining 14 percent of this energy came from nuclear and renewable sources, such as hydroelectric power, wind, biomass (e.g., wood and agricultural crops), and solar energy.

On the consumption side, 39 percent of total U.S. energy use in 2004 passed through the electricity-generation sector. Roughly one-third of electricity-sector energy input was converted into electricity and delivered to end-use customers. The remaining two-thirds was lost due to inefficiencies in the production and transmission of electricity. Of the 73 quadrillion Btu of energy delivered to

TABLE 11-1.— Energy Sources and Uses, 2004 [Quadrillion BTU]

Energy sources	Energy Uses						
	End-use sectors					Electricity	All
	Transport	Industrial	Residential	Commercial	All end-use		sectors
Total primary	27.7	22.1	7.0	4.1	60.9	38.9	99.7
Petroleum	26.7	9.6	1.6	0.8	38.6	1.2	39.8
Natural gas	0.7	8.7	5.0	3.1	17.5	5.5	23.0
Coal	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.1	2.3	20.3	22.5
Nuclear	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.2	8.2
Renewable	0.3	1.7	0.4	0.1	2.5	3.6	6.1
Electricity retail sales	0.0	3.5	4.4	4.2	12.1	}	
Total end-use	27.7	25.6	11.4	8.3	73.0		

Note: Because total primary energy consumption in 2004 was almost exactly 100 quadrillion Btu, numbers in the table can also be interpreted approximately as the percent of total primary energy consumption coming from various sectors and going to various uses. Total end-use energy consumption of 73 quadrillion Btu is less than total primary energy consumption due to electricity-sector energy losses.

Source: Department of Energy (Energy Information Administration).

end-use customers, 38 percent went to the transportation sector (to power vehicles used to transport people and goods), 35 percent went to industry (for manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and construction), 16 percent was used in residences, and 11 percent was used by the commercial sector (in business, government, schools, and other public and private organizations).

### Crude Oil

U.S. crude oil consumption in 2004 was 15.5 million barrels per day, approximately 65 percent of which was imported. Crude oil is used to produce a wide array of petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel and jet fuels, heating oil, lubricants, asphalt, plastics, and many other products used for their energy or chemical content. Not surprisingly, crude oil markets are monitored closely by consumers, businesses, and governments, because the prices of petroleum-based products depend heavily on the price of crude oil.

### A Global Market in Crude Oil

Crude oil can be transported long distances cheaply. Transportation costs average roughly \$2 per barrel for crude oil imported into the United States. As a result, oil prices generally are determined by the balancing of supply and demand at the global level, where prices are roughly uniform for a given grade of oil. U.S. refiners, and ultimately U.S. consumers, realize great benefit from having the option of purchasing crude oil from both nearby sources, such as Texas or Oklahoma, and from sources halfway around the globe, such as Russia or the Middle East.

The international crude oil market is very active. Out of a total global crude oil production of 67 million barrels per day in 2002, roughly 60 percent was traded internationally. However, crude oil is produced in large quantities for export in a relatively limited number of locations around the world. In the first nine months of 2005, the top ten oil-producing countries accounted for over 50 percent of global production, and nearly 30 percent of global production originated in the Persian Gulf. Although the United States was the world's third-largest oil producer in 2004, trailing only Saudi Arabia and Russia, the United States ranks eleventh in total proven oil reserves, with just 2 percent of total proven world reserves (Chart 11-1).

### Crude Oil Prices

Crude oil prices generally change gradually in response to slowly evolving domestic and international trends in oil demand and supply, though prices have spiked sharply on a limited number of occasions. Some of these spikes were short-lived, while others persisted for several years.

### Recent Price Rises

Because crude oil is traded in a global market, long-term trends in demand by other consuming nations and unexpected events in other countries affect the world market price that U.S. refiners pay and the price that domestic oil




Chart 11-1 World Proven Oil Reserves The United States holds a small fraction of total reserves.

Note: Canada includes oil sands representing 98 percent of its total reserves Numbers do not sum to 100% due to independent rounding Sources: Department of Energy (Energy Information Administration), PennWell Corporation (Oil & Gas Journal)

producers receive. Due to robust economic growth in the United States, China, and other high-growth countries in Asia, world consumption of petroleum products grew strongly over the past several years.

On the supply side, industrial countries have exhausted most low-cost opportunities for profitable domestic exploration and development, and international energy companies often face considerable risk when making investments for exploration, development, and production in less-developed countries. Some countries, particularly those with national oil companies, prohibit or restrict foreign investment. Consequently, new production capacity has been slow to emerge. World crude oil production in 2005 stood at about 74 million barrels per day, while the Department of Energy estimates that current world oil production capacity is only 1-1.5 million barrels per day higher—the lowest level of world spare capacity in more than three decades. Most of this spare capacity is in Saudi Arabia. As a result of this tight market, crude oil prices have increased roughly threefold since the beginning of 2002.

### Past Oil Price Spikes

Although high, the current price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil (a common pricing benchmark) is lower than the historic peak of over \$87 per barrel (in 2005 dollars) reached in 1980. Oil prices more than doubled from the last quarter of 1973 to the first quarter of 1974 as a result of the Arab Oil Embargo. Oil prices more than doubled again from mid-1979 to mid-1980 following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Prices fell gradually from this point until 1985-1986, and then they fell rapidly after Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries increased production. A short-lived shock in 1990 was associated with the Persian Gulf War. The recent increase in crude oil prices, which has come largely through a surge in world oil demand, has occurred much more gradually than past price spikes, which resulted from abrupt reductions in production in oil-exporting countries.

# The Strategic Petroleum Reserve

Sudden oil supply shocks are potentially damaging to the U.S. economy. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) provides the United States with an insurance policy should a severe energy supply disruption occur. These Federally owned crude oil stocks, which totaled 684 million barrels in late 2005, are sufficient to cover about 68 days of U.S. crude oil imports or 44 days of total U.S. crude oil consumption. The President of the United States has authorized an emergency drawdown of the SPR on two occasions: once during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and a second time in September 2005 following Hurricane Katrina, which temporarily shut down crude oil production facilities in the Gulf of Mexico (See Box 11-2). The Secretary of Energy has also approved a number of short-term loans of SPR

oil to help companies address short-term disruptions to their operations, including after hurricanes Lili in 2002, Ivan in 2004, and Katrina in 2005. The Administration recognizes the critical importance of the SPR, and has increased SPR stocks by about 25 percent since January 2001.

### Future Price Expectations and Incentives for Nonconventional Fuels

Although world oil production capacity is expected to increase, world demand is expected to increase as well, and we are likely to face tight crude oil markets for a number of years. Prices on contracts for future deliveries of crude oil (called crude oil futures) indicate that market participants expect oil prices to remain elevated at or near current levels through at least the end of 2006. Box 11-1 looks at the development of energy futures markets, which can help energy suppliers and users manage the risks associated with market fluctuations, and which can help facilitate investment in new conventional and alternative sources of energy.

In the longer term, an expectation of high future petroleum prices serves as a signal to potential developers of alternative fuels and producers of petroleum from nonconventional sources that investment in exploration, research, development, production, and marketing of such alternatives is likely to be profitable. Chart 11-2 presents cost estimates for commercial production of potential alternative fuels and nonconventional petroleum sources. Commercial production of some of these alternatives has already begun. For other alternatives, such as coal-to-liquids and oil shale, the technologies needed for production are not yet mature, and their production cost estimates do not include research, development, and initial demonstration costs. In all cases, the production cost estimates reflect expenditures on variable inputs (e.g., raw materials and labor), as well as capital costs for production facilities. These production costs vary widely.

Although oil prices have risen to more than \$60 per barrel in recent months, they have averaged as low as \$25 per barrel within the last five years. Having experienced past volatility in oil prices, oil companies report using a working assumption of \$15-\$30 per barrel for the future price of oil when making long-term investment planning decisions. Only a handful of alternative fuels and nonconventional sources of petroleum are profitable at these prices, including petroleum from Canadian oil sands and ethanol (when subsidized at current levels). Canada's petroleum industry reports that production of crude oil from oil sands is currently at 1 million barrels per day and is expected to approach 2.7 million barrels per day by 2015.

Ethanol-an alcohol fuel made from the sugars found in corn and other crops—can be burned by most automobile engines in the United States when blended with gasoline. U.S. ethanol production, which is supported by

#### **Box 11-1: Energy Futures Markets**

A futures contract is a legal agreement to buy or sell a particular, precisely defined commodity at a specified price and location at a specified date in the future. Trading in energy futures allows suppliers or consumers of energy to lock in a specific price at which they can sell or purchase energy products, thereby reducing or eliminating price risk. This can aid in investment planning for energy production.

The market for crude oil futures in organized exchanges, such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the International Petroleum Exchange in London, is well developed and increasing in size. For example, the quantity of oil committed under NYMEX futures contracts with maturities of three months or less increased from a value equal to 30 percent of U.S. oil production in 1997 to 80 percent in mid-2005. The expansion of markets for contracts with longer maturities is even more striking, with the quantity of oil committed under NYMEX futures contracts with six-year maturities growing from less than 1 percent of U.S. production in 1997 to 9 percent in 2005.

Although there is very little trading in crude oil futures with longer maturities, futures contracts for horizons of longer than six years can be arranged privately with the assistance of investment banks or other financial intermediaries in so-called over-the-counter transactions.


Energy futures are examples of financial instruments known as derivatives, which firms use to manage risks associated with market fluctuations. Weather derivatives also have been used by firms in recent years in order to manage risks associated with fluctuations in temperature and precipitation, which can have a significant effect on energy markets.

various Federal subsidies, currently stands at about 250,000 barrels per day. Ethanol production is expected to increase substantially in response to a mandate included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that gasoline sold in the United States contain at least 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels in 2012 (about half-a-million barrels per day).

Private-sector development of nonconventional fuels, such as coal-to-liquids or oil shale, may accelerate if high oil prices are sustained over the long term. For the time being, however, these alternatives are in a developmental stage and their future commercial success will depend on future energy prices, technological advances, and environmental and other regulatory requirements.

High energy prices also provide incentives for expanded domestic production of conventional oil and gas. The Administration supports greater access to oil and natural gas resources in Federal waters off shore states that support such

Chart 11-2 Estimated Production Costs of Alternatives to Conventional Oil



Note: Annual average oil prices are for West Texas Intermediate crude. Oil shale and coal-to-liquids are not currently commercial in the United States; cost estimates are for a mature industry and do not include research, development, and initial demonstration

Sources: Wall Street Journal, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, Council of Economic Advisers

development and supports opening a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska for environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. According to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the 1.5-million-acre coastal plain of ANWR and adjacent Native lands and state offshore waters hold between 5.7 and 16 billion barrels of technically recoverable reserves, with a mean estimate of 10.4 billion barrels—enough to supply 1 million barrels per day for over 28 years.

### Gasoline and Other Refined Products

The United States derives approximately 40 percent of the energy it uses from petroleum, making petroleum the single largest source of energy for our Nation. Refined petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, provide 96 percent of the energy used in the U.S. transportation sector, and are also important for the industrial sector, which gets 37 percent of its energy from petroleum. The residential sector gets 14 percent of its energy from refined petroleum products (mainly home heating oil), while petroleum supplies 10 percent of the energy used in the commercial sector.

#### Gasoline Prices

The prices that consumers and other end users pay for gasoline depend heavily on the prices that petroleum refiners pay for crude oil. During the first eleven months of 2005, the cost of crude oil accounted for about 53 percent of the retail price of gasoline (the most recent available data from the Department of Energy). Refining costs and profits accounted for 20 percent, Federal and state taxes another 20 percent, and distribution and marketing about 8 percent of the retail price of gasoline.

Crude oil price changes are passed directly through to consumers in the form of changing prices for gasoline and other refined products, at the rate of about 2.4 cents per gallon of refined product for every \$1 per barrel change in the price of crude oil. According to Department of Energy data, rising crude oil prices explain roughly two-thirds of the increase in average gasoline prices between 2000 and 2005.

In addition to crude oil prices, other factors have a lesser but sometimes pronounced effect on the price that consumers pay for gasoline. Refinery or pipeline shutdowns caused by damaging weather, such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita, can impede the ability of refiners to produce or distribute refined petroleum products, leading to short-term local or regional spikes in the price of gasoline and other refined products that do not coincide with spikes in the price of crude oil (Box 11-2).

# Box 11-2: The Effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Energy Supplies

In late August 2005 the states of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were struck by Hurricane Katrina, a powerful storm that disrupted, damaged, or destroyed portions of our Nation's energy infrastructure. Hurricane Rita followed almost exactly one month later, while recovery from Katrina was still underway. The impact of these disruptions on prices for crude oil, gasoline, other refined petroleum products, and natural gas varied substantially, and the divergent impacts help illustrate key differences in markets for these energy sources (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of the effects on the economy generally).

Due to evacuations and subsequent damage of oil rigs and platforms, virtually all of Gulf-region oil production—about 28 percent of total U.S. production—was shut down. Because there is a robust world market for crude oil, however, the effect on world prices and the prices that U.S. refiners pay for crude oil was relatively small. The Administration approved several temporary loans of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to help refineries offset short-term physical supply

#### Box 11-2 — continued

disruptions. The President also authorized the emergency sale of up to an additional 30 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR. These actions also helped to moderate any impact the production shut-downs had on U.S. oil supplies.

About two dozen Gulf region refineries were also shut down by flooding and electricity outages associated with the hurricanes, so that following Hurricane Rita more than half of Gulf region refining capacity and roughly one-quarter of total U.S. refining capacity were shut down. Katrina initially led to a shutdown of the Colonial and Plantation pipelines, which deliver most of the refined petroleum products consumed on the East Coast, as well as the Capline pipeline, which delivers crude oil from the Gulf region to pipeline systems serving refineries in the Midwest. After the storm passed and safety assessments revealed no damage, these pipelines began operation substantially below capacity due to electricity outages and product shortages. Hurricane Rita subsequently led to shutdowns in several other pipelines. As a result of these shutdowns of refineries and pipelines, gasoline and refined product price increases were particularly pronounced in regions served by these refineries and pipelines-namely, the East Coast, Midwest, and Gulf regions. The effects on West Coast refined product prices were less pronounced.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development responded by coordinating the release of IEA members' reserve stocks of petroleum. The United States made SPR crude oil available, while other IEA countries primarily offered refined petroleum products. These and other imports of refined petroleum products helped ease the impact of the hurricanes on gasoline and refined product prices, and prices declined further as petroleum refineries and pipelines came back on line.

Offshore natural gas production faced similar disruptions, with shutdowns of up to about 85 percent of Gulf daily natural gas production or 16 percent of total U.S. production. Onshore natural gas processing facilities and gathering lines were also damaged, further disrupting natural gas markets. Unlike crude oil prices, however, natural gas prices rose by over half as a result of the hurricane-related supply disruptions, due to the regional isolation of U.S. natural gas markets.

By the end of 2005, less than 10 percent of U.S. oil production capacity, less than 5 percent of U.S. refining capacity, and less than 5 percent of U.S. natural gas production capacity remained off-line, and further recovery was expected. Prices for crude oil, gasoline, and natural gas had returned to pre-Katrina levels, although natural gas prices were still experiencing volatility.

Another related factor is that surplus refining capacity has declined substantially during the last 25 years. In the early 1980s, U.S. petroleum refiners were producing at only about 70 percent of their total potential production capacity. In contrast, total refiner output has been over 90 percent of capacity for the last decade. Several factors explain this trend. First, many small, inefficient refineries exited the industry in the early 1980s following the removal of poorly conceived Federal petroleum price and allocation controls that had favored such refineries. Without these controls, inefficient refineries were no longer profitable, and total U.S. refining capacity fell by 19 percent from roughly 19 million barrels per day at its peak in 1981 to about 15 million barrels per day in 1994. Second, low profitability in the refining sector during the early to mid 1990s did not provide the necessary incentive to expand total refining capacity. Finally, local concerns about environmental quality have made it increasingly difficult to site new heavy industrial facilities, including refineries. Constraints on the expansion of refining capacity to keep pace with growing demand can lead to higher prices for refined products in the long run.


Refinery profitability increased in the late 1990s, however. As a result, domestic refining capacity rose 12 percent from 1994 to 17 million barrels per day in 2004. This increase in capacity has come exclusively through the expansion of existing refineries, as no new refinery has been built in the United States since 1976. In response to more-stringent clean-air regulations over the last two decades, much of the recent investment in refining has been directed toward increased capacity for producing cleaner fuels, even while using heavier crude oils with higher sulfur contents. Rising refinery costs and profits explain roughly one-quarter of the increase in average gasoline prices between 2000 and 2005.

# Short-Run Impacts of High Gasoline Prices

When gasoline prices increase unexpectedly, households and businesses are not able to cut their gasoline consumption quickly enough to fully offset the higher costs. In the short term, then, gasoline price increases cut into household budgets and increase business costs. Price increases can have a substantial impact over the longer term, as well. Mirroring year-to-year changes in gasoline prices, household gasoline expenditures have increased recently after declining for several years from a peak of about 6 percent of mean household income in 1981 (Chart 11-3). Fuel-intensive transportation industries, such as airlines and trucking, also face substantially higher costs when prices of refined petroleum products increase.

When such price increases occur in response to a natural disaster or a failure of energy supply infrastructure, sellers are often accused of "price gouging." Following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which caused energy supply disruptions and price spikes, the Administration remained vigilant to pursue and

Chart 11-3 U.S. Household Gasoline Expenditures High gasoline prices can burden household budgets.



Sources: Department of Energy (Energy Information Administration), Department of Transportation (Bureau of Transportation Statistics), Department of Commerce (Census Bureau), Council of Economic Advisers.

investigate reports of illegal pricing practices, while recognizing that competitive markets are the most effective means for delivering energy supplies to areas of greatest need. Rising prices encourage consumers to conserve fuel and provide domestic producers and importers with incentives to increase supply. If prices are controlled artificially and not allowed to increase, however, consumers will demand more than suppliers are willing to deliver, leading to nonprice rationing (e.g., long lines) and potentially exacerbating the shortage. At least 28 states currently have statutes that address potential market manipulation in the aftermath of a disaster, and a number of these states have initiated investigations of anticompetitive behavior. The Federal Trade Commission has also launched an investigation to scrutinize the refining industry for evidence of unlawful and anticompetitive behavior.

# Refining Capacity and Trade

Efficiency improvements and restructuring in the refining industry have led to lower operating costs per barrel. Excluding oil and other energy inputs, refinery operating costs fell roughly 20 percent between the early 1980s and 2003. These cost reductions tend to reduce the price of gasoline for consumers. Lower surplus capacity may, however, increase the sensitivity of gasoline prices to temporary disruptions in production at particular refineries. When production at one refinery is disrupted, it is difficult for other refineries to compensate by ramping up production. As a result, we are more likely to see short-term spikes in the price of gasoline.

Although U.S. refining capacity and utilization have increased since the early 1990s, these increases in production have not kept pace with U.S. demand for gasoline and other refined products. As a consequence, U.S. imports of refined petroleum products, including gasoline, have grown from 11 percent of total refined product consumption in 1993 to 15 percent in 2004.

Demand for various types of petroleum products within a country and the configuration of its domestic refining capacity drive much of this international trade. For instance, Europe has moved toward consuming more diesel fuel relative to gasoline. According to industry sources, diesel-powered vehicles increased from roughly 30 percent of European new car sales in 2000 to 40 percent in 2005. This has resulted in an excess supply of gasoline at European refineries, which Europe now exports to the United States. At the same time, Europe imports diesel fuel from the United States and other countries. Likewise, other countries have differences between domestic consumption patterns and production capacity. These patterns have resulted in the United States exporting certain refined petroleum products to North America, South America, and Europe, while importing other refined products from these same countries, as well as from the Middle East and the Caribbean.

Transport costs for refined petroleum products are sufficiently low that international trading can moderate the effects of regional price spikes. For example, when supplies of gasoline and other refined petroleum products ran short in the United States following Hurricane Katrina, and prices began to rise quickly, importers responded to this price incentive by delivering significantly more product to the United States.


# Price-Induced Substitution and Technological Change

In the long run, households and businesses respond to higher fuel prices by cutting consumption, purchasing products that are more efficient, and switching to alternative energy sources. Higher energy prices also encourage entrepreneurs to invest in the research and development of new energy-conserving technologies and alternative fuels, further expanding the opportunities available to households and businesses to reduce energy use and switch to low-cost energy sources.

The energy intensity of the U.S. economy—that is, the ratio of total Btu of energy consumed per dollar of real GDP—has declined substantially over the past several decades (Chart 11-4). And, as one might expect, energy intensity declined most rapidly from the mid-1970s though the mid-1980s, when energy prices were at their highest in real terms. Reductions in overall energy intensity

result from both shifts in economic activity toward less energy-intensive sectors, as well as from energy efficiency improvements within particular sectors. Recent research suggests that energy efficiency improvements account for roughly one-third of the reduction in energy intensity between 1985 and 2002, after controlling for shifts in economic activity between different sectors.

Although reductions in energy consumption are made primarily in response to changes in market conditions, government policy may also play a role in facilitating improvements in energy efficiency. This role has included supporting the development of new technologies, encouraging investment in improved efficiency, and in some areas, mandating efficiency improvements to new appliances, equipment, buildings, and vehicles. For example, on-road fuel efficiency for new cars and light trucks (e.g., minivans, pickup trucks, and SUVs) increased from an average of 13 miles per gallon in 1975 to 21 miles per gallon in 2005. This rise is due in part to higher fuel prices, technological improvements, and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which mandate fuel efficiency in passenger cars and light trucks (Box 11-3). The benefits of any such government policy must be weighed carefully against the costs to U.S. taxpayers, consumers, workers, and businesses. The Administration recently proposed new CAFE standards for light trucks in model years 2008-2011 based on a careful accounting of these benefits and costs.



#### Box 11-3: Automobile Fuel Economy Standards

For three decades, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have mandated separate average fuel economy targets for passenger cars and light trucks sold in the United States, and each domestic and foreign manufacturer must meet these same targets in every model year. Congress has established a default level of 27.5 miles per gallon for passenger cars, and passenger car standards have remained at this default level since 1990. The Department of Transportation (DOT) sets CAFE standards for light trucks for each model year, and the Administration raised those standards from 20.7 miles per gallon in 2004 to 22.2 miles per gallon by model year 2007.

There are concerns that the structure of current CAFE standards encourages manufacturers to build minivans, SUVs, and other light trucks instead of cars, because the fuel economy standard for light trucks is lower than the standard for cars. This could lead to an overall decrease in average fuel economy. There are also concerns that manufacturers might meet higher CAFE targets primarily by reducing vehicle size and weight, rather than by applying fuel-saving technologies, and that these size and weight reductions could have a negative impact on the safety of vehicle occupants.

Motivated by these concerns, DOT has proposed a new CAFE rule for light trucks for model years 2008-2011 (to be finalized by April 2006) that incorporates two notable reforms. First, DOT has proposed that CAFE standards for light trucks depend on vehicle size, whereby smaller light trucks will face higher fuel economy standards than larger light trucks. Size-dependent CAFE standards will reduce the incentive to build light trucks instead of cars, discourage manufacturers from achieving CAFE standards only by selling smaller vehicles, encourage greater fuel savings in small light trucks, and spread the burden of achieving CAFE standards more evenly across manufacturers. Second, proposed standards for 2011 would be set using a new economic model developed by DOT that sets CAFE standards to maximize economic benefits minus costs - a milestone in the use of benefit-cost analysis in the rule-making process. The model takes into account the impact of mandated fuel economy improvements on vehicle costs, the value of fuel savings, environmental benefits and costs, and other factors. The proposed rule will save an estimated 10 billion gallons of fuel over the lifetime of the light trucks affected by the rule.

The Administration has requested authority from Congress to implement further reforms to the CAFE system, including utilization of market-based incentives, such as trading of fuel economy credits, to obtain fuel savings at the lowest possible cost to consumers. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed by the President calls for a report on CAFE reform ideas to be delivered to Congress within one year.

# Reform of the New Source Review Program

Unfortunately, government mandates sometimes lead unintentionally to outcomes that are contrary to their environmental goals. An example of this is the New Source Review (NSR) component of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendment. NSR requires that new refineries, electric generating units, and other industrial sources of air emissions apply the best-available air emissions control technology. Existing facilities that undertake significant modifications are also required to apply the best-available technology. NSR requirements were designed to ensure that new emissions sources are appropriately controlled so that the local air quality is not compromised. Unfortunately, NSR has led over time to sources seeking to avoid its requirements because the permitting process was complicated, potentially expensive, and timeconsuming, especially for sources modifying their facilities. This can provide an incentive for existing sources of emissions to continue their business operations for longer than would have been the case under normal market conditions without the regulation. It also provides an incentive for existing plants to forgo modifications.

New production sources tend to be less polluting than old ones even in the absence of regulations, so extending the business operations of older plants without making modifications could result in higher emissions. Applying different regulations for "routine" versus "major" modifications also leads to ambiguity, litigation delays, and uncertainty in business planning, all of which can harm the economy and may impede environmental improvements. The Administration recently addressed this problem by establishing clear rules that remove disincentives for facilities to modify and undertake routine equipment replacement activities that could improve the safety, reliability, and efficiency of the plants. The Administration also established rules that provide facilities with greater flexibility to modernize their operations without increasing air pollution, encourage the installation of state-of-the-art pollution controls, and base NSR requirements more accurately on actual facility emissions levels. These changes will help to address the extreme demands being placed on our Nation's energy supply infrastructure by assuring that the NSR program provides greater regulatory certainty and flexibility for business investment decisions, while protecting the environment.

# Natural Gas

Nearly a quarter of U.S. energy consumption is supplied by natural gas. Natural gas has numerous uses in homes, industry, commerce, electricity production, and transportation and is a vital component of fertilizer and chemical production. The United States consumed 61 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day in 2004: 38 percent in industry (roughly one-tenth of which was used as a feedstock), 24 percent in electricity generation, 22 percent by households, 13 percent in the commercial sector, and the remaining 3 percent in transportation. U.S. natural gas consumption is projected to grow to 74 billion cubic feet per day by 2025.

Natural gas is produced from underground reservoirs that are sometimes associated with crude oil; much smaller amounts are generated from landfills, coal mines, and other sources. Domestic onshore production totaled about 42 billion cubic feet per day in 2004, while offshore production totaled 12 billion cubic feet per day. Total domestic production of 54 billion cubic feet per day is enough to heat about 300 million typical Midwestern homes for one year. After extraction, natural gas is processed to remove impurities (e.g., heavier hydrocarbons) and distributed via pipelines to retailers and eventually to end-use consumers in all sectors of the economy.

# Regionalized Natural Gas Markets

Unlike crude oil, which trades on a global market at roughly uniform world prices, the current natural gas marketplace is highly regionalized. As a point of comparison, about 60 percent of global crude oil production was traded internationally in 2002, whereas only 28 percent of global natural gas production was traded. These differences stem from relatively high shipping costs for natural gas and a less-developed infrastructure for natural gas trade. International trade in natural gas occurs mainly within the regions of North America, Western Europe/Russia, and Asia-Pacific/Japan, each with its own unique pricing system and other market characteristics.

In North America, pipelines move natural gas between the United States, Canada, and Mexico with subregions of the continent supplying the majority of their own consumption needs. U.S. net imports of natural gas were 9.3 billion cubic feet per day in 2004, representing 15 percent of total U.S. natural gas consumption. Most imports came by gas pipeline from Canada. Only a relatively small amount was imported from beyond North America, as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Trinidad, Algeria, and other countries. The United States also exports small amounts of natural gas to Canada and Mexico by pipeline and to Japan as LNG from Alaska.

#### Natural Gas Prices

Wholesale natural gas prices at Henry Hub on the Louisiana Gulf coast (a common natural gas pricing benchmark) averaged around \$2-\$3 per million Btu from 1994 through the middle of 2000. One million Btu of natural gas is equal to about one thousand cubic feet of natural gas. Prices then spiked to a peak of \$10.50 per million Btu in December of 2000 in response to an

unusually cold winter before falling back to their previous low levels. Prices have increased substantially since then from roughly \$3 per million Btu in early 2002 to over \$10 per million Btu in November 2005. Prices rose roughly in tandem with crude oil prices due to the presence of close substitution possibilities between natural gas and oil in power production and heating, though there have been some bumps along the way. Prices spiked to a peak of \$19 per million Btu in February 2003 in response to another unusually cold winter, rose as high as \$15 per million Btu in September 2005 following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and increased to over \$15 again in December 2005 with the onset of cold temperatures.

# Volatility in Natural Gas Prices

Regionalization reduces the frequency and extent to which natural gas price spikes in other regions affect U.S. natural gas prices. However, the absence of a robust international market for natural gas also makes the United States more susceptible to price shocks within our own region. Disruptions to supply or increases in demand may necessitate large price changes to reestablish equilibrium between regional supply and demand. Opportunities for the import of natural gas from other regions would dull these sharp price spikes, although localized price spikes in some regions will likely never be eliminated completely due to limitations in the natural gas distribution infrastructure.

Volatility in natural gas prices in the United States is often related to extreme and unexpected weather events. In the summer months, for example, periods of extreme heat drive up demand for electricity to power air conditioners, leading to increased demand for natural gas for electricity production. Droughts and periods of low rainfall deplete resources for hydroelectric power generation and may require increased use of natural gas for replacement electricity generation. In the winter, periods of extreme cold drive up demand for natural gas for heating. Hurricanes, floods, and other severe weather events may shut down natural gas production and processing facilities and pipeline distribution networks, leading to supply disruptions.


# Liquefied Natural Gas

Liquefied natural gas (LNG)-natural gas in liquid form-is expanding natural gas markets to a more global level, which in the future holds potential to moderate some of this price volatility. LNG is created by cooling natural gas to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point it turns into a liquid, significantly reducing its volume. Specially manufactured doublehulled ships are then able to transport LNG over long distances at lower cost than pipeline transport of natural gas. Upon reaching port, LNG is pumped into a receiving terminal where it is converted back into gas (regasified) and then distributed to consumers via pipeline.

Although some inter-regional movement of natural gas does occur, three key factors have limited the development of a full-scale international market. First, natural gas resources are widely distributed internationally, which at least until recently, has limited the need of many countries to import natural gas from distant sources. Second, it is still costly to transport natural gas as LNG over long distances, which means that regional price differentials need to be large before international trade is cost-effective. Finally, natural gas price differentials are now high enough to justify long-distance shipping of LNG, but the infrastructure for liquefying natural gas into LNG is not well developed in many countries with natural gas supplies.

Although the United States has been able to maintain a high level of natural gas production, North America holds only 4 percent of proven world reserves, including 3 percent of world reserves in the United States and 1 percent in Canada (Chart 11-5). Assuming U.S. demand continues to increase, the need for imports from sources outside the region will grow. At present, it appears that LNG is the best means for importing natural gas from beyond North America, and current Department of Energy projections are that LNG imports from various regions will increase from about 3 percent of U.S. natural gas consumption in 2004 to 15 percent by 2025.

Chart 11-5 World Proven Natural Gas Reserves
The United States holds a small fraction of total reserves.



Note: Numbers do not sum to 100% due to independent rounding Sources: Department of Energy (Energy Information Administration), PennWell Corporation (Oil & Gas Journal)

#### LNG Conversion and Transport Costs

A truly global market for natural gas will require transporting natural gas over long distances, and LNG is superior to pipeline transport in this regard. Currently, pipeline transport is less expensive than LNG for distances up to about 1,300 miles in the case of offshore pipelines and up to about 2,400 miles in the case of onshore pipelines. Beyond these distances, LNG transport in tankers is less expensive.

In addition to the cost of extracting and processing natural gas at the supply source, LNG must be liquefied, transported via special tanker, and then turned back into gas upon arrival. The costs associated with liquefying LNG have decreased between 35 percent and 50 percent over the past ten years, while transport and regasification costs have also fallen. These costs are still high enough, however, that U.S. natural gas prices need to exceed wellhead prices in LNG-supplying countries by at least \$1.50 to \$3 per million Btu roughly \$9 to \$17 per barrel of oil equivalent—before LNG transport is cost-effective. As these costs continue to fall, the international marketability of LNG will grow.

## U.S. LNG Terminal Capacity

Total LNG import costs are about \$2-\$4 per million Btu, which is far below current domestic natural gas prices. Given sufficient LNG infrastructure capacity, therefore, domestic prices eventually could be reduced through increased imports. Over 150 LNG tankers were in operation in 2003, and another 50 are under construction. Currently, there are five existing LNG import terminals in the continental United States (four onshore and one offshore), and these facilities operated at about 40 percent of capacity in 2005. About a dozen additional terminals have been approved, and about 20 others have been proposed. The recent Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed by the President took steps to remove unnecessary impediments to siting LNG terminals by clarifying the role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as the lead agency for coordinating authorization of onshore LNG terminals and LNG terminals in state waters. Federal approval of projects will continue to be conditional on state approval under various environmental laws.

With ample capacity in both shipping and receiving, the current bottleneck in LNG imports to the United States is an insufficient supply of overseas facilities for liquefying LNG. As long as capacity for liquefying LNG is in short supply abroad, there will be great competition in international markets for LNG cargoes, as is already happening among the major importers of LNG, including the United States, Japan, Spain, and other countries. Not surprisingly, high natural gas prices in these and other countries have led to an expansion of capacity to liquefy LNG abroad. Qatar, which has 15 percent of proven world natural gas reserves, recently began exporting LNG. The

12 nations that currently export LNG hold more than one-quarter of proven world reserves, and some of the world's largest natural gas exporters are in the process of constructing plants to develop LNG export capacity, including Russia and Norway.

# Future Prospects for an International LNG Market

Currently, LNG markets are undergoing a substantial evolution, with demand growing and strong future growth expected. Between 1993 and 2003, international LNG trade grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent, and global LNG capacity is expected to grow by more than one-third between 2003 and 2007. Although international trade in LNG is expanding, the market has not yet evolved to the point where it can respond fully to price spikes in North America and other regional markets. The market for prompt delivery of LNG "spot cargoes," although growing, is still less than 10 percent of world LNG trade, with most LNG cargoes delivered under long-term contracts.

# Prospects for Domestic Production of Natural Gas

The emergence of international natural gas markets does not eliminate the need to develop domestic production. Greater domestic natural gas production holds promise both in Alaska and on the outer continental shelf (OCS)—Federally controlled offshore areas within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the United States but beyond the 3-mile zone under state jurisdiction—as well as other areas. A difficulty in Alaskan production has been the lack of infrastructure to transport remote natural gas resources to market, which would be solved by development of the Alaska natural gas pipeline to the lower 48 states. The Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act signed by the President in October 2004 established an expedited Federal approval process for construction of the pipeline, and FERC has been working with state, Federal, and Canadian agencies to establish a framework for coordinating permitting activities.

The OCS has vast additional natural gas resources. Proven Federal offshore reserves as of 2003 were about 23 trillion cubic feet—12 percent of total U.S. proven reserves of 189 trillion cubic feet. The Department of Interior estimates the OCS also contains 400 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural gas. About 20 percent of this natural gas—80 trillion cubic feet—is currently subject to Federal offshore leasing moratoria. The Administration supports greater access to natural gas and oil resources in Federal waters off shore of states that support such development. This would open up substantial additional natural gas supplies for the Nation.

# Electricity

Although 39 percent of total U.S. energy consumption in 2004 passed through the electricity-generation sector, only about one-third of electricitysector energy input was converted into electricity and passed on to end-use customers (Table 11-1). The remaining two-thirds was lost due to inefficiencies in the production and transmission of electricity. Some of these losses could be avoided through further efficiency improvements, though most are unavoidable due to the physics of electricity production and transmission. Retail electricity consumption is divided roughly equally among the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. The residential sector consumed 36 percent of this electricity for lighting, heating, air conditioning, and powering household appliances, while 35 percent went to the commercial sector for similar uses. Industry consumed 29 percent, and less than 1 percent went to the transportation sector to power electric rail transport.

# **Electricity-Generation Technologies**

A range of energy sources and technologies are used to produce electricity. A total of 71 percent of generated electricity comes from fossil fuels, including 50 percent from coal, 18 percent from natural gas, and 3 percent from petroleum. Nuclear power provides about 20 percent of electricity, while hydroelectric power provides 7 percent, and other renewable sources, such as wind, biomass, and solar, provide a combined 2 percent.

With the exception of solar power and diesel-powered internal combustion engines, all electricity is generated by the turning of turbines that drive electric generators. Falling water drives the turbines in a hydroelectric plant, and wind turns the turbine of a windmill. Natural gas plants use a combustion process like that in a jet aircraft engine to generate a high-speed stream of combustion gases, which is used to drive a natural gas turbine. In natural-gascombined-cycle plants, exhaust gases exiting the gas turbine are used to heat water, which generates high-pressure steam that drives a second turbine. Nuclear and conventional coal plants generate high-pressure steam to drive turbines by heating water using the energy released by nuclear reactions and coal combustion, respectively. Advanced coal-fired generating plants use various alternative technologies to enhance efficiency and cut emissions. Combined heat and power plants can very efficiently generate steam or hot water for heating and production processes, as well as for electricity.

# The Real-Time Challenge of Electricity Markets

Most fuels, such as gasoline, home heating oil, or natural gas, can be manufactured and then stored for later distribution and use. Unlike these energy sources, however, the generation and consumption of electricity must match exactly in real time. Although it is possible to store electricity in batteries, storing electricity on a large scale is too costly. If generation fails to provide the energy needed to satisfy demand, the electricity production and distribution network can become unstable, leading to outages or system failures. Shutdowns of generating plants in one location can therefore affect the entire network, as was the case in August 2003, when a plant shutdown in Ohio triggered cascading failures that ultimately forced the shutdown of at least 265 power plants. These shutdowns left an estimated 50 million people in the United States and Canada without power and led to economic losses of \$4-\$10 billion in the United States and noticeable downturns in Canadian hours worked, manufacturing shipments, and economic output. The Federal government took a number of actions after the blackout to diminish the risk that a similar disruption would occur in the future.

The demand for electricity fluctuates with the seasons and during the course of each day. For example, the hot summer months bring increased demand for electricity to power air conditioners, and electricity demand peaks each afternoon and drops to its lowest level late at night. Because the production and use of electricity must match in real time, electricity generation fluctuates one-for-one with these seasonal and daily consumption patterns. Electricity-generating capacity is tuned to match these fluctuations. Plants that have low operating costs or that are difficult to turn on and off, such as nuclear and coal-fired steam plants, provide the "baseload" power that is used all day every day. Plants that have higher operating costs or that can be started up quickly, such as natural gas turbine plants, start up incrementally as electricity demand increases and peaks, with some units remaining idle for much of the day or even much of the year. Hydroelectric plants, which have low operating costs and can be started quickly, are suitable for both baseload and peak electricity production.

These fluctuations can have impacts in other energy markets. Reduced hydroelectric power due to low rainfall and falling reservoir levels can increase demand for electricity from natural gas. Likewise, particularly hot summers increase electricity demand to power air conditioners, increasing demand for natural gas as gas-powered generators come on line. If the weather is drier or the summer is hotter than marketers of natural gas anticipate, stored levels of natural gas will be low relative to unexpectedly high demand, and natural gas prices will increase.

# Real-Time Pricing and Other Reforms

Because electricity-generating units are dispatched incrementally in order of increasing operating cost, the marginal cost of producing electricity—that is, the additional cost of producing one additional unit of electricity—is

highest during periods of peak production and lowest during periods of low production. In practice, however, most retail customers pay a fixed seasonal rate for the electricity they use and thus have no incentive to reduce their consumption of electricity during the times of day when it is most costly to produce. As a result, electricity producers must invest in generating units that remain idle most of the time, and the capital costs of these units are passed on to consumers in the form of higher average prices. Constraints in the electricity transmission system, which limit the extent to which electricity can be directed to areas of high demand or low supply, can also lead to high electricity prices in some regions.

The recent Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed by the President addresses the issue of inefficient pricing by requiring electric utilities and competitive retailers to offer customers time-based rates by February 2007. By ensuring that electricity suppliers offer their customers rates that better reflect the cost of electricity generation, these provisions will encourage consumers and businesses to conserve electricity during times of peak demand. This will reduce the need for excess generating capacity that remains idle most of the time and will, as a result, lower average electricity bills for retail customers. The Act also establishes energy-efficiency standards for household products and Federal buildings, which will reduce consumption of energy.

#### **Environmental Protection**

Combustion of fossil fuels, coal in particular, generates sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides, which contribute to poor air quality if not controlled. Currently, emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from electric utilities are regulated under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which established a cap-and-trade system of tradable permits that holds total annual emissions to a mandated level at low cost. See Box 11-4, which includes a discussion of the Clean Air Interstate Rule and the President's Clear Skies proposal, which calls for a further 70 percent reduction in air emissions.

Fossil fuel combustion also generates emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, which contribute to the warming of the Earth's surface. The Administration is supporting the development of various technologies that will improve power plant efficiency, while greatly reducing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the Department of Energy is supporting research and development of technologies that turn coal into a highly enriched hydrogen gas, which can be burned much more cleanly than burning coal directly or can be used as an industrial feedstock. These technologies also provide opportunities to remove and sequester emissions of carbon dioxide and air pollutants prior to combustion. In February 2003 the President announced FutureGen, a government-industry partnership to build a prototype fossil fuel power plant that will demonstrate these technologies.

#### Box 11-4: Cap-and-Trade Programs for Air Pollution

Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments established a national cap-and-trade system for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. SO2 emissions, which are generated by the burning of fossil fuels—such as coal in an electric power plant-can lead to health concerns and are a component of acid rain. Title IV's program caps total allowable SO2 emissions from power plants nationwide and requires that each facility own a permit for every unit of SO2 it emits. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitors and enforces this cap rigorously.

Under the Title IV program, SO2 permits can be bought and sold by emitting facilities. Trading allows facilities with high pollution-reduction costs to purchase permits from facilities with low reduction costs. thereby allowing the power industry to achieve mandated emissions reductions in a cost-effective manner. The program does not tell power producers how to reduce pollution, but rather they are free to choose the most cost-effective method for achieving reductions.

The SO2 trading program has been very successful at reducing emissions at a lower cost than direct plant-level emissions standards. The compliance has been nearly 100 percent, and research shows the trading program saves U.S. power producers hundreds of millions of dollars per year relative to direct plant-level standards. Thus, cap-andtrade programs promote clean air while reducing the cost impact on energy consumers. A similar regional cap-and-trade program exists in the eastern United States to control nitrogen oxide emissions, which contribute to regional ozone and smog problems.

In 2002, the President proposed "Clear Skies" legislation, which would expand the Clean Air Act Title IV cap-and-trade approach for SO2 to also include nitrogen oxide and mercury, reducing these emissions to roughly 70 percent below 2000 levels by 2018. As Congress has not vet enacted Clear Skies, the EPA has sought to achieve much of the benefits of the Clear Skies legislation by issuing the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) in March 2005. CAIR requires 28 states in the eastern half of the country to regulate power plant emissions of SO2 and nitrogen oxides and encourages them to do this within the framework of an interstate cap-and-trade system. When fully implemented, CAIR will reduce power-plant SO2 emissions in these states by over 70 percent and nitrogen oxide emissions by over 60 percent from 2003 levels. CAMR is the first-ever regulatory action to reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants and includes a cap-and-trade approach as a way of achieving nearly 70-percent reductions in mercury emissions.

The Administration is also supporting further development of renewable sources of electricity, such as wind, solar energy, and biomass (e.g., wood and agricultural crops), which generate little or zero net greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the Administration is supporting the development of nuclear power, which does not generate air pollution or greenhouse gases. The Nuclear Power 2010 program is a cost-shared government-industry partnership to identify sites for new nuclear power plants, improve nuclear technologies, and demonstrate untested regulatory processes. The Generation IV nuclear power program supports the development of future technologies with reduced capital costs, enhanced safety, minimal waste, and reduced risk of weapons materials proliferation.

# Electricity Markets in Transition

The electric power industry has gone through a transition over the past several decades, evolving from a highly regulated, monopolistic industry to a less regulated, more competitive industry. Traditionally, electric utilities owned and operated electricity-generating units, transmission lines, and distribution systems, and were the sole providers of electricity to a specific geographic area. Federal legislation and rule-making activities during the last decade, however, have opened up access to transmission lines and encouraged greater wholesale trade of electricity between generators and retailers. The market changes vary from state to state and are dynamic, with continual adjustments being made as problems emerge. Some states continue to operate under a traditional, integrated market structure, others are striving to encourage greater competition among generating companies, and some even have opened up competition between electricity retailers.

# Recent Electricity Market Policy Reforms

Successful operation of the electric power system requires coordination among system participants. Competition can lead to better products and lower costs for consumers. Ensuring the benefits of competition and reliability are therefore key components of successful reform. Provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed by the President promote competition and investment in transmission infrastructure by providing for reasonably priced access to transmission grids, while providing for the establishment of mandatory reliability rules for the electric system. In order to further reduce costs and increase reliability, the Act repealed the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), which restricted the ability of regulated utilities to invest in electricity infrastructure, and amended the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) to allow utilities greater flexibility to purchase wholesale electricity from producers with lower costs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 improves market competition by promoting the dissemination of information

about the availability and prices of wholesale electricity and transmission services. The Act also protects consumers by banning market manipulation, unauthorized disclosure of consumer information, and unfair trade practices, such as changing the electricity service providers chosen by consumers without their consent.

# Conclusion

Today, most of our energy comes from petroleum, coal, and other fossil fuels. There are constraints on supplies of these resources in the short term. Increased scarcity and rising prices over time will encourage conservation, increase incentives for exploration, and stimulate the development of new, energy-efficient technologies and alternative energy sources. In the near term, unexpected disruptions to energy supply and distribution networks may continue to impact consumers and businesses. The recent hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated that competitive markets play a central role in allocating scarce energy resources, especially during times of natural disaster or national emergency. The continued expansion of energy markets through regional and global trade can further increase our resilience to energy supply disruptions. Finally, individual energy market participants do not always have an incentive to tackle problems associated with the production and consumption of energy, such as environmental damage or the potentially damaging effects of energy price spikes on the U.S. economy. Policies that reduce U.S. vulnerability to supply disruptions, encourage energy efficiency, and protect the environment can therefore be beneficial supplements to markets. Policymakers can design these policies to be more effective and less costly by harnessing the power of economic incentives and aiming to minimize distortion of normal market forces.



# Appendix A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS DURING 2005

#### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, Washington, D.C., December 30, 2005.

Mr. President:

The Council of Economic Advisers submits this report on its activities during the calendar year 2005 in accordance with the requirements of the Congress, as set forth in section 10(d) of the Employment Act of 1946 as amended by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.

Sincerely,

Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman Katherine Baicker, Member Matthew J. Slaughter, Member

# Council Members and Their Dates of Service

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Edwin G. Nourse	Chairman	August 9. 1946	November 1, 1949
eon H Keyserling.	Vice Chairman	August 9, 1946	
	Acting Chairman	November 2, 1949	
	Chairman	May 10, 1950 .	January 20, 1953.
John D. Clark	Member	August 9, 1946	
	Vice Chairman	May 10, 1950 .	February 11, 1953
Roy Blough	Member	June 29, 1950	August 20, 1952
Robert C. Turner	Member	September 8, 1952	January 20, 1953
Arthur F. Burns	Chairman	March 19, 1953	December 1, 1956
Neil H. Jacoby	Member	September 15, 1953 .	February 9, 1955
Valter W Stewart	Member	December 2, 1953	April 29, 1955
Raymond J Saulnier	Member	April 4 1955	
	Chairman	December 3, 1956 .	January 20, 1961.
oseph S Davis	Member	May 2. 1955	October 31, 1958
Paul W. McCracken	Member	December 3, 1956	January 31, 1959.
(arl Brandt	Member	November 1, 1958.	January 20. 1961
lenry C Wallich	Member	May 7, 1959	January 20, 1961
Valter W. Heller	Chairman	January 29, 1961 .	November 15, 196
ames Tobin	Member	January 29, 1961	July 31, 1962.
ermit Gordon	Member	January 29, 1961	December 27, 196
ardner Ackley	Member	August 3, 1962	
	Chairman	November 16, 1964	February 15, 1968
ohn P. Lewis	Member	May 17, 1963	August 31 1964
Otto Eckstein.	Member.	September 2, 1964	February 1, 1966.
orthur M. Okun	Member	November 16, 1964	
	Chairman	February 15, 1968	January 20, 1969
ames S Duesenberry	Member	February 2, 1966	June 30, 1968.
Merton J. Peck	Member	February 15, 1968	January 20, 1969
Varren L Smith	Member	July 1 1968	January 20, 1969.
aul W. McCracken .	Chairman	February 4. 1969	December 31, 197
lendrik S. Houthakker	Member	February 4, 1969	July 15, 1971.
lerbert Stein	Member	February 4, 1969	
	Chairman.	January 1, 1972	August 31, 1974
zra Solomon.	Member	September 9, 1971	March 26, 1973
Marina v.N. Whitman .	Member	March 13, 1972	August 15, 1973
ary L Seevers	Member .	July 23, 1973	April 15, 1975
Villiam J. Fellner	Member	October 31, 1973	February 25, 1975
lan Greenspan	Chairman .	September 4, 1974.	January 20. 1977
aul W MacAvoy	Member	June 13. 1975	November 15, 1976
Burton G. Malkiel	Member	July 22, 1975 .	January 20, 1977.

# Council Members and Their Dates of Service

Name	Position	Oath of office date	Separation date
Charles L. Schultze	Chairman	January 22, 1977	January 20, 1981
William D. Nordhaus	Member	March 18, 1977	February 4, 1979.
Lyle E. Gramley	Member	March 18, 1977	May 27, 1980.
George C Eads	Member.	June 6. 1979	January 20, 1981.
Stephen M. Goldfeld	Member	August 20, 1980	January 20, 1981
Murray L. Weidenbaum	Chairman	February 27, 1981	August 25, 1982.
William A. Niskanen	Member	June 12, 1981	March 30, 1985.
Jerry L. Jordan	Member	July 14, 1981	July 31, 1982.
Martin Feldstein	Chairman	October 14, 1982	July 10. 1984.
William Poole	Member	December 10, 1982	January 20, 1985.
Beryl W. Sprinkel	Chairman	April 18, 1985	January 20, 1989
Thomas Gale Moore	Member	July 1, 1985	May 1, 1989
Michael L. Mussa	Member	August 18, 1986	September 19, 198
Michael J. Boskin	Chairman	February 2, 1989	January 12, 1993
John B. Taylor	Member	June 9, 1989	August 2, 1991.
Richard L Schmalensee	Member	October 3, 1989	June 21, 1991.
David F. Bradford	Member	November 13, 1991	January 20, 1993.
Paul Wonnacott	Member	November 13, 1991	January 20, 1993.
Laura D'Andrea Tyson	Chair	February 5, 1993	April 22, 1995.
Alan S. Blinder	Member	July 27, 1993	June 26, 1994.
Joseph E. Stiglitz	Member	July 27, 1993	
	Chairman	June 28, 1995	February 10, 1997.
Martin N. Baily	Member	June 30, 1995	August 30, 1996.
Alicia H. Munnell	Member	January 29, 1996	August 1, 1997.
Janet L. Yellen	Chair	February 18, 1997	August 3, 1999.
Jeffrey A. Frankel	Member	April 23, 1997	March 2, 1999.
Rebecca M. Blank	Member	October 22, 1998	July 9, 1999.
Martin N. Baily	Chairman	August 12, 1999	January 19, 2001.
Robert Z. Lawrence	Member	August 12, 1999	January 12, 2001.
Kathryn L. Shaw	Member	May 31, 2000	January 19, 2001.
R. Glenn Hubbard	Chairman	May 11, 2001	February 28, 2003.
Mark B. McClellan	Member	July 25, 2001	November 13, 2002
Randall S. Kroszner	Member	November 30, 2001	July 1, 2003.
N Gregory Mankiw	Chairman	May 29, 2003	February 18, 2005.
Kristin J. Forbes	Member	November 21, 2003	June 3, 2005.
Harvey S Rosen	Member	November 21, 2003	
,	Chairman	February 23, 2005	June 10, 2005.
Ben S Bernanke	Chairman	June 21, 2005	Jane 10, 2003.
Katherine Baicker	Member	November 18, 2005	
Matthew J. Slaughter	Member	November 18, 2005	

# Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers During 2005

The Council of Economic Advisers was established by the Employment Act of 1946 to provide the President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development and implementation of a wide range of domestic and international economic policy issues.

# The Chairman of the Council

Ben S. Bernanke was appointed by the President on June 21, 2005 as Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. Bernanke succeeded Harvey S. Rosen, who returned to Princeton University, where he is the John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and Business Policy. Dr. Rosen succeeded N. Gregory Mankiw, who returned to Harvard University, where he is the Robert M. Beren Professor of Economics.

Prior to his appointment to the Council, Dr. Bernanke served as a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Before becoming a Member of the Board, Dr. Bernanke was the Howard Harrison and Gabrielle Snyder Beck Professor of Economics and Public Affairs and Chair of the Economics Department at Princeton University (1996-2002). Dr. Bernanke had served as a Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton since 1985.

Dr. Bernanke was nominated by the President on October 24, 2005 to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve System for a term to begin on February 1, 2006. Dr. Bernanke subsequently recused himself from the development of the Administration's economic forecast for the fiscal year 2007 budget.

The Chairman of the Council is responsible for communicating the Council's views on economic matters directly to the President through personal discussions and written reports. He represents the Council at Cabinet meetings, meetings of the National Economic Council, daily White House senior staff meetings, budget team meetings with the President, and other formal and informal meetings with the President. He also travels within the United States and overseas to present the Administration's views on the economy. The Chairman is the Council's chief public spokesperson. He directs the work of the Council and exercises ultimate responsibility for the work of the professional staff.

# The Members of the Council

Katherine Baicker was appointed by the President as a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers on November 8, 2005. She succeeds Dr. Rosen. who had served as a Member prior to being appointed Chairman. Dr. Baicker is on leave from the University of California in Los Angeles, where she is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Policy. At the Council Dr. Baicker's responsibilities include work on public finance, labor, and health issues.

Matthew J. Slaughter was appointed by the President as a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers on November 8, 2005. He succeeds Kristin J. Forbes, who returned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management where she is the Mitsubishi Career Development Chair of International Management and Associate Professor of International Management in the Applied Economics Group. Dr. Slaughter is on leave from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College where he is an Associate Professor of Business Administration. At the Council Dr. Slaughter's responsibilities include work on international finance and trade, and industrial organization issues.

#### Macroeconomic Policies

As is its tradition, the Council devoted much time during 2005 to assisting the President in formulating economic policy objectives and designing programs to implement them. In this regard the Chairman kept the President informed, on a continuing basis, of important macroeconomic developments and other major policy issues through regular macroeconomic briefings. The Council prepares for the President, the Vice President, and the White House senior staff regular memoranda that report key economic data and analyze current economic events.

The Council, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—the Administration's economic "troika"—are responsible for producing the economic forecasts that underlie the Administration's budget proposals. The Council, under the leadership of the Chairman and the Chief Economist, initiates the forecasting process twice each year. In preparing these forecasts, the Council consults with a variety of outside sources, including leading private sector forecasters.

In 2005, the Council took part in discussions on a range of macroeconomic issues. An important concern in the second half of the year was providing analysis related to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Council works closely with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other government agencies in

providing analyses to the Administration on these topics of concern. It also works closely with the National Economic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and other offices within the Executive Office of the President in assessing the economy and economic policy proposals.

#### International Economic Policies

The Council was involved in a range of international trade issues, including discussions on trade liberalization at the global, regional, and bilateral levels. This involvement included extensive analysis of alternative liberalization scenarios, participation in deliberations concerning trade policy in a number of industries, and analysis related to U.S. economic interaction with China. In international finance, the Council provided extensive analysis of the implications of changes in the U.S. external position and developments in foreign-exchange markets. The Council participated in discussions concerning international financial relations with both advanced and emerging market economies. Council members regularly met with representatives of the Council's counterpart agencies in foreign countries, as well as with foreigntrade ministers, other government officials, and members of the private sector. In recent months, meetings have been held with the ministers of finance from countries including Great Britain, Japan, and India as well as officials from the European Commission and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.

Council staff were part of the U.S delegation that participated in Joint Economic Committee discussions in Beijing, focused on banking reform and capital market development in China. In addition, the Council participated in discussions with Chinese officials in the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. The Council participated in the development of U.S. proposals for providing additional debt relief to the world's poorest countries (Highly Indebted Poor Countries, or HIPCs) that were agreed to at the G-8 Summit held at Gleneagles, Scotland, and prepared analyses for the summits involving the countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Council is also a leading participant in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the principal forum for economic cooperation among the high-income industrial countries. The Chairman heads the U.S. delegation to the semiannual meetings of the OECD's Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and serves as the EPC Chairman. Dr. Rosen, Dr. Forbes, and Dr. Slaughter participated in meetings of the Economic Policy Committee, as well as meetings of the OECD's Working Party 3 on macroeconomic policy and coordination. Council staff participated in additional OECD meetings.

#### Microeconomic Policies

A wide variety of microeconomic issues received Council attention during 2005. The Council actively participated in the Cabinet-level National Economic Council, dealing with such diverse issues as health care policy, energy policy, environment, Social Security, tax policy, immigration, education reform, asbestos litigation, and financial markets and institutions. The Council was particularly active in the area of health care policy, conducting analyses of the sources and impact of rising health care costs, the use of health savings accounts, and a number of issues related to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The Council also participated in discussions related to marketbased health care reforms and the tax treatment of health care spending. Energy policy was also an important focus of the Council, with analysis on the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita on energy markets, increasing world demand for oil, and the impact of various policy proposals regarding both energy efficiency and energy supply.

# The Staff of the Council of Economic Advisers

The professional staff of the Council consists of the Chief of Staff, the Chief Economist, the Director of Macroeconomic Forecasting and Statistics, nine senior economists, four staff economists, and five research assistants. The professional staff and their areas of concentration at the end of 2005 were:

Chief of Staff Gary D. Blank

Chief Economist H. Keith Hall

Director of Macroeconomic Forecasting and Statistics Steven N. Braun

#### Senior Economists

D 11: E:

John E. Anderson	Public Finance
William D. Block	International Finance and Development
Joseph C. Cooper	Agriculture and Natural Resources
Daniel M. Covitz	Macroeconomics and Finance
William H. Dow	Health
Wayne R. Dunham	Regulation, Technology, and
	Transportation
Dino D. Falaschetti	Regulation and Finance
Christine A. McDaniel	International Trade
Richard G. Newell	Energy and Environment

#### Economist

Rebecca J. Kalmus ...... Labor

# Staff Economists

Faisal Z. Ahmed...... International Finance and Trade,

and Macroeconomics

#### Research Assistants

Jeffrey P. Clemens	Public Finance and Regulation
Sarena F. Goodman	Macroeconomics and Labor
Dagmara K. Tchalakov	International Trade and Finance
Diana C. Wielocha	Macroeconomics, Finance,
	and Regulation
Jonathan A. Wolfson	Health and Regulation

#### Statistical Office

The Statistical Office maintains and updates the Council's statistical information, oversees the publication of the monthly Economic Indicators and the statistical appendix to the Economic Report of the President, and verifies statistics in Presidential and Council memoranda, testimony, and speeches.

Linda A. Reilly	Program Analyst (Statistical)
Brian A. Amorosi	Program Analyst (Statistical)
Dagmara A. Mocala	Research Assistant

Catherine Furlong retired from Federal service on September 2, 2005. She had worked in the CEA Statistical Office for 54 years, and had been its Senior Statistician since 1977. A retirement ceremony was held on September 30, where she was honored in comments by present and former Council Chairmen, Ben Bernanke, Alan Greenspan, and Charles Schultz. Chairman Raymond Saulinier was also in attendance. Her untiring dedication to accuracy, detail and the reputation of the Council will indeed be missed. All future Councils will benefit from that wisdom.

# Administrative Office

The Administrative Office provides general support for the Council's activities. This includes financial management, human resource management, and travel, facility, security, information, and telecommunications management support.

Rosemary M. Rogers ...... Administrative Officer

#### Office of the Chairman

Alice H. Williams	Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Sandra F. Daigle	Executive Assistant to the Chairman
	and Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Lisa D. Branch	Executive Assistant to Dr. Slaughter
Mary E. Jones	Executive Assistant to Dr. Baicker

#### Staff Support

Sharon K. Thomas ...... Administrative Support Assistant

Jane Tufts and Barbara Pendergast provided editorial assistance in the preparation of the 2006 Economic Report of the President.

Student Interns during the year were: Matthew B. Adler, Taylor W. Buley, Sean D. Clifford, Andrew M. Dietrich, Alan Y. Gu, Brett W. Hollenbeck, Rebecca L. Homkes, Thomas R. Johnson, Aaron W. Kletzing, Edwin H. Lee, Stephanie Mak, Andrew Park, Sean X. Qin, Elizabeth M. Schultz, Brian C. Tucci, and Joseph S. Vavra.

Fellows during the year were: Courtney Biesecker, Kenneth Gillingham, and Neal Rappaport.

# Departures

Phillip P. Swagel left the Council as Chief of Staff in February of 2005 to join the American Enterprise Institute as a resident scholar.

Donald B. Marron left the Council as Chief Economist in October of 2005 to join the Congressional Budget Office where he is currently the Acting Director.

The Council's senior economists, in most cases, are on leave of absence from faculty positions at academic institutions or from other government agencies or research institutions. Their tenure with the Council is usually limited to one or two years. Some of the senior economists who resigned during the year returned to their previous affiliations. They are: Raymond R. Geddes (Cornell University), Pia M. Orrenius (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas), John C. Driscoll (Federal Reserve Board), Joshua S. Graff Zivin (Columbia University), Gerald Auten (Department of the Treasury), Alexander Raskovich (Department of Justice), Philip Levy (State Department)

Staff economists are generally graduate students who spend one year with the Council and then return to complete their dissertations. Those who departed the Council in 2005 are: Maria Damon, Peter R. Kingston, Anne Berry, and Carol Cohen.

Those who served as research assistants at the Council and resigned during 2005 were: Namita K. Kalyan, Therese C. Scharlemann, Derek A. Haas, James Soldano, and Daniel Ramsey.

Brenda Compton, Finance Manager, accepted a position with the Census Bureau.

Satiah Pee, Information Management Assistant accepted a position with the Discovery Channel.

# Public Information

The Council's annual Economic Report of the President is an important vehicle for presenting the Administration's domestic and international economic policies. It is available on the Internet at www.gpoaccess.gov/eop. The Council also has responsibility for compiling the monthly Economic Indicators. The Internet address for the Economic Indicators is www.gpoaccess.gov/indicators. The Council's home page is located at www.whitehouse.gov/cea.

# Appendix B STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTION

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#### General Notes

Detail in these tables may not add to totals because of rounding.

Because of the formula used for calculating real gross domestic product (GDP), the chained (2000) dollar estimates for the detailed components do not add to the chained-dollar value of GDP or to any intermediate aggregate. The Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) no longer publishes chained-dollar estimates prior to 1990, except for selected series.

Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures are in current dollars.

#### Symbols used:

P Preliminary.

... Not available (also, not applicable).

Data in these tables reflect revisions made by the source agencies through January 27, 2006. In particular, tables containing national income and product accounts (NIPA) estimates reflect revisions released by the Department of Commerce in July 2005.

#### NATIONAL INCOME OR EXPENDITURE

TABLE B-1.—Gross domestic product, 1959-2005

[Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Person	nal consum	ption expen	ditures		Gross private domestic investment					
								- Fr	xed investi	ment		0.
Year or quarter	Gross domestic product	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	Serv- ices	Total	Total		onresident Struc-	Equip- ment	Resi- dential	Change in pri- vate inven-
								Total	tures	and soft- ware		tories
959	506.6	317.6	42.7	148 5	126.5	78.5	74 6	46.5	181	28 4	28 1	3
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967	526 4 544.7 585 6 617.7 663.6 719.1 787.8 832 6 910.0 984 6	331 7 342 1 363.3 382.7 411.4 443 8 480.9 507 8 558 0 605.2	43.3 41.8 46.9 51.6 56.7 63.3 70.4 80.8 85.9	152.8 156.6 162.8 168.2 178.6 191.5 208.7 217.1 235.7 253.1	135.6 143.8 153.6 162.9 176.1 189.0 203.8 220.3 241.6 266.1	78.9 78.2 88 1 93 8 102.1 118 2 131.3 128.6 141.2 156.4	75.7 75.2 82.0 88.1 97.2 109.0 117.7 118.7 132.1 147.3	49.4 48.8 53.1 56.0 63.0 74.8 85.4 86.4 93.4 104.7	19.6 19.7 20.8 21.2 23.7 28.3 31.3 31.5 33.6 37.7	29 8 29 1 32 3 34 8 39 2 46 5 54 0 54 9 59 9 67 0	26.3 26.4 29.0 32.1 34.3 34.2 32.3 32.4 42.6	3 6 5 4 9 13 9
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978	1.038.5 1.127 1 1.238.3 1.382.7 1.500 0 1.638.3 1.825.3 2.030.9 2.294 7 2.563 3	648 5 701.9 770.6 852 4 933 4 1.034 4 1.151 9 1.278.6 1.428 5 1.592.2	85.0 96.9 110.4 123.5 122.3 133.5 158.9 181.2 201.7 214.4	272.0 285.5 308.0 343.1 384.5 420.7 458.3 497.1 550.2 624.5	291.5 319.5 352.2 385.8 426.6 480.2 534.7 600.2 676.6 753.3	152.4 178.2 207.6 244.5 249.4 230.2 292.0 361.3 438.0 492.9	150 4 169 9 198.5 228.6 235.4 236.5 274 8 339.0 412.2 474.9	109.0 114.1 128.8 153.3 169.5 173.7 192.4 228.7 280.6 333.9	40.3 42.7 47.2 55.0 61.2 61.4 65.9 74.6 93.6 117.7	68.7 71.5 81.7 98.3 108.2 112.4 126.4 154.1 187.0 216.2	41.4 55.8 69.7 75.3 66.0 62.7 82.5 110.3 131.6 141.0	28 8 9 15 14 -6 17 22 25 18
980	2,789.5 3.128 4 3.255.0 3.536.7 3.933 2 4.220.3 4.462.8 4.739 5 5.103 8 5,484 4	1,757 1 1,941 1 2,077.3 2,290 6 2,503 3 2,720.3 2,899.7 3,100.2 3,353 6 3,598 5	214 2 231.3 240.2 280.8 326.5 363.5 403.0 421.7 453.6 471.8	696.1 758.9 787.6 831.2 884.6 928.7 958.4 1,015.3 1.083.5 1.166.7	846.9 950.8 1.049.4 1.178.6 1.292.2 1.428.1 1.538.3 1.663.3 1.816.5 1.960.0	479.3 572.4 517.2 564.3 735.6 736.2 746.5 785.0 821.6 874.9	485.6 542.6 532.1 570.1 670.2 714.4 739.9 757.8 803.1 847.3	362.4 420.0 426.5 417.2 489.6 526.2 519.8 524.1 563.8 607.7	136.2 167.3 177.6 154.3 177.4 194.5 176.5 174.2 182.8 193.7	226.2 252.7 248.9 262.9 312.2 331.7 343.3 349.9 381.0 414.0	123.2 122.6 105.7 152.9 180.6 188.2 220.1 233.7 239.3 239.5	-6 29 -14 -5 65 21 -18 27
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 997	5,803.1 5.995.9 6.337.7 6.657.4 7.072.2 7.397.7 7,816.9 8,304.3 8,747.0 9,268.4	5,879.5	474 2 453.9 483.6 526.7 582.2 611.6 652.6 692.7 750.2 817.6	1.249.9 1.284.8 1.330.5 1.379.4 1.437.2 1.485.1 1.555.5 1.619.0 1.683.6 1.804.8	2,115 9 2,247,4 2,421.2 2,571.8 2,723 9 2,879.1 3,048.7 3,235.8 3,445.7 3,660.0	861.0 802.9 864.8 953.4 1.097.1 1.144.0 1.240.3 1.389.8 1.509.1 1.625.7	846.4 803.3 848.5 932.5 1.033.3 1.112.9 1.209.5 1.317.8 1.438.4 1.558.8	622 4 598 2 612 1 666 6 731 4 810 0 875 4 968 7 1,052 6 1.133 9	202.9 183.6 172.6 177.2 186.8 207.3 224.6 250.3 275.2 282.2	419.5 414.6 439.6 489.4 544.6 602.8 650.8 718.3 777.3 851.7	224 0 205.1 236.3 266.0 301 9 302.8 334 1 349.1 385.8 424.9	14 20 63 33 30 77 70
000 . 001 002 003 004	9.817 0 10,128.0 10,469.6 10,971 2 11,734 3 12,479 4	6,739 4 7,055.0 7,350 7 7,709 9 8,214.3 8,745.9	863 3 883.7 923 9 950.1 987.8 1,025.7	1,947.2 2,017.1 2,079.6 2,189.0 2,368.3 2,564.3	3,928.8 4,154.3 4,347.2 4,570.8 4,858.2 5,155.9	1,735.5 1,614.3 1.582.1 1,670.4 1,928.1 2,099.5	1.679.0 1.646.1 1.570.2 1.654.9 1.872.6 2.084.3	1,232.1 1,176.8 1,066.3 1,082.4 1,198.8 1,328.3	313.2 322.6 279.2 276.9 298.4 334.5	918.9 854.2 787.1 805.6 900.4 993.8	446.9 469.3 503.9 572.5 673.8 756.0	56 -31 11 15 55
1002: I II III	10,333 3 10,426.6 10,527 4 10,591 1	7.230.3 7.323 0 7.396.6 7 453 1	915.2 918.9 940.1 921.5	2,044.9 2,078.9 2,085.1 2,109.7	4.270.2 4.325.2 4.371.4 4.421.8	1.564 1 1.571 4 1.592.9 1.600 1	1,572.4 1,568.8 1,566.8 1,572.8	1,085.2 1,067.8 1,061.4 1,050.7	292.2 280.9 272.1 271.7	793.0 787.0 789.3 779.0	487.2 501.0 505.4 522.1	-8 2 26 27
2003. I . II . IV	10.717.0 10.844 6 11.087 4 11.236.0	7,555.2 7,635.3 7,782.4 7,866.6	919 7 942 2 974 7 963.6	2.156 0 2 153 1 2.213 5 2.233 6	4,479 5 4,540 0 4,594 2 4,669 5	1.610.0 1.619.3 1.694.2 1.757.9	1,588.2 1,619.7 1,683.7 1,728.2	1.048 2 1.066 8 1.098 8 1.116.0	268.4 277.1 279.0 283.0	779.8 789.7 819.8 833.0	540.0 552.9 584.9 612.2	21 10 29
004      .       	11.457 1 11.666.1 11.818.8 11.995 2	8.032.3 8.145.6 8.263.2 8.416.1	974 2 974 6 993 8 1.008 6	2,302.7 2,355.2 2,378.4 2,437.1	4.755.4 4.815.9 4.891.0 4.970.4	1.818 2 1.928 5 1.961.2 2.004.5	1.772 7 1.856.6 1.908.7 1.952.6	1,140.7 1,182.7 1,219.0 1,252.9	285 3 296 3 302.1 309 8	855.3 886.5 916.9 943.1	632 0 673 9 689.7 699 7	45 71 52 51
005      .     .	12.198 8 12.378 0 12.605 7 12.735.3	8,535.8 8,677.0 8,844.0	1,017 3 1,035.5 1,050.9 999.0	2.476.6 2.533 7 2.604 9 2.642.0	5,041 8 5,107.8 5,188.3 5,285.9	2.058.5 2.054.4 2.099.5 2.185.7	1.998 7 2.058.5 2.119.2 2.160.9	1,280.1 1,313.5 1,348.9 1,370.6	315.9 325.6 340.2 356.3	964 3 987 9 1,008 7 1,014 3	718 5 745.0 770.3 790.3	55 -4 -15 24

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-1.—Gross domestic product, 1959-2005—Continued [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Year or quarter		exports of and service		Gover		nsumption oss invest		ntes	Final G	Gross	Adden- dum.	Percent from proper	eceding
	Net exports	Exports	Imports	Total	Total	Nation- al de- fense	Non- de- fense	State and local	sales of domes- tic product	domes- tic pur- chases <sup>1</sup>	Gross national prod- uct 2	Gross domes- tic prod- uct	Gross domes- tic pur- chases 1
1959	0.4	22.7	22.3	110.0	65.4	53.8	11.5	44.7	502.7	506.2	509.3	8 4	8.5
1960	4.2 4.9 4.1 4.9 6.9 5.6 3.9 3.6 1.4	27.0 27.6 29.1 31.1 35.0 37.1 40.9 43.5 47.9 51.9	22.8 22.7 25.0 26.1 28.1 31.5 37.1 39.9 46.6 50.5	111.6 119.5 130.1 136.4 143.2 151.5 171.8 192.7 209.4 221.5	64.1 67.9 75.3 76.9 78.5 80.4 92.5 104.8 111.4	53.4 56.5 61.1 61.0 60.3 60.6 71.7 83.5 89.3	10.7 11.4 14.2 15.9 18.2 19.8 20.8 21.3 22.1 23.8	47.5 51.6 54.9 59.5 64.8 71.0 79.2 87.9 98.0 108.2	523.2 541.7 579.5 612.1 658.8 709.9 774.2 822.7 900.9 975.4	522.2 539.8 581.5 612.8 656.7 713.5 783.9 829.0 908.6 983.2	529.5 548.2 589.7 622.2 668.5 724.4 792.9 838.0 916.1 990.7	3.9 3.5 7.5 5.5 7.4 8.4 9.5 5.7 9.3 8.2	3.2 3.4 7.7 5.4 7.2 8.6 9.9 5.8 9.6 8.2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	4.0 .6 -3.4 4.1 8 16.0 -1.6 -23.1 -25.4 -22.5	59.7 63.0 70.8 95.3 126.7 138.7 149.5 159.4 186.9 230.1	55.8 62.3 74.2 91.2 127.5 122.7 151.1 *82.4 212.3 252.7	233.8 246.5 263.5 281.7 317.9 357.7 383.0 414.1 453.6 500.8	113.5 113.7 119.7 122.5 134.6 149.1 159.7 175.4 190.9 210.6	87.6 84.6 87.0 88.2 95.6 103.9 111.1 120.9 130.5 145.2	25.8 29.1 32.7 34.3 39.0 45.1 48.6 54.5 60.4 65.4	120.3 132.8 143.8 159.2 183.4 208.7 223.3 238.7 262.6 290.2	1,036.5 1,118.9 1,229.2 1,366.8 1,486.0 1,644.6 1,808.2 2,008.6 2,268.9 2,545.3	1,034.6 1,126.5 1,241.7 1,378.6 1,500.8 1,622.4 1,826.9 2,054.0 2,320.1 2,585.9	1,044.9 1,134.7 1,246.8 1,395.3 1,515.5 1,651.3 1,842.1 2,051.2 2,316.3 2,595.3	5.5 8.5 9.9 11.7 8.5 9.2 11.4 11.3 13.0 11.7	5.2 8.9 10.2 11.0 8.9 8 1 12.6 12.4 13.0 11.5
1980	-13.1 -12.5 -20.0 -51.7 -102.7 -115.2 -132.7 -145.2 -110.4 -88.2	280.8 305.2 283.2 277.0 302.4 302.0 320.5 363.9 444.1 503.3	293.8 317.8 303.2 328.6 405.1 417.2 453.3 509.1 554.5 591.5	566.2 627.5 680.5 733.5 797.0 879.0 949.3 999.5 1,039.0 1,099.1	243.8 280.2 310.8 342.9 374.4 412.8 438.6 460.1 462.3 482.2	168.0 196.3 225.9 250.7 281.6 311.2 330.9 350.0 354.9 362.2	75.8 84.0 84.9 92.3 92.8 101.6 107.8 110.0 107.4 120.0	322.4 347.3 369.7 390.5 422.6 466.2 510.7 539.4 576.7 616.9	2,795.8 3,098.6 3,269.9 3,542.4 4,198.4 4,456.3 4,712.3 5,085.3 5,456.7	2,802.6 3,141.0 3,275.0 3,588.3 4,035.9 4,335.5 4,595.6 4,884.7 5,214.2 5,572.5	2,823.7 3,161.4 3,291.5 3,573.8 3,969.5 4,246.8 4,480.6 4,757.4 5,127.4 5,510.6	8.8 12 2 4.0 8.7 11.2 7.3 5.7 6.2 7.7	8.4 12 1 4.3 9.6 12.5 7.4 6.0 6.3 6.7 6.9
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	-78.0 -27.5 -33.2 -65.0 -93.6 -91.4 -96.2 -101.6 -159.9 -260.5	552.4 596.8 635.3 655.8 720.9 812.2 868.6 955.3 955.9 991.2	630.3 624.3 668.6 720.9 814.5 903.6 964.8 1,056.9 1,115.9 1,251.7	1,180.2 1,234.4 1,271.0 1,291.2 1,325.5 1,369.2 1,416.0 1,468.7 1,518.3 1,620.8	508.3 527.7 533.9 525.2 519.1 519.2 527.4 530.9 530.4 555.8	374.0 383.2 376.9 362.9 353.7 348.7 354.6 349.6 345.7 360.6	134.3 144.5 157.0 162.4 165.5 170.5 172.8 181.3 184.7 195.2	671.9 706.7 737.0 766.0 806.3 850.0 888.6 937.8 987.9 1,065.0	5,788.5 5,996.3 6,321.4 6,636.6 7,008.4 7,366.5 7,786.1 8,232.3 8,676.2 9,201.5	5,881.1 6,023.4 6,371.0 6,722.4 7,165.8 7,489.0 7,913.1 8,405.9 8,906.9 9,528.9	5,837.9 6,026.3 6,367.4 6,689.3 7,098.4 7,433.4 7,851.9 8,337.3 8,768.3 9,302.2	5.8 3.3 5.7 5.0 6.2 4.6 5.7 6.2 5.3 6.0	5.5 2.4 5.8 5.5 6.6 4.5 5.7 6.2 7.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	-379.5 -367.0 -424.4 -500.9 -624.0 -725.7	1,096.3 1,032.8 1,005.9 1,045.6 1,173.8 1,299.2	1,475.8 1,399.8 1,430.3 1,546.5 1,797.8 2,024.9	1,721.6 1,825.6 1,961.1 2,091.9 2,215.9 2,359.7	578.8 612.9 679.7 754.8 827.6 874.8	370.3 392.6 437.1 496.7 552.7 585.3	220.3 242.5 258.2 274.9	1,142.8 1,212.8 1,281.5 1,337.1 1,388.3 1,484.9	9,760.5 10,159.7 10,457.7 10,955.8 11,678.9 12,464.2	10,196.4 10,495.0 10,894.0 11,472.1 12,358.3 13,205.2	9,855.9 10,171.6 10,500.2 11,039.3 11,788.0	5.9 3.2 3.4 4.8 7.0 6.4	7.0 2.9 3.8 5.3 7.7 6.9
2002:            	-373.1 -416.1 -433.8 -474.6	976.4 1,008.2 1,022.9 1,016.2	1,349.5 1,424.3 1,456.7 1,490.8	1,912.0 1,948.3 1,971.8 2,012.5	654.9 675.2 682.0 706.6	418.2 431.1 438.0 461.1	243.9	1,257.2 1,273.1 1,289.8 1,305.9	10,341.6 10,424.0 10,501.4 10,563.9	10,706.4 10,842.7 10,961.2 11,065.7	10,359.5 10,443.3 10,557.0 10,641.1	4.3 3.7 3.9 2.4	4.9 5.2 4.4 3.9
2003: I II III IV	-502.6 -500.6 -495.3 -505.0	1,018.8 1,016.1 1,046.6 1,101.1	1,521.4 1,516.6 1,541.9 1,606.1	2,054.4 2,090.5 2,106.2 2,116.5	724.0 763.4 761.8 770.0	467.2 507.2 500.3 512.0	256.3 261.5	1,330.4 1,327.1 1,344.4 1,346.5	10,695.2 10,845.0 11,076.9 11,206.2	11,219.6 11,345.2 11,582.8 11,741.1	10,761.9 10,911.4 11,154.8 11,329.2	4.8 4.8 9.3 5.5	5.7 4.6 8.6 5.6
2004:            	-559.6 -613.1 -638.0 -685.4	1,130.8 1,163.3 1,183.8 1,217.1	1,690.3 1,776.4 1,821.8 1,902.5	2,166.2 2,205.0 2,232.5 2,260.0	808.3 824.6 836.5 840.8	538.7 547.2 562.9 562.0	277.4 273.6	1,357.9 1,380.4 1,395.9 1,419.1	11,411.6 11,594.2 11,766.3 11,943.3	12,016.7 12,279.1 12,456.8 12,680.6	11,540.1 11,712.8 11,867.3 12,032.0	8.1 7.5 5.3 6.1	9.7 9.0 5.9 7.4
2005: I II III IV P	-697.5 -691.0 -730.4 -784.1	1,253.2 1,297.1 1,314.6 1,331.8	1,950.6 1,988 1 2,045.1 2,115.8	2,302.0 2,337.6 2,392.7 2,406.8	860.2 869.8 892.2 876.9	575.3 582.5 601.7 581.6	290.5	1,441.7 1,467.7 1,500.4 1,529.9	12,138.9 12,382.1 12,625.4 12,710.5	12,896.3 13,069.0 13,336.1 13,519.3	12,238.2 12,413.5 12,650.0	7.0 6.0 7.6 4.2	7.0 5.5 8.4 5.6

 $<sup>^1\</sup>mathrm{Gross}$  domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services.  $^2\mathrm{GDP}$  plus net income receipts from rest of the world.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

#### TABLE B-2.—Real gross domestic product, 1959–2005

[Billions of chained (2000) dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		re(50))	ai consum	otion expend	······································		-	oss private			-	
								Fixe	d investme	nt		Change
Year or quarter	Gross domestic product	Total	Ourable goods	Non- durable goods	Services	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft-	Resi- dential	Change In pri- vate Inven- tories
								_		ware		
1959	2,441 3	1,554.6				266.7						
1960 .	2.501 8	1.597.4				266.6 264.9						
1961 1962	2,560.0 2,715.2	1,630.3 1,711.1				298 4						
1963 1964	2.834.0 2.998.6	1,781.6 1,888.4				318 5 344 7						
1965	3.1911	2.007.7				3931						
1966 1967	3,399.1 3,484.6	2.121.8 2.185.0				427 7 408.1						
1968	3.652.7	2.310.5				4319						
1969	3,765.4	2,396.4				457.1 427.1						
1970 1971	3,771.9 3,898.6	2,451 9 2 545 5				427.1						
1972	4,105.0	2.545.5				532.1						
1973	4,341.5 4,319.6	2,833.8 2,812.3				594.4 550.6						
1975	4,311.2	2,876.9				453.1						
1976	4,540.9 4.750.5	3,035.5 3,164.1				544 7 627 0						
1978	5,015.0	3,303.1				702.6						
1979	5,173.4 5,161.7	3,383.4				725.0 645.3						
1980 1981	5 291.7	3.422.2				704 9						
1982 -	5,189.3 5,423.8	3,470 3				606 0 662 5						
1983 1984	5,813.6	3,668.6 3,863.3				857.7						
1985	6.053.7	4.064.0 4,228.9				849.7 843.9						
1986 1987	6,263.6 6,475.1	4,220.3				870.0						
1988	6.742.7	4,546.9				890.5 926.2						
1989	6,981.4 7.112.5	4,675.0 4,770.3	453.5	1,484.0	2 851 7	895.1	886.6	595.1	275.2	355.0	298.9	15.4
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	7,110.5 7,336.6 7,532.7 7,835.5 8,031.7 8,328.9 8,703.5 9,066.9 9,470.3	4,778.4 4,934.8 5,099.8 5,290.7 5,433.5 5,619.4 5,831.8 6,125.8 6,438.6	427.9 453.0 488.4 529.4 552.6 595.9 646.9 720.3 804.6	1,480.5 1,510.1 1,550.4 1,603.9 1,638.6 1,680.4 1,725.3 1,794.4 1,876.6	2,851.7 2,900.0 3,000.8 3,085.7 3,176.6 3,259.9 3,356.0 3,468.0 3,615.0 3,758.0	822.2 889.0 968.3 1,099.6 1,134.0 1,234.3 1,387.7 1,524.1 1,642.6	829.1 878.3 953.5 1.042.3 1.109.6 1.209.2 1.320.6 1.455.0 1.576.3	563.2 581.3 631.9 689.9 762.5 833.6 934.2 1.037.8 1.133.3	244.6 229.9 228.3 232.3 247.1 261.1 280.1 294.5 293.2	345.9 371.1 417.4 467.2 523.1 578.7 658.3 745.6 840.2	270 2 307 6 332 7 364 8 353 1 381 3 388 6 418 3 443 6	16.5 20.6 63.6 29.5 28.7 71.7 68.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	9,817.0 9,890.7 10,048.8 10,320.6 10,755.7 11,131.1	6,739.4 6,910.4 7,099.3 7,306.6 7,588.6 7,858.1	863 3 900.7 964.8 1.028.5 1.089.9 1.137.7	1,947-2 1,986.7 2,037.1 2,101.8 2,200.4 2,298.0	3.928 8 4.023.2 4.100.4 4.183.9 4.310.9 4.438 0	1.735.5 1.598.4 1.557 1 1.617 4 1.809 8 1.915.6	1.679 0 1.629.4 1.544.6 1.600.0 1.755.1 1.896.1	1.232.1 1.180.5 1.071.5 1.085.0 1.186.7 1.287.6	313.2 306.1 253.8 243.1 248.4 253.1	918.9 874.2 820.2 846.8 947.6 1.049.8	446.9 448.5 469.9 509.4 561.8 602.1	56.5 -31.7 12.5 15.5 52.0 17.2
2002 · I III	9,977.3 10,031.6 10,090.7 10,095.8	7,042.2 7,083.5 7,123.2 7,148.2	948 4 956 9 983 4 970.4	2,026.8 2,033.4 2,035.0 2,053.1	4.069.4 4.095.7 4.109.0 4.127.4	1,541.7 1,549.0 1,570.9 1,567.0	1,551.5 1,545.9 1,543.2 1,537.8	1.090.3 1.073.3 1.068.0 1.054.5	270.3 256.4 245.8 242.5	820.9 819.0 825.7 815.4	459 0 469 5 471 8 479.3	-10.2 2.6 28.0 29.5
2003: I	10.138 6 10.230 4 10.410 9 10.502 6	7,192 2 7,256.8 7,360.7 7,416.4	979.1 1.014.0 1.061.0 1.060.0	2.069.5 2.079 1 2.121 2 2.137.3	4.146.5 4.169.7 4.190.2 4.229.4	1,565.3 1,575.8 1,640.6 1,687.9	1.540.9 1.573.7 1.629.0 1.656.3	1.051.6 1.072.9 1.101.8 1.113.7	237.3 244.8 244.7 245.5	818 7 832.0 862 4 874.0	484 8 496 0 521.2 535 7	24.1 9. 29.1
2004 I II III IV	10,612.5 10,704 1 10,808.9 10,897 1	7,501 4 7,536.6 7,617 5 7,698 8	1,071 6 1,072.5 1,100.4 1,115 1	2.171 9 2.186.1 2,206.9 2.236.5	4.269 0 4.288.6 4.324 0 4.362.1	1,729 1 1,813.0 1,833.4 1,863.9	1.684.4 1,744.5 1.780.2 1,811.3	1,135.1 1,171.6 1,204.8 1,235.1	243.4 248.5 249.4 252.3	899.1 931.4 965.6 994.2	542.4 565.1 568.8 571.0	41.9 65.6 50.4 50.3
2005.         .       .          .	10,999.3 11,089.2 11,202.3 11,233.5	7,764 9 7,829.5 7,907.9 7,930.2	1.122.3 1.143.9 1.169 7 1.114 7	2,265.6 2,285.9 2,305.8 2,334.7	4,392 0 4,417 6 4,453.5 4,489.1	1,902.9 1,885.0 1,909.4 1.965.1	1.842.2 1.884.7 1.921.5 1,935.9	1,252.2 1,279.0 1,305.2 1,314.2	251.0 252.7 254.1 254.5	1.014.2 1.040.9 1.067.5 1.076.8	584 1 599.3 610 0 615.2	58.1 -1.1 -13.25.

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-2.—Real gross domestic product, 1959-2005—Continued

[Billions of chained (2000) dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Percent change

from preceding

Adden

Government consumption expenditures and gross investment

Net exports of goods

and services

Year or	a	na service	:5		and g	Federal	iment		Final sales of	Gross domes-	Adden- dum:	per	
Year or quarter	Net exports	Exports	Imports	Total	Total	Nation-	Non- de- fense	State and local	domes- tic product	fic pur- chases 1	Gross national prod- uct <sup>2</sup>	Gross domes- tic prod- uct	Gross domes- tic pur- chases 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966		77.2 90.6 91.1 95.7 102.5 114.6 117.8 126.0 128.9 139.0 145.7	101.9 103.3 102.6 114.3 117.3 123.6 136.7 157.1 168.5 193.6 204.6	715.4 751.3 797.6 818.1 836.1 861.3 937.1 1.008.9 1.040.5					2 506 8	2,485,9 2,529,6 2,587,6 2,751,4 2,866,0 3,023,2 3,228,6 3,450,3 3,545,1 3,727,5 3,844,1	2,457,4 2,519,4 2,579,3 2,736,9 2,857,2 3,023,6 3,217,3 3,423,7 3,510,1 3,680,0 3,792,0	7 1 2 5 2.3 6 1 4 4 5 8 6 4 6 5 2.5 4 8 3.1	1.8 2.3 6.3 4.2 5.5 6.8 6.9 2.7
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977		161.4 164.1 176.5 209.7 226.3 224.9 234.7 240.3 265.7 292.0	213 4 224.7 250.0 261.6 255.7 227.3 271.7 301.4 327.6 333.0	990.8 983.5 980.0 1,004.7 1,027.4 1,031.9 1,043.3 1,074.0					3,787.7 3,893.4 4,098.6 4,315.9 4,305.5 4,352.5 4,522.3 4,721.6 4,981.6 5,161.2	3.837.4 3.974.2 4.192.8 4.399.1 4.343.8 4.297.0 4.575.0 4.818.5 5.081.5 5.206.8	3,798.2 3,927.8 4,136.2 4,383.6 4,367.5 4,348.4 4,585.3 4,800.3 5,064.4 5,240.1	.2 3 4 5 3 5.8 5 2 5.3 4.6 5.6 3.2	5.5 4 9 -1.3 -1.1 6 5 5.3
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987		323.5 327.4 302.4 294.6 318.7 328.3 353.7 391.8 454.6 506.8	310 9 319 1 315.0 354.8 441 1 469.8 510.0 540.2 561 4 586.0	1,145.4 1,187.3 1,227.0 1,312.5 1,392.5					5,196.7 5,265.1 5,233.4 5,454.0 5,739.2 6,042.1 6,271.8 6,457.2 6,734.5 6,962.2	5,108.9 5,244.7 5,175.1 5,477.6 5,951.6 6,215.8 6,443.6 6,644.1 6,857.9 7,060.8	5,227.6 5,349.7 5,249.7 5,482.5 5,869.3 6,093.4 6,290.6 6,500.9 6,775.2 7,015.4	2 2.5 -1.9 4.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.5	-1 3 5.8 8 7 4.4 3.7 3.1 3.2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	-54.7 -14.6 -15.9 -52.1 -79.4 -71.0 -79.6 -104.6 -203.7 -296.2	552.5 589.1 629.7 650.0 706.5 778.2 843.4 943.7 966.5 1.008.2	607.1 603.7 645.6 702.1 785.9 849.1 923.0 1.048.3 1.170.3 1.304.4	1,530.0 1,547.2 1,555.3 1,541.1 1,541.3 1,549.7 1,564.9 1,594.0 1,624.4 1,686.9	659.1 658.0 646.6 619.6 596.4 580.3 573.5 567.6 561.2 573.7	479.4 474.2 450.7 425.3 404.6 389.2 383.8 373.0 365.3 372.2	178.6 182.8 195.4 194.1 191.7 191.0 189.6 194.5 195.9 201.5	868.4 886.8 906.5 919.5 943.3 968.3 990.5 1.025.9 1.063.0 1.113.2	7,108.5 7,115.0 7,331.1 7,522.3 7,777.8 8,010.2 8,306.5 8,636.6 8,997.6 9,404.0	7,161.6 7,101.2 7,338.9 7,577.2 7,911.3 8,098.4 8,405.7 8,807.6 9,272.5 9,767.7	7,155.2 7,136.8 7,371.8 7,568.6 7,864.2 8,069.8 8,365.3 8,737.5 9,088.7 9,504.7	1 9 2 3 3 2 7 4.0 2.5 3.7 4 5 4.2 4 5	8 3 3 3 2 4.4 2.4 3.8 4 8 5.3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	-379.5 -399.1 -471.3 -521.4 -601.3 -631.9	1.096.3 1.036.7 1.013.3 1.031.2 1.117.9 1.193.3	1.475.8 1.435.8 1.484.6 1.552.6 1.719.2 1.825.2	1,721.6 1,780 3 1,858.8 1,911.1 1,952 3 1,985.1	578.8 601.4 643.4 687.8 723.7 738.4	370.3 384 9 413.2 449.7 481.3 492.2	208.5 216.5 230.2 238.0 242.2 246.0	1,142.8 1,179.0 1,215.4 1,223.3 1,228.4 1,246.5	9,760.5 9,920.9 10,036.5 10,303.6 10,702.4 11,112.2	10,196.4 10,290.1 10,517.7 10,837.3 11,348.7 11,754.1	9,855.9 9,933.6 10,079.0 10,385.2 10,805.7	3.7 .8 1.6 2.7 4.2 3.5	3.0
2002: I II III IV	-441.3 -458.9 -472.2 -513.0	992.8 1,018.0 1,025.2 1,017.2	1,434.0 1,476.9 1,497.4 1,530.2	1.832.0 1.853.4 1.863.9 1.885.8	623.2 641.7 646.5 662.3	399.2 410.2 414.4 428.9	224.0 231.5 232.2 233.4	1.208.9 1.211.8 1.217.5 1,223.6	9,986.8 10,028.4 10,063.5 10,067.3	10,418.0 10,488.5 10,560.4 10,604.1	10,004 1 10,048.6 10,119.7 10,143.8	2.7 2.2 2.4 .2	3.6 2.7 2.8 1.7
2003: I II III	-510 7 -528.4 -516.2 -530.2	1,009.7 1,004.5 1,032.2 1,078.4	1,520.4 1,532.9 1,548.4 1,608.6	1,884.4 1,917.5 1,920.1 1,922.6	662.8 696.8 693.2 698.5	425.0 460.1 452.5 461.2	237.9 236.4 240.6 237.0	1,221.6 1,220.7 1,226.8 1,224.1	10,114.7 10,228.2 10,399.5 10,471.8	10,644.7 10,753.8 10,923.1 11,027.6	10,182.0 10,294.1 10,474.7 10,590.0	1.7 3.7 7.2 3 6	1 5 4.2 6.5 3.9
2004: I II III IV	-563.0 -601.7 -606.5 -634.1	1.091.8 1.110.2 1.125.0 1.144.5	1.654 8 1.711.9 1.731.5 1,778.6	1,938.4 1,949.5 1,958.4 1,962.8	716.5 722.2 728.6 727.6	476.4 477.4 487.7 483.7	239.9 244.6 240.6 243.6	1,221.8 1,227.1 1,229.6 1,235.0	10,568.9 10,637.4 10,757.1 10,846.0	11.168.8 11.297.4 11.407.0 11.522.0	10,689.5 10,747.7 10,854 1 10,931.8	4.3 3.5 4.0 3.3	5.2 4.7 3.9 4.1
2005: I II III IV P	-645.4 -614.2 -617.5 -650.3	1,165.3 1,195.4 1,202.7 1,209.8	1.810.7 1.809.6 1.820.2 1.860.1	1.971.9 1.984.1 1.998.1 1.986.2	731.8 736.1 749.5 736.1	487.3 491.7 503.6 486.2	244.3 244.2 245.6 249.7	1,239.8 1,247.8 1,248.5 1,249.8	10,940.3 11,089.2 11,214.4 11,205.0	11.635.4 11.694.8 11.811.2 11.875.1	11,036.3 11,122.5 11,243.2	3 8 3 3 4 1 1 1	4.0 2 I 4.0 2 2

 $<sup>^1\,\</sup>mathrm{Gross}$  domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services  $^2\,\mathrm{GDP}$  plus net income receipts from rest of the world.

TABLE B-3.—Quantity and price indexes for gross domestic product, and percent changes, 1959–200. [Quarterly data are seasonally adjusted]

				Gross do	mestic produ	ct (GDP)		
		Index	numbers, 2000	=100	Percei	nt change from	preceding pe	riod 1
	Year or quarter	Real GDP (chain-type quantity index)	GDP chain-type price index	GDP implicit price deflator	GDP (current dollars)	Real GDP (chain-type quantity index)	GDP chain-type price index	GDP implicit price deflator
1959		24 868	20 754	20.751	8.4	7.1	1.2	1.2
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966		25.484 26.077 27 658 28 868 30 545 32 506 34 625 35.496	21.044 21.281 21.572 21.801 22.134 22.538 23.180 23.897	21 041 21 278 21 569 21 798 22 131 22 535 23 176 23 893	3.9 3.5 5.5 5.4 8.4 9.5	2.5 2.3 6.1 4.4 5.8 6.4 6.5 2.5	1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.8 3.1	1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.8 3.1
1968 1969		37 208 38.356	24 916 26 153	24.913 26.149	9.3 8.2	4.8 3.1	4 3 5 0	4.3 5.0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979		38.422 39.713 41.815 44.224 44.001 43.916 46.256 48.391 51.085 52.699	27 538 28 916 30 171 31 854 34 721 38 007 40 202 42 758 45 762 49 553	27.534 28.911 30.166 31.849 34.725 38.002 40.196 42.752 45.757 49.548	5.5 8.5 9.9 11.7 8.5 9.2 11.4 11.3 13.0	3 4 5 3 5 8 - 5 - 2 5 3 4 6 5 6 3 2	5.3 5.0 4.3 5.6 9.0 9.5 5.8 6.4 7.0 8.3	5.3 5.0 4.3 5.6 9.4 9.4 7.0 8.3
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989		52.579 53.904 52.860 55.249	54 062 59.128 62.738 65.214 67.664 69.724 71.269 73.204 75.706 78.569	54.043 59.119 62.726 65.207 67.655 69.713 71.250 73.196 75.694 78.556	8.8 12.2 4.0 8.7 11.2 7.3 5.7 6.2 7.7 7.5	-2 2.5 -1.9 4.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.5	9.1 9.4 6.1 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.7 3.4 3.8	9.1 9.4 6.1 4.0 3.6 2.2 2.7 3.8
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999		72 451 72.329 74 734 76 731 79.816 81.814 84.842 88 658 92 359 96 469	81.614 84.457 86.402 88.390 90.265 92.115 93.859 95.415 96.475 97.868	81.590 84.444 86.385 88.381 90.259 92.106 93.852 95.414 96.472 97.868	5.8 3.3 5.0 6.2 4.6 5.7 6.2 5.3 6.0	1.9 -2 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.5 3.7 4.5	3.9 3.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.1	3.5 3.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005		100 000 100.751 102.362 105 130 109 562 113 386	100.000 102.402 104.193 106.310 109.102 112.144	100 000 102.399 104.187 106.305 109.099 112.113	5.9 3.2 3.4 4.8 7.0 6.4	3.7 .8 1.6 2.7 4.2 3.5	2 2 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.8	2.2 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.8
		101 633 102 186 102 788 102 840	103 553 103.944 104.347 104 926	103.568 103.938 104.328 104.907	4.3 3.7 3.9 2.4	2.7 2.2 2.4	1.7 1.5 1.6 2.2	1.5 1.4 1.5 2.2
	    .    .  V	103 276 104.211 106.050 106 984	105.724 106.019 106.500 106.996	105.705 106.004 106.498 106.983	4 8 4 8 9.3 5.5	1 7 3 7 7.2 3.6	3 1 1.1 1 8 1 9	3.1 1.1 1.9 1.8
	II	108 104 109.037 110.104 111 003	107.951 108.976 109.371 110.111	107.958 108.987 109.343 110.077	8.1 7.5 5.3 6.1	4.3 3.5 4.0 3.3	3.6 3.9 1.5 2.7	3.7 3.9 1.3 2.7
2005		112 044 112 959 114 112 114 429	110 950 111 655 112 567 113 407	110.905 111.622 112.527 113.369	7.0 6.0 7.6 4.2	3 8 3 3 4 1 1 1	3.1 2.6 3.3 3.0	3.0 2.6 3.3 3.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quarterly percent changes are at annual rates.

TABLE B-4.—Percent changes in real gross domestic product, 1959-2005 [Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Pe	ersonal co expend	onsumptio ditures	on	G	ross priva inves	ite domes tment	tic	Exports ports of and se	f goods -	tion exp	nent con: penditure investm	s and
Year or	Gross domes-					Nonr	esidential	fixed						
quarter	tic product	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Serv- ices	Total	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Resi- dential fixed	Ex- ports	lm- ports	Total	Fed- eral	State and local
1959	7.1	5.6	12.1	4.1	5.3	8.0	2.4	11.9	25.4	10.3	10.5	3.4	3.1	3.8
1960	2.5 2.3 6.1 4.4 5.8 6.4 6.5 2.5 4.8 3.1	2.8 2.1 5.0 4.1 6.0 6.3 5.7 3.0 5.7	2.0 -3.8 11.7 9.7 9.3 12.7 8.4 1.6 11.0 3.5	1.5 1.8 3.1 2.1 4.9 5.3 5.5 1.6 4.6 2.7	4.5 4.2 5.0 4.6 6.1 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.2 4.8	5.7 6 8.7 5.6 11.9 17.4 12.5 -1.4 4.5 7.6	7.9 1.4 4.5 1.1 10.4 15.9 6.8 -2.5 1.5 5.4	4.2 -1.9 11.6 8.4 12.8 18.3 16.0 7 6.2 8.8	-7.1 .3 9.6 11.8 5.8 -2.9 -8.9 -3.1 13.6 3.0	17.4 .5 5.1 7.1 11.8 2.8 6.9 2.3 7.9 4.8	1.3 7 11.3 2.7 5.3 10.6 14.9 7.3 14.9 5.7	5.0 6.2 2.6 2.2 3.0 8.8 7.7 3.1	-2.7 4.2 8.5 .1 -1.3 .0 11.0 9.9 .8 -3.4	4.4 6.2 3.1 6.0 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.0 5.9
1970	3.4 5.3 5.8 5 2 5.3 4.6 5.6 3.2	2.3 3.8 6.1 4.9 8 2.3 5.5 4.2 4.4 2.4	-3.2 10.0 12.7 10.3 -6.9 .0 12.8 9.3 5.3 3	2.4 1.8 4.4 3.3 -2.0 1.5 4.9 2.4 3.7 2.7	4.0 3.9 5.7 4.7 2.3 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.7 3.1	5 .0 9.2 14.6 .8 -9.9 4.9 11.3 15.0	.3 -1.6 3.1 8.2 -2.1 -10.5 2.4 4.1 14.4 12.7	-1.0 12.9 18.3 2.6 -9.5 6.2 15.1 15.2 8.7	-6.0 27.4 17.8 6 -20.6 -13.0 23.6 21.5 6.3 -3.7	10.7 1.7 7.5 18.9 7.9 6 4.4 2.4 10.5 9.9	4.3 5.3 11.3 4.6 -2.3 -11.1 19.5 10.9 8.7 1.7	-2.4 -2.2 7 4 2.5 2.3 .4 1.1 2.9 1.9	-7.4 -7.7 -4.1 -4.2 .9 .3 .0 2.1 2.5 2.4	2.8 3.1 2.2 2.8 3.8 3.7 .7 .4 3.3 1.5
1980	2 2.5 -1.9 4.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.5	3 1.4 1.4 5.7 5.3 5.2 4.1 3.3 4.1 2.8	-7.8 1.2 -1 14.6 14.6 10.1 9.7 1.7 6.0	2 1.2 1.0 3.3 4.0 2.7 3.6 2.4 3.3 2.8	1.8 1.7 2.1 5.5 4.1 5.6 2.9 4.3 4.0 3.0	3 5.7 -3.8 -1.3 17.7 6.6 -2.9 1 5.2 5.6	5.8 8.0 -1.7 -10.8 14.0 7.1 -11.0 -2.9 .6 2.0	-3.6 4.3 -5.2 5.4 19.8 6.4 1.9 1.4 7.5 7.3	-21.2 -8.0 -18.2 41.4 14.8 1.6 12.3 2.0 -1.0 -3.0	10.8 1.2 -7.6 -2.6 8.2 3.0 7.7 10.8 16.0 11.5	-6.6 2.6 -1.3 12.6 24.3 6.5 8.6 5.9 3.9	2.0 9 1.8 3.7 3.3 7.0 6.1 2.5 1.3 2.6	4.7 4.8 3.9 6.6 3.1 7.8 5.7 3.6 -1.6 1.5	1 -2.0 .1 1.2 3.6 6.2 6.4 1.5 3.7 3.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997	1.9 -2 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.5 3.7 4.5 4.2 4.5	2.0 2 3.3 3.3 3.7 2.7 3.4 3.8 5.0 5.1	3 -5.6 5.9 7.8 8.4 4.4 7.8 8.6 11.3	1.6 -2 2.0 2.7 3.5 2.2 2.6 2.7 4.0 4.6	2.9 1.7 3.5 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.3 4.2 4.0	5 -5.4 3.2 8.7 9.2 10.5 9.3 12.1 11.1 9.2	1.5 -11.1 -6.0 7 1.8 6.4 5.6 7.3 5.1 4	.0 -2.6 7.3 12.5 11.9 12.0 10.6 13.8 13.3 12.7	-8.6 -9.6 13.8 8.2 9.6 -3.2 8.0 1.9 7.6 6.0	9.0 6.6 6.9 3.2 8.7 10.1 8.4 11.9 2.4 4.3	3.6 6 7.0 8.8 11.9 8.0 8.7 13.6 11.6 11.5	3.2 1.1 .5 -9 .0 .5 1.0 1.9 1.9 3.9	2.0 2 -1.7 -4.2 -3.7 -2.7 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 2.2	4.1 2.1 2.2 1.4 2.6 2.6 2.3 3.6 3.6 4.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	3.7 .8 1.6 2.7 4.2 3.5	4.7 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.9 3.6	7.3 4.3 7.1 6.6 6.0 4.4	3.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.7 4.4	4.5 2.4 1.9 2.0 3.0 2.9	8.7 -4.2 -9.2 1.3 9.4 8.5	6.8 -2.3 -17.1 -4.2 2.2 1.9	9.4 -4.9 -6.2 3.2 11.9 10.8	4.8 8.4 10.3 7.2	8.7 -5.4 -2.3 1.8 8.4 6.7	13.1 -2.7 3.4 4.6 10.7 6.2	2.1 3.4 4.4 2.8 2.2 1.7	.9 3.9 7.0 6.9 5.2 2.0	2.7 3.2 3.1 .6 .4 1.5
2002: h II III IV	2.7 2.2 2.4 .2	1.4 2.4 2.3 1.4	-4.2 3.6 11.5 -5.2	3.3 1.3 .3 3.6	1.8 2.6 1.3	-12.8 -6.1 -2.0 -5.0	-19.0 -19.0 -15.5 -5.3	-10.4 9 3.3 -4.9	10.4 9.5 2.0 6.4	5.2 10.6 2.9 -3.1	11.7 12.5 5.7 9.0	4.3 4.8 2.3 4.8	5.9 12.5 3.0 10.2	3.5 1.0 1.9 2.0
2003: I II III	1.7 3.7 7.2 3.6	2.5 3.6 5.8 3.1	3.6 15.1 19.8 3	3.2 1.9 8.3 3.1	1.9 2.3 2.0 3.8	-1.1 8.4 11.2 4.4	-8.4 13.3 1 1.3	1.6 6.7 15.4 5.5	4.7 9.6 21.9 11.5	-2.9 -2.1 11.5 19.1	-2.5 3.3 4.1 16.5	3 7.2 .5 .5	22.1 -2.0 3.1	6 3 2.0 9
11 11 11	4.3 3.5 4.0 3.3	4.7 1.9 4.4 4.3	4 4 .4 10.8 5.5	6.6 2.6 3.9 5.5	3.8 1.8 3.4 3.6	7.9 13.5 11.8 10.4	-3.5 8.8 1.4 4.7	12.0 15.2 15.5 12.4	5.2 17.8 2.6 1.6	5.0 6.9 5.5 7.1	12.0 14.5 4.7 11.3	3.3 2.3 1.8	10.7 3.2 3.6 6	7 1 8 .8 1.8
2005: I II IV P	3.8 3.3 4.1 1.1	3.5 3.4 4.1 1.1	2 6 7 9 9.3 -17.5	5.3 3.6 3.5 5.1	2.8 2.3 3.3 3.2	5.7 8.8 8.5 2.8	-2.0 2.7 2.2 7	8.3 10.9 10.6 3.5	9.5 10.8 7.3 3.5	7.5 10.7 2.5 2.4	7.4 3 2.4 9.1	1.9 2.5 2.9 -2.4	2.4 2.4 7.4 -7.0	1 6 2 6 .2

Note.—Percent changes based on unrounded data

Table B-5.—Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1959-2005 [Percentage points, except as noted, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Personal	l consump	ption expei	nditures		Gros	s private	domestic	investme	nt	
	Gross							Fixed	d investm	ent		
Year or	domes- tic			Non-				No	nresidenti	al		Change in
quarter	product (per- cent change)	Total	Ourable goods	durable goods	Serv-	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Resi- dential	pri- vate inven- tories
1959	7.1	3 55	0.97	1 25	1 33	2.80	1.94	0.73	0.09	0.64	1 21	0.86
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	2.5 2.3 6.1 4.4 5.8 6.4 6.5 2.5 4.8 3.1	1.73 1 30 3.11 2.56 3 71 3 91 3.50 1 81 3.50 2 27	17 - 31 89 77 77 1 07 73 13 93 31	.44 53 90 .59 1.33 1.43 1.46 .42 1.19	1 12 1 08 1 31 1 20 1 61 1 42 1 31 1 26 1.38 1.28	.00 10 1 81 1.00 1.25 2 16 1.44 76 90	13 - 04 1.24 1.08 1 37 1 50 87 - 28 1 00 .90	.52 06 .78 .50 1.07 1.65 1.29 15 .46	.28 05 .16 .04 .36 .57 .27 10 .06	-24 11 61 46 71 1.07 1 02 - 05 41 58	39 .01 .46 .58 .30 15 43 13	13 05 .57 08 13 .66 58 49 10
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	2 3.4 5.3 5.8 - 5.2 5.6 5.6 3.2	1 42 2 38 3 80 3 05 - 47 1 42 3 48 2 68 2 76 1 52	- 28 81 1.07 90 - 61 .00 1.04 .80 .47 - 03	61 47 1.11 .82 51 .37 1.24 60 91 .65	1.08 1.09 1.61 1.33 .65 1.05 1.19 1.27 1.38	-1.04 1 67 1.87 1 96 -1.30 -2.98 2.84 2 43 2.16	- 31 1 10 1.81 1 46 -1.04 -1.71 1 42 2.18 2.04 1 02	06 .00 .92 1.50 .09 -1.14 .52 1.19 1.69 1.23	.01 06 .12 .31 09 43 .09 .15 .54	- 07 07 81 1 19 18 - 70 43 1 04 1 15 71	26 1 10 89 04 -1.13 57 .90 99 .35 21	73 .58 .06 .50 27 -1.27 1.41 .25 .12 41
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	-2 2.5 -1 9 4.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 3.4 4 1 3.5	- 17 .90 87 3.65 3.44 3.31 2.62 2.17 2.66 1.86	.00 1.07 1.15 .83 .83 .16 .53	.80 .93 61 .78 .52 .70	.52 .65 1.79 1.36 1.87 1.01 1.50 1.43 1.07	-2 12 1.59 -2.55 1.45 4 63 17 12 51 .39	-1.21 .39 -1.22 1.17 2.68 .89 .20 .09 .52	04 .74 51 16 2.05 .82 36 01 57	.27 .40 09 57 .60 .32 50 11	30 34 42 41 1 44 .50 15 .10 .55 54	-1 17 - 35 - 71 1 33 .64 .07 .55 .10 05 14	91 1.20 -1.34 .29 1.95 -1.06 32 42 14
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	1 9 -2.2 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.5 3.7 4.5 4.2 4.5	1 34 .11 2.18 2 23 2.52 1 81 2.31 2.54 3.36 3.44	46 44 59 .66 .36 .64 .70	05 .43 .56 .71 .44 .51 .53 .78	1.03 62 1.31 1.09 1.14 1.01 1.15 1.31 1.66 1.56	53 -1.20 1.07 1.21 1.93 48 1.35 1.95 1.63 1.33	32 94 .79 1.14 1.30 -94 1.34 1.42 1.60 1.36	.05 57 .32 .83 .91 1.08 1.01 1.33 1.28 1.09	.05 39 18 02 .05 .17 .16 .21 .16 01	00 -18 .50 .85 87 .91 .85 1.12 1.12	37 37 47 31 .39 14 .33 .08 .32	46 .02
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	3.7 .8 1.6 2.7 4.2 3.5	3.17 1.74 1.90 2.05 2.71 2.49	.37 .61 .57 .51	40 .50 .63 .94	1.80 .97 .79 .85 1.27 1.22	-1 39 41 -58 1 82 96	1.09 50 84 .54 1.47 1.28	1.06 52 -1.06 .13 .92 .87	21 - 07 55 11 .06 .05	.85 - 44 51 24 86 -82	03 .02 .22 41 .55 42	88 .43 .05 .35
2002. I II III IV	2.7 2.2 2.4 2	1.01 1.64 1.57 97	.31	.26	.75 1.07 .54 .74	1 92 .30 87 14	-1.04 23 12 21	-1.50 66 21 52		90 09 .23 38	46 43 .09 .30	.53 .98
2003 I II III IV	1.7 3.7 7.2 3.6	1 70 2 55 4 13 2 15	1.23 1.64	1.65	.76 94 -84 1 57	- 03 42 2.53 1.78	13 1 26 2 15 1 03	10 .79 1 08 .43	32	12 47 1 09 40	.23 47 1.07 59	84 38
2004 f . II III IV	4.3 3.5 4.0 3.3	3 27 1.33 3.05 3.01	.03	53	1 39	1.52 3.10 .75 1.11	1.04 2.22 1.31 1.13	.76 1.29 1.15 1.04	.22	.85 1.07 1.12 92	.28 93 .15 .09	87 56
2005-1	3 8 3.3 4 1 1.1	2 44 2.35 2 85 79	.64	.74	.97 1.36	1.42 63 87 1.95	1 12 1-51 1 31 .51	.58 .90 .88 .30	.07 .06	.64 83 .82 28	54 62 43 21	-2.14 43

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-5.—Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product, 1959-2005—Continued [Percentage points, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				t exports and serv				Gover		nsumptio oss inves	n expendit tment	ures
Year or			Exports			Imports				Federal		C4 - 4 -
quarter	Net exports	Total	Goods	Serv- ices	Total	Goods	Serv- ices	Total	Total	Na- tional defense	Non- detense	State and local
1959	0.00	0.45	-0.02	0.48	-0.45	-0.48	0.03	0.76	0.42	-0.23	0.65	0.34
1960	.72 .06 21 .24 .36 30 29 22 30 04	.78 .03 .25 .35 .59 .15 .36 .12 .41	.76 .02 .17 .29 .52 .02 .27 .02 .30	.02 .01 .08 .06 .07 .13 .09 .10	06 .03 47 12 23 45 65 34 70 29	.05 .00 40 12 19 41 49 17 68 20	11 .02 07 .00 04 04 16 16 03 09	.03 1.07 1.36 .58 .49 .65 1.87 1 68 .73 06	35 .51 1.07 .01 17 .00 1.24 1.17 .10 42	17 .45 .63 25 40 19 1.21 1.19 .16	18 .06 .44 .26 .23 .19 .03 02 06	.39 .56 .29 .57 .65 .66 .63 .51
1970 1971 1972 1973 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	.34 19 21 .82 .75 .89 -1.08 72 .05	.56 .10 .42 1.12 .58 05 .37 .20 .82	.44 02 .43 1.01 .46 16 .31 .08 .68	.12 01 .11 .12 .10 .05 .11 .15	22 29 63 29 .18 .94 -1.45 92 78 16	15 33 57 34 .17 87 -1.35 84 67 14	07 .04 06 .05 .00 .07 10 07 11	55 50 16 08 .52 .48 .10 .23 .60	86 85 42 41 .08 .03 .00 .19 .22	83 97 61 39 05 06 02 .07	03 .12 .18 02 .13 .09 .03 .12 .16	.31 .36 .26 .33 .44 .45 .09 .04 .38
1980	30 .17	.97 .12 73 22 .63 .23 .54 .78 1.24	.86 09 67 19 .46 .20 .26 .56 1.04	.11 06 03 .17 .02 .28 .21 .20	.71 27 .12 -1.13 -2.21 55 84 61 42 47	.67 18 .20 -1.00 -1.83 52 82 39 36 38	.04 09 08 13 39 13 02 22 07 10	.38 .19 .35 .77 .70 1.41 1.27 .52 .27	.39 .42 .35 .63 .30 .74 .55 .36 15	.25 .38 .48 .50 .35 .60 .47 .35 .03 .03	.14 .04 -13 .13 05 .14 .08 .01 12	01 23 .01 .13 .40 .67 .71 .17 .42
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997	.43 .69 04 59 43 .11 14 34 -1.16 99	.81 .63 .68 .32 .85 1.04 .91 1.30 .27	.56 .46 .52 .23 .67 .85 .68 1.11 .18	.26 .16 .16 .09 .18 .19 .22 .19 .09	39 .06 72 91 -1.29 93 -1.05 -1.64 -1.43 -1.46	26 .01 77 85 -1.18 87 94 -1.45 -1.20 -1.31	13 .05 .05 06 11 06 11 19 23 15	.64 .23 .11 18 .00 .10 .18 .34 .34	.18 02 15 35 30 20 08 07 07	.00 07 32 33 27 19 07 13 09 08	.18 .06 .17 02 03 01 02 .06	.46 .24 .26 .17 .30 .30 .26 .41 .41
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	69 46	60 23 .17 .80	84 48 28 .12 .59	.09 12 .06 .05 .22 .18	-1.79 .40 46 63 -1.53 96	-1.55 .39 41 56 -1.30 86	25 .01 05 07 23 09	.36 .60 .80 .53 .41	.05 .23 .43 .45 .36 14	02 .15 .29 .37 .32	.07 .08 .14 .08 .04	.31 .37 .37 .08 .05
2002: I II IV		.96 .27 31	11 .88 .14 64	.59 .08 .13	-1.44 -1.58 76 -1.21	95 -1.65 72 90	48 .07 04 31	.79 .88 43 .89	.36 .76 .20 .64	.14 .45 .17 .59	.22 .31 .03 .05	.43 .12 .23 .25
2003:1 II IV	.08 - 66 48 - 47	29 20 1.04 1.69	.09 .00 .58 1.05	38 20 .46	.37 46 56 -2.16	71 10 -1.91	.05 .26 46 25	05 1.37 .11 .10	.03 1.40 14 .21	15 1.46 31 .35	18 06 17 14	08 04 .25 11
2004: I II IV	-1.37 17	.49 .67 .53	.50 .53 .55 .25	01 .14 02 .44	-1.65 -2.03 70 -1.68	-1.41 -1.71 59 -1.60	23 32 11 08	.62 .43 .35 .17	.71 .22 .25 04	.60 .04 .41 16	.11 .19 16	09 .21 .10 .21
2005: I	1.11	.74 1.07 .26	.37 1.08 .23	.37 01 .03 03	-1.14 .04 38 -1.42	-1.05 .15 46 -1.32	10 11 .09 11	.35 .47 .54 45	.17 .17 .52 50	.14 .17 .46 66	.03 01 .06 15	.19 .31 .03

TABLE B-6.—Chain-type quantity indexes for gross domestic product, 1959–2005 [Index numbers, 2000=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

		Person	al consump	tion expend	ditures		Gross pr	rivate dome	estic investi	ment	
		7						Fixe	d investmer	nt	
Year or	Gross domes-			Mon		,		No	onresidentia	d	
quarter	tic product	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	Services	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Resi- dential
1959	24.868	23.067	10.822	33.491	20.794	15.367	15.736	10.760	36.530	6.065	37.820
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	25.484 26.077 27.658 28.868 30.545 32.506 34.625 35.496 37.208 38.356	23.702 24.191 25.389 26.436 28.020 29.791 31.484 32.422 34.284 35.558	11.041 10.622 11.865 13.017 14.222 16.025 17.377 17.648 19.594 20.289	33.994 34.621 35.710 36.463 38.248 40.277 42.487 43.157 45.126 46.326	21.720 22.626 23.747 24.830 26.345 27.749 29.129 30.552 32.148 33.691	15.362 15.261 17.197 18.351 19.863 22.650 24.644 23.517 24.887 26.338	15.870 15.820 17.248 18.584 20.378 22.459 23.745 23.306 24.935 26.486	11.371 11.299 12.284 12.966 14.504 17.031 19.160 18.900 19.746 21.246	39.433 39.966 41.775 42.239 46.626 54.058 57.751 56.284 57.102 60.189	6.322 6.200 6.917 7.500 8.457 10.007 11.609 11.532 12.250 13.334	35.129 35.227 38.604 43.154 45.662 44.329 40.362 39.092 44.421 45.733
1970	38.422 39.713 41.815 44.224 44.001 43.916 46.256 48.391 51.085 52.699	36.381 37.770 40.082 42.048 41.729 42.688 45.041 46.950 49.012 50.204	19.631 21.593 24.336 26.849 25.001 24.996 28.187 30.809 32.435 32.325	47.436 48.294 50.422 52.068 51.020 51.771 54.301 55.609 57.687 59.226	35.038 36.400 38.469 40.274 41.216 42.743 44.475 46.392 48.558 50.044	24.608 27.413 30.658 34.249 31.729 26.111 31.387 36.130 40.486 41.776	25.931 27.894 31.246 34.101 31.971 28.541 31.356 35.863 40.205 42.473	21.134 21.135 23.072 26.429 26.653 24.022 25.200 28.045 32.243 35.489	60.364 59.370 61.201 66.200 64.785 57.984 59.390 61.841 70.769 79.731	13.201 13.332 15.052 17.812 18.268 16.529 17.562 20.208 23.284 25.318	42.998 54.789 64.526 64.112 50.877 44.271 54.698 66.440 70.623 68.032
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	52.579 53.904 52.860 55.249 59.220 61.666 63.804 65.958 68.684 71.116	50.065 50.779 51.493 54.436 57.325 60.303 62.749 64.840 67.468 69.369	29 788 30.149 30 128 34.535 39 577 43.577 47.785 48 616 51.549 52.686	59.137 59.839 60.409 62.417 64.417 66.665 69.060 70.715 73.016 75.044	50.921 51.773 52.865 55.760 58.026 61.303 63.111 65.843 68.506 70.555	37.182 40.615 34.918 38.172 49.420 48.963 48.629 50.130 51.309 53.369	39.708 40.591 37.737 40.491 47.331 49.823 50.403 50.682 52.352 53.928	35.388 37.398 35.981 35.518 41.788 44.561 43.287 43.259 45.520 48.063	84.350 91.074 89.528 79.865 91.016 97.502 86.817 84.340 84.885 86.583	24.407 25.445 24.122 25.420 30.462 32.397 33.011 33.463 35.987 38.624	53.636 49.336 40.378 57.093 65.566 66.604 74.776 76.269 75.496 73.204
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	72.451 72.329 74.734 76.731 79.816 81.814 84.842 88.658 92.359 96.469	70.782 70.903 73.224 75.672 78.504 80.623 83.382 86.533 90.896 95.537	52 532 49.564 52.470 56.577 61 321 64.011 69.025 74.935 83.432 93 192	76.209 76.033 77.553 79.619 82.369 84.152 86.300 88.605 92.154 96.374	72.583 73.812 76.379 78.540 80.854 82.973 85.420 88.270 92.011 95.652	51.574 47.378 51.223 55.795 63.358 65.340 71.123 79.961 87.821 94.647	52.803 49.379 52.312 56.788 62.079 66.090 72.018 78.657 86.657 93.884	48.302 45.712 47.179 51.287 55.999 61.885 67.661 75.820 84.232 91.980	87.867 78.091 73.423 72.891 74.180 78.903 83.354 89.432 94.019 93.619	38.636 37.643 40.387 45.428 50.846 56.930 62.981 71.641 81.137 91.437	66.887 60.460 68.825 74.446 81.621 79.005 85.331 86.947 93.597 99.254
2000	100.000 100.751 102.362 105.130 109.562 113.386	100.000 102.537 105.340 108.416 112.601 116.600	100.000 104.327 111.752 119.134 126.245 131.777	100.000 102.027 104.614 107.938 113.000 118.014	100 000 102.403 104.366 106.493 109.725 112.960	100.000 92.103 89.724 93.195 104.286 110.379	100.000 97.047 91.997 95.297 104.534 112.929	100.000 95.817 86.969 88.063 96.314 104.510	100.000 97.737 81.029 77.621 79.314 80.802	100.000 95.136 89.265 92.154 103.126 114 250	100.000 100.357 105.149 113.989 125.714 134.732
2002: I	101.633 102.186 102.788 102.840	104 494 105.106 105.695 106 066	109.858 110.840 113.908 112.404	104 085 104 426 104.507 105.439	103.579 104.247 104.585 105.055	88.835 89.255 90.517 90.290	92 405 92.076 91.914 91.593	88 489 87.116 86.687 85 584	86.299 81.879 78.500 77.438	89.335 89.130 89.855 88.739	102.707 105.066 105.582 107.242
2003. I	103.276 104.211 106.050 106.984	106.719 107.678 109.219 110.046	113 407 117.456 122.891 122.784	106.282 106.775 108 934 109 762	105.539 106.131 106.652 107.649	90 194 90.798 94.533 97.257	91.779 93.732 97.023 98.652	85.353 87.082 89.423 90.394	75.763 78.173 78.146 78.400	89.097 90.549 93.852 95.117	108.474 110.989 116.631 119.861
2004	108.104 109.037 110.104 111.003	111.307 111.829 113.030 114 236	124 119 124 231 127 463 129 166	111.540 112.267 113.337 114.857	108.657 109.156 110.059 111.027	99.632 104.469 105.644 107.398	100.323 103.905 106.027 107.880	92-126 95.095 97.790 100.246	77.704 79.361 79.635 80.554	97.851 101.364 105.087 108.201	121.376 126.441 127.267 127.772
2005: I III IV "	112.044 112.959 114.112 114.429	115.217 116.176 117.338 117.670	129 999 132.499 135.492 129 119	116.351 117.392 118.413 119.900	111.789 112.440 113.353 114 260	109.645 108.615 110.023 113.234	109.722 112.252 114.443 115.300	101.633 103.806 105.935 106.665	80.145 80.680 81 123 81.259	110.376 113.274 116.170 117.180	130.695 134.100 136.484 137.648

See next page for continuation of table.

TABLE B-6.—Chain-type quantity indexes for gross domestic product, 1959-2005—Continued [Index numbers, 2000=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

	Expo	rts of good services	s and	Impo	rts of good services	s and	Gov	vernment co and g	onsumption ross invest	expenditure ment	es
Year or quarter									Federal		State
quarter	Total	Goods	Services	Total	Goods	Services	Total	Total	National defense	Non- defense	and local
1959	7.043	6.198	9.641	6.908	5.403	15.462	41.489	68.666	89.447	33.305	26.999
1960	8.266 8.309 8.729 9.353 10.454 10.747 11.492 11.757 12.681	7.651 7.689 8.031 8.662 9.849 9.901 10.589 10.638 11.481	9.797 9.857 10.535 11.070 11.733 12.926 13.814 14.905 16.049	7.000 6.953 7.742 7.951 8.374 9.265 10.642 11.417 13.118	5.314 5.307 6.092 6.339 6.757 7.714 8.930 9.400 11.342	16.669 16.385 17.150 17.137 17.579 18.096 20.395 22.887 23.298 24.767	41.553 43.639 46.329 47.522 48.563 50.028 54.430 58.604 60.436	66.779 69.564 75.492 75.540 74.530 74.508 82.737 90.960 91.681	87.977 91.851 97.412 95.085 91.304 89.403 102.205 115.571 117.416	30.672 31.599 38.144 42.217 45.880 48.995 49.501 49.059 47.912	28.182 29.918 30.839 32.696 34.913 37.252 39.590 41.589 44.048
1969	13.294	12.082	16.646	13.866	11.963		60.290	88.525	111.604	49.186	45.534
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977	14.723 14.973 16.096 19.131 20.643 20.512 21.408 21.923 24.234 26.637	13.460 13.408 14.849 18.259 19.709 19.252 20.165 20.429 22.712 25.396	18.128 19.527 19.404 20.775 22.396 23.773 24.476 26.055 28.234 29.103	14.457 15.229 16.943 17.729 17.327 15.402 18.413 20.426 22.196 22.565	12.432 13.474 15.307 16.388 15.932 13.924 17.073 19.153 20.871 21.229	26.059 25.317 26.390 25.500 25.472 24.367 26.049 27.347 29.297 29.700	58.833 57.553 57.128 56.926 58.360 59.675 59.940 60.598 62.383 63.549	81.997 75.686 72.574 69.519 70.134 70.360 70.388 71.880 73.681 75.465	101.477 89.980 82.921 78.322 77.714 76.977 76.706 77.597 78.259 80.648	48.674 50.961 54.551 54.213 57.023 58.965 59.523 62.089 65.947 66.640	46.797 48.232 49.291 50.694 52.603 54.536 54.937 55.137 56.938 57.775
1980	29.506 29.868 27.586 26.875 29.068 29.951 32.259 35.742 41.469 46.233	28.422 28.114 25.573 24.838 26.801 27.790 29.217 32.456 38.572 43.172	30.919 34.211 33.263 32.710 35.627 36.051 41.325 45.502 49.616 54.723	21.066 21.620 21.348 24.041 29.893 31.833 34.561 36.602 38.039 39.706	19.653 20.058 19.554 22.210 27.584 29.310 32.314 33.812 35.181 36.686	29.037 30.711 32.346 34.958 43.724 47.050 47.638 53.205 55.010 57.678	64.790 65.381 66.530 68.964 71.273 76.240 80.885 82.873 83.940 86.110	79.043 82.818 86.018 91.726 94.550 101.957 107.754 111.674 109.898 111.594	84.160 89.486 96.244 103.158 108.186 117.355 124.871 130.779 130.161 129.518	70.373 71.310 67.888 71.398 70.035 74.169 76.764 76.984 73.037 79.075	57.736 56.577 56.607 57.268 59.322 63.003 67.064 68.041 70.582 72.994
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	50.394 53.736 57.439 59.291 64.447 70.982 76.930 86.082 88.164 91.969	46.810 50.042 53.785 55.534 60.937 68.070 74.086 84.717 86.614 89.907	60.480 64.082 67.590 69.726 74.097 78.793 84.483 89.509 92.077 97.207	41.139 40.905 43.748 47.576 53.256 57.539 62.544 71.037 79.299 88.391	37.770 37.741 41.263 45.423 51.466 56.104 61.337 70.172 78.364 88.078	61.430 59.849 58.321 60.026 63.421 65.492 69.094 75.600 84.222 90.038	88.869 89.872 90.342 89.513 89.525 90.015 90.896 92.588 94.354 97.987	113.873 113.679 111.713 107.056 103.050 100.254 99.091 98.066 96.970 99.122	129.472 128.050 121.708 114.860 109.259 105.093 103.648 100.733 98.650 100.515	85.651 87.700 93.749 93.087 91.957 91.613 90.955 93.320 93.985 96.646	75.991 77.600 79.318 80.459 82.543 84.728 86.668 89.770 93.014 97.409
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005"	100.000 94.565 92.430 94.064 101.970 108.850	100.000 93.871 90.143 91.763 99.899 106.963	100.000 96.302 98.104 99.776 107.119 113.569	100.000 97.291 100.601 105.205 116.495 123.676	100.000 96.833 100.377 105.288 116.830 124.643	100.000 99.706 101.824 104.921 114.991 119.070	100.000 103.412 107.969 111.009 113.398 115.305	100.000 103.908 111.169 118.839 125.038 127.575	100.000 103.936 111.578 121.447 129.970 132.915	100.000 103.859 110.441 114.159 116.166 117.976	100.000 103.162 106.354 107.042 107.487 109.071
2002: I	90.557 92.858 93.520 92.784	88.206 91.181 91.670 89.517	96.393 97.034 98.120 100.870	97.172 100.078 101.467 103.688	96.360 99.998 101.580 103.572	101.358 100.577 100.995 104.367	106.411 107.658 108.266 109.539	107.667 110.873 111.700 114.438	107.801 110.780 111.897 115.835	107.428 111.040 111.358 111.938	105.782 106.033 106.532 107.067
2003: I II IV	92.103 91.624 94.159 98.373	89.842 89.843 91.830 95.538	97.714 96.058 99.938 105.396	103.023 103.872 104.923 109.003	102.892 104.476 104.711 109.073	103.800 101.044 106.053 108.787	109.454 111.378 111.528 111.675	114.521 120.383 119.770 120.680	114.772 124.259 122.200 124.558	114.102 113.414 115.415 113.704	106.895 106.814 107.351 107.109
2004: I II III	99.591 101.269 102.622 104.398	97.292 99.153 101.120 102.031	105.303 106.532 106.368 110.275	112.134 115.999 117.328 120.518	112.311 116.225 117.563 121.221	111.401 115.027 116.317 117.217	112.595 113.236 113.753 114.008	123.791 124.774 125.881 125.704	128.643 128.908 131.709 130.621	115.064 117.336 115.399 116.865	106.911 107.377 107.592 108.069
2005: I	106.295 109.037 109.710 110.357	103.356 107.266 108.104 109.124	113.578 113.466 113.738 113.493	122.698 122.620 123.340 126.044	123.629 123.276 124.335 127.332	118.292 119.561 118.596 119.830	114.537 115.248 116.063 115.372	126.446 127.188 129.491 127.174	131.595 132.791 135.990 131.286	117.188 117.120 117.814 119.782	108.489 109.183 109.246 109.365

TABLE B-7.—Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1959-2005 [Index numbers, 2000=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

		Person	al consump	tion expend	itures		Gross p	orivate dome	estic investr	nent	
								Fixe	d investmen	t	
Year or	Gross							No	onresidentia		
quarter	domestic product	Total	Durable goods	Non- durable goods	Services	Total	Total	Total	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Resi- dential
959 _	20.754	20 432	45 662	22.765	15.485	29.474	28.262	35.114	15.923	50.882	16.630
960	21.044	20 767	45.444	23.089	15.887	29.619	28 414	35.275	15.904	51 305	16.743
961	21 281	20 985	45.551	23.227	16.173	29.538	28 325	35.076	15.810	51.025	16.769
962	21 572	21 232	45.755	23.412	16.466	29.558	28 346	35.087	15.941	50 774	16.795
963	21.801	21 479	45.915	23.683	16.701	29.467	28 267	35.088	16.085	50.495	16.663
964	22.134	21 786	46.142	23.986	17.016	29.634	28 440	35.268	16.316	50 474	16.796
965	22.538	22 103	45.721	24.423	17.334	30.107	28 926	35.672	16.791	50 520	17.272
966	23.180	22 662	45.517	25.232	17.810	30.726	29 536	36.206	17.398	50 654	17.899
967	23.897	23 237	46.228	25.830	18.349	31.538	30.364	37.129	17.943	51.776	18.521
968	24 916	24 151	47.749	26.820	19.128	32.714	31.582	38.431	18.835	53.167	19.504
969	26 153	25 255	49.067	28.062	20.106	34.264	33 140	40.018	20.074	54.645	20.853
970	27.538	26 448	50.148	29.446	21.175	35.713	34 565	41 908	21.390	56.657	21.526
971	28.916	27 574	51.975	30.359	22.340	37.493	36 306	43 880	23.040	58.340	22.775
972	30.171	28 528	52.531	31.373	23.304	39.062	37.865	45 367	24.704	59.044	24.158
973	31.854	30 081	53.301	33.838	24.381	41.172	39.958	47.115	26.619	60.047	26.297
974	34.721	33 191	56.676	38.702	26.345	45.263	43.890	51.658	30.295	64.474	29.011
975	38.007	35 955	61.844	41.735	28.595	50.847	49.384	58.763	33.911	74.001	31.706
976	40.202	37 948	65.278	43.346	30.603	53.654	52.244	62.018	35.571	78.355	33.743
977	42.758	40 410	68.129	45.911	32.933	57.677	56.342	66.258	38.651	83.011	37.147
978	45.762	43 248	72.038	48.985	35.464	62.381	61.101	70.695	42.382	87.391	41.696
979	49.553	47 059	76.830	54.148	38.316	68.027	66.642	76.440	47.313	92.932	46.374
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988	54 062 59.128 62 738 65.214 67 664 69 724 71.269 73.204 75 706 78.569	52.078 56.720 59.859 62.436 64.795 66.936 68.569 70.947 73.755 76.972	83.277 88.879 92.358 94.181 95.550 96.620 97.685 100.465 101.921 103.717	60.449 65 130 66 955 68 386 70.004 71 543 71.273 73.731 76.206 79.842	42.332 46.746 50.528 53.799 56.680 59.295 62.040 64.299 67.493 70.708	74 424 81 278 85 455 85 237 85 845 86.720 88 599 90 289 92 354 94 559	72 887 79 670 84 047 83 912 84 399 85 457 87 501 89 118 91 431 93 641	83.198 91.245 96.295 95.432 95.195 95.936 97.566 98.435 100.625 102.731	51.740 58.880 63.566 61.939 62.468 63.940 65.168 66.199 69.016 71.707	100 868 108.077 112.293 112.530 111 547 111 413 113 178 113.796 115.216 116.657	51.394 55.587 58.564 59.908 61.630 63.219 65.868 68.561 70.928 73.211
990 991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	81 614 84.457 86 402 88 390 90.265 92.115 93 859 95 415 96 475 97.868	80 498 83.419 85.824 87.804 89.654 91.577 93.547 95.124 95.978 97.575	104 561 106.080 106.756 107.840 109.978 110.672 109.507 107.068 104.152 101.626	84.226 86.779 88.105 88.973 89.605 90.629 92.567 93.835 93.821 96.173	74 197 77.497 80.684 83.345 85 748 88.320 90.844 93.305 95.319 97.393	96.379 97.749 97.395 98.521 99.813 100.941 100.520 100.157 99.035 98.972	95.542 96.960 96.670 97.805 99.133 100.292 100.028 99.785 98.861 98.888	104.695 106.314 105.411 105.487 106.008 106.239 105.011 103.696 101.421 100.057	74.015 75.355 75.330 77.602 80.388 83.879 86.045 89.381 93.474 96.257	118 168 119.854 118.444 117.243 116.572 115.224 112.451 109.120 104.259 101 366	74.930 75.912 76.836 79.941 82.754 85.769 87.610 89.843 92.239 95.780
2000	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000	100 000	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000
2001	102 402	102.094	98.114	101.531	103.257	101.013	101.023	99.683	105.403	97.708	104.633
2002	104.193	103.542	95.766	102.089	106.018	101.640	101.660	99.513	110.030	95.956	107.240
2003	106.310	105.520	92.372	104.151	109.246	103.311	103.432	99.764	113.889	95.133	112.379
2004	109.102	108.246	90.631	107.634	112 695	106.555	106.697	101.025	120.124	95.022	119.935
2005 p	112.144	111.298	90.159	111.585	116.176	109.796	109.937	103.155	132.176	94.666	125.568
2002-1	103.553	102.673	96.496	100.895	104.937	101.347	101.348	99.542	108.065	96.607	106.151
}	103.944	103.385	96.029	102.238	105.608	101.472	101.480	99.485	109.455	96.087	106.720
	104.347	103.841	95.594	102.464	106.390	101.512	101.532	99.380	110.612	95.598	107.130
V	104.926	104.268	94.946	102.760	107.137	102.229	102.279	99.645	111.988	95.534	108.960
2003	105 724	105.051	93.906	104.179	108.036	102.954	103.071	99.676	113.093	95 251	111.420
.	106.019	105.220	92.879	103.560	108.887	102.831	102.933	99.436	113.182	94.916	111.508
.	106.500	105.734	91.833	104.356	109.647	103.255	103.370	99.733	113.996	95.061	112.261
.	106.996	106.076	90.868	104.509	110.414	104.202	104.354	100.211	115.287	95.304	114.330
2004	107.951	107 084	90.898	106.031	111 402	105.086	105.263	100.502	117.279	95.121	116.561
II	108.976	108 089	90.866	107.744	112 303	106.280	106.448	100.958	119.230	95.168	119.294
III	109.371	108 484	90.310	107.781	113.120	107.120	107.248	101 185	121.159	94.945	121.312
IV	106.996	106 076	90.868	104.509	110 414	104.202	104.354	100 211	115.287	95.304	114.330
2005	110.950	109.936	90.648	109 327	114 803	108 427	108.522	102 244	125.876	95.067	123.062
N	111.655	110.832	90.527	110.854	115 633	109 164	109.254	102.715	128.886	94.910	124.359
	112.567	111.846	89.839	112.985	116.508	110 169	110.318	103.358	133.914	94.491	126.335
	113.407	112.576	89.621	113 176	117 758	111.424	111.653	104.304	140.027	94.197	128.516

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-7.—Chain-type price indexes for gross domestic product, 1959-2005—Continued [Index numbers, 2000=100, except as noted; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

		ts and orts	Gove	rnment co and g	insumption ross inves	n expendit tment	ures		Gross d purch		Perce	ent cha	nge <sup>2</sup>
Year or		ds and rices			Federal		Canala	Final sales of			Gross		domestic hases <sup>1</sup>
quarter	Exports	Imports	Total	Total	National defense	Non- defense	State and local	domestic product	Total	Less food and energy	domestic product	Total	Less food an energy
959	29.433	21.901	15.404	16.450	16.257	16.591	14.475	20.581	20.365		1 2	1.2	
960 961 962 963 964 965 965 966 967 968	29.846 30.300 30.375 30.307 30.556 31.529 32.481 33.725 34.461 35.627	22.110 22.110 21.849 22.273 22.743 23.059 23.596 23.688 24.048 24.675	15.597 15.909 16.314 16.669 17.132 17.588 18.330 19.099 20.128 21.341	16.590 16.871 17.228 17.597 18.191 18.658 19.330 19.913 20.995 22.130	16.383 16.619 16.940 17.320 17.822 18.314 18.950 19.518 20.539 21.664	16.798 17.296 17.808 18.116 19.036 19.408 20.190 20.815 22.116 23.251	14.738 15.093 15.564 15.911 16.234 16.685 17.507 18.488 19.475 20.780	20.872 21.108 21.398 21.629 21.963 22.368 23.010 23.729 24.752 25.988	20.646 20.865 21.139 21.385 21.725 22.102 22.724 23.389 24.380 25.580		1.4 1 1 1 4 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.8 3.1 4.3 5.0	1.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.7 2.8 2.9 4.2 4.9	
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978	36.993 38.358 40.146 45.425 55.965 61.682 63.707 66.302 70.342 78.808	26.135 27.739 29.682 34.841 49.847 53.997 55.622 60.523 64.798 75.879	23.079 24.875 26.788 28.743 31.646 34.824 37.118 39.694 42.235 45.775	23.915 25.957 28.495 30.449 33.162 36.615 39.217 42.180 44.785 48.231	23.321 25.387 28.319 30.396 33.217 36.460 39.117 42.079 45.035 48.628	25.478 27.400 28.780 30.394 32.819 36.746 39.209 42.152 43.983 47.099	22.488 24.087 25.524 27.477 30.500 33.481 35.563 37.872 40.359 43.944	27.369 28.741 29.994 31.673 34.517 37.789 39.987 42.546 45.551 49.322	31.343 34.546 37.761 39.938 42.634 45.663		5.3 5.0 4.3 5.6 9.0 9.5 5.8 6.4 7.0 8.3	9.3 5.8 6.8 7.1	
980	86.801 93.217 93.645 94.015 94.887 91.983 90.639 92.874 97.687 99.310	92.629 91.829 88.813 88.871 94.251 98.774	50.761 55.752 59.414 61.778 64.955 66.970 68.175 70.056 71.899 74.139	53.299 58.476 62.446 64.612 68.426 69.974 70.352 71.200 72.704 74.677	53.908 59.229 63.392 65.617 70.290 71.621 71.554 72.281 73.631 75.528	51.683 56.516 60.020 62.038 63.577 65.740 67.395 68.616 70.609 72.826	48.858 53.709 57.140 59.666 62.336 64.739 66.624 69.361 71.485 73.940	53.806 58.859 62.489 64.958 67.399 69.494 71.060 72.985 75.519 78.383	54.876 59.896 63.296 65.515 67.822 69.760 71.338 73.527 76.043 78.934	62.221 64.685 67.106 69.232 71.474 73.716 76.429 79.151	9.1 9.4 6.1 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.7 3.4 3.8	10.5 9.1	33 33 33 33
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998	99.982 101.313 100.892 100.898 102.033 104.376 102.988 101.232 98.905 98.313	103.420 103.552 102.671 103.634 106.412 104.529 100.816	77.139 79.787 81.719 83.789 86.002 88.358 90.491 92.139 93.469 96.079	77.142 80.232 82.602 84.788 87.061 89.503 91.982 93.533 94.511 96.884	78.010 80.821 83.628 85.313 87.412 89.598 92.379 93.716 94.643 96.886	75.260 79.100 80.411 83.728 86.375 89.351 91.216 93.192 94.268 96.880	77.357 79.681 81.300 83.294 85.472 87.778 89.709 91.414 92.934 95.667	81.440 84.286 86.237 88.226 90.108 91.965 93.736 95.320 96.428 97.847	82.144 84.836 86.828 88.730 90.583 92.483 94.145 95.440 96.060 97.556	82.109 84.942 87.169 89.211 91.213 93.176 94.616 95.865 96.797 98.165	3.9 3.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.1	4.1 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.4 .6 1.6	
000 001 002 003 004	100.000 99.624 99.273 101.398 104.999 108.879	97.497 96.341 99.610 104.571	100.000 102.544 105.507 109.460 113.505 118.874	100.000 101.907 105.631 109.740 114.354 118.478	100.000 102.002 105.792 110.434 114 840 118.915	100.000 101.739 105.345 108.473 113.498 117.724	100.000 102.868 105.435 109.303 113.022 119.131	100.000 102.406 104.197 106.330 109.124 112.166	100.000 101.994 103.583 105.863 108.899 112.377	100.000 101.882 103.796 105.640 108.224 110.954	2.2 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.8	2.5 2.0 1.6 2.2 2.9 3.2	1 1
002: I II III IV	98.360 99.048 99.772 99.911	94.146 96.474 97.304 97.441	104.378 105.126 105.795 106.728	105.098 105.231 105.502 106.696	104.784 105.112 105.744 107.529	105.665 105.449 105.073 105.193	103.997 105.064 105.943 106.734	103.554 103.946 104.352 104.936	102.755 103.385 103.816 104.374	103 150 103.579 103.990 104.465	1.7 1.5 1.6 2.2	1.5 2.5 1.7 2.2	1
003: I II III IV	100.909 101.165 101.401 102.116	100.069 98.938 99.580 99.853	109.030 109.026 109.695 110.087	109.238 109.579 109.902 110.241	109.939 110.229 110.573 110.995	107.966 108.396 108.676 108.853	108.909 108.714 109.582 110.005	105.743 106.036 106.521 107.021	105.418 105.513 106.040 106.483	105.115 105.367 105.806 106.270	3.1 1.1 1.8 1.9	4.1 .4 2.0 1.7	
004:1 11 111 1V	103.584 104.803 105.242 106.366	102.177 103.812 105.269	111.755 113.114 114.003 115.148	112.825 114.191 114.825 115.575	113.091 114.641 115.429 116.198	112.402 113.408 113.734 114.447	111.141 112.496 113.536 114.914	107.980 109.003 109.389 110.124	107.586 108.683 109.235 110.092	107.164 108.011 108.541 109.181	3.6 3.9 1.5 2.7	4.2 4.1 2.0 3.2	3
005: I II III	107.559 108.534 109.323	109.925	116.747 117.820 119.751 121.178	117.550 118.168 119.056	118.060 118.471 119.493 119.634	116.647 117.681 118.298	116.291 117.635 120.186 122.411	110.963 111.667 112.589 113.443	110.883 111.785 112.953 113.886	109.990 110.561 111.236 112.027	3 1 2.6 3.3 3.0	2.9 3.3 4.2 3.3	

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$  Gross domestic product (GDP) less exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Quarterly percent changes are at annual rates.

Table B-8.—Gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Goods

Total Durable goods Nondurable goods Change Final ıπ Gross sales of Change DII-Change Change Serv-Struc-Year or domestic domesın ın tures quarter vate ŧΠ product tic Final Final inven-Final Dri-Dft-DII-Intal product tories sales vate sales vate sales vate ınveninveninventories tories 1 tories 1 3 9 39 86 3 2 9 1173 206.5 625 506 6 502 7 2376 523 2 541 7 217 9 1 7 246 6 243 4 90.2 153.2 619 1960 526 4 231 0 249.7 544 7 250 1 247 2 902 -1 34 26 30 541 1961 262 0 274 5 579 5 612 1 268 1 67 8 72 7 1962 585 6 617 7 61 994 168.5 179.7 280 106 0 1963 38 658 8 296 0 320 2 4892 116 4 128 4 142 0 10 284 3 78.4 84.7 1964 6636 48 300.9 1918 305.0 1965 7191 709 9 774 2 9 2 329.4 350 9 2089 36 88 0 787.8 364.5 1966 373.9 402.6 822 7 99 1464 48 2176 5.0 369 1 896 196 9 1 1587 900 9 393 6 45 2348 4.5 4074 100.0 1968 975 4 92 432 0 422 8 9.2 1711 60 251.7 32 444 4 1083 1969 444 9 464 7 173 6 2.0 446 9 472.9 2.0 2713 2.2 481.9 109.7 1.036 5 1.0385 83 2.9 5.3 525 8 574 8 8.3 181 2836 128.4 1.127 1 1.118 9 1.229 2 1971 507 5 581 2 629 3 202 4 236 6 516.6 1972 9.1 9 1 6.4 305.1 146.9 15.9 130 344 6 2 9 162.9 1973 1.382 366.8 15.9 486 0 643.3 140 254 5 10.9 374 8 413 2 439.2 3.1 6910 165.6 166.7 697 7 -6 3 17.1 22 3 25 8 644 6 691 777 284 5 321 2 1975 6383 6 3 Δ 780 2 777 5 851.5 10.8 6.3 1912 17 1 22 3 25.8 1976 .825 3 808.2 760.4 856 6 829 1 935 2 9 5 952.7 363 8 465.3 12.8 226.8 2 030 9 2,008 6 2,268 9 1977 2.294 7 2.268 9 2.545 3 273.9 1978 2,563.3 180 1,0781 1,060 1 180 472.0 12.8 588 1 5.2 1.1719 313.3 1979 651 9 716.1 752.5 792 7 -6.3 29.8 500 1 542.2 539 7 -2.3 7.3 1.152 0 4.0 1,322.5 1.487.7 321 3 2.789 5 2,795.8 6.3 1.145 7 1980 288 2 277 3 258 3 292 2 22 5 29 8 -14 9 352 1981 3,128.4 3 098 6 -14.9 1.633.2 344.5 3 255 0 3,269 9 -160 1982 3.542.4 370 8 5.8 578 1 802.9 368.7 3.536 7 -58 365 0 1983 1.957.8 65.4 549 6 484 2 65.4 21.8 650.2 41.4 834 0 240 425 8 1984 3.933 2 17.4 4,198 4 218 607.4 585 6 711 0 4 4 874 6 2.154 1 458 7 1.657 0 1.751.3 1.903 4 -1.9 22.9 22.7 910 6 66 6.6 739 9 764 9 2.325 7 2.490.5 1986 4,462 8 4.456 3 650 5 8 4 480 1 4 739 5 4 2 724 2 959 3 1987 4 712 4976 5.085 3 18 5 27 7 884.9 18.5 27.7 841.8 1.043.1 -43 2.685.3 515.0 5.103.8 2,066 6 2.0389 9171 20 0 1.121.9 7.7 529 0 1989 5.456.7 2.141 3 2.185.1 2.266.0 2.367.0 2.500.0 2.630.0 2.776.3 2.935.7 3.072.6 2,155.8 2,184.7 2,282.3 2,387.8 2,563.8 2,661.1 7.7 533.5 499.9 522.7 1990 5.803 1 5.788 5 14.5 145 950.2 1,191.1 68 944 1 5.995.9 6.337.7 5.996.3 1,241.0 1,279.8 13.2 19.3 3,311.3 3.532.7 1991 \_ 1 -13.6 16 3 20 8 63.8 16 3 20 8 986 1 1992 1.047 9 319.1 557 8 6.657.4 7.072.2 6,636 6 7,008 4 1994 63.8 35.7 375.0 427.8 28.1 3.901.2 607.3 202.2 33 6 -2.4 4.098.4 30 8 72 0 11.7 7.816.9 7.786 2,807.0 30.8 191 4783 4,312.7 6971 8.232 3 8,676 2 409 1 526.6 584.8 1997 8.304 3 8.747 0 3.0077 72.0 70.8 39.9 42.8 32 1 4 548 4 748 2 4.789.8 813.8 1998 70.8 3.143 4 487 8 28 0 3.244 4 1999 9.268 4 9.201 5 66.9 3.311.3 66 9 1 576 5 40.0 1.667.9 26.9 5.081.8 875.3 56 5 31.7 56.5 -31.7 1.739 5 2000 9.817.0 9,760.5 3,449.3 3,392 8 1,653.3 36 1 20.4 5,425.6 5,725.6 942 1 3,412 6 3,442 4 1,814.0 10.128.0 10,159 7 3,444.3 ,630.3 41.8 100 989.8 10,457.7 15.1 12.4 37.4 10,469.6 119 3.430.5 11.9 559.9 1.870.7 -3.26.031.4 995.8 10,955 8 10.971 2 3.521 2 586 7 1,934 6 2,059 4 2,164 9 2003 15 4 55 4 3,536.7 3,783 0 15 4 55 4 3.0 6,366.1 6,755.4 1.068 4 11.678 9 18.0 1.195.8 1 668 3 15.2 2005 12 479 4 12,464 2 15.2 3,962 1 3,946 9 1,782.0 18.9 -3.77.184 6 1.332.7 -8 3 2 6 26 0 27.3 10,333.3 10,3416 -8 3 2.6 26 0 27 3 1,570 7 -4.7 5,908 8 2002 3.434 1 3.442.4 1,8717 -3.7 990 4 10.426.6 10.527.4 10.591.1 10,424 0 3.437 0 3.473 1 3,434.4 560 7 6.7 1.873 7 -4.15 997 9 9918 10,501 4 10,563 9 3 447 15.8 42.6 1,868.8 1,578 2 6.064 0 9903 3.425 4 1,529.7 -154 3,398 2 6,155.0 1.010.6 IV 1.868.4 1,025 4 1,047.2 1,087.5 10.717.0 10.695.2 21.8 3.448.2 3.426 4 3.467 3 21.8 1.534 4 20.3 1.892.0 1.5 6.243 4 10.884 6 11.087 4 - 4 10.6 1,902 2 6.330 5 6.396.8 10.845 0 3.466 9 1,565 0 Õ 10.6 3.592 6 3.598 7 11,076 9 11,206 2 3,603.1 6314 -4 8 34 2 15.4 1.982.8 11.236 D 1,6159 -4.5 6.4939 I٧ 298 3.628.5 298 1.113.7 2004 11 457.1 11,4116 45 5 3,705 8 3,660 3 455 1.6393 42.1 2.021.0 3.5 6.617.3 1.133.9 3,699 7 3,751.5 2,058 8 2,067 7 2,090.0 11.594.2 11.766.3 71 9 52.5 3.7715 1,640 9 51 0 26 9 20 9 6.699.7 1,194 8 1,216.9 11,8188 3.8040 1.683 8 6,797 9 ١٧ 11.9952 11,943.3 519 3.850 8 3,7990 51.9 1.7090 29.9 22.0 6,906.7 1.237 7 12,198 8 12,378 0 12,605 7 12.138 9 12,382 1 12,625 4 12,710.5 59 9 -4 2 -19 7 35.0 -7.3 2,122.5 2,171.9 7.025.1 7.112 4 2005 599 3.906.3 3 846 4 1.723.9 24.9 1,267 4 1,311.2 -42 107 3,954.4 3.958 5 1.786.6 3.1 19 4.001.3 4.021.0 1.827 6 5.6 2,193.4 2,171.8 -25.3 250.2 12.735 3 248 3,986 3 3.9615 24.8 1,789 8 7,350 8 1,398 1

Estimates for durable and nondurable goods for 1996 and earlier periods are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC); later estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)

Includes government consumption expenditures, which are for services (such as education and national defense) produced by government in current dollars, these services are valued at their cost of production

TABLE B-9.—Real gross domestic product by major type of product, 1959-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

							Goods					
		Final	Change		Total		Durable	goods	Nondurat	le goods		
Year or quarter	Gross domestic product	sales of domes- tic product	pri- vate inven- tories	Total	Final sales	Change in pri- vate inven- tories	Final sales	Change in pri- vate inven- tories <sup>1</sup>	Final sales	Change In pri- vate inven- tories 1	Serv- ices <sup>2</sup>	Struc- tures
1959	2,441.3	2,442.7	12.3	700.7					,,,,,,,,,,,		1,391.1	392.8
1960 1961 1962 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967 1968	2,715.2 2,834.0 2,998.6 3,191.1 3,399.1 3,484.6 3,652.7 3,765.4	2,506.8 2,566.8 2,708.5 2,830.3 2,999.9 3,173.8 3,364.8 3,467.6 3,640.3 3,753.7	10.4 9.4 19.5 18.0 15.4 29.3 42.1 30.3 27.4 27.0	721.1 726.7 773.8 803.4 856.4 927.3 1,005.2 1,006.4 1,047.9 1,082.2							1,433.0 1,489.4 1,574.3 1,642.4 1,720.1 1,803.6 1,916.7 2,034.8 2,140.4 2,212.2	389.1 399.9 422.8 451.3 481.7 505.8 506.4 499.0 529.7 536.5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976 1977 1978	3,898.6 4,105.0 4,341.5 4,319.6 4,311.2 4,540.9 4,750.5 5,015.0 5,173.4	3,787.7 3,893.4 4,098.6 4,315.9 4,305.5 4,352.5 4,522.3 4,721.6 4,981.6 5,161.2	5.0 22.3 23.1 35.0 25.9 -11.3 30.7 38.5 41.1 25.1	1,076.3 1,105.7 1,180.5 1,299.5 1,288.1 1,263.7 1,359.8 1,423.2 1,515.6 1,577.9							2,255.4 2,313.6 2,393.7 2,461.3 2,522.8 2,612.1 2,676.9 2,770.5 2,874.9 2,943.3	513.4 561.0 602.7 615.6 551.8 501.7 548.7 600.6 658.3 677.0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	5,189.3 5,423.8	5.196.7 5,265.1 5,233.4 5,454.0 5,739.2 6,042.1 6,271.8 6,457.2 6,734.5 6,962.2	-8.0 34.9 -17.5 -6.4 71.3 23.7 8.3 30.3 20.3 28.3	1,567.1 1,634.5 1,559.7 1,625.4 1,810.9 1,851.3 1,906.0 1,984.9 2,108.9 2,223.3							3,004.2 3,062.5 3,120.0 3,251.0 3,341.1 3,520.8 3,671.0 3,797.3 3,930.9 4,049.5	627.8 619.2 566.1 607.1 689.2 725.1 735.9 739.2 737.9 732.8
1990		7,108.5 7,115.0 7,331.1 7,522.3 7,777.8 8,010.2 8,306.5 8,636.6 8,997.6 9,404.0	15.4 5 16.5 20.6 63.6 29.9 28.7 71.2 72.6 68.9	2,252.7 2,221.5 2,307.8 2,394.8 2,550.6 2,639.0 2,772.4 2,971.3 3,132.7 3,312.6	2,244.3 2,228.9 2,297.7 2,380.3 2,493.9 2,614.9 2,747.4 2,904.6 3,063.7 3,246.4	15.4 5 16.5 20.6 63.6 29.9 28.7 71.2 72.6 68.9	872.8 852.7 894.7 949.8 1,016.4 1,096.9 1,193.8 1,317.4 1,431.8 1,554.3	7.2 -13.6 -3.0 16.4 33.4 31.0 17.8 38.5 42.4 40.4	1,402.1 1,410.3 1,434.3 1,457.7 1,501.4 1,536.9 1,566.5 1,593.4 1,634.2 1,692.6	3.5 6.1 8.7 1.5 12.6 -1.2 4.5 32.4 29.8 28.1	4,170.0 4,251.2 4,373.7 4,457.5 4,558.3 4,654.7 4,765.6 4,901.1 5,057.5 5,245.1	718.3 662.8 688.3 709.3 746.0 753.5 803.1 835.7 879.1 913.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	10,755.7	9,760.5 9,920.9 10,036.5 10,303.6 10,702.4 11,112.2	56.5 -31.7 12.5 15.5 52.0 17.2	3,449.3 3,390.9 3,432.5 3,549.0 3,778.2 3,950.7	3,392.8 3,421.9 3,419.7 3,531.2 3,721.3 3,932.0	56.5 -31.7 12.5 15.5 52.0 17.2	1,653.3 1,655.6 1,610.8 1,680.7 1,797.7 1,929.4	36.1 -42.4 15.5 12.6 36.5 18.0	1,739.5 1,766.1 1,806.3 1,849.3 1,925.3 2,008.6	20.4 10.3 -2.8 3.3 16.4	5,425.6 5,553.2 5,693.4 5,820.7 5,979.6 6,139.0	942.1 945.6 922.1 951.6 1,006.1 1,054.1
2002: I	9,977.3 10,031.6 10,090.7 10,095.8	9.986.8 10,028.4 10,063.5 10,067.3	-10.2 2.6 28.0 29.5	3,413.1 3,425.5 3,468.8 3,422.8	3,422.7 3,422.3 3,440.7 3,393.2	-10.2 2.6 28.0 29.5	1,609.4 1,609.2 1,635.4 1,589.3	-4.6 6.8 16.1 43.6	1,810.7 1,810.3 1,803.7 1,800.5	-5.7 -4.2 11.9 -13.1	5,635.1 5,683.1 5,707.2 5,748.2	928.7 922.3 915.3 922.2
2003: I II III		10,114.7 10,228.2 10,399.5 10,471.8	24.0 4 9.3 29.0	3,458.9 3,478.4 3,616.3 3,642.5	3,434.1 3,476.6 3,604.4 3,609.9	24.0 4 9.3 29.0	1,605.8 1,651.3 1,735.8 1,729.8	21.6 -1.0 -4.9 34.6	1,824.6 1,823.7 1,869.2 1,879.7	2.9 .5 13.6 -4.0	5,758.2 5,810.7 5,829.4 5,884.4	920.2 938.6 968.9 978.8
2004: I II III IV	10,704.1	10,568.9 10,637.4 10,757.1 10,846.0	41.9 65.6 50.4 50.1	3,706.5 3,749.6 3,809.9 3,846.6	3,660.0 3,678.2 3,754.7 3,792.2	41.9 65.6 50.4 50.1	1,760.3 1,765.1 1,820.5 1,844.8	41.9 50.0 25.8 28.4	1,900.3 1,913.1 1,936.8 1,950.9	1.8 17.2 24.7 22.0	5,932.1 5,950.1 5,994.6 6,041.5	980.1 1.010.9 1.014.0 1,019.5
2005: I	11,089.2	10,940.3 11,089.2 11,214.4 11,205.0	58.2 -1.7 -13.3 25.7	3,888 0 3,935.3 3,986.8 3,992.9	3,824.9 3,937.5 4,002.6 3,962.9	58.2 -1.7 -13.3 25.7	1,858.8 1,929.6 1,981.7 1,947.3	33.4 -6.9 5.6 39.9	1,969.3 2,013.5 2,029.5 2,022.0	25.3 4.6 -17.4 -10.5	6,089.9 6,112.8 6,167.8 6,185.4	1,032.5 1,053.4 1,062.0 1,068.4

<sup>1</sup> Estimates for durable and nondurable goods for 1996 and earlier periods are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), later estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).

<sup>2</sup> Includes government consumption expenditures, which are for services (such as education and national defense) produced by government. In current dollars, these services are valued at their cost of production.

TABLE B-10.—Gross value added by sector, 1959-2005

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		В	lusiness 1		Househol	ds and ins	stitutions	Gener	al governm	nent <sup>3</sup>	-
Year o quarte	Gross domestic product	Total	Non- farm <sup>1</sup>	Farm	Total	House- holds	Non- profit institu- tions serving house- holds 2	Total	Federal	State and local	Adden- dum. Gross housing value added
1959	506 6	408 2	390 9	173	40 1	29 8	10 3	58 3	31 9	26.5	36 9
1960	526 4	420 4	402.3	18 2	43 9	32 3	11 7	62 0	33 1	28 9	39.9
1961	544 7	432 0	413.7	18 3	46 7	34 3	12 4	66 0	34 4	31.6	42.8
1962	585 6	464 5	446.1	18 4	50 4	36 7	13 6	70.7	36.5	34 2	46.0
1963	617 7	488 7	470.2	18 5	53 6	38 8	14 8	75 5	38 4	37 1	48.9
1964	663 6	525 6	508.2	17 3	56 9	40 8	16 1	81 1	40.7	40 4	51.6
1965	719 1	571 4	551.5	19 9	61.0	43 3	17.7	86 7	42.4	44 2	54.9
1966	787 8	625 1	604.3	20 8	65 8	45 9	19 9	96.9	47.3	49 6	58.2
1967	832 6	654 5	634.4	20 1	70 9	48 8	22 1	107 2	51.7	55.5	62.1
1968	910.0	714 5	694.0	20.5	76 5	51 6	25.0	119 0	56.4	62.5	65.9
1969	984 6	770 3	747.5	22 8	84 3	55 6	28 7	130 0	60.0	70 0	71.3
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	1.038 5 1.127.1 1.238 3 1.382.7 1.500.0 1.638 3 1.825.3 2.030 9 2.294 7 2.563.3	803 6 869 9 959 0 1.079 4 1.166 9 1.268 5 1.423 7 1.593 5 1,813 4 2.032 9	779 9 844 5 929 4 1.032.7 1.122.6 1.222 8 1.380 7 1.549 9 1.762 7 1.972.8	23.7 25.4 29.7 46.8 44.2 45.6 43.5 50.7 60.1	91 4 100 9 109 9 120.0 131.7 145 4 158 1 172.8 193 8 217 4	59 4 65 1 70.3 76 0 82.5 90.3 98 1 107 3 120 4 135.0	32.0 35.7 39.5 44.0 49.2 55.1 60.0 65.6 73.4 82.5	143.6 156.4 169.4 183.3 201.4 224.5 243.5 264.6 287.5 313.0	64 1 67 8 71.6 74 0 79.6 87.3 93 8 102.1 109.7 117.6	79 5 88 6 97 9 109 3 121 8 137 1 149 7 162 6 177 8 195 4	76 7 83 9 91 1 98 3 106 8 117 2 126 6 140 3 155 2 172 5
1980	2.789 5	2 191 1	2.139 7	51 4	249 9	155 5	94 4	348 6	131 3	217.3	199 4
1981	3.128 4	2 459 4	2.394 5	65.0	283 7	176 8	106.9	385.3	147 4	237.9	228 4
1982	3.255 0	2 520 7	2.460 3	60 4	315.3	195 7	119.6	419.0	161 3	257.7	255 4
1983	3.536 7	2 747 2	2.702 3	44 9	344 0	211 7	132.4	445 4	171.3	274.1	277 4
1984	3.933 2	3 071 8	3.007 7	64 2	376.2	230.2	146.0	485 2	192.1	293.1	301 1
1985	4.220 3	3 290 8	3.227 4	63 4	406.0	249 6	156.4	523.5	205 1	318.4	332 9
1986	4.462 8	3 468 8	3.409 4	59 4	438 0	267 4	170.6	556.1	212.6	343.5	359 5
1987	4.739 5	3 669 9	3.608 4	61 6	478.4	287.6	190.8	591.2	223.4	367.8	385 5
1988	5.103 8	3 948 6	3.887.2	61 3	525 1	312.8	212.4	630.1	234.9	395.2	415 5
1989	5.484 4	4 243 2	4.169.7	73.6	569.6	337.0	232.6	671.5	246.6	424.9	443 8
1990	5.803.1	4 462 6	4,386 0	76.6	618 9	362 9	256.0	721 6	258 9	462.6	478.1
1991	5.995.9	4.569 3	4,499.5	69.9	660.7	383.4	277.3	765 9	275.0	490.9	508.5
1992	6.337.7	4.840 4	4,761.7	78.7	697.9	397.2	300.7	799 4	282.1	517.3	531.0
1993	6.657.4	5.096 2	5,025.6	70.6	732 0	413.7	318.3	829 3	286.3	543.0	549.1
1994	7.072.2	5.444 0	5,362.4	81.6	771.3	439.5	331.7	857 0	286.2	570.7	582.0
1995	7.397.7	5.700 6	5,632 0	68.5	815.5	463.3	352.1	881 6	284.7	596.9	613.3
1996	7.816.9	6.056.7	5,966.0	90.7	852 2	484.7	367.5	908 0	288.6	619.3	638.0
1997	8.304.3	6.471.9	6,383 8	88.1	895.8	509.6	386.2	936 7	290.9	645.8	667.7
1998	8.747.0	6.827.1	6,748 2	78.9	949 7	538.0	411.7	970 3	293.1	677.2	700.2
1999	9.268.4	7.243 4	7,174 7	68.8	1.012 3	576.4	435.9	1.012.7	300.9	711.8	747.8
2000	9.817 0	7,666 7	7.595 1	71.5	1.080 7	615 6	465 1	1.069 6	315.4	754.2	794 3
2001	10.128 0	7,841.2	7.768 0	73.1	1.160.4	662.0	498.4	1.126.4	325.7	800.8	849.8
2002	10.469 6	8,040 5	7.969.7	70.8	1.227 3	687.7	539.6	1.201 8	352.9	848.9	876 7
2003	10.971 2	8,427 8	8.339 8	88.0	1.267.1	696.9	570.3	1.276 3	382.6	893.7	875 5
2004	11.734 3	9,041 2	8.928 9	112.2	1.353 5	751.3	602.2	1.339 7	408.2	931.4	933.1
2005	12.479 4	9,640 7	9.554 6	86.1	1.436 0	789 7	646.4	1.402.7	424.1	978.5	972.1
2002 I	10.333.3	7.938 3	7.871 8	66.5	1.213 4	688 7	524.6	1.181 6	349.4	832 2	882 5
II	10.426 6	7.999.1	7,937.7	61.4	1.233 0	696 5	536.4	1.194 5	351.1	843.5	889 2
III	10.527 4	8.090 4	8.017.6	72.9	1.230.5	684 3	546.2	1.206.4	351.8	854 6	871 5
IV	10,591 1	8.134 2	8.051 6	82.6	1.232 3	681 0	551.3	1.224 7	359.2	865.5	863 8
2003. I II IV	10.717.0 10.844.6 11.087.4 11.236.0	8.206 6 8.318 0 8 548 6 8.638 1	8,130 1 8,232 4 8,460 7 8,536 0	76 4 85 6 87 9 102 1	1.252 2 1.255 0 1.255.3 1.306.0	692 6 687 9 682 2 724 8	559 6 567 2 573 1 581 2	1.258 2 1.271 5 1.283.5 1.291 9	377.4 383.1 384.4 385.4	880 9 888 4 899.1 906 5	875.7 866.8 854.7 904.7
2004   	11.457 1 11.666 1 11.818 8 11,995.2	8.822 4 8.993 2 9.106 5 9.242 5	8.699.6 8.868.4 9.001.9 9.145.9	122 8 124 9 104 6 96 6	1.316 4 1.339 8 1.366 0 1.391 7	731 6 744 9 758 7 770 0	584 8 594 9 607.3 621 6	1.318 2 1.333 1 1.346.3 1.361 0	403 3 407.2 409.4 413.1	914 9 925.9 936.9 948.0	912.7 926.0 941.0 952.9
2005-1	12.198.8	9.405 3	9.312 5	92 8	1.411 4	777 8	633 5	1.382 1	422 8	959 4	960.9
II	12.378.0	9.559 9	9.475 2	84 7	1.424 7	783 4	641.3	1.393 4	423 1	970.2	965.5
III	12.605.7	9.748 3	9.665 8	82 5	1.445.9	793.0	653 0	1 411 4	424.6	986.8	975.1
IV n	12.735.3	9.849 5	9.765 0	84 5	1 462 1	804 4	657.7	1.423.7	426.0	997.7	987.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Gross domestic business product equals gross domestic product excluding gross value added of households and institutions and of general government. Nonfarm product equals gross domestic business value added excluding gross farm value added.

<sup>2</sup> Equals compensation of employees of nonprofit institutions, the rental value of nonresidential fixed assets owned and used by nonprofit institutions serving households, and rental income of persons for tenant-occupied housing owned by nonprofit institutions.

<sup>3</sup> Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital.

TABLE B-11.—Real gross value added by sector, 1959-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

			Business <sup>1</sup>		Househo	lds and in	stitutions	Gene	ral govern	ment 3	
Year or quarter	Gross domestic product	Total	Non- farm <sup>1</sup>	Farm	Total	House- holds	Non- profit institu- tions serving house- holds <sup>2</sup>	Total	Federal	State and local	Adden- dum: Gross housing value added
1959		1,716.0	1.684 1	21.2	261.7	161.6	97.8	514.5	279.4	236.7	195.0
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967 1968	2,560.0 2,715.2 2,834.0 2,998.6 3,191.1 3,399.1 3,484.6 3,652.7	1,748.8 1,782.8 1,897.7 1,985.4 2,111.7 2,260.6 2,413.6 2,459.5 2,581.7 2,660.3	1,713.5 1,747.8 1,867.0 1,954.3 2,086.0 2,233.5 2,393.2 2,434.1 2,561.5 2,639.1	22.4 22.6 22.1 22.8 22.1 23.5 22.7 24.5 23.6 24.5	279.6 291.5 307.7 320.4 333.7 350.2 366.3 381.6 400.4 417.8	171.4 179.6 189.8 197.7 205.7 215.2 224.0 233.1 239.3 249.1	106.6 109.6 115.4 120.0 125.4 132.6 140.2 146.5 161.0 168.8	532.2 550.9 572.5 589.5 609.7 630.3 669.7 705.2 732.7 751.3	284.6 290.5 302.5 305.2 308.2 310.4 330.7 352.2 358.1 359.0	249.3 262.1 271.8 285.9 303.1 321.5 340.6 354.9 376.2 393.4	207.3 219.2 232.8 244.3 255.4 268.9 281.0 294.0 304.6 318.7
1970 1971 1972 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977 1978	3,898.6 4,105.0 4,341.5 4,319.6 4,311.2 4,540.9 4,750.5 5,015.0	2,659,3 2,761.5 2,939.8 3,145.0 3,101.3 3,071.2 3,272.9 3,456.2 3,673.3 3,796.7	2,636.0 2,736.2 2,918.4 3,131.5 3,089.1 3,037.5 3,249.1 3,431.1 3,656.8 3,774.2	25.1 26.4 26.4 26.2 25.6 30.5 29.1 30.7 29.6 32.2	425.0 443.0 460.7 476.3 493.9 513.7 521.5 528.3 552.4 576.7	254.7 266.5 277.7 287.5 299.9 308.0 313.3 316.2 335.1 350.4	170.0 176.1 182.4 188.2 193.1 205.2 207.5 211.6 216.3 225.3	754.1 755.3 753.8 757.2 772.6 785.1 791.8 800.1 815.5	343.6 327.8 311.8 300.1 299.2 297.5 297.9 298.8 302.5 302.3	410.8 427.5 442.3 457.8 474.4 488.9 495.3 502.9 514.6 523.7	328.9 343.8 360.1 373.0 390.7 402.7 408.3 418.3 436.8 453.9
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987	5,291.7 5,189.3 5,423.8 5,813.6 6,053.6 6,263.6 6,475.1 6,742.7	3,756.1 3,859.5 3,743.1 3,944.3 4,286.3 4,484.5 4,652.0 4,815.5 5,023.0 5,206.6	3,736.1 3,814.7 3,691.9 3,932.8 4,254.3 4,434.2 4,606.2 4,769.8 4,987.7 5,162.3	31.1 41.0 43.1 26.9 37.2 46.7 44.9 45.5 40.9 46.4	606.9 626.5 647.2 665.9 687.8 700.1 718.5 745.7 780.6 812.3	372.9 384.7 391.8 399.4 413.3 423.2 428.7 440.3 457.1 471.5	232.8 240.5 254.4 265.7 273.6 275.9 289.1 304.8 323.1 340.6	836.0 840.6 849.2 854.6 865.2 890.0 911.9 931.8 956.0 978.8	307.0 311.7 316.8 324.2 331.5 341.0 347.0 356.1 360.5 364.9	530.8 530.6 534.0 531.8 535.0 550.3 566.3 577.2 596.9 615.3	481.9 501.0 514.7 526.2 543.0 564.4 574.9 588.8 606.2 620.3
1990	7,100.5 7,336.6 7,532.7 7,835.5 8,031.7 8,328.9 8,703.5 9,066.9	5,287.0 5,245.4 5,456.5 5,625.9 5,905.3 6,076.8 6,356.0 6,693.8 7,017.1 7,376.8	5,237.9 5,194.7 5,395.2 5,576.0 5,841.4 6,030.2 6,300.4 6,627.2 6,955.3 7,314.2	49.3 50.0 57.5 50.6 60.9 49.6 56.1 64.4 61.6 62.9	841.2 865.3 882.6 904.8 923.1 945.1 957.8 983.5 1,010 4 1,042.3	483.2 497.8 502.6 507.9 524.7 534.3 540.8 554.0 563.8 590.7	357.9 367.5 379.9 396.9 398.4 410.8 417.0 429.5 446.9 451.6	1,003.9 1,014.3 1,017.7 1,019.8 1,019.9 1,020.6 1,022.1 1,030.0 1,041.0 1,051.4	371.6 373.8 366.0 358.9 347.2 334.1 325.0 318.8 315.2 312.7	633.6 641.7 652.6 661.6 673.1 686.5 711.2 725.8 738.7	635.7 657.2 666.2 669.9 690.8 705.7 712.1 726.5 735.5
2000 2001 2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	9,890.7 10,048.8 10,320.6 10,755.7	7,666.7 7,691.0 7,806.9 8,070.6 8,454.4 8,790.7	7,595.1 7,625.7 7,736.9 7,994.6 8,379.5 8,726.4	71.5 65.6 70.1 76.0 75.9 69.1	1,080.7 1,110.0 1,130.9 1,126.3 1,172.0 1,204.0	615.6 634.8 634.2 625.9 666.5 690.1	465.1 475.1 496.6 500.3 506.0 514.8	1,069.6 1,089.3 1,110.4 1,126.3 1,135.7 1,146.8	315.4 317.0 323.3 331.8 334.9 336.7	754.2 772.3 787.1 794.4 800.7 810.1	794.3 815.1 809.0 786.5 827.8 852.4
2002: I	10,031.6	7,740.7 7,780.4 7,848.8 7,857.6	7,686.5 7,712.9 7,772.7 7,775.5	54.5 67.4 76.3 82.1	1,131.4 1,141.0 1,129.1 1,122.1	642.1 645.3 628.8 620.8	489.4 495.7 500.2 501.2	1.104 2 1,108.9 1,112.6 1,116.0	320.4 322.5 324.6 325.7	783.7 786.3 788.0 790.4	823.2 824.0 801.0 787.7
2003: I	10,230.4 10,410.9	7.891.8 7,986.2 8,176.1 8,228.3	7,814.2 7,903.8 8,102.4 8,157.9	77.1 81.9 73.7 71.2	1.124 3 1,119.5 1,112.5 1,149.1	623.6 619.8 612.8 647.6	500.6 499.5 499.4 501.7	1,122.4 1,126.1 1,127.4 1,129.1	329.7 332.4 332.6 332.5	792.6 793.6 794.7 796.5	789.6 781.3 767.4 807.9
2004:            	10.704.1 10,808.9	8,328.2 8,410.5 8,501.7 8,577.2	8,241.6 8,335.3 8,430.2 8,510.7		1,157.9 1,166.9 1,177.6 1,185.4	654.5 662.0 671.1 678.3	503.7 505.3 507.0 507.9	1,131.5 1,132.7 1,136.6 1,142.0	334.1 333.7 335.0 337.0	797.3 799.0 801.5 804.9	814.2 821.9 832.6 842.4
2005: I	11,089.2	8,669.6 8,754.8 8,857.8 8,880.8	8,601.7 8,694.8 8,794.3 8,814.6	65.3 68.5	1,194.5 1,199.9 1,208.1 1,213.7	683.8 686.5 691.5 698.5	511.4 514.2 517.4 516.3	1,143.9 1,144.6 1,148.0 1,150.5	337.4 336.5 336.1 336.8	806.4 808.1 812.0 813.7	847.1 849.4 853.4 859.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Gross domestic business product equals gross domestic product excluding gross value added of households and institutions and of general government. Nonfarm product equals gross domestic business value added excluding gross farm value added.

<sup>2</sup> Equals compensation of employees of nonprofit institutions, the rental value of nonresidential fixed assets owned and used by nonprofit institutions serving households, and rental income of persons for tenant-occupied housing owned by nonprofit institutions.

<sup>3</sup> Equals compensation of general government employees plus general government consumption of fixed capital.

TABLE B-12.—Gross domestic product (GDP) by industry, value added, in current dollars and as a percentage of GDP, 1974-2004

[Billions of dollars: except as noted]

			(Bil	lions of do	llars; exce	pt as note	d]				
						Private in	dustries				
	Gross	Total	Agrı- cul-			Ma	anufacturin	g			
Year	domestic product	Total private indus- tries	ture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	Mining	Con- struc- tion	Total manu- fac- turing	Our- able goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Util- ities	Whole- sale trade	Retail trade
					V	alue added					
974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 984 985 986	1.500 0 1.638 3 1.825 3 2.030 9 2.294 7 2.563 3 2.789 5 3.128 4 3.2556 7 3.933 2 4 220 3 4.462 8 4.739 5 5.103 8	1.277 3 1.391.5 1.556.2 1.739.4 1.977.0 2.217.7 2.405.8 2.702.5 2.792.6 3.395.1 3.637.0 3.842.9 4.399.1	50 1 51.4 50 2 51.3 59.8 70.6 62.0 75.4 77.1 77.1 77.1 74.2 79.8 80 22.8	29 3 33.8 37 5 43.4 49.5 58.4 91 3 122 9 120 0 103.1 107.2 105.4 68.9 71.4	74 0 74 8 85.5 94 2 111 5 127.0 130.3 131.8 128 8 139 8 164 4 184 6 207.7 218.2 232.7	318 2 337 1 386 7 438 6 489 9 543 8 556 6 616 5 603 2 740 3 766 0 811 3	192.5 198.5 230.2 265.0 303.4 331.1 333.9 370.4 353.4 449.2 459.3 483.8 519.0	125 7 138.6 156.5 173.6 186.5 212.7 222.7 246.1 249.8 280.5 291.1 306.7 357.9	29 2 37.1 41.5 45.9 60.0 70.7 81.7 91.6 102.3 109.2 114.4 123.0 122.8	104.7 114.6 122.7 134.9 153.4 175.8 188.7 208.3 207.9 249.4 268.3 278.5 285.3 318.1	113 127 144 158 177 193 200 221 229 261 293 318 336 349
989 990 991 992 993 994 995 995 997 997	5,484.4 5,803.1 5,995.9 6,337.7 6,657.4 7,072.2 7,397.7 7,816.9 8,304.3 8,747.0 9,268.4	4,732.3 4,997.8 5,138.7 5,440.4 5,729.3 6,110.5 6,407.2 6,795.2 7,247.5 7,652.5 8,127.2	92.8 96.7 89.2 99.6 93.1 105.6 93.1 113.8 110.7 102.4 93.8	76.0 84.9 76.0 71.3 72.1 73.6 74.1 87.5 92.6 92.4 85.4	244 8 248 5 230.2 232.5 248.3 274 4 287.0 311.7 337.6 406.6	927.3 947.4 957.5 996.7 1.039.9 1.118.8 1.177.3 1.209.4 1.273.9 1.343.9	543.2 542.7 540.9 562.8 593.1 647.7 677.2 706.5 755.5 806.9 820.4	384 1 404 7 416.6 433 8 446.8 471 1 500.0 502.9 524 3 537.0 552.7	135.9 142.9 152.5 157.4 165.3 174.6 181.5 183.3 179.6 180.8 185.4	337 4 347.7 360.5 378.9 401.2 442.7 457.0 489.1 521.2 542.9 577.7	389 405 430 458 493 514 543 574 598 635
000 001 002 003	9.817.0 10.128.0 10.469.6 10.971.2 11,734 3	8,614.3 8,869.7 9,131.2 9,556.8 10,251.0	98.0 97.9 95.4 114.2 141.6	121 3 118.7 106.5 142.3 171.9	435.9 469.5 482.3 501.0 549.5	1.426.2 1.341.3 1.352.6 1.369.2 1.420.1	865.3 778.9 774.8 785.5 824.1	560.9 562.5 577.9 583.7 596.1	189.3 202.3 207.3 222.6 235.3	591 7 607 1 615.4 633.0 694 7	662 691 719 751 790
	Percent			Indust	ry value ad	ided as a p	ercentage (	of GDP (per	cent)		
974 975 976 977 978	100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0	85.2 84.9 85.3 85.6 86.2 86.5	3.3 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.8	2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3	4 9 4 6 4 7 4 6 4 9 5.0	21.2 20.6 21.2 21.6 21.3 21.2	12.8 12.1 12.6 13.1 13.2 12.9	8.4 8.5 8.6 8.5 8.1 8.3	1.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0	7 0 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.9	7 7 7 7 7
980 981 982 983 984 986 987 988 988	100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0	86.2 86.4 85.8 86.1 86.2 86.1 86.2 86.3	2.2 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7	3.3 3.9 3.7 2.7 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.4	4.7 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.6 4.5	20.0 19.7 18.5 18.5 18.4 17.5 17.2 17.1 17.2	12.0 11.8 10.9 10.7 11.3 10.6 10.3 10.2 10.2	8.0 7.9 7.7 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.0	2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.5	6.8 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.2	7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998	100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0	86 1 85.7 85 8 86 1 86.4 86.9 87.3 87.5	1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2	1 5 1 3 1 .1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 9	4 3 3 8 3.7 3.7 3.9 4 0 4.1 4.3 4.4	16.3 16.0 15.7 15.6 15.8 15.9 15.5 15.4 14.8	9.4 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.2 9.2 9.0 9.1	7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.1	2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0	6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 2 6 3	6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0	87.7 87.6 87.2 87.1 87.4	1 0 1 0 9 1 0 1 2	1.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.5	4 4 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 7	14.5 13.2 12.9 12.5 12.1	8.8 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.0	5.7 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.1	1 9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0	6.0 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.9	6 6 6 6

See next page for continuation of table.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Consists of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hinting, mining, construction, and manufacturing <sup>2</sup>Consists of utilities, wholesale trade; retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, professional and business services, educational services, health care, and social assistance arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and tood services; and other services, except government.

Note —Value added is the contribution of each private industry and of government to gross domestic product. Value added is equal to an industry's gross output minus its intermediale inputs. Current-dollar value added is calculated as the sum of distributions by an industry to its labor and caustal which are detailed from the groupperts of arcs domestic product. its labor and capital which are derived from the components of gross domestic income

TABLE B-12.—Gross domestic product (GDP) by industry, value added, in current dollars and as a percentage of GDP, 1974-2004-Continued

[Billions of dollars; except as noted]

			f dollars;							
		-	Private inc	oustries—	-continued					
Year	Trans- por- ta- tion and ware- hous- ing	Infor- ma- tion	Finance, insur- ance, real estate, rental, and leasing	Pro- fes- sion- al and busi- ness serv- ices	Educational services, health care, and social assistance	Arts, enter- tainment, recrea- tion, accom- modation, and food services	Other services, except govern- ment	Govern- ment	Private goods- produc- ing indus- tries <sup>1</sup>	Private services produc- ing indus- tries <sup>2</sup>
	+		1		Value	added				
974 975 976 977 977 978	59.4 68.8 76.2 86.7	50.9 56.5 63.5 71.1 81.4 90.3	223 3 248.2 272.1 304.0 347.4 390.3	84.6 92.9 105.1 122.7 141.9 164.0	64 3 74.2 84.0 93.8 106.4 120.5	40.9 45.7 51.9 58.8 67.9 77.1	35.8 38.4 42.8 46.1 53.2 58.2	222 6 246.9 269 1 291.5 317.7 345.7	471.7 497.2 559.8 627.5 710.6 799.7	805 894 996 1,111 1,266 1,417
980 981 982 983 983 984 985 985 986 987 988	109.9 105.9 117.8 131.4 136.3 145.6	99.0 112.7 123.6 140.0 147.1 162.9 173.1 185.0 194.0 210.4	442.4 498.4 539.9 604.6 670.2 729.7 795.1 840.3 910.1	186.3 213.2 230.9 262.5 303.8 340.8 378.8 414.1 466.3 518.0	214.1 231.3	165.9	62.6 68.5 70.7 79.2 89.3 98.0 107.2 112.3 124.4 133.9	383.7 425.9 462.4 493.1 538.1 583.3 620.0 659.1 704.7 752.0	840.2 946.6 923.3 953.1 1,072.7 1,107.4 1,116.7 1,180.8 1,261.3 1,341.0	1,565 1,755 1,869 2,090 2,322 2,529 2,726 2,899 3,137 3,391
990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	178.2 186.6 201.0 218.0 226.3 235.2 253.7 273.7	225.1 235.2 250.9 272.6 294.0 307.6 335.7 347.8 381.6 439.3	1,042.1 1,103.6 1,177.4 1,241.5 1,297.8 1,383.0 1,470.7 1,593.3 1,684.6 1,798.4	569.8 579.3 626.7 659.1 698.4 743.1 810.1 896.5 976.2 1,064.5	424.8 463.5 488.0 511.1 533.3 552.5 573.1	216.2 225.5 235.0 248.3 264.4 289.8 306.0	142.6 144.2 153.0 163.7 173.2 180.9 188.1 197.4 211.1 217.8	897.3 928.1 961.8 990.4	1.377.4 1.352.8 1.400.0 1.453.4 1.572.4 1.631.4 1.722.4 1.820.8 1.895.4 1.958.9	3,620 3,785 4,040 4,275 4,538 4,775 5,072 5,426 5,757 6,168
000 01 01 02 03 04	301.6 296.9 304.6 321.6	458.3 476.9 483.0 491.8 538.7	1,931.0 2,059.2 2,141.9 2,260.4 2,412.9	1.140.8 1.165.9 1.189.0 1.235.9 1.351.9	678.4 739.3 799.6 850.6 909.0	350.1 361.5	229 1 241.5 252.5 264.3 227.7	1,202.7 1,258.3 1,338.4 1,414.5 1,483.3	2.081.5 2.027.5 2.036.9 2,126.7 2,283.1	6,532 6,842 7,094 7,430 7,967
			Industry	value ac	ided as a	percentage	of GDP (	percent)		
174	3.6 3.8 3.8	3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5	14 9 15.1 14 9 15.0 15.1 15.2	5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4	4.6 4.6	2.9	2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3	14.8 15.1 14.7 14.4 13.8 13.5	31 4 30.3 30.7 30.9 31 0 31.2	53 54 54 55 55
80 81 82 83 84 85 85 86 87 88	3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2	3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8	15.9 15.9 16.6 17.1 17.0 17.3 17.8 17.7 17.8	6.7 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.5 8.7 9.1	5.0 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.0	3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3	2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4	13.8 13.6 14.2 13.9 13.7 13.8	30.1 30.3 28.4 26.9 27.3 26.2 25.0 24.9 24.7 24.5	56 56 57 59 59 61 61
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97	2.9 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1	3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.7	18.0 18.4 18.6 18.6 18.7 18.7 19.2 19.3 19.4	9.8 9.7 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.4 10.8 11.2	6.7 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.9	3 4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5	2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3	13.9 14.3 14.2 13.9 13.6 13.4 13.1	23.7 22.6 22-1 21.8 22.2 22.1 22.0 21.9 21.7 21.1	62 63 64 64 64 65 65
000 001 002 003 003	3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9	4.7 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.6	19 7 20.3 20.5 20.6 20.6	11.5 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.5	6.9 7.3 7.6 7.8	3.6 3.6 3.6	2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4	12.3	21.2 20.0 19.5 19.4 19.5	66 67 67 67

Note (cont'd).—Value added industry data shown in Tables B-12 and B-13 are based on the 1997 North American industry Classification System (NAICS). GDP by industry data based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) are available from the Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Historical data for 1947-73 are available from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. See Survey of Current Business, December 2005, for details.

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-13.—Real gross domestic product by industry, value added, and percent changes, 1974-2004

						Private in	dustries				
Year	Gross domestic product	Total private indus- tries	Agri- cul- ture, forestry, fishing, and	Mining	Con- struc- tion	Ma Total manu- fac-	nufacturing Our- able	Non- dur- able	Util- ities	Whole- sale trade	Retail trade
			hunting	4-		turing	goods	goods			
			C	hain-type q	uantity ind	exes for val	ue added (	2000=100)			
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	44 001 43 916 46.256 48.391 51.085 52.699	41 645 41 482 43 911 46 088 48 802 50 606	39 532 45.885 44.589 46.430 45.057 48 573	78.981 80.253 80.136 86.262 88.929 79.749	75.227 68.132 73.128 74.057 78.442 81.174	42.094 39 206 43 369 46.745 49.157 50 843	35.093 31 649 34 910 37 736 40 159 40.808	54.964 53.697 59.644 64.010 66.062 70.282	57.065 60.771 60.220 59.909 59.583 54.661	30 154 30 899 31 994 33 611 37 065 39 888	33.97 34.24 36.89 38.41 40.65 40.70
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 989	52.579 53.904 52.860 55.249 59.220 61.666 63.804 65.958 68.684 71.116	50 321 51 720 50.422 52.785 56 789 59.383 61.137 63.367 66.299 68.710	47.543 59.731 62.961 43.338 57.105 69.555 68.605 71.483 64.678 71.099	89.978 90.260 86.329 81.175 88.849 93.077 87.529 91.661 99.992 97.072	74 626 67 939 59 460 62 805 72 200 79 043 81 818 82 448 85 435 87 646	48.190 50.480 46.795 50.455 55.084 56.582 56.516 60.746 64.212 65.033	38 476 39 563 35 645 37 953 44 042 45 187 45 550 48 859 52 843 53 696	67.152 72.303 69.864 76.660 76.466 78.688 77.515 83.572 85.425 86.109	51.968 51.733 50.698 52.706 57.341 60.940 64.406 72.315 70.613 79.002	39.782° 42.074 42.096 43.770 47.143 49.523 54.486° 53.070 56.444 58.603°	38.90 40.03 39.95 44.12 48.26 51.23 54.18 52.13 56.54 58.83
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997	72,451 72,329 74,734 76,731 79,816 81,814 84,842 88,658 92,359 96,469	69.905 69.779 72.363 74.291 77.765 79.722 83.179 87.362 91.662 96.183	74.689 75.398 83.114 72.838 84.616, 73.099 80.041 88.315 86.287 89.163	96.157 97.638 95.694 97.020 105.327 105.681 98.850 102.463 101.682 104.300	86.543 79.137 80.026 82.010 86.586 86.312 90.694 93.267 97.087 99.411	64 299 63 412 65.508 68.255 73.496 76.819 79.682 84.518 90.181 94.104	52.963 51.496 52.742 55.173 60.173 65.218 69.120 75.335 84.355 89.627	85.419 85.835 89.669 92.943 98.369 97.783 98.443 100.438 99.762 101.298	84.447 85.285 85.362 85.814 89.518 93.835 95.405 91.161 90.481 94.672	57.318 59.387 65.037 67.135 71.346 70.800 77.261 85.648 95.431 100.412	59.79 59.48 62.96 65.35 69.80 72.97 79.40 86.03 90.39 95.68
0000	100.000 100.751 102.362 105.130 109.562	100.000 100.908 102.354 105.178 110.069	100.000 93.661 98.767 106.268 108.139	100 000 94.715 88 719 87.383 89.352	100 000 100 163 98.201 96.895 99.305	100.000 94.436 97.066 98.894 103.638	100.000 94.031 95.663 99.756 106.071	100.000 95.034 99.056 97.827 100.507	100.000 95.081 99.144 106.881 108.054	100.000 107.003 108.059 110.467 115.559	100.00 106.97 109.29 113.20 120.42
				F	ercent cha	nge from y	ear earlier				
974 975 976 977 978 979 979	-0.5 2 5.3 4.6 5.6 3.2	-0.9 4 5 9 5.0 5.9 3.7	-2.2 16.1 -2.8 4.1 -3.0 7.8	-4.2 1.6 1 7.6 3.1 -10.3	-3 6 -9.4 7.3 1 3 5.9 3.5	-4.5 -6.9 10.6 7.8 5.2 3.4	-3.4 -9.8 10.3 81 64 1.6	-6.2 -2.3 11.1 7.3 3.2 6.4	1.8 6.5 9 5 5 -8.3	-1.2 2.5 3.5 5.1 10.3 7.6	-4 7 4 5
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	-2 2.5 -1.9 4.5 7.2 4.1 3.5 3.4	6 2.8 -2.5 4.7 7.6 4.6 3.0 3.6 4.6 3.6	-2.1, 25.6 5.4 -31.2 31.8 21.8 -1.4 4.2, -9.5 9.9	12.8 3 -4.4 -6.0 9.5 4.8 -6.0 4.7 9.1 -2.9	-8.1 -9.0 -12.5 5.6 15.0 9.5 3.5 8 3.6 2.6	-5.2 4.8 -7.3 7.8 9.2 2.7 -1.7 5.5 5.7	-5.7 2.8 -9.9 6.5 16.0 2.6 8 7.3 8.2 1.6	-4.5 7.7 -3.4 9.7 -3.2 9 -1.5 7.8 2.2	-4.9 -5.5 -2.0 4.0 8.8 6.3 5.7 12.3 -2.4 11.9	-3 5.8 1 4.0 7.7 5.0 10.0 -2.6 6.4 3.8	-4. 2. 10. 9. 6. 5. -3. 8.
1990	1.9 -2 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.5 3.7 4.5 4.2 4.5	1.7 -2-3.7 2.7 4.7 2.5 4.3 5.0 4.9	5.0 9 10.2 -12.4 16.2 -13.6 9.5 10.3 -2.3 3.3	9 1.5 -2.0 1.4 8.6 3.3 -6.5, 3.7 -8 2.6	-1.3 -8.6 1.1 2.5 5.6 3 5.1 2.8 4.1 2.4	-1.1 -1.4 3.3 4.2 7 7 4.5 3 7 6.1 6.7 4.4	-1.4 -2.8 2.4 4.6 9.1 8.4 6.0 9.0 12.0 6.2	- 8 4.5 3.7 5.8 - 6 7 2.0 - 7 1.5	6.9 1.0 .1 .5 4.3 4.8 1.7 -4.4 7 4.6	-2.2 3.6 9.5 3.2 6.3 8 9.1 10.9 11.4 5.2	1 -5 3 6 4 8 8 5 5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	3.7 .8 1.6 2.7 4.2	4.0 .9 1.4 2.8 4.7	12.2 -6.3 5.5 7.6 1.8	-4 1 -5.3 -6.3 -1.5 2.3	-2.0 -1.3 2.5	6.3 -5.6 2.8 1.9 4.8	11.6 -6.0 1.7 4.3 6.3	-1.3 -50 4.2 -12 27	5.6 -4.9 4.3 7.8 1.1	4 7.0 1.0 2.2 4.6	4 7 2 3 6

See next page for continuation of table

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consists of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, mining, construction; and manufacturing <sup>2</sup> Consists of utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation and warehousing; information, finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, professional and business services, educational services, health care, and social assistance, arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services; and other services, except government.

TABLE B-13.—Real gross domestic product by industry, value added, and percent changes, 1974-2004—Continued

				Private in	dustries—c	ontinued					
Ye	Year	Trans- por- ta- tion and ware- hous- ing	Infor- ma- tion	Finance, insur- ance, real estate, rental, and leasing	Pro- fes- sion- al and busi- ness serv- ices	Educa- tional services, health care, and social assis- tance	Arts, enter-tainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services	Other services, except govern- ment	Govern- ment	Private goods- produc- ing indus- tries <sup>1</sup>	Private services- produc- ing indus- tries <sup>2</sup>
				Chain-	type quant	ity indexes	tor value a	dded (2000	=100)		
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978		41.313 38 471 41.733 43.462 45 697 48 252	24.289 25.176 26.473 28.460 31.532 34.231	43.359 45.494 46.720 47.363 50.358 52.965	30.374 29.732 31.391 34.086 36.884 39.387	48.961 51.971 54.419 57.878 60.672 63.234	41.950 42.348 45.554 48.641 52.049 53.512	68.356 68.213 70.997 71.231 75.107 75.703	72.251 73.147 74.283 74.973 76.694 77.721	47.628 45.467 49.103 52.269 54.587 56.085	38 887 39.687 41.544 43.258 46.163 48.120
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985		47.232 46.178 43.855 49.486 52.121 52.715 53.021 55.690 57.990 59.507	36.394 38.257 38.155 41.017 40.717 42.039 42.672 45.764 47.649 51.150	55.414 56.573 56.986 58.734 61.282 62.812 63.965 65.941 68.652 70.359	40.529 41.554 41.345 44.142 48.913 52.748 56.860 60.050 64 420 68.787	66.887 68.455 68.856 71.153 72.366 73.629 75 166 80.273 80.570 84.002	52.407 54.193 55.695 59.784 62.194 66.167 69.642 71.515 73.872	74.411 72.329 69.103 72.470 77.498 80.936 82.885 84.221 89.044 92.188	79.023 79.328 79.456 80.178 81.038 83.172 85.105 86.753 88.812 90.984	53.880 55.783 52.029 53.361 59.454 62.569 62.534 66.173 69.104 70.366	48.764 49.923 49.794 52.637 55.727 58.104 60.576 62.256 65.186 68.033
1991 1992 1993 1994		62.281 65.060 68.758 71.988 77.827 80.473 84.585 88.373 91.454 95.301	53.420 54.441 57.568 61.445 65.223 67.996 72.714 74.559 82.252 95.467	71.877 73.051 74.863 76.931 78.506 80.732 82.893 86.786 90.201 94.994	72.073 69.786 72.008 73.224 75.430 77.382 82.053 87.432 91.976 96.898	87.047 89.285 91.728 92.199 92.413 93.503 94.144 94.809 95.603 97.304	76.063 74.232 77.250 78.787 80.604 83.542 86.796 90.310 93.446 96.836	94.369 91.258 92.502 95.195 98.624 99.714 99.072 99.291 101.871 100.236	93.215 93.658 94.134 94.055 94.407 94.250 94.768 95.864 96.923 98.009	69.858 68.214 70.330 72.128 77.818 79.572 82.596 87.229 91.878 95.402	69.877 70.319 73.074 75.047 77.745 79.773 83.377 87.407 91.591 96.434
2001	•••••	100.000 97.354 99.531 103.164 107.340	100.000 104.034 106.263 109.092 123.022	100.000 103.858 104.800 108.409 112.539	100.000 99.346 99.192 102.393 108.993	100 000 103.186 107.527 110.523 114.026	100.000 99.292 101.022 103.997 107.168	100.000 98.337 98.667 99.780 101.001	100.000 100.794 102.467 103.766 104.766	100.000 95.654 96.853 98.009 101.811	100.000 102.584 104.107 107.452 112.686
					Perce	nt change	from year e	arlier			
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978		1.0 -6.9 8.5 4.1 5.1 5.6	3.2 3.7 5.2 7.5 10.8 8.6	5.1 4.9 2.7 1.4 6.3 5.2	0.8 -2.1 5.6 8.6 8.2 6.8	4.1 6.1 4.7 6.4 4.8 4.2	-2.5 9 7.6 6.8 7.0 2.8	-3.3 2 4.1 .3 5.4	2.6 1.2 1.6 .9 2.3 1.3	-4.1 -4.5 8.0 6.4 4.4 2.7	1.1 2.1 4.7 4.1 6.7 4.2
1981 1982 1983		-2.1 -2.2 -5.0 12.8 5.3 1.1 6 5.0 4.1 2.6	6.3 5 1 - 3 7.5 7 3.2 1.5 7.2 4.1 7.3	4.6 2 1 .7 3.1 4 3 2.5 1.8 3.1 4.1 2.5	2.9 2.5 5 6.8 10.8 7.8 7.8 5.6 7.3 6.8	5.8 2.3 .6 3.3 1.7 1.7 2.1 6.8 4.3	-2.1 3.4 2.8 7.3 4.0 6.4 5.3 -1.3 4.0 3.3	-1.7 -2.8 -4.5 4.9 6.9 4.4 2.4 1.6 5.7	1.7 .4 .2 .9 11 2.6 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.4	-3.9 3.5 -6.7 2.6 11.4 5.2: -1.1 5.8 4.4 1.8	1.3 2.4 3 5.7 5.9 4.3 4.3 2.8 4.7 4.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996		4.7 4.5 5.7 4.7 8.1 3.4 5.1 4.5 3.5	4.4 19 5.7 6.1 4.3 6.9 2.5 10.3 16.1	2.2 1.6 2.5 2.8 2.0 2.8 2.7 4.7 3.9 5.3	4.8 -3.2 3.2 1.7 3.0 2.6 6.0 6.6 5.2	3.6 2.6 2.7 .5 .2 1.2 .7 .7	3.0 -2.4 4.1 2.0 2.3 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.6	2.4 -3.3 1.4 2.9 3.6 1.1 6 -2 2.6 -1.6	2.5 .5 .5 1 .4 2 .5 1.2 1.1	7 -2.4 3.1 2.6 7.9 2.3 3.8 5.6 5.3	2.7 6 3.9 2.7 3.6 2.6 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.3
2000 2001 2002 2003		4.9 -2.6 2.2 3.7	4.7 4.0 2.1 2.7 12.8	5.3 3.9 .9 3.4 3.8	3.2 7 2 3.2 6.4	2.8 3.2 4.2 2.8 3.2	3.3 7 1.7 2.9 3.0	2 -1.7 .3 1.1 1.2	2.0 .8 1.7 1.3 1.0	4.8 -4.3 1.3 1.2 3.9	3.7 2.6 1.5 3.2 4.9

Note.—Data are based on the 1997 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
Historical data for 1947-73 are available from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. See Survey of Current Business, December 2005, for details.
See Note, Table 8-12.

TABLE B-14.—Gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959-2005 (Billions of dollars, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates)

	0					Net	value add	ied				Α	ddenda	
	Gross value added	Con-			Taxes		Ne	et operat	ing surpl	us			In-	Сарі-
Year or quarter	of non- tinan- cial corpo- rate	sump- tion ot fixed cap- ital	Total	Com- pen- sa- tion of employ-	on prod- uction and imports less	Total	Net interest and mis- cel- la-	Busi- ness cur- rent trans-	invento	ate profit ry valuati al consum djustment Taxes	on and option is	Profits before tax	ven- tory valua- tion ad-	tal con- sump- tion ad-
	busi- ness!	1,01		ees	subsi- dies		neous pay- ments	fer pay- ments	Total	on cor- porate income	Profits after tax?		just- ment	just- ment
1959	266 0	21 1	244.9	170 8	24.4	49 7	2 9	13	45.5	20 7	248	43 4	-0.3	2 3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	276 4 283 7 309 8 329 9 356 1 391 2 429 0 451 2 497 8 540 5	22 6 23 2 23.9 25 2 26 4 28 4 31 5 34.3 37 6 42 4	253 8 260.5 285 9 304 7 329 7 362 8 397 4 416.8 460 2 498 1	180 4 184 5 199 3 210 1 225 7 245 4 272 9 291 1 321 9 357 1	26 6 27 6 29 9 31 7 33 9 36.0 37 0 39 3 45 5 50 2	46 8 48 4 56 8 62 9 70 2 81 4 87.6 86.4 92.8 90.8	3 2 3 7 4 3 4.7 5.2 5.8 7.0 8 4 9 7 12.7	1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.2	42 2 43.2 50 8 56 5 63 0 73.3 77 9 75.2 80.0 74 9	19 1 19 4 20.6 22.8 23 9 27 1 29 5 27.8 33 5 33 3	23 1 23 8 30 2 33 8 39 2 46 2 48 4 47 3 46 5 41 6	40 1 39 9 44 6 49.7 55.9 66.1 71 4 67 6 74 0	-2.3 .0 1 5 -1.2 -2.1 -1.6 -3.7 -5 9	2.3 3.0 6.1 6.8 7.7 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	558 3 603 0 669.5 750 8 809 8 876.7 989 7 1.119 4 1.272 9 1,415.9	46.8 50.7 56.4 62.7 74.1 87.9 97.0 110.5 127.8 147.3	511 5 552 4 613 2 688 1 735 7 788.7 892.7 1,008.8 1,145 1 1,268.6	376.5 399.4 443.9 502.2 552.2 575.5 651.4 735.3 845.3 959.9	54 2 59 5 63 7 70 1 74 4 80.2 86 7 94 6 102.7 108 8	80.7 93.4 105.6 115.8 109.1 133.1 154.7 178.9 197.0 200.0	16 6 17.6 18 6 21 8 27.5 28 4 26 0 28 5 33 4 41 8	3.3 3.7 4.0 4.7 4.1 5.0 7.0 9.0 9.5 9.5	60.9 72 1 83.0 89.4 77 5 99 6 121 7 141 4 154 1 148 8	27.3 30 0 33 8 40 4 42.8 41 9 53.5 60.6 67.6 70.6	33.6 42.1 49.2 49.0 34.7 57.7 68.2 80.9 86.6 78.1	58.5 67.4 79.2 99.4 110.1 110.7 138.2 159.4 183.7 197.0	-6.6 -4.6 -19.6 -38.2 -10.5 -14.1 -15.7 -23.7 -40.1	8.9 9.3 10.5 9.5 5.6 5 2.4 2.2 5.9 8.1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	1.537 1 1.746 0 1.806 2 1.933 0 2.167.5 2.302.0 2.387 5 2.557 1 2.771.6 2.912 3	168 2 191 5 211 2 217 6 230 7 247 4 255 3 266 5 281 6 301 6	1.368 9 1.554 5 1.594 9 1.715.4 1.936.8 2.054 6 2.132.2 2.290.6 2.490.0 2.610.7	1.049 8 1.161 5 1.203 9 1.266 9 1.406 1 1.504 2 1.583 1 1.687 8 1.812 8 1.914 7	121 5 146 7 152 9 168 0 185 0 196 6 204 6 216 8 233 8 248 2	197.6 246.4 238.1 280.5 345.7 353.8 344.5 386.0 443.4 447.9	54 2 67 2 77 4 77 0 86 0 91 5 95 1 96 4 109 8 142 0	10.2 11.4 8.8 10.5 11.7 16.1 27.3 29.9 27.4 23.0	133 2 167.7 151.9 192.9 248.0 246 3 222.1 259 7 306.2 282.9	68.2 66.0 48.8 61.7 75.9 71.1 76.2 94.2 104.0 101.2	65 0 101 7 103 1 131 2 172 0 175 2 145 9 165 5 202 3 181 7	184.0 185.0 139.9 163.3 197.6 173.4 149.7 209.8 260.4 238.7	-42 1 -24 6 -7.5 -7 4 -4 0 7.1 -16.2 -22 2 -16.3	-8.7 7.4 19.5 37.1 54.3 72.8 65.3 66.2 68.0 60.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	3.041 5 3.099 7 3.236 0 3.397 8 3.669 5 3.879 5 4.109 5 4.401 8 4.655 0 4 950.8	319 2 341 4 353 6 363 4 391 5 415.0 436 5 467 1 493 3 523 8	2,722 3 2,758.3 2,882.3 3,034.4 3,278.0 3,464.5 3,673.0 3,934.7 4,161.7 4,427.0	2,012 9 2,048 4 2,154 1 2,244 8 2,381 5 2,509 8 2,630.8 2,812 9 3,045 6 3,267.7	263 5 285 7 302 5 318 8 349.6 356 9 369.1 385 5 398 7 416 6	445 8 424 2 425 7 470 8 546 9 597 8 673 1 736 3 717 4 742 7	146.2 135.9 111.3 102.0 101.0 115.2 111.9 124.0 143.8 160.2	25.4 26.7 25.2 29.6 30.0 30.2 38.0 39.0 35.2 45.0	274 3 261.5 289 2 339.2 415 9 452.5 523.2 573 4 538 3 537.6	98 5 88 6 94.4 108 0 132 9 141.0 153.1 161.9 158.6 171.2	175 8 172 9 194 8 231 2 283 1 311 4 370 1 411 5 379 7 366 3	239.0 222.4 258.2 303.3 380.1 419.3 458.5 494.2 449.4 457.9	-12.9 4 9 -2.8 -4.0 -12.4 -18.3 3.1 14 1 20.2 1.0	48.2 34.2 33.8 39.9 48.3 51.5 61.6 65.0 68.7 78.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	5,272.2 5.293.5 5,371.7 5,595.7 5,995.4	567 8 646.8 643 6 652 6 690 3 729 2	4,704 3 4,646.7 4,728.2 4,943 1 5,305.1	3,544.4 3,595.9 3,611.9 3,703.2 3,906.8 4,173.9	443 4 439.1 465 5 486 5 519 1 549 8	716 5 611 8 650.8 753.4 879.2	191 7 204 0 167 4 166 2 164 9	48 4 50.6 54.0 62 4 60.4 43 0	476.4 357.2 429.4 524.9 653.9	170.2 111.7 97.0 126.5 165.9	306 2 245 5 332.3 398.3 487.9	423.9 310.6 336.3 448.1 573.9	-14.1 11.3 -2 2 -13.3 -39 6	66.6 35.2 95.3 90.0 119.7 -55.7
2002-1 11 111 1V	5,284 6 5,358 3 5,395 6 5,448 4	643.3 643.4 643.4 644.2	4.641 3 4.715.0 4.752 1 4.804.2	3,576.7 3,616.8 3,626.4 3,627.4	454 3 462 8 470.2 474 8	610.2 635.3 655.5 702.0	186 1 168 5 160 1 155 0	53.6 53.2 53.8 55.2	370.6 413.5 441.5 491.8	78 2 91 9 102.0 116 0	292 3 321.6 339.5 375 8	260.9 317.2 357.2 409.8	13.3 -1.6 -11.8 -8.8	96.4 97.9 96.1 90.9
2003     II   III   IV	5,456 5 5,541 8 5,650 0 5,734 4	646 1 649 6 654 3 660.2	4,810 4 4,892 2 4,995 7 5,074.2	3,636.8 3,682.2 3,726.1 3,767.8	478 3 474 9 493 1 499 8	695.2 735.2 776.5 806.6	161 3 166 1 168.4 168.9	59 1 61 6 63 7 65.0	474.8 507.5 544.4 572.8	119 3 116 7 128.1 141.9	355.4 390.7 416.3 430.9	423.7 414.3 454.0 500.5	-25.0 -2.1 -5.1 -20.8	76.0 95.3 95.6 93.1
2004   	5.822 0 5.922 8 6.038 0 6.198 9	667 4 675 7 722 0 696 2	5,154 7 5,247 1 5,316.1 5,502 8	3,806 3 3,850 5 3,928 5 4,042.0	509 8 516 2 520 6 529 9	838.5 880.4 866.9 930.9	169 1 166 2 162 1 162 1	66.7 67.6 37.9 69.5	602.7 646.6 666.9 699.3	145 9 165.2 171 8 180 8	456 8 481 4 495.1 518 5	507.9 571.9 589.5 626.1	-28.9 -48.3 -36.9 -44.4	123.8 123.0 114.2 117.6
2005   II   III   IV e   .	6,282 8 6 414 0 6.512 1	697.5 700 4 792 8 726 0	5,585.3 5,713.6 5,719.3	4.105.4 4.140.5 4.198.8 4.251.1		942 2 1,025 2 966 8	167 0 167 3 172.8	58 0 58.4 2.9 52.7	717 1 799 6 791 1	231.9 248.6 258.0	485.2 550.9 533.1	807 6 865.5 890.8	-39 1 -18 9 -27.5	-51.3 -47.0 -72.2 -52.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Estimates for nonfinancial corporate business for 2000 and earlier periods are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC); later estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) <sup>2</sup> With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

TABLE B-15.—Gross value added and price, costs, and profits of nonfinancial corporate business, 1959-2005

## [Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		ross added	Price pe	er unit of re	al gross	value adde	ed of nontin	ancial corp	orate bus	iness (doll	ars) 1 2
Year or quarter	nonfi corp bus	of nancial porate iness		Com- pen- sation of		Unit noi	labor cost	Net	invento capita	ate profits ry valuational consump liustments	in and otion
rear or quarter		ons of ars) <sup>1</sup> Chained	Total <sup>2</sup>	employ- ees (unit	Total	sump- tion of	on produc- tion and	interest and miscel- laneous	Total	Taxes on corpo-	Profits
	dollars	(2000) dollars		cost)		fixed capital	ım- ports <sup>3</sup>	pay- ments		rate income	tax 5
1959	266.0	980.4	0.271	0.174	0.051	0.022	0.026	0.003	0.046	0.021	0.02
1960	276.4 283.7	1,012.0 1,033.6	.273 .274	178 179	.053 .054	.022	.028	.003	.042	.019	.023
962 963	309.8 329.9	1,120.7 1,186.7	.276 .278	.178	.053	.021	.028	.004	.045	.018	.02
964	356.1	1,270.3	.280	.178	.053	.021	.028	.004	.048	019 .019	.02
965 966	391.2 429.0	1,375.1 1,472.6	.284	.178	.053	.021	.028	.004	.053	.020	.03
967	451.2	1,508.9	.299	.103	.057	023	.027	.005	.053	.020	.03
968 969	497.8 540.5	1,604.8 1,667.6	.310	.201	.059	.023	.030	.006	.050	.021	.02
969 970	558.3	1,649.9	.324	.214	.065	.025	.032	.008	.045	.020	.02
971	603.0	1,716.6	.351	.233	.077	030	.037	.010	.042	.017	.02
972 973	669.5 750.8	1,846.4 1.957.7	.363 .384	.240 .257	.078	.031	.037	.010	.045	.018	.02
974	809.8	1.925.4	.421	.287	.093	.038	.041	.014	.040	.022	.01
975 976	876.7 989.7	1,898.8 2,050.0	.462 .483	.303 .318	.106	.046	.045	.015	.052 .059	.022	.03
977	1,119.4	2,200.0	.509	.334	.110	.050	.047	.013	.064	.028	.03
978 979	1,272.9 1,415.9	2,344.1 2,418.7	.543 .585	.361 .397	.117	.055	.048	.014	.066	.029	.03
980	1,537.1	2,394.6	.642	.438	148	.070	.055	.023	.056	.028	.02
981 982	1,746.0 1.806.2	2,491.5 2,430.6	.701	466 .495	.167	.077 .087	.063	.027 .032	.067 062	.026	.04
983	1.933.0	2,545.1	.759	.498	.185	.085	.070	.030	.076	.024	.05
984 985	2,167.5 2,302.0	2,772.8 2,896.3	.782	.507 .519	185	.083	.071 .073	.031	.089 085	.027	.06
986	2,387.5	2,963.3	.806	.534	.196	.086	.078	.032	.075	.026	.04
987	2,557.1 2,771.6	3,119.6 3,300.7	.820 .840	.541	.195	.085	.079	.031	.083	.030	.05 .06
989	2,912.3	3,361.8	.866	.570	.213	.090	.081	.042	.084	.030	.05
90 91	3,041.5 3,099.7	3,404.0 3,376.2	.894	.591 .607	.222	.094	.085	.043	.081	.029	.05
992	3,236.0	3,479.5	.930	.619	.228	.101	.093	.032	.077 .083	.026 .027	.05 .05
993	3,397.8 3,669.5	3,575.5 3,797.9	.950	.628 .627	228	.102	.097	.029	_095 _110	.030	.06
95	3,879.5	3,977.4	.975	.631	.230	.104	.097	.029	.114	.035	.07
996 997	4,109.5 4,401.8	4,196.4 4,469.3	.979 .985	.627 .629	.228	.104	.097 .095	.027	.125	.036	.08
998	4,655.0	4,725.4	.985	.645	.226	.104	.092	.030	.114	.034	.08
999	4,950.8 5,272.2	5,011.0 5,272.2	.988	.652 .672	.229	.105	.092	.032	.107	.034	.07
001	5.293.5	5,224.5	1.013	.688	.257	.124	.093	.036	.068	.032 .021	.05
002	5.371.7	5,269.7 5,418.2	1.019	.685 .683	.253 .252	.122	099 .101	.032	.081	.018	.06
004	5,595.7 5,995.4	5,714.1	1.049	.684	.251	.121	101	.031	.114	.029	.08
002:1	5,284.6	5,194.6	1.017	.689	.258	.124	.098	.036	.071	.015	.05
11 111	5,358.3 5,395.6	5,265.4 5,296.0	1.018	.687	.252	122 121	.098	.032	.079	.017	.06
1V	5,448.4	5,322.8	1.024	.681	.250	.121	.100	.029	.092	.022	.07
003:1	5,456.5 5,541.8	5,301.9 5,374.5	1.029	.686 .685	.253 .252	122 121	-101 -100	.030	.090	.023	.06
III	5,650.0	5,466.9	1.033	.682	.253	120	.102	.031	.100	.023	.07
IV	5,734.4	5,529.7	1.037	.681	.252	.119	.102	031	.104	.026	.07
004: I	5,822.0 5,922.8	5,578.3 5,625.9	1.044	.682	.253 .254	.120	.103	.030	.108	.026	.08: 80
fil	6,038.0	5,756.2	1.049	.682	.250	.125	.097	.028	.116	.030	.08
IV	6,198.9	5,895.9 5.943.3	1.051	.686	.247	.118	.102	.027	.119	.031	.08
II	6,414.0	6,046.0	1.061	.685	.244	.116	.100	.028	.132	.041	.09
<b>III</b>	6,512.1	6,107.0	1.066	.688	.249	.130	.091	.028	.130	.042	.08

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Estimates for nontinancial corporate business for 2000 and earlier periods are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC); later estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).

<sup>2</sup> The implicit price deflator for gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business divided by 100.

<sup>3</sup> Less subsidies plus business current transfer payments.

<sup>4</sup> Unit profits from current production.

5 With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-16.—Personal consumption expenditures, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Dur	able goo	ds		Nondu	rable god	ds				Servi	ces		
	Personal con-		Motor	Furni- ture		•	Cloth	Gaso-	Fuel			House		Trans-	
Year or quarter	sumption expendi- tures	Total 1	vehi- cles and parts	and house- hold equip- ment	Total <sup>1</sup>	Food	Cloth- ing and shoes	line and oil	Fuel oil and coal	Total <sup>1</sup>	Hous- ing <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>1</sup>	Elec- tricity and gas	por- ta- tion	Medi- cal care
1959	317 6	42 7	18 9	18 1	148 5	80 6	26 4	11 3	4 0	126.5	45 0	18.7	7.6	10.6	16.4
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	331 7 342 1 363 3 382.7 411 4 443.8 480 9 507 8 558 0 605 2	43 3 41 8 46 9 51 6 56 7 63 3 68 3 70 4 80 8 85 9	19 7 17 8 21 5 24 4 26 0 29 9 30 3 30 0 36 1 38 4	18 0 18 3 19 3 20 7 23 2 25.1 28 2 30 0 32 9 34.7	152 8 156 6 162 8 168 2 178 6 191 5 208 7 217 1 235 7 253 1	82.3 84 0 86 1 88 2 93 5 100.7 109 3 112 4 122 2 131 5	27 0 27 6 29.0 29.8 32.4 34 1 37 4 39 2 43.2 46 5	12 0 12 0 12 6 13 0 13 6 14 8 16 0 17 1 18 6 20 5	3 8 3 8 3 8 4 0 4 1 4 4 4 7 4 8 4 7 4 6	135 6 143 8 153 6 162 9 176 1 189 0 203 8 220 3 241 6 266 1	48.2 51.2 54.7 58.0 61.4 65.4 69.5 74.1 79.8 86.9	20.3 21.2 22.4 23.6 25.0 26.5 28.1 30.0 32.3 35.0	8.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.9 11.5 12.2 13.0 14.1	11.2 11.6 12.3 12.9 13.8 14.7 15.9 17.4 19.3 21.6	17 7 19.0 21.2 23.0 26.4 28.6 31.5 34.7 40.1 45.8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	648 5 701 9 770.6 852 4 933 4 1.034 4 1.151 9 1.278.6 1.428 5 1.592 2	85 0 96 9 110 4 123 5 122 3 133 5 158 9 181 2 201 7 214 4	35.5 44.5 51.1 56.1 49.5 54.8 71.3 83.5 93.1 93.5	35.7 37.8 42.4 47.9 51.5 54.5 60.2 67.2 74.3 82.7	272 0 285.5 308.0 343.1 384.5 420.7 458.3 497 1 550 2 624 5	143 8 149 7 161 4 179 6 201 8 223 2 242 5 262 6 289 6 324 7	47 8 51 7 56.4 62 5 66 0 70.8 76.6 84 1 94.3 101.2	21 9 23.2 24.4 28.1 36.1 39.7 43 0 46.9 50.1 66.2	4 4 4 6 5.1 6 3 7.8 8.4 10.1 11.1 11.5 14.4	291 5 319.5 352 2 385.8 426.6 480.2 534.7 600.2 676.6 753.3	94 1 102 8 112 6 123 3 134 8 147 7 162 2 180 2 202 4 227 3	37.8 41.1 45.4 49.9 55.8 64.0 72.5 81.8 91.2 100.3	15.3 16.9 18.8 20.4 24.0 29.2 33.2 38.5 43.0 47.8	24 0 26 8 29 6 31 6 34 1 37 9 42 5 48 7 53 4 59 9	51 7 58 4 65.6 73 3 82.3 95.6 109.1 125.3 143.1 161 0
1980 . 1981 1982 1983 . 1984 . 1985 1986 1987 1988	1.757.1 1.941.1 2.077.3 2.290.6 2.503.3 2.720.3 2.899.7 3.100.2 3,353.6 3,598.5	214 2 231 3 240 2 280 8 326 5 363 5 403 0 421 7 453 6 471 8	87.0 95.8 102.9 126.5 152.1 175.9 194.1 195.0 209.4 215.3	163.7	696 1 758 9 787 6 831 2 884 6 928 7 958 4 1.015 3 1.083 5 1.166.7	356 0 383 5 403 4 423 8 447 4 467 6 492 0 515 2 553 5 591 6	107 3 117 2 120.5 130 9 142.5 152 1 163 1 174 4 185.5 198 9	86.7 97.9 94.1 93.1 94.6 97.2 80.1 85.4 88.3 98.6	117	846,9 950,8 1,049,4 1,178,6 1,292,2 1,428,1 1,538,3 1,663,3 1,816,5 1,960,0	256.2 289.7 315.2 341.0 374.5 412.7 448.4 483.7 521.5 557.4	113 7 126.8 142.5 157.0 169 4 181.8 187.7 195.4 207.3 221.1	57.5 64.8 74.2 82.4 86.5 90.8 89.2 90.9 96.3 101.0	65.2 70.3 72.9 81.1 93.2 104.5 111.1 120.9 133.4 142.0	184.4 216.7 243.3 274.3 303.2 331.5 357.5 392.2 442.8 492.5
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998	3.839 9 3.986 1 4.235 3 4.477 9 4.743 3 4.975 8 5.256 8 5.547 4 5.879 5 6.282.5	474 2 453.9 483 6 526.7 582 2 611 6 652 6 692 7 750 2 817.6	212.8 193.5 213.0 234.0 260.5 266.7 284.9 305.1 336.1 370.8	171.6 171.7 178.7 193.4 213.4 228.6 242.9 256.2 273.1 293.9	1,379 4 1,437.2 1,485 1 1,555.5 1,619.0 1,683 6	636 8 657.5 669 3 691.9 720.6 740.9 768 7 796.2 829 8 873.1	204 1 208.7 221.9 229.9 238.1 241.7 250.2 258.1 270.9 286.3	111.2 108 5 112 4 114 1 116.2 120.2 130.4 134 4 122 4 137.9	12 2 12.4 12.8 13 1 14.3 13 3 11 5	2,421.2 2,571.8 2,723.9 2,879.1 3,048.7 3,235.8 3,445.7	597.9 631.1 658.5 683.9 726.1 764.4 800.1 842.6 894.6	227.3 238.6 250.7 269.9 286.2 298.7 318.5 337.0 350.5 364.8	101.0 107.4 108.9 118.2 120.7 122.2 129.4 131.3 129.8 130.6	172.7 190.6 207.7 226.5 245.7 259.5	556.0 608.9 672.2 715.1 752.9 797.9 833.5 873.0 921.4 961.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	6,739 4 7,055 0 7,350 7 7,709 9 8,214 3 8,745 9	923 9 950.1 987 8	386 5 407.9 429 3 439 1 441.8 445 8	312.9 312.1 323.1 330.3 354.1 373.3	2.079 6 2.189 0 2.368 3	925 2 967 9 1.001 9 1.048 5 1.134 7 1.218 8	297.7 297.7 303.5 310.8 329.0 345.5	175.7 171.6 164.5 192.6 230.4 287.2	15.4 14.2 17.0 19.5	4,154 3 4,347.2 4,570.8	1,073.7 1,123.1 1.158.0 1,221.1	390 1 409 0 407 7 428 8 446.2 482.4	143 3 156.7 152.5 166.6 175.9 201 6	292 8 288 4 296 8 306.9	1,026 8 1,113.8 1,206.2 1,299.4 1,401 1 1,509 8
2002-1 II III IV ,	7,230 3 7,323 0 7,396 6 7,453 1	940 1	422 8 422 4 446 6 425 2	322 0 324 9 322.2 323.3	2,078 9 2,085.1 2,109.7	1,002.4 1,011.6	303 6 303 8 300 2 306 5	146.7 167 2 170.1 174.1	14 1 14.4	4,270.2 4,325.2 4,371.4 4,421.8	1.121.1	400 0 406.9 407.9 415.9	146.5 153.0 151.3 159.1	289.0 287.7	1,169 4 1,193 4 1,218 0 1,244 0
2003         . 	7.555 2 7,635.3 7,782 4 7,866 6	942 2 974 7	427.2 438.1 454.6 436.4	319 5 325.9 335 3 340.6	2.153 1 2.213.5	1,026.6 1.033 7 1,058.9 1,074.9	302 8 307 0 316.1 317.3	199.9 185.2 194.9 190.6	16 I 16.7	4,479.5 4,540.0 4,594.2 4,669.5	1,149.5	424.7 428.2 427.9 434.3	164 2 167 1 165 1 169 8	294 9 298 4 300.8	1,265 2 1,288.6 1,308.1 1,335.9
2004   	8,032.3 8,145.6 8,263.2 8,416.1	974 6 993 8	437 0 432 4 444 9 452 8	347.2 351.7 356.9 360.6		1 106 5	326.7	211.3 234.9 229.0 246.5	18.2	4 815 9	1.195.8 1,213 9 1,230 0 1,244 7	440.7 440.7 445.9 457.9	172.9 171.8 173.2 185.9	305.6 308.0	1,360.1 1,387.1 1,415.4 1,441.6
2005   	8,535.8 8,677.0 8,844.0 8,926.9	1,035.5 1,050.9	449 6 458.5 468 7 406.4	366.9 370.0 374.9 381.6	2.476.6 2.533.7 2,604.9 2,642.0	1,184 2 1,207.1 1,229.9 1,254 2	340.5 344.9 343.9 352.6	253 1 273 9 313 9 307 9	22.5	5,107 8	1,260.6 1,275.3 1,288.2 1,302.3	465.3 471.4 484.4 508.4	189 5 192.4 202.1 222.4	318.5	1,470.5 1,492.6 1,522.0 1,554.0

 $<sup>^{1}\,\</sup>mathrm{Includes}$  other items not shown separately  $^{2}\,\mathrm{Includes}$  imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing

Source- Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

TABLE B-17.—Real personal consumption expenditures, 1990-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Per-	Du	rable go	ods		Nondu	ırable go	ods				Serv	ices		
Year or	sonal con- sump-		Motor vehi-	Furni- ture and			Cloth-	Gaso-	Fuel			House		Trans-	Medi-
quarter	tion ex- pendi- tures	Total <sup>1</sup>	cles and parts	house- hold equip- ment	Total	Food	and shoes	line and oil	oil coal	Total <sup>1</sup>	Hous- ing <sup>2</sup>	Total 1	Elec- tricity and gas	porta- tion	cal
1990	4,770.3 4,778.4 4,934.8 5,099.8 5,290.7 5,433.5 5,619.4 5,831.8 6,125.8 6,438.6	453.5 427.9 453.0 488.4 529.4 552.6 595.9 646.9 720.3 804.6	256.1 226.6 244.9 259.2 276.2 272.3 285.4 304.7 339.0 372.4	119.9 121.1 127.8 141.1 156.8 173.3 193.4 216.3 244.7 280.7	1,484.0 1,480.5 1,510.1 1,550.4 1,603.9 1,638.6 1,680.4 1,725.3 1,794.4 1,876.6	784.4 783.3 787.9 802.2 821.8 827.1 834.7 845.2 865.6 893.6	188.2 188.8 199.2 207.4 218.5 227.4 238.7 246.0 263.1 282.7	141.8 140.3 146.0 149.7 151.7 154.5 157.9 162.8 170.3 176.3	16.7 16.6 17.0 17.4 18.2 18.7 18.4 16.9 16.0 16.4	2,851.7 2,900.0 3,000.8 3,085.7 3,176.6 3,259.9 3,356.0 3,468.0 3,615.0 3,758.0	802.2 820.1 832.7 841.8 869.3 887.5 901.1 922.5 948.8 978.6	266.4 269.9 277.4 291.1 303.3 312.9 327.3 340.4 357.1 371.9	117.4 121.1 120.4 126.8 128.8 130.2 134.7 133.7 136.7 138.1	195.7 186.3 194.2 202.5 218.4 231.8 247.5 263.2 272.0 283.4	797.6 824.5 863.6 877.2 887.1 906.4 922.5 942.8 970.7 989.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004		863.3 900.7 964.8 1,028.5 1,089.9 1,137.7	386.5 405.8 429.0 449.7 457.0 451.7	312.9 331.8 364.3 396.3 442.9 485.2	1,947.2 1,986.7 2,037.1 2,101.8 2,200.4 2,298.0		297.7 303.7 318.3 334.1 355.0 376.6	175 7 178.3 181.9 183.2 185.9 190.6	15.8 15.2 15.5 15.5 15.5 14.6	3,928.8 4,023.2 4,100.4 4,183.9 4,310.9 4,438.0	1,033.7 1,042 1 1,048.4 1,078.4	390.1 391.0 393.2 398.2 405.6 416.8	143.3 140.9 144.9 146.8 149.2 154.9	291.3 288.0 280.2 280.1 283.4 287.2	1,026.8 1,075.2 1,136.6 1,184.9 1,233.8 1,291.8
2002: I II III IV	7,042.2 7,083.5 7,123.2 7,148.2	948.4 956.9 983.4 970.4	422.1 422.5 445.6 425.9	356.9 363.5 365.2 371.6	2,026.8 2,033.4 2,035.0 2,053.1	950.2 954.5 954.4 959.5	315.9 317.0 315.7 324.4	181.3 182.0 183.2 181.2	14.7 15.6 15.5 16.3	4,069.4 4,095.7 4,109.0 4,127.4	1,043.7 1,041.0	388.0 395.1 392.4 397.3	139.8 145.8 144.1 149.8	281.9 281.0 279.1 279.0	1,113.5 1,129.5 1,144.6 1,158.8
2003: I II III IV	7,192.2 7,256.8 7,360.7 7,416.4		431.6 445.9 466.8 454.4	372.5 387.4 407.5 417.7	2,069.5 2,079.1 2,121.2 2,137.3	969.2 970.5 987.7 992.8	323.4 331.1 340.4 341.5	181.7 181.7 184.0 185.3	15.7 14.7 15.6 16.1	4,146.5 4,169.7 4,190.2 4,229.4	1,044.5	397.9 396.4 395.9 402.4	148.6 145.5 143.8 149.2	280.6 279.4 280.0 280.4	1,169.8 1,180.1 1,187.6 1,202.2
2004 · I II III IV	7,501.4 7,536.6 7,617.5 7,698.8	1,072.5	453.9 448.1 461.4 464.6	428.4 437.1 449.2 456.8	2,171.9 2,186.1 2,206.9 2,236.5	1,022.5 1,030.9	352.6 349.7 354.9 363.0	184.7 185.5 185.4 188.1	15.6 15.4 16.0 15.0	4,269.0 4,288.6 4,324.0 4,362.1	1,074.6 1,081.9	404.2 402.3 403.5 412.4	149.7 146.9 145.6 154.7	283.8 283.5 283.4 283.0	1,211.4 1,225.5 1,241.6 1,255.4
2005: I II III IV P	7,764.9 7,829.5 7,907.9 7,930.2	1.143.9 1.169.7	455.0 463.3 477.3 411.3	469.2 475.9 490.5 505.2	2,265.6 2,285.9 2,305.8 2,334.7	1.072.2 1,088.7	367.9 374.4 377.2 387.0	192.1 190.5 188.7 190.9	15.6 14.8 14.4 13.6	4,392.0 4,417.6 4,453.5 4,489.1	1,101.4 1,106.6	414.3 413.8 418.5 420.5	155.2 153.2 155.5 155.9	284.6 286.3 287.6 290.5	1,269.1 1,282.3 1,299.6 1,316.1

Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total personal consumption expenditures for 1959-89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes other items not shown separately.
<sup>2</sup> Includes imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing.

TABLE B-18.—Private fixed investment by type, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

						Nonresio	fential					Re	esidential	
						Equ	upment	and soft	ware				Structi	ures
Year or	Private fixed	Total			Inform	nation prod ment and		quip-		Trans-		Total		
quarter	invest- ment	non- resi- den- tial	Struc- tures	Total	Total	Com- puters and pe- ripheral equip- ment	Soft- ware	Other	Indus- trial equip- ment	porta- tion equip- ment	Other equip- ment	resi- den- tial <sup>1</sup>	Total <sup>1</sup>	Sin- gle fam- ily
959	746	46.5	18.1	28 4	4 0	0.0	0.0	4 0	8.5	8.3	7.6	28 1	27 5	16
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 966 967 968	75.7 75 2 82.0 88 1 97.2 109.0 117.7 118.7 132.1 147 3	49 4 48 8 53 1 56 0 63.0 74.8 85.4 86 4 93 4 104 7	19 6 19.7 20.8 21 2 23.7 28.3 31.3 31.5 33.6 37.7	29.8 29.1 32.3 34.8 39.2 46.5 54.9 59.9 67.0	4 9 5 3 5.7 6.5 7.4 8.5 10.7 11.3 11.9 14.6	2 3 .3 .7 .9 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.4	1 2 .2 4 .5 .7 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8	4 6 4 8 5 1 5 4 5.9 6.7 8 0 8.2 8.7 10.4	9.4 8.8 9.3 10.0 11.4 13.7 16.2 16.9 17.3 19.1	8.5 8.0 9.8 9.4 10.6 13.2 14.5 14.3 17.6 18.9	7.1 7.0 7.5 8.8 9.9 11.0 12.7 12.4 13.0 14.4	26.3 26.4 29.0 32.1 34.3 34.2 32.3 32.4 38.7 42.6	25.8 25.9 28.4 31.5 33.6 33.5 31.6 37.9 41.6	14 14 15 16 17 17 16 16 16
970 971 972 973 974 976 977 978	150.4 169.9 198.5 228.6 235.4 236.5 274.8 339.0 412.2 474.9	109.0 114.1 128.8 153.3 169.5 173.7 192.4 228.7 280.6 333.9	40.3 42.7 47.2 55.0 61.2 61.4 65.9 74.6 93.6 117.7	68.7 71.5 81.7 98.3 108.2 112.4 126.4 154.1 187.0 216.2	16.6 17.3 19.5 23.1 27.0 28.5 32.7 39.2 48.7 58.5	2.7 2.8 3.5 3.9 3.6 4.4 5.7 7.6 10.2	2.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.9 4.8 5.2 5.5 6.3 8.1	11.6 12.2 13.2 16.3 19.2 20.2 23.1 28.0 34.8 40.2	20.3 19.5 21.4 26.0 30.7 31.3 34.1 39.4 47.7 56.2	16.2 18.4 21.8 26.6 26.3 25.2 30.0 39.3 47.3 53.6	15.6 16.3 19.0 22.6 24.3 27.4 29.6 36.3 43.2 47.9	41 4 55 8 69 7 75 3 66 0 62 7 82 5 110 3 131 6 141 0	40.2 54.5 68.1 73.6 64.1 60.8 80.4 107.9 128.9 137.8	17 25 32 33 29 43 62 77
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988	485.6 542.6 532.1 570.1 670.2 714.4 739.9 757.8 803.1 847.3	362 4 420.0 426.5 417.2 489.6 526.2 519.8 524.1 563.8 607.7	136.2 167.3 177.6 154.3 177.4 194.5 176.5 174.2 182.8 193.7	226.2 252.7 248.9 262.9 312.2 331.7 343.3 349.9 381.0 414.0	68 8 81.5 88 3 100.1 121.5 130 3 136 8 141.2 154.9 172 6	12.5 17.1 18.9 23.9 31.6 33.7 33.4 35.8 38.0 43.1	9 8 11 8 14.0 16.4 20 4 23.8 25 6 29.0 34.2 41.9	46.4 52.5 55.3 59.8 69.6 72.9 77.7 76.4 82.8 87.6	60.7 65.5 62.7 58.9 68.1 72.5 75.4 76.7 84.2 93.3	48.4 50.6 46.8 53.5 64.4 69.0 70.5 68.1 72.9 67.9	48.3 55.2 51.2 50.4 58.1 59.9 60.7 63.9 69.0 80.2	123.2 122.6 105.7 152.9 180.6 188.2 220.1 233.7 239.3 239.5	119 8 118.9 102.0 148.6 175.9 183 1 214 6 227 9 233.2 233 4	5 4 7 8 8 10 11 12 12
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 996 997	846.4 803.3 848.5 932.5 1.033.3 1.112.9 1.209.5 1.317.8 1.438.4 1.558.8	622.4 598.2 612.1 666.6 731.4 810.0 875.4 968.7 1.052.6 1.133.9	202.9 183.6 172.6 177.2 186.8 207.3 224.6 250.3 275.2 282.2	419.5 414.6 439.6 489.4 544.6 602.8 650.8 718.3 777.3 851.7	177.2 182.9 199.9 217.6 235.2 263.0 290.1 330.3 363.4 411.0	38.6 37.7 44.0 47.9 52.4 66.1 72.8 81.4 87.2 96.0	47.6 53.7 57.9 64.3 68.3 74.6 85.5 107.5 124.0 152.6	90.9 91.5 98.1 105.4 114.6 122.3 131.9 141.4 152.2 162.4	92.1 89.3 93.0 102.2 113.6 129.0 136.5 140.4 146.4	70.0 71.5 74.7 89.4 107.7 116.1 123.2 135.5 144.0 167.6	80.2 70.8 72.0 80.2 88.1 94.7 101.0 112.1 123.5 126.0	224 0 205 1 236.3 266.0 301 9 302.8 334 1 349 1 385.8 424 9	218 0 199 4 230 4 259 9 295 6 296 5 327 8 342 8 379 3 417 8	11 9 12 14 16 15 17 17 19 22
000 001 002 003 004	1.679.0 1.646.1 1.570.2 1.654.9 1.872.6 2.084.3	1,232.1 1.176.8 1,066.3 1,082.4 1,198.8 1,328.3	313.2 322.6 279.2 276.9 298.4 334.5	918.9 854.2 787 1 805.6 900.4 993.8	467.6 437.0 399.4 405.7 447.0 489.2	101.4 85.4 77.2 77.6 91.6 105.6	176.2 174.7 167.6 170.0 178.5 198.1	190 0 177.0 154.5 158.2 176.9 185.5	159.2 146.7 135.7 137.1 145.3 161.0	160 8 141 7 126.3 127 9 151.9 170.9	131.2 128.8 125.7 134.8 156.2 172.7	446.9 469.3 503.9 572.5 673.8 756.0	439.5 461.9 496.3 564.7 665.4 747.1	23 24 26 31 37 42
002: I II . III IV .,	1.572 4 1.568.8 1.566.8 1.572.8	1.085.2 1.067.8 1.061.4 1.050.7	292 2 280.9 272.1 271 7	793.0 787.0 789.3 779.0	402.9 400.3 403.7 390.6	79.7 76.4 78.1 74.8	165.9 167.7 171.0 166.0	157.3 156.2 154.7 149.9	136.7 133.6 136.0 136.4	130 6 126 9 123 1 124 7	122.8 126.1 126.5 127.3	487.2 501.0 505.4 522.1	479.6 493.3 497.8 514.5	25 26 26 27
003: I II III . IV .	1.588.2 1.619.7 1.683.7 1.728.2	1.048.2 1.066.8 1.098.8 1.116.0	268 4 277 1 279.0 283 0	779 8 789 7 819.8 833 0	392 0 395 3 412.9 422 8	73 9 75 0 79 1 82 3	165 6 166.7 173.0 174 6	152.5 153.6 160.8 165.9	140 7 137.6 136 9 133.3	119 0 127 2 131 6 133.7	128 1 129.5 138.4 143.3	540.0 552.9 584.9 612.2	532 4 545 2 576 9 604.1	29 29 31 34
004   	1.772 7 1.856 6 1.908 7 1.952 6	1.140 7 1.182.7 1.219.0 1.252 9	285.3 296.3 302.1 309.8	855 3 886 5 916 9 943 1	436 5 444 3 450 9 456 3	86 6 90 0 92.3 97 5	176.1 176.9 179.9 181.1	173.9 177.4 178.6 177.8	139.9 139.5 149.3 152.6	133.3 150.3 155.6 168.4	145.6 152.4 161.0 165.8	632.0 673.9 689.7 699.7	623.8 665.5 681.3 691.1	35 37 38 39
005   	1.998 7 2,058.5 2.119 2 2,160.9	1.280 1 1.313.5 1.348 9 1.370.6	315 9 325 6 340 2 356 3	964 3 987 9 1,008 7 1,014 3	474 6 486 6 494 5 501 3	102 7 105 6 105 0 109 3	188.3 197.3 201.3 205.5	183 6 183 6 188 2 186 6	161 3 154 9 161 3 166 4	163 8 172 8 177.9 169 0	164.6 173.7 175.0 177.6	718 5 745 0 770 3 790 3	709.7 736 1 761 3 781 1	40 41 42 44

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes other items, not shown separately

TABLE B-19.—Real private fixed investment by type, 1990-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

						Nonre	sidential					R	esidentia	I
						E	quipment	and softw	are				Struct	ures
V	Private .	Total			Intorm	ation proc and s	cessing e	quipment				Total		
quarter quarter	fixed invest- ment	non- resi- den- tial	Struc- tures	Total	Total	Com- puters and periph- eral equip- ment <sup>1</sup>	Soft- ware	Other	Indus- trial equip- ment	Trans- porta- tion equip- ment	Other equip- ment	Total resi- den- tial <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>2</sup>	Single family
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	886.6 829.1 878.3 953.5 1,042.3 1,109.6 1,209.2 1,320.6 1,455.0 1,576.3	595.1 563.2 581.3 631.9 689.9 762.5 833.6 934.2 1,037.8 1,133.3	275.2 244.6 229.9 228.3 232.3 247.1 261.1 280.1 294.5 293.2	355.0 345.9 371.1 417.4 467.2 523.1 578.7 658.3 745.6 840.2	100.7 105.9 122.2 138.2 155.7 182.7 218.9 269.9 328.9 398.5		39.9 45.1 53.0 59.3 65.1 71.6 84.1 108.8 129.4 157.2	80.1 79.6 84.4 90.9 99.4 107.0 117.2 127.3 143.2 158.0	109.2 102.2 104.0 112.9 122.9 134.9 139.9 143.0 148.1 147.9	81.0 78.8 80.2 95.1 111.4 120.6 125.4 135.9 145.4 167.7	96.0 82.0 81.6 89.3 96.5 101.7 105.6 115.8 125.7 126.7	298 9 270 2 307.6 332.7 364.8 353.1 381.3 388.6 418.3 443.6	292.6 264 0 301.4 326.4 358.6 346.8 375.1 382.4 411.9 436.6	154 2 135.1 164.1 179.7 198.9 180.6 197.3 196.6 218.1 234.2
2000	1,679.0	1,232.1	313.2	918.9	467.6		176.2	190.0	159.2	160.8	131.2	446.9	439.5	236.8
2001	1,629.4	1,180.5	306.1	874.2	459.0		173.8	181.7	145.7	142.8	126.9	448.5	441.1	237.1
2002	1,544.6	1,071.5	253.8	820.2	437.4		169.7	161.1	134.5	126.0	122.9	469.9	462.2	246.3
2003	1,600.0	1,085.0	243.1	846.8	459.7		175.7	166.2	134.9	123.1	130.7	509.4	501.3	272.6
2004	1,755.1	1,186.7	248.4	947.6	522.4		188.8	188.9	139.4	138.7	150.0	561.8	552.9	307.5
2005 p	1,896.1	1,287.6	253.1	1,049.8	590.8		210.2	198.8	148.9	156.5	159.7	602.1	592.7	327.5
2002: I	1,551.5	1,090.3	270.3	820.9	435.0		166.3	162.9	135.8	130.4	120.3	459.0	451 4	238.0
II	1,545.9	1,073.3	256.4	819.0	437.1		170.2	162.6	132.7	126.1	123.8	469.5	461.8	245.9
III	1,543.2	1,068.0	245.8	825.7	444.2		173.4	161.7	134.7	124.1	123.6	471.8	464.2	248.9
IV	1,537.8	1,054.5	242.5	815.4	433.3		168.7	157.1	134.9	123.5	124.1	479.3	471.6	252.4
2003: I	1,540.9	1,051.6	237.3	818.7	439.4		169.8	159.7	138.8	116.7	124.5	484.8	477.1	257.8
II	1,573.7	1,072.9	244.8	832.0	445.3		171.0	161.1	135.6	126.3	125.5	496.0	488.0	262.4
III	1,629.0	1,101.8	244.7	862.4	469.0		178.9	169.1	134.5	126.6	134.0	521.2	512.9	276.4
IV	1,656.3	1,113.7	245.5	874.0	485.3		183.2	174.9	130.7	122.6	138.8	535.7	527.1	293.8
2004	1,684.4	1.135.1	243.4	899 1	504.8		185.5	184.7	135.9	121 9	141-3	542.4	533.7	298.0
	1,744.5	1.171.6	248.5	931.4	517.4		186.9	189.5	134.4	136.7	146.4	565.1	556.2	308.2
	1,780.2	1.204.8	249.4	965.6	527.9		190.0	191.1	142.8	142.8	154.3	568.8	559.7	312.0
V	1,811.3	1,235.1	252.3	994.2	539.7		192.8	190.3	144.5	153.3	158.0	571.0	561.8	312.0
2005: I	1,842.2	1,252.2	251.0	1,014.2	565.1		199.8	196.3	150.9	148.8	153.9	584 1	574.8	320.5
II	1,884.7	1,279.0	252.7	1,040.9	584.6		209.1	196.5	143.2	158.1	160.6	599 3	590.0	323.3
III	1,921.5	1,305.2	254.1	1,067.5	600.2		213.7	202.1	148.8	163.3	161.1	610.0	600.6	329.0
IV P	1,935.9	1,314.2	254.5	1,076.8	613.4		218.2	200.5	152.6	155.6	163.1	615.2	605.6	337.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For details on this component see *Survey of Current Business*, Table 5.3.6, Table 5.3.1 for growth rates, Table 5.3.2 for contributions, and Table 5.3.3 for quantity indexes.

<sup>2</sup> Includes other items, not shown separately.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-20.—Government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Gov	ernment	consump	otion exp	enditures a	ind gross	investme	ent			
						Federal						State and	local	
Year or				National	Gro			Nonde	Gro				Gro	
quarter	Total	Total	Total	Con- sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Total	Con- sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Total	Con- sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware
1959	110.0	65 4	53.8	40.1	2.5	11 2	11.5	9 8	1.5	0.2	44.7	30.7	12.8	11
1960 1961 1962 1963 1965 1965 1966 1967 1968	111 6 119.5 130.1 136.4 143.2 151.5 171.8 192.7 209.4 221.5	64 1 67.9 75.3 76.9 78.5 80.4 92.5 104 8 111.4 113.4	53.4 56.5 61.1 61.0 60.3 60.6 71.7 83.5 89.3 89.5	41.0 42.7 46.6 48.3 48.8 50.6 60.0 70.0 77.2 78.2	2 2 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2	10.1 11.5 12.5 11.0 10.2 89 10.5 12.3 10.9 9 9	10.7 11.4 14.2 15.9 18.2 19.8 20.8 21.3 22.1 23.8	8.7 9.0 11.3 12.4 14.0 15.1 15.9 17.1 18.3 20.2	1.7 1 9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.1	.3 .6 8 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.7	47.5 51.6 54.9 59.5 64.8 71.0 79.2 87.9 98.0 108.2	33.5 36.6 39.0 41.9 45.8 50.2 56.1 62.6 70.4 79.9	12 7 13.8 14.5 16.0 17 2 19.0 21.0 23.0 25.2 25.6	1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978	233.8 246.5 263.5 281.7 317.9 357.7 383.0 414.1 453.6 500.8	113.5 113.7 119.7 122.5 134.6 149.1 159.7 175.4 190.9 210.6	87.6 84.6 87.0 88.2 95.6 103.9 111.1 120.9 130.5 145.2	76.6 77.1 79.5 79.4 84.5 90.9 95.8 104.2 112.7 123.8	1.3 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5	9.8 5.7 5.7 6.6 8.9 10.7 13.2 14.4 15.3 18.9	25.8 29.1 32.7 34.3 39.0 45.1 48.6 54.5 60.4 65.4	22.1 24.9 28.2 29.4 33.4 38.7 41.4 46.5 50.6 55.1	2 1 2.5 2 7 3.1 3.4 4 1 4 6 5 0 6.1 6.3	1.7 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.7 4.0	120.3 132.8 143.8 159.2 183.4 208.7 223.3 238.7 262.6 290.2	91.5 102.7 113.2 126.0 143.7 165.1 179.5 195.9 213.2 233.3	25.8 27.0 27.1 29.1 34.7 38.1 36.9 42.8 49.0	3.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.9 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.6 7.8
1980	566.2 627.5 680.5 733.5 797.0 879.0 949.3 999.5 1.039.0 1,099.1	243.8 280.2 310.8 342.9 374.4 412.8 438.6 460.1 462.3 482.2	168 0 196.3 225.9 250.7 281.6 311 2 330.9 350.0 354.9 362.2	143 7 167 3 191 2 208 8 232 9 253 7 268 0 283 6 293 6 299 5	3.2 4.0 4.8 4.9 6.2 6.8 7.7 7.4 6.4	21 1 25.7 30.8 37.1 43 8 51.3 56.1 58.8 53.9 56.3	75.8 84.0 84.9 92.3 92.8 101.6 107.8 110.0 107.4 120.0	63.8 71.0 72.1 77.7 77.1 84.7 90.3 90.6 88.9 99.7	7.1 7.7 6.8 6.7 7.0 7.3 8.0 9.0 6.8 6.9	4 9 5.3 6.0 7.8 8.7 9 6 9.5 10.4 11.7 13.4	322.4 347.3 369.7 390.5 422.6 466.2 510.7 539.4 576.7 616.9	258.4 282.3 304.9 324.1 347.7 381.8 417.9 440.9 470.4 502.1	55.1 55.4 54.2 54.2 60.5 67.6 74.2 78.8 84.8 84.8	8.9 9.5 10.6 12.2 14.4 16.8 18.6 19.6 21.5 26.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	1.180.2 1.234.4 1.271.0 1.291.2 1.325.5 1,369.2 1.416.0 1.468.7 1.518.3 1.620.8	508.3 527 7 533.9 525.2 519 1 519 2 527.4 530.9 530.4 555.8	374 0 383 2 376 9 362 9 353 7 348 7 354 6 349 6 345 7 360 6	308.1 319.8 315.3 307.6 300.7 297.3 302.5 304.7 300.7 312.9	6.1 4.6 5.2 5.1 5.7 6.3 6.7 5.7 5.1 5.0	59.8 58.8 56.3 50.1 47.2 45.1 45.4 39.2 39.9 42.8	134.3 144.5 157.0 162.4 165.5 170.5 172.8 181.3 184.7 195.2	111.7 119.7 129.8 134.2 140.1 143.2 143.8 153.0 153.9 162.2	8.0 9.2 10.3 11.2 10.5 10.8 11.2 9.8 10.6 10.6	14 6 15.7 16.9 16.9 14.9 16.5 17.9 18.5 20.2 22.4	671 9 706.7 737.0 766.0 806.3 850.0 888.6 937.8 987.9 1.065.0	544.6 574.6 602.7 630.3 663.3 696.1 724.8 758.9 801.4 858.9	98.5 103.2 104.2 104.5 108.7 117.3 126.8 139.5 143.6 159.7	28.7 28.9 30.1 31.2 34.3 36.7 36.9 39.4 43.0 46.4
2000 = 2001 = 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	1,721.6 1,825.6 1,961.1 2,091.9 2,215.9 2,359.7	578.8 612.9 679.7 754.8 827.6 874.8	370.3 392.6 437.1 496.7 552.7 585.3	321.5 342.4 381.7 436.6 484.2 514.4	5.0 4.6 4.4 5.1 5.1 5.2	43.8 45.6 51.0 55.0 63.4 65.6	208.5 220.3 242.5 258.2 274.9 289.5	177.8 189.5 209.9 225.3 241.4 252.8	8.3 8.3 9.9 10.3 9.4 10.2	22.3 22.5 22.8 22.6 24.0 26.5	1,142.8 1,212.8 1,281.5 1,337.1 1,388.3 1,484-9	917.8 969.8 1,025.3 1,074.8 1,117.7 1,192.6	176.0 192.4 205.9 211.6 217.6 235.8	49 0 50 6 50.2 50 8 53.0 56.5
2002.I II III . IV	1,912.0 1,948.3 1,971.8 2,012.5	654.9 675.2 682.0 706.6	418.2 431.1 438.0 461.1	366.8 375.4 379.8 404.8	4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6	47 3 51 3 53.7 51.7	236 6 244.1 243.9 245 5	204.5 209.6 211.6 213.7	9.7 9.7 9.8 10.3	22.5 24.8 22.5 21.5	1,257 2 1,273.1 1,289.8 1,305 9	1,001 8 1,019.4 1,033.6 1,046.7	204 8 203.5 206 0 209 5	50.6 50.2 50.2 49.8
2003.1 II IV	2,054.4 2,090.5 2,106.2 2,116.5	724.0 763.4 761.8 770.0	467.2 507.2 500.3 512.0	409.9 447.0 439.4 450.0	4.7 5.0 5.5 5.3	52.6 55.2 55.5 56.6	256.8 256.3 261.5 258.0	224.9 220.6 229.0 226.8	10.2 10.9 10.6 9.3	21.8 24.7 21.9 21.9	1,330.4 1,327.1 1,344.4 1,346.5	1,070 8 1,067.8 1,077.7 1,082.9	209.6 209.0 215.6 212.0	50.1 50.2 51.1 51.7
2004 1 II III IV	2.166 2 2.205 0 2.232.5 2.260 0	808.3 824.6 836.5 840.8	538 7 547 2 562.9 562 0	472.5 479.6 494.6 490.1	5.1 4.7 5.2 5.2	61.1 62.9 63.1 66.7	269 6 277.4 273.6 278 8	238.1 241.5 241.1 245.1	9 1 9.6 9.5 9.6	22 4 26 4 23 0 24.2	1.357.9 1.380.4 1.395.9 1.419.1	1,095 1 1,108 9 1,123.9 1,143 1	210 7 218.7 218.8 222.0	52.1 52.7 53.3 54.0
2005: I II III IV e	2,302.0 2,337.6 2,392.7 2,406.8	860 2 869.8 892.2 876.9	575 3 582 5 601.7 581.6	508.9 512.3 528 6 507 8	5.1 5.1 5.1 5.5	61 3 65 1 68.0 68 2	285 0 287.3 290.5 295.3	250.7 250.5 254.3 255.7	9.2 8.7 9.8 13.1	25.0 28.2 26.4 26.5	1.441 7 1.467.7 1.500.4 1.529.9	1.159.0 1,175.7 1,205.7 1,230.1	227.5 235.7 237.7 242.2	55.2 56.3 57.1 57.6

TABLE B-21.—Real government consumption expenditures and gross investment by type, 1990-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Gov	ernment	consump	tion exp	enditures a	and gross	investme	ent			
		_				Federal						State and	local	
				Nationa!	defense			Nonde	ense			State and	10021	
Year or quarter	Total		-	Con-	Gro invest			Con-	Gro			Con-	Gro invest	
		Total	Total	sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Total	sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware	Total	sump- tion expend- itures	Struc- tures	Equip- ment and soft- ware
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	1,530.0 1,547.2 1,555.3 1,541.1 1,541.3 1,549.7 1,564.9 1,594.0 1,624.4 1,686.9	659 1 658.0 646.6 619.6 596.4 580.3 573.5 567.6 561.2 573.7	479.4 474.2 450.7 425.3 404.6 389.2 383.8 373.0 365.3 372.2	404.9 404.4 383.5 367.2 350.6 338.1 332.2 328.1 319.8 324.6	8.6 6.4 7.0 6.4 7.1 7.4 7.7 6.4 5.5	64.2 61.8 58.7 51.1 46.8 43.7 43.8 38.9 40.1 42.5	178.6 182.8 195.4 194.1 191.7 191.0 189.6 194.5 195.9 201.5	156.5 158.4 168.2 166.0 167.3 164.7 161.1 166.6 164.8	10.6 11.8 13.2 14.1 12.7 12.6 12.7 10.9 11.5	12.9 13.7 15.0 15.0 13.3 14.7 16.4 17.5 19.8 22.3	868.4 886.8 906.5 919.5 943.3 968.3 990.5 1,025.9 1,063.0 1,113.2	714.2 729.0 746.5 761.4 780.6 798.4 812.8 834.9 866.4 900.3	132.1 136.5 137.0 133.9 134.9 139.5 146.3 155.8 155.6 167.0	25.0 24.8 25.9 26.8 29.3 31.3 32.3 36.41.45.9
2000	1,721.6 1,780.3 1,858.8 1,911.1 1,952.3 1,985.1	578.8 601.4 643.4 687.8 723.7 738.4	370.3 384.9 413.2 449.7 481.3 492.2	321.5 334.1 356.7 388.5 413.3 423.0	5.0 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.4 4.3	43.8 46.4 52.6 56.7 64.4 65.6	208.5 216.5 230.2 238.0 242.2 246.0	177.8 185.8 197.3 204.8 208.6 210.0	8.3 8.0 9.3 9.4 8.3 8.4	22.3 22.7 23.5 23.6 25.3 28.0	1,142.8 1,179.0 1,215.4 1,223.3 1,228.4 1,246.5	917 8 941.2 969.4 975.2 979.5 991.1	176.0 186.0 193.5 194.3 192.8 196.0	49. 51. 52. 53. 56. 60.
2002: I II III IV	1,832.0 1,853.4 1,863.9 1,885.8	623.2 641.7 646.5 662.3	399.2 410.2 414.4 428.9	346.5 353.5 355.2 371.5	3.9 4.2 4.3 4.3	48.8 52.9 55.4 53.2	224.0 231.5 232.2 233.4	191.8 196.9 199.5 201.2	9.2 9.2 9.3 9.6	22.9 25.6 23.3 22.3	1,208.9 1,211.8 1,217.5 1,223.6	961.9 967.8 972.0 975.7	194.4 191.6 192.8 195.4	52. 52. 52. 52.
2003: I II III IV	1,884.4 1,917.5 1,920.1 1,922.6	662.8 696.8 693.2 698.5	425.0 460.1 452.5 461.2	366.7 398.7 390.5 398.2	4.3 4.5 5.0 4.8	54.2 57.0 57.3 58.4	237.9 236.4 240.6 237.0	205.5 200.7 207.7 205.2	9.4 10.1 9.7 8.5	22.7 25.8 22.9 23.1	1,221.6 1,220.7 1,226.8 1,224.1	975.3 975.1 974.8 975.4	193 4 192.3 197.8 193.8	52. 53. 54. 55
2004: I II III IV	1,938.4 1,949.5 1,958.4 1,962.8	716.5 722.2 728.6 727.6	476.4 477.4 487.7 483.7	409.7 410.1 419.8 413.4	4.5 4.1 4.5 4.4	62.7 63.9 63.9 66.9	239.9 244.6 240.6 243.6	207.9 208.8 207.9 209.9	8.2 8.5 8.3 8.2	23.6 27.7 24.3 25.5	1,221.8 1,227.1 1,229.6 1,235.0	975.3 977.2 980.7 984.8	191.2 194.2 192.6 193.2	56.
2005: I II III IV e	1,971.9 1,984.1 1,998.1 1,986.2	731.8 736.1 749.5 736.1	487.3 491.7 503.6 486.2	421.9 422.9 432.2 415.0	4.3 4.3 4.2 4.4	61.2 65.2 68.1 68.0	244.3 244.2 245.6 249.7	210.4 208.2 210.1 211.4	7.8 7.2 8.0 10.6	26.3 29.7 28.0 28.1	1,239.8 1,247.8 1,248.5 1,249.8	986.8 988.8 993.3 995.6	195.0 199.9 195.5 193.7	58. 60. 61. 62.

Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total government consumption expenditures and gross investment for 1959-89.

TABLE B-22.—Private inventories and domestic final sales by industry, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted]

			Mining. utili-	rivate inve					Final sales of	Ratio of inventi to final s domestic	ories ales of
Quarter	Total?	Farm	ties, and construc- tion?	Manu- tac- turing	Whole- sale trade	Retail trade	Other indus- tries?	Non- farm <sup>2</sup>	domes- tic busi- ness 3	Total	Nontarm
Fourth quarter 1959	132 9	42 1		47.7	16 5	20 5	6.1	90 8	316	4 20	2.87
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	136 2 139 6 147 2 149.7 154 3 169.3 185.7 194 9 208 2 227 7	42 7 44 3 46 7 44 2 42 1 47 1 47 4 45.8 48 9 53.1		48.7 50 1 53 2 55.1 58 6 63 4 73 0 79 9 85 1 92 6	16.9 17 3 18.0 19.5 20.8 22.5 25.8 28.1 29.3 32.5	21 9 21 3 22.7 23 9 25.2 28.0 30.6 30 9 34 2 37.5	6 1 6.6 6 6 7.1 7.7 8 3 8.9 10.1 10.6 12.0	93 5 95 2 100 5 105 5 112 2 122 2 138 3 149 1 159 3 174 6	32.7 34.3 36.0 38.3 41.2 45.3 47.8 50.3 55.4 59.1	4 17 4 07 4 09 3 91 3 75 3 73 3 88 3 87 3 76 3 85	2.86 2.78 2.79 2.75 2.73 2.70 2.89 2.96 2.87 2.95
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977	236.0 253.9 283.9 352.2 406.3 409.3 440.1 482.4 571.4 668.2	52 7 59 5 74 0 102.8 88.2 90.3 85.8 91.0 119.7 135.6		95 5 96.6 102.1 121 5 162 6 162 2 178.7 193 2 219 8 261 8	36.4 39.4 43.1 51.7 66.9 66.5 74.1 84.0 99.0 119.5	38 5 44 7 49 8 58 4 63 9 64 4 73 0 80.9 94 1 104 7	12.9 13.7 14.8 17.7 24.7 25.9 28.5 33.3 38.8 46.6	183.3 194.4 209.9 249.4 318.1 319.0 354.2 391.4 451.7 532.6	62.4 68.0 76.3 84.3 90.4 101.7 111.9 124.8 144.7 160.1	3.78 3.73 3.72 4.18 4.49 4.02 3.93 3.86 3.95 4.17	2.94 2.86 2.75 2.96 3.52 3.14 3.17 3.14 3.12 3.33
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	739.8 779.2 774.1 797.6 869.3 876.1 858.0 924.2 999.2 1.044.4	141.1 127.5 131.5 132.5 131.8 125.9 112.9 119.8 130.2 129.6		293 4 313 1 304 6 308.9 344.5 333 3 320.6 339 6 372.4 390.5	139.4 148.8 147.9 153.4 169.1 175.9 182.0 195.8 213.9 222.8	111 7 123.2 123 2 137.6 157 0 171 4 176 2 199.1 213.2 231 4	54 1 66.6 66.8 65 2 66.9 69 5 66.3 69 9 69.5 70.1	598.7 651.7 642.6 665.1 737.6 750.2 745.1 804.4 869.1 914.7	175.0 187.7 195.8 216.8 234.8 250.7 265.7 279.3 305.6 324.4	4.23 4.15 3.95 3.68 3.70 3.49 3.23 3.31 3.27 3.22	3.42 3.47 3.28 3.07 3.14 2.99 2.80 2.88 2.84 2.82
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995	1.082 3 1.057 2 1 082 4 1.115 8 1.194 3 1.257.0	133 4 123 2 132.9 132.1 134.3 130.9		404 5 384.1 377 6 380 1 404 3 424 5	236.8 239.2 248.3 258.6 281.5 303.7	236.6 240.2 249.4 268.6 293.6 312.2	71.0 70.5 74.3 76.5 80.6 85.6	948.9 934.0 949.5 983.7 1.060.0 1.126.1	337.6 347.6 372.7 393.6 416.8 439.2	3.21 3.04 2.90 2.83 2.87 2.86	2.81 2.69 2.55 2.50 2.54 2.56
NAICS 1996 1997 1998 1999	1.284 4 1.329 5 1.346.8 1.442.2	136.3 136.7 120.3 124.2	31 1 33.7 37.3 39 6	421 0 431 7 431 5 457.7	285.1 303.1 313.3 337.4	328 7 337 5 353 6 383 8	82.1 86.9 90.9 99.5	1.148.1 1.192.9 1.226.5 1.318.0	469 1 495.6 526.8 556.7	2.74 2.68 2.56 2.59	2 45 2 41 2 33 2 37
2000 2001	1,535.9 1,458.3	132 1 126 1	44.5 47.5	477 0 437.9	359 0 338 6	409.0 395.6	114 4 112 6	1.403.8 1.332.2	583.6 598.7	2.63 2.44	2.41 2.23
2002                V	1,460 8 1,468.2 1,487 6 1,507 8	128 3 125 1 128 1 135.8	47 8 49.1 48 0 49.4	437 1 436 8 441 0 443.6	336.0 338.0 346.1 348.0	400 4 407 5 412.7 419 3	111 0 111 7 111 5 111 7	1,332 4 1,343.0 1,359 4 1,372 0	596 0 598 2 600.6 601.0	2 45 2.45 2 48 2.51	2.24 2.25 2.26 2.28
2003. L. II III IV	1,536 2 1,529 6 1,547 5 1,569 3	136 5 136 9 149 2 151.0	55.5 55.6 56.4 58.4	450.9 446.5 443.9 449.7	352 3 348 4 351 5 360.3	428 7 429 5 434 0 437.3	112 4 112 6 112 6 112 6	1,399.7 1,392.7 1,398.3 1,418.3	606.6 614.8 631.5 639.1	2.53 2.49 2.45 2.46	2.31 2.27 2.21 2.22
2004 I II III IV	1,606.5 1,650.9 1,679.7 1,711.7	154 2 160 0 152 9 152 5	60 7 63.3 66.3 70 4	460 7 474.7 491 7 499 6	370.9 380.4 393.6 404.2	446.6 457.5 458.4 465.9	113 4 114 9 116 9 119 1	1,452 3 1,490 9 1,526.8 1,559.3	650.6 661.2 670.4 681.0	2.47 2.50 2.51 2.51	2.23 2.25 2.28 2.29
2005   	1.761 5 1.763 0 1.792 3 1.829.0	170.1 165.4 164.3 166.2	71 8 75 9 80 5 90 7	512 8 510 7 522.9 531 5	414 9 419 5 430 4 438 0	470.8 468.8 469.2 476.0	121 1 122.7 124 9 126.5	1.591 4 1.597 6 1.628.0 1.662 8	691.3 707.8 721.3 725.9	2 55 2 49 2 48 2.52	2.30 2.26 2.26 2.29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Inventories at end of quarter Quarter-to-quarter change calculated from this table is not the current-dollar change in private inventories component of GDP. The former is the difference between two inventory stocks, each valued at its respective end-of-quarter prices. The latter is the change in the physical volume of inventories valued at average prices of the quarter. In addition, changes calculated from this table are at quarterly rates, whereas change in private inventories is stated at annual rates.

<sup>2</sup> Inventories of construction, mining, and utilities establishments are included in other industries through 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Final sales of domestic business equals final sales of domestic product less gross output of general government, gross value added of nonprofit institutions, compensation paid to domestic workers, and space rent for owner-occupied housing

government, gross value added at horipital institutions, exceptional includes a small amount of final sales by farm and by government enterprises.

Note —The industry classification of inventories is on an establishment basis. Estimates through 1995 are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Beginning with 1996, estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

TABLE B-23.—Real private inventories and domestic final sales by industry, 1959-2005 [Billions of chained (2000) dollars, except as noted; seasonally adjusted]

				Private in	iventories <sup>1</sup>				Final	Ratio of invent	
Quarter	Total <sup>2</sup>	Farm	Mining, utili- ties, and con- struc- tion <sup>2</sup>	Manu- fac- turing	Whole- sale trade	Retail trade	Other indus- tries?	Non- tarm <sup>2</sup>	sales of domes- tic busi- ness <sup>3</sup>	to final s domestic l	ales of
Fourth quarter:	428.1	106.9		143.5	57.6	63.9	29 8	298 7	131.3	3.26	2.2
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	438.5 448.0 467.4 485.4 500.8 530.1 572.2 602.5	108.3 110.4 111.8 112.9 109.8 111.8 110.7 112.8 116.1		145.4 149.8 159.8 165.9 175.1 187.4 212.5 229.3 239.8 250.9	59.1 60.7 63.4 68.4 72.5 77.4 87.7 94.7 98.0 105.1	68.2 66.9 71.5 75.3 79.3 87.1 94.1 94.1 101.9 108.9	30 8 33.9 33 8 36.2 38.4 40.1 41.1 46.0 47.3 49.7	307.5 314.4 332.7 349.7 369.4 396.8 442.0 470.4 494.1 521.9	134.3 140.1 145.4 153.9 163.2 177.2 180.9 185.3 195.1 198.9	3.27 3.20 3.21 3.15 3.07 2.99 3.16 3.25 3.23 3.33	2.29 2.29 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.24 2.34 2.54 2.55 2.66
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	661.9 684.2 707.3 742.2 768.1 756.8 787.5 826.0 867.1 892.2	114.2 117.5 117.9 119.3 115.7 120.4 119.1 125.0 126.7 130.2		250.9 247.9 254.6 273.5 294.1 286.7 300.4 308.8 322.9 335.3	113.0 119.1 124.6 128.1 139.7 133.7 142.7 154.1 166.9 175.0	109.0 123.6 133.1 143.7 141.6 134.6 144.9 153.2 163.3 163.3	50.3 52.1 54.7 57.5 61.3 62.9 63.6 68.4 72.5 72.4	529.7 548.3 572.5 609.1 644.2 625.0 659.0 691.1 732.0 753.5	201.3 211.5 228.8 236.9 228.2 238.7 250.5 263.6 283.2 289.8	3.29 3.24 3.09 3.13 3.37 3.17 3.14 3.06 3.08	2.6. 2.5! 2.5! 2.5 2.6: 2.6: 2.6: 2.6: 2.6:
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	884.3 919.2 901.7 895.3 966.6 990.3 998.5 1,028.8 1,049.1 1,077.4	124.3 132.5 138.6 124.4 129.6 135.3 133.5 126.1 115.4 115.4		335.7 340.2 325.0 324.5 352.8 346.6 342.9 351.1 367.6 381.4	180.0 185.1 183.0 182.7 198.5 204.9 213.2 220.6 229.7 233.6	158.7 167.5 163.7 177.0 198.6 214.0 217.4 238.5 246.1 260.5	71.2 79.2 76.8 75.9 77.0 81.4 84.4 86.6 85.2 81.4	753 5 779.0 754 4 764.6 831.2 848.7 858.8 896.5 929.2 958.0	289.6 287.2 286.1 307.6 324.6 339.4 352.2 362.6 381.6 392.5	3.05 3.20 3.15 2.91 2.98 2.92 2.84 2.84 2.75	2.6/ 2.7 2.6/ 2.4/ 2.5/ 2.5/ 2.4/ 2.4/ 2.4/
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994	1,092.8 1,092.3 1,108.7 1,129.4 1,193.0 1,222.8	120.9 119.4 125.1 119.1 130.3 119.6		390.0 383.5 378.9 382.4 394.1 407.8	242.0 246.4 254.8 261.0 276.7 289.9	258.9 259.5 264.1 279.4 299.9 312.0	78.3 81.4 83.9 86.9 91.1 93.3	971.2 972.2 982.5 1,010.2 1,062.2 1,103.5	394.0 394.6 415.7 429.8 447.2 464.2	2.77 2.77 2.67 2.63 2.67 2.63	2.41 2.41 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31
NAICS: 1996 1997 1998 1999	1,251.6 1,322.7 1,395.3 1,464.2	126.4 129.3 130.7 127.8	33.6 36.1 43.3 42.7	409.9 430.7 449.3 466.3	273.3 298.3 320.9 340.6	325.9 340.6 357.9 385.5	82.7 88.1 94.0 101.3	1,125.2 1,193.7 1,264.9 1,336.4	488.3 509.2 538.0 563.4	2.56 2.60 2.59 2.60	2.30 2.30 2.31 2.31
2000 2001	1,520.7 1,488.9	126.4 126.5	41 1 51.7	474.2 452.8	358.2 347.5	407.1 396.3	113.7 113.9	1,394.3 1,362.4	581.0 583.6	2.62 2.55	2.4
2002: I	1,486.4 1,487.0 1,494.0 1,501.4	126.7 124.4 124.1 124.0	51.8 50.1 49.2 48.1	449.1 446.3 447.1 447.0	343.6 343.6 346.7 348.8	401.6 408.7 413.4 420.6	113.1 113.5 113.1 112.5	1,359.6 1,362.7 1,370.1 1,377.6	581 1 582.6 584 1 582.5	2.56 2.55 2.56 2.58	2.34 2.34 2.31 2.31
2003: I	1,507.4 1,507.3 1,509.6 1,516.9	125.1 124.7 123.9 124.2	48.6 49.5 50.9 53.2	445.8 444.0 440.7 439.4	348.4 346.9 347.5 350.0	427.2 429.2 434.0 437.3	111.9 112.6 112.4 112.3	1,382.5 1,382.7 1,386.0 1,393.0	586.2 592.8 606.8 611.4	2.57 2.54 2.49 2.48	2.36 2.33 2.28 2.28
2004: I	1,527.4 1,543.8 1,556.4 1,568.9	123.4 125.0 126.6 126.6	52-3 52-4 54.1 55.0	441.7 443.5 445.2 445.6	353.2 358.3 366.9 373.3	443.9 451.0 448.5 452.7	113.1 113.7 114.8 115.8	1,404.7 1,419.3 1,430.3 1,443.0	617.2 621.7 629.5 636.2	2.47 2.48 2.47 2.47	2.28 2.28 2.27 2.27
2005: I	1,583 4 1,583.0 1,579.7 1,586.1	126.0 124.9 123.8 122.9	55.5 56.7 55.8 55.3	451.8 449.7 449.1 447.4	379.1 383.2 385.9 389.2	454.5 451.1 447.7 453.9	116 6 117.4 117.7 118.7	1.458.4 1,459.3 1.457.2 1.464.9	642.0 653.7 661 9 661 7	2.47 2.42 2.39 2.40	2.27 2.23 2.20 2.21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Inventories at end of quarter. Quarter-to-quarter changes calculated from this table are at quarterly rates, whereas the change in private inventories component of GDP is stated at annual rates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Inventories of construction, mining, and utilities establishments are included in other industries through 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Quarterly totals at monthly rates. Final sales of domestic business equals final sales of domestic product less gross output of general government, gross value added of nonprofit institutions, compensation paid to domestic workers, and space rent for owner-occupied housing includes a small amount of final sales by farm and by government enterprises.

Note.—The industry classification of inventories is on an establishment basis. Estimates through 1995 are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Beginning with 1996, estimates are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). See Survey of Current Business, Tables 5.7.6A and 5.7.6B, for detailed information on calculation of the chained (2000) dollar inventory series.

TABLE B-24.—Foreign transactions in the national income and product accounts, 1959-2005

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data al seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Curren	t receipts	trom res	of the w	orld .				Current p	ayments to	rest of the	ne world			
Yea				s of goods services		in-		Impor	ts ot goods services	and	In-	to	Current to transfer p rest of the	axes and payments world (ne	1)	Balance
qua rea		Total	Total	Goods <sup>1</sup>	Serv- ICES 1	come re- ceipts	Total	Total	Goods 1	Serv-	come pay- ments	Total	From persons (net)	From govern- ment (net)	From busi- ness (net)	current account, NIPA
1959		270	22 7	165	6 3	4 3	28 2	22 3	15.3	7.0	1.5	4 3	0.5	3 8	0 1	-1.2
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		31 9 32 9 35 0 37 6 42 3 45.0 49 0 52 1 58.0 63 7	27 0 27 6 29 1 31 1 35 0 37 1 40 9 43 5 47 9 51 9	20 5 20 9 21 7 23 3 26 7 27 8 30 7 32 2 35 3 38 3	6 6 6 7 7 4 7 7 8 3 9 4 10 2 11 3 12 6 13 7	4 9 5 3 5 9 6 5 7.2 7.9 8 1 8 7 10 1 11 8	28 7 28 6 31.1 32.6 34 7 38.8 45 1 48.6 56.3 61.9	22 8 22 7 25.0 26 1 28.1 31.5 37.1 39.9 46.6 50.5	15 2 15 1 16.9 17 7 19.4 22 2 26.3 27 8 33.9 36.8	7.6 7.6 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.3 10.7 12.2 12.6 13.7	1 8 1 .8 1 8 2 .1 2 .3 2 .6 3 .0 3 .3 4 0 5 .7	4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.7 5.8	.5 .5 .7 .7 .8 .8 1.0 1.0	3.5 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.4	1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3	1.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979		72 5 77.0 87 1 118 8 156.5 166 7 181.9 196.6 233 1 298 5	59.7 63.0 70.8 95.3 126.7 138.7 149.5 159.4 186.9 230.1	44 5 45 6 51 8 73 9 101.0 109 6 117 8 123.7 145.4 184 0	15.2 17.4 19.0 21.3 25.7 29.1 31.7 35.7 41.5 46.1	12 8 14 0 16.3 23 5 29.8 28.0 32.4 37 2 46.3 68.3	68.5 76.4 90.7 109.5 149.8 145.4 173.0 205.6 243.6 297.0	55 8 62 3 74 2 91 2 127 5 122 7 151 1 182 4 212 3 252 7	40.9 46.6 56.9 71.8 104.5 99.0 124.6 152.6 177.4 212.8	14 9 15.8 17.3 19.3 22.9 23.7 26.5 29.8 34.8 39.9	6.4 6.4 7.7 10.9 14.3 15.0 15.5 16.9 24.7 36.4	6.3 7.6 8.8 7.4 81 7.6 6.3 6.2 6.7 8.0	1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6	4.7 5.9 7.0 5.2 5.8 5.6 3.9 3.5 3.8 4.3	4 .4 .5 .7 1.0 .7 1.1 1.4 1.4 2.0	9.3 6.6 21.4 8.9 -9.0 -10.4
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988		359.9 397.3 384.2 378.9 424.2 414.5 431.9 487.1 596.2 681.0	280.8 305.2 283.2 277.0 302.4 302.0 320.5 363.9 444.1 503.3	225.8 239 1 215.0 207.3 225 6 222 2 226.0 257 5 325.8 369 4	55.0 66.1 68.2 69.7 76.7 79.8 94.5 106.4 118.3 134.0	79.1 92.0 101.0 101.9 121.9 112.4 111.4 123.2 152.1 177.7	348.5 390.9 384.4 410.9 511.2 525.3 571.2 637.9 708.4 769.3	293.8 317.8 303.2 328.6 405.1 417.2 453.3 509.1 554.5 591.5	248.6 267.8 250.5 272.7 336.3 343.3 370.0 414.8 452.1 484.8	45.3 49.9 52.6 56.0 68.8 73.9 83.3 94.3 102.4 106.7	44.9 59.1 64.5 64.8 85.6 85.9 93.6 105.3 128.5 151.5	9.8 14.1 16.7 17.5 20.5 22.2 24.3 23.5 25.5 26.4	1.8 5.5 6.6 6.9 7.8 8.2 9.0 9.9 10.6	5.5 5.4 6.7 7.2 9.2 11.1 12.2 10.3 10.4 10.4	2.4 3.2 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.5 4.6	2 -32.1 -86.9 -110.8 -139.2 -150.8 -112.2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999		741.5 765.7 788.0 812.1 907.3 1.046.1 1.117.3 1.242.0 1.243.1 1.312.1	552.4 596.8 635.3 655.8 720.9 812.2 868.6 955.3 955.9 991.2	396 6 423.5 448 0 459 9 510 1 583.3 618 3 687 7 680 9 697 2	155.7 173.3 187.4 195.9 210.8 228.9 250.2 267.6 275.1 294.0	189.1 168.9 152.7 156.2 186.4 233.9 248.7 286.7 287.1 320.8	811.5 752.3 824.9 882.5 1.012.5 1.137.1 1.217.6 1.352.2 1.430.5 1.585.9	630.3 624.3 668.6 720.9 814.5 903.6 964.8 1,056.9 1,115.9 1,251.7	508 1 500 7 544 9 592 8 676 8 757 4 807 4 885 3 929 0 1,045 5	122.3 123.6 123.6 128.1 137.7 146.1 157.4 171.5 186.9 206.3	154.3 138.5 123.0 124.3 160.2 198.1 213.7 253.7 265.8 287.0	26.9 -10.6 33.4 37.3 37.8 35.4 39.1 41.6 48.8 47.2	12.0 13.0 12.3 14.2 15.4 16.2 18.0 21.0 24.6 28.3	10.0 -28.6 17.1 17.8 15.8 10.1 14.1 10.9 11.2	4.8 5.0 3.9 5.4 6.6 9.1 7.1 9.7 12.9 7.3	13.5 -36.9 -70.4 -105.2 -91.0 -100.3 -110.2 -187.4
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005		1.355 2	1.096 3 1.032 8 1.005 9 1.045 6 1.173 8 1.299 2	731 2 697.6 724 3 818 1	311 9 301.6 308 4 321.3 355 7 396.0	305.7 343.7	1,725.6 1,769.9 1,893.8	1,475 8 1,399 8 1,430 3 1,546.5 1,797 8 2,024 9	1,189.3 1,283.9 1,495.9	232.3 231.9 241.0 262.6 301.9 327.1	343.7 278.8 275.0 275.6 361.7	56.1 47.0 64.5 71.7 81.5 89.3	31.5 33.0 40.0 41.2 42.9 45.8	13.5 9.5 14.3 18.0 19.7 24.9	11.2 4.5 10.3 12.4 18.9 18.5	-370.4 -458.3 -504.5 -651.7
2002 I II III		1,340 6	976 4 1,008.2 1,022 9 1,016.2	703 4 713.0	299.6 304.8 309.9 319.1	307 1 317 7	1,774.7	1,424.3 1,456.7	1,115 4 1,187.8 1,214.5 1,239.7	234.1 236.5 242.2 251.1	268.3 290.5 288.1 253.3	74.1 60.0 59.4 64.6	39.5 39.0 40.2 41.1	23.0 10.4 9.6 14.1	11.6 10.6 9.6 9.4	-459.4 -463.6
2003 I II III	Ι.,	1,335 2 1,345.1 1,390.9 1,486 0	1,018.8 1,016.1 1,046.6 1,101.1	708 6 723.1	313.0 307.5 323.5 341.3	316.5 329.1 344.3 384.9	1,848.4	1,516.6	1,266 8 1,264.3 1,275 0 1,329.5	254 6 252.3 266.9 276.6	271.5 262.2 277.0 291.7	71.5 69.5 71.0 74.7	40.8 40.7 39.3 44.2	20.9 18.2 18.7 14.2	9.8 10.6 13.1 16.3	5 -503 3 -499.0
2004 I II IV	1	1.510 7 1.564.5 1.601 9 1.679.5	1.130 8 1.163.3 1.183 8 1.217 1	811 5 829 7	344 7 351 8 354 1 372.1	380.0 401.2 418.1 462.4	2,076.9 2,213.4 2,255.1 2,418.1	1,690.3 1,776.4 1,821.8 1,902.5	1.478.3	288.5 298.1 306.8 314.1	297.0 354.5 369.6 425.6	89.6 82.6 63.6 90.0	43.0 43.5 43.4 41.7		19.2 22.3 3.0 31.0	-648.9 -653.2
		1.786 6 1.835 5	1,253 2 1,297.1 1,314 6 1,331 8	904 7 914 8 928.0	387.7 392.5 399.9 403.8		2,576 6	1,988 1 2,045 1 2,115.8	1,661 8 1,718.6 1,783.3	323.0 326.3 326.4 332.5	422.9 453.9 476.6	108.8 91.3 54.9 102.0	48.3 44.9 44.4 45.7	18.2	28.7 28.2 -8.7 25.9	-746.8 -741.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Beginning with 1986, repairs and alterations of equipment were reclassified from goods to services.

TABLE B-25.—Real exports and imports of goods and services, 1990-2005
[Billions of chained (2000) dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	E	xports of	goods an	d service:	S	Ir	nports of	goods an	d services	s
			Goods 1					Goods 1		
Year or quarter	Total	Total	Oura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Serv- ices <sup>1</sup>	Total	Total	Dura- ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Serv- ices <sup>1</sup>
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	552.5 589.1 629.7 650.0 706.5 778.2 843.4 943.7 966.5 1,008.2	367.2 392.5 421.9 435.6 478.0 533.9 581.1 664.5 679.4 705.2	226.3 243.1 262.5 276.1 309.6 353.6 394.9 466.2 481.2 503.6	145.1 153.7 163.6 162.4 170.1 181.1 186.7 198.7 198.5 201.7	188.7 199.9 210.8 217.5 231.1 245.8 263.5 279.2 287.2 303.2	607.1 603.7 645.6 702.1 785.9 849.1 923.0 1,048.3 1,170.3 1,304.4	469.7 469.3 513.1 564.8 640.0 697.6 762.7 872.6 974.4 1,095.2	264.7 266.1 294.0 328.8 383.1 427.1 472.8 550.3 621.8 711.7	218.4 215.9 231.9 248.0 266.0 277.0 295.2 326.4 355.7 384.3	142.7 139.0 135.5 139.4 147.3 152.1 160.5 175.6 209.1
2000 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	1,096.3 1,036.7 1,013.3 1,031.2 1,117.9 1,193.3	784.3 736.3 707.0 719.7 783.6 839.0	569.2 522.2 491.2 499.8 555.7 606.1	215.1 214.2 216.1 220.2 229.0 235.6	311.9 300.4 306.0 311.2 334.1 354.3	1,475.8 1,435.8 1,484.6 1,552.6 1,719.2 1,825.2	1,243.5 1,204 1 1,248.2 1,309.2 1,452.7 1,549.9	820.7 769.4 801.0 835.3 949.7 1,028.7	422.8 435.1 447.4 474.2 505.4 526.3	232.3 231.6 236.5 243.7 267.1 276.6
2002: I	992.8 1,018.0 1,025.2 1,017.2	691.8 715.2 719.0 702.1	478.2 497.4 502.2 487.2	214.1 218.1 217.1 215.1	300.7 302.7 306 1 314.7	1,434.0 1,476.9 1,497.4 1,530.2	1,198.2 1,243.4 1,263.1 1,287.9	769 2 802.3 814.3 818 4	429.4 441.4 449.2 469.8	235.4 233.6 234.6 242.4
2003: I	1,009.7 1,004.5 1,032.2 1,078.4	704.7 704.7 720.3 749.3		221.0 216.5 221.8 221.7	304.8 299.6 311.7 328.8	1,520.4 1,532.9 1,548.4 1,608.6	1,279.4 1,299 1 1,302 1 1,356.3	811.9 825.6 827.1 876.6	467.6 473.6 475.0 480.5	241.1 234.7 246.3 252.7
2004: I	1,091.8 1,110.2 1,125.0 1,144.5	763.1 777.7 793.1 800.3	538.6 551.8 564.7 567.7	225.3 227.0 229.8 233.8	328.5 332.3 331.8 344.0	1,654.8 1,711.9 1,731.5 1,778.6	1,396.6 1,445.2 1,461.9 1,507.3	898.9 946.2 963.6 990.1	498.4 501.5 501.6 520.2	258.8 267.2 270.2 272.3
2005:	1,165.3 1,195.4 1,202.7 1,209.8	810.7 841.3 847.9 855.9	576.4 599.3 614.2 634.7	235.6 243.6 236.7 226.5	354.3 353.9 354.8 354.0	1,810.7 1,809.6 1,820.2 1,860 1	1,537.3 1,532.9 1,546.1 1,583.3	1,007.8 1,019.2 1,037.0 1,050.6	532.1 519.0 516.6 537.3	274.8 277.7 275.5 278.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Certain goods, primarily military equipment purchased and sold by the Federal Government, are included in services. Beginning with 1986, repairs and alterations of equipment were reclassified from goods to services.

Note.—See Table B-2 for data for total exports of goods and services and total imports of goods and services for 1959-89. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-26.—Relation of gross domestic product, gross national product, net national product, and national income, 1959-2005

## [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Plus.	Less		Less: Consu	mption of fix	ed capital			
Year or quarter	Gross domestic product	Income receipts from rest of the world	payments to rest of the world	Equals: Gross national product	Total	Private	Govern- ment	Equals: Net national product	Less: Statistical discrep- ancy	Equals: National income
959	506.6	4 3	1.5	509.3	53.0	38.6	14.5	456.3	0.5	455.
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 1968	526.4 544.7 585.6 617.7 663.6 719.1 787.8 832.6 910.0 984.6	4 9 5.3 5.9 6.5 7.2 7.9 8.1 8.7 10.1 11.8	1 8 1 8 2 1 2 3 2 6 3.0 3.3 4.0 5.7	529.5 548.2 589.7 622.2 668.5 724.4 792.9 838.0 916.1 990.7	55.6 57 2 59.3 62.4 65.0 69.4 75.6 81.5 88.4 97.9	40.5 41.6 42.8 44.9 50.5 55.5 59.9 65.2 73.1	15.0 15.6 16.5 17.5 18.1 18.9 20.1 21.6 23 1 24 8	473.9 491.0 530.5 559.8 603.5 655.0 717.3 756.5 827.7 892.8	9 -6 -4 8 16 6.3 4.6 4.6 3.2	474, 491, 530, 560, 602, 653, 711, 751, 823, 889
970	1,038.5 1,127.1 1,238.3 1,382.7 1,500.0 1,638.3 1,825.3 2,030.9 2,294.7 2,563.3	12.8 14.0 16.3 23.5 29.8 28.0 32.4 37.2 46.3 68.3	6.4 7.7 10.9 14.3 15.0 15.5 16.9 24.7 36.4	1,044.9 1.134.7 1,246.8 1.395.3 1,515.5 1,651.3 1,842.1 2,051.2 2,316.3 2,595.3	106.7 115.0 126.5 139.3 162.5 187.7 205.2 230.0 262.3 300.1	80.0 86.7 97.1 107.9 126.6 147.8 162.5 184.3 212.8 245.7	26.7 28.3 29.5 31.4 35.9 40.0 42.6 45.7 49.5 54.5	938.2 1.019.7 1.120.3 1.256.0 1,353.0 1,463.6 1,637.0 1,821.2 2,054.0 2,295.1	7.3 11.6 9.1 8.6 10.9 17.7 25.1 22.3 26.6 46.0	930. 1,008 1,111 1,247 1,342 1,445 1,611 1,798 2,027 2,249
980	2,789.5 3,128.4 3,255.0 3,536.7 3,933.2 4,220.3 4,462.8 4,739.5 5,103.8 5,484.4	79.1 92.0 101.0 101.9 121.9 112.4 111.4 123.2 152.1 177.7	44.9 59.1 64.5 64.8 85.6 85.9 93.6 105.3 128.5 151.5	2.823.7 3.161.4 3.291.5 3.573.8 3.969.5 4.246.8 4.480.6 4.757.4 5.510.6	343.0 388.1 426.9 443.8 472.6 506.7 531.3 561.9 597.6 644.3	281 1 317 9 349.8 362.1 385.6 414.0 431.8 455.3 483.5 522.1	61.8 70.1 77.1 81.7 87.0 92.7 99.5 106.7 114.1 122.2	2,480.7 2,773.3 2,864.6 3,130.0 3,496.9 3,740.1 3,949.3 4,195.4 4,529.8 4,866.3	41.4 30.9 3 45.7 14.6 16.7 47.0 21.7 -19.5 39.7	2,439 2,742 2,864 3,084 3,482 3,723 3,902 4,173 4,549 4,826
990 991 992 993 993 995 995 996 997 998	5.803.1 5.995.9 6.337.7 6.657.4 7.072.2 7.397.7 7.816.9 8.304.3 8.747.0 9.268.4	189 1 168.9 152.7 156.2 186.4 233.9 248.7 286.7 287.1 320.8	154.3 138.5 123.0 124.3 160.2 198.1 213.7 253.7 265.8 287.0	5.837.9 6.026.3 6.367.4 6.689.3 7.098.4 7.433.4 7.851.9 8.337.3 8.768.3 9.302.2	682 5 725.9 751.9 776.4 833.7 878.4 918 1 974 4 1.030 2 1.101.3	551.6 586.9 607.3 624.7 675.1 713.4 748.8 800.3 851.2 914.3	130.9 139.1 144.6 151.8 158.6 165.0 169.3 174.1 179.0 187.0	5.155.4 5.300.4 5.615.5 5.912.9 6.264.7 6.555.1 6.933.8 7.362.8 7.738.2 8.200.9	66.2 72.5 102.7 139.5 142.5 101.2 93.7 70.7 -14.6 -35.7	5.089 5.227 5.512 5.773 6.122 6.453 6.840 7.292 7.752 8.236
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	9.817.0 10.128.0 10.469.6 10.971.2 11.734.3 12.479.4	382.7 322.4 305.7 343.7 415.4	343 7 278.8 275.0 275.6 361.7	9.855.9 10.171.6 10.500.2 11.039.3 11.788.0	1,187.8 1,281.5 1,292.0 1,331.3 1,435.3 1,574.1	990.8 1,075.5 1,080.3 1,112.8 1,206.2 1,327.2	197.0 206.0 211.6 218.5 229.1 246.9	8.668.1 8.890.2 9.208.3 9.708.0 10,352.8	-127.2 -89.6 -21.0 47.1 76.8	8,795 8,979 9,229 9,660 10,275
2002 · [	10,333.3 10,426.6 10,527.4 10,591.1	294 5 307.1 317.7 303.3	268 3 290.5 288 1 253.3	10,359 5 10,443.3 10,557 0 10,641.1	1.282.0 1.288.2 1.294.9 1,302.7	1,073.1 1,077.5 1,082.4 1,088.4	208.9 210.8 212.5 214.3	9,077.5 9,155.0 9,262.1 9,338.4	-53.6 -56.7 14.6 11.7	9.131 9.211 9.247 9.326
2003: I	10,717.0 10,844.6 11,087.4 11,236.0	316 5 329 1 344 3 384 9	271.5 262.2 277.0 291.7	10,761.9 10,911.4 11,154.8 11,329.2	1,311 8 1,323.8 1,337.2 1,352.5	1,095.7 1,105.8 1,117.8 1,131.8	216.1 218.1 219.3 220.6	9,450.1 9,587.6 9,817.6 9,976.8	16 6 14 4 85.3 72.0	9,433 9,573 9,732 9,904
2004   .   -   -   -   V	11,457 1 11,666 1 11,818.8 11,995.2	380.0 401.2 418.1 462.4	297.0 354.5 369.6 425.6	11,540 1 11,712 8 11,867.3 12,032 0	1,371.1 1,393.8 1,534.1 1,442.0	1,147.8 1,165.8 1,303.5 1,207.6	223.3 228.1 230.6 234.5	10,169 0 10,319.0 10,333.2 10,589.9	77.8 108.1 90.8 30.6	10.091 10.210 10.242 10.559
2005: I II . III . IV r	12.198.8 12.378 0 12.605 7 12.735.3	462 3 489 4 520 8	422 9 453 9 476.6	12,238.2 12,413.5 12,650.0	1,448.4 1.457 2 1.863.8 1,526.9	1.210.9 1.216.9 1.603.6 1.277.3	237 5 240.4 260.2 249.6	10,789.8 10,956.3 10,786.2	39.4 78.3 66.5	10,750 10,878 10,719

TABLE B-27.—Relation of national income and personal income, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

					Less.				PI	us:	Equals:
Year or quarter	National income	Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments	Taxes on pro- duction and imports less subsi- dies	Contri- bu- tions for govern- ment social insur- ance	Net interest and mis- cellane- ous pay- ments on assets	Business current transfer pay- ments (net)	Current surplus of gov- ernment enter- prises	Wage accruals less disburse- ments	Personal income receipts on as- sets	Personal current transfer receipts	Personal income
1959	455.8	55.7	40.0	13.8	9.6	1.8	1.0	0.0	34.6	24 2	392.8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967	474.9 491.6 530.1 560.6 602.7 653.4 711.0 751.9 823.2 889.7	53 8 54.9 63.3 69.0 76.5 87.5 93.2 91.3 98.8 95.4	43.4 45.0 48.2 51.2 54.6 57.8 59.3 64.2 72.3 79.4	16.4 17.0 19.1 21.7 22.4 23.4 31.3 34.9 38.7 44.1	10.6 12.5 14.2 15.2 17.4 19.6 22.4 25.5 27.1 32.7	1.9 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.3	.9 .8 .9 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 .9 1.2	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	37.9 40.1 44.1 47.9 53.8 59.4 64.1 69.0 75.2 84.1	25.7 29.5 30.4 32.2 33.5 36.2 39.6 48.0 56.1 62.3	411.5 429.0 456.7 479.6 514.6 555.7 603.9 648.3 712.0 778.5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1974 1975 1976 1977	930.9 1,008.1 1,111.2 1,247.4 1,342.1 1,445.9 1,611.8 1,798.9 2,027.4 2,249.1	83.6 98.0 112.1 125.5 115.8 134.8 163.3 192.4 216.6 223.2	86.7 95.9 101.4 112.1 121.7 131.0 141.5 152.8 162.2 171.9	46.4 51.2 59.2 75.5 85.2 89.3 101.3 113.1 131.3	39.1 43.9 47.9 55.2 70.8 81.6 85.5 101.1 115.0 138.9	4.5 4.3 4.9 6.0 7.1 9.4 9.5 8.4 10.6 13.0	-0 -2 -5 -4 -9 -3.2 -1.8 -2.6 -1.9 -2.6	.0 .0 -1 5 .1 .1 .1 .3 2	93.5 101.0 109.6 124.7 146.4 162.2 178.4 205.3 234.8 274.7	74 7 88.1 97.9 112.6 133 3 170.0 184.0 194 2 209 6 235.3	838.8 903.5 992.1.110.1 1.222.6 1.335.0 1.474.8 1.633.2 1.837.1 2.062.2
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	2,439.3 2,742.4 2,864.3 3,084.2 3,482.3 3,723.4 3,902.3 4,173.7 4,549.4 4,826.6	201.1 226.1 209.7 264.2 318.6 330.3 319.5 368.8 432.6	190.9 224.5 226.4 242.5 269.3 287.3 298.9 317.7 345.5 372.1	166.2 195.7 208.9 226.0 257.5 281.4 303.4 323.1 361.5 385.2	181.8 232.3 271.1 285.3 327.1 341.3 366.8 366.4 385.3 432.1	14.4 17.6 20.1 22.5 30.1 34.8 36.6 33.8 34.0 39.2	-4.8 -4.9 -4.0 -3.1 -1.9 .8 1.3 1.2 2.5 4.9	.0 1 .0 4 .2 2 .0 .0 .0	338.7 421.9 488.4 529.6 607.9 654.0 695.5 717.0 769.3 878.0	279.5 318.4 354.8 383.7 400.1 424.9 451.0 467.6 496.6 543.4	2,307. 2,591. 2,775 2,960. 3,289. 3,526. 3,722. 3,947. 4,253. 4,587.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997	5,773.4 6,122.3 6,453.9	437.8 451.2 479.3 541.9 600.3 696.7 786.2 868.5 801.6 851.3	398.7 430.2 453.9 467.0 513.5 524.2 546.8 579.1 604.4 629.8	410.1 430.2 455.0 477.7 508.2 532.8 555.2 587.2 624.2 661.4	442.2 418.2 388.5 365.7 366.4 367.1 376.2 415.6 487.1 495.4	39.4 39.9 42.4 40.7 43.3 46.9 53.1 49.9 64.7 67.4	1.6 5.7 7.6 7.2 8.6 11.4 12.7 12.6 10.3	.1 -15.8 6.4 17.6 16.4 3.6 -2.9 7 5.2	924.0 932.0 910.9 901.8 950.8 1,016.4 1,089.2 1,181.7 1,283.2 1,264.2	595.2 666.4 749.4 790.1 827.3 877.4 925.0 951.2 978.6 1.022.1	4.878. 5.051. 5.362. 5.558. 5.842. 6.152. 6.520. 6.915. 7.423. 7.802.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	8,795.2 8,979.8 9,229.3 9,660.9 10,275.9	817.9 767.3 886.3 1,031.8 1,161.5	664.6 673.3 724.4 754.8 809.4 847.1	702.7 731.1 750.0 776.6 822.2 869.4	559.0 566.3 520.9 528.5 505.5 497.1	87 1 92.8 84.3 81 6 91 1 79.4	5.3 -1.4 .9 1.3 -3.0 -11.2	.0 .0 .0 .0	1,387.0 1,380.0 1,333.2 1,338.7 1,396.5 1,456.7	1,084.0 1,193.9 1,286.2 1,344.0 1,427.5 1,525.5	8,429. 8,724 8,881. 9,169. 9,713. 10,238
2002: I II III	9,131.1 9,211.7 9,247.5 9,326.7	829 4 864.3 895.4 956.1	706.1 720.8 733.3 737.2	747.1 751.1 751.1 750.9	545.8 519.3 507.0 511.5	91.1 85.8 81.4 78.8	-1.6 -1.2 4.0 2.3	.0 .0 .0	1,340.6 1,336.5 1,327.4 1,328.5	1,260.9 1,284 0 1,292.7 1,307 1	8,814 8,892 8,895 8,925
2003: I II III	9.433.6 9.573.2 9,732.3 9,904.8	951.5 1,005.0 1,057.5 1,113.1	741.6 740.1 762.1 775.2	765.8 773.6 780.7 786.3	530.9 532.4 528.1 522.7	79.0 80.5 82.5 84.3	4.1 1.8 4 -1.1	1.4 -1.4 .0	1,337.6	1,319 8 1,336 9 1,356.8 1,362.3	9,013 9,118 9,215 9,328
2004-1 	10.091 2 10,210.9 10,242 4 10.559.3	1,147.3 1,162.0 1,117.2 1,219.5	794 8 806.0 812 3 824 4	806.3 813.0 825.9 843.5	519.9 512.2 497.5 492.7	88.2 90.7 83.0 102.6	-1.6 -2.2 -3.0 -5.2	1.5 -1.5 .0	1,350.4 1,363.9 1,378.2 1,493.6	1.399.6 1.419.8 1.441.5 1.449.2	9,484 9,614 9,729 10.024
2005: I II III IV P	10,750 4 10,878 0	1,288.2 1,347.5 1,293.1	833.2 848.0 853.4 853.8	861.0 864.9 872.6 879.2	498.3 488.7 497.6	99.0 99.6 21.8 97.2	-6.1 -7.0 -22.8 -8.8	.0 .0 .0	1,407.9 1,439.8 1,468.9 1,510.3	1.488.8 1.509 6 1.558 1 1.545 5	10,073 10,185 10,231 10,462

TABLE B-28.—National income by type of income, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Comp	ensation of	employees			Propriet	tors' incoi iry valuati	ne with	
			Wage a	nd salary	accruals	Supple	ments to wa salaries	ges and	capital	consumpi justments	ion ad-	Rental income
Year or quarter	National income	Total	Total	Gov- ern- ment	Other	Total	Employer contributions for employee pension and insurance funds	Employer contribu- tions for govern- ment social insur- ance	Total	Farm	Non- farm	of persons with capital consump- tion adjust- ment
1959	455.8	281.0	259.8	46.1	213.8	21.1	13.3	7.9	50.7	100	40.6	16.2
960	474.9 491.6 530.1 560.6 602.7 653.4 711.0 751.9 823.2 889.7	296.4 305.3 327.1 345.2 370.7 399.5 442.7 475.1 524.3 577.6	272.9 280.5 299.4 314.9 337.8 363.8 400.3 429.0 472.0 518.3	49.2 52.5 56.3 60.0 64.9 69.9 78.4 86.5 96.7 105.6	223.7 228.0 243.0 254.8 272.9 293.8 321.9 342.5 375.3 412.7	23.6 24.8 27.8 30.4 32.9 35.7 42.3 46.1 52.3 59.3	14.3 15.2 16.6 18.0 20.3 22.7 25.5 28.1 32.4 36.5	9.3 9.6 11.2 12.4 12.6 13.1 16.8 18.0 20.0 22.8	50.8 53.2 55.4 56.5 59.4 63.9 68.2 69.8 74.3 77.4	10.5 11.0 11.0 10.8 9.6 11.8 12.8 11.5 11.5	40.3 42.2 44.4 45.7 49.8 52.1 55.4 58.4 62.8 64.7	17.1 17.5 18.6 19.5 19.6 20.2 20.8 21.2 20.9 21.2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	930.9 1,008.1 1,111.2 1,247.4 1,342.1 1,445.9 1,611.8 1,798.9 2,027.4 2,249.1	617.2 658.9 725.1 811.2 890.2 949.1 1,059.3 1,180.5 1,336.1 1,500.8	551.6 584.5 638.8 708.8 772.3 814.8 899.7 994.2 1,121.2 1,255.8	117.2 126.8 137.9 148.8 160.5 176.2 188.9 202.6 220.0 237.1	434.3 457.8 500.9 560.0 611.8 638.6 710.8 791.6 901.2 1,018.7	65.7 74.4 86.4 102.5 118.0 134.3 159.6 186.4 214.9 245.0	41.8 47.9 55.2 62.7 73.3 87.6 105.2 125.3 143.4 162.4	23.8 26.4 31.2 39.8 44.7 46.7 54.4 61.1 71.5 82.6	78.4 84.8 95.9 113.5 113.1 119.5 132.2 145.7 166.6 180.1	12.7 13.2 16.8 28.9 23.2 21.7 17.0 15.7 19.6 21.8	65.7 71.6 79.1 84.6 89.9 97.8 115.2 130.0 147.1 158.3	21.4 22.4 23.4 24.3 24.3 20.7 22.3 20.7 22.1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	2,439.3 2,742.4 2,864.3 3,084.2 3,482.3 3,723.4 3,902.3 4,173.7 4,549.4 4,826.6	1,651.8 1,825.8 1,925.8 2,042.6 2,255.6 2,424.7 2,570.1 2,750.2 2,967.2 3,145.2	1,377.6 1,517.5 1,593.7 1,684.6 1,855.1 1,995.5 2,114.8 2,270.7 2,452.9 2,596.3	261.5 285.8 307.5 324.8 348.1 373.9 397.0 422.6 451.3 480.2	1,116.2 1,231.7 1,286.2 1,359.8 1,507.0 1,621.6 1,717.9 1,848.1 2,001.6 2,116.2	274.2 308.3 332.1 358.0 400.5 429.2 455.3 479.5 514.2 548.9	185.2 204.7 222.4 238.1 261.5 281.5 297.5 313.2 329.6 355.2	88.9 103.6 109.8 119.9 139.0 147.7 157.9 166.3 184.6 193.7	174.1 183.0 176.3 192.5 243.3 262.3 275.7 302.2 341.6 363.3	11.3 18.7 13.1 6.0 20.6 20.8 22.6 28.7 26.8 33.0	162.8 164.3 163.3 186.5 222.7 241.5 253.1 273.5 314.7 330.3	30.0 38.0 38.6 37.6 40.2 41.9 33.5 40.6 43.1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998	5,089.1 5,227.9 5,512.8 5,773.4 6,122.3 6,453.9 6,840.1 7,292.2 7,752.8 8,236.7	3,338.2 3,445.2 3,635.4 3,801.4 3,997.2 4,193.3 4,390.5 4,661.7 5,019.4 5,357.1	2.754.0 2.823.0 2.964.5 3.089.2 3.249.8 3.435.7 3.623.2 3.874.7 4.182.7 4.471.4	517.7 546.8 569.2 586.8 606.2 625.5 644.4 668.1 697.3 729.3	2,236.3 2,276.2 2,395.3 2,502.4 2,643.5 2,810.2 2,978.8 3,206.6 3,485.5 3,742.1	584.2 622.3 670.9 712.2 747.5 757.7 767.3 787.0 836.7 885.7	377.8 407.1 442.5 472.4 493.3 493.6 492.5 497.5 529.7 562.4	206.5 215.1 228.4 239.8 254.1 264.0 274.9 289.5 307.0 323.3	380.6 377.1 427.6 453.8 473.3 492.1 543.2 576.0 627.8 678.3	31.9 26.7 34.5 31.2 33.9 22.7 37.3 34.2 29.4 28.6	348.7 350.4 393.0 422.6 439.4 469.5 505.9 541.8 598.4 649.7	50.7 60.3 78.0 95.6 119.7 122.1 131.5 128.8 137.5 147.3
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	8,795 2 8,979.8 9,229.3 9,660.9 10,275.9	5,782.7 5,942.1 6,091.2 6,321.1 6,687.6 7,113.6	4,829.2 4,942.8 4,980.9 5,111.1 5,389.4 5,711.9	774.7 815.9 865.9 903.3 939.5 971.4	4,054 5 4,126.9 4,115.0 4,207.8 4,450.0 4,740.4	953.4 999.3 1,110.3 1,210.0 1,298.1 1,401.8	609.9 642.7 745.1 830.0 895.5 976.2	343.5 356.6 365.2 380.0 402.7 425.6	728.4 771.9 768.4 810.2 889.6 937.8	22.7 19.7 10.6 27.7 35.8 20.1	705.7 752.2 757.8 782.4 853.8 917.7	150.3 167.4 152.9 131.7 134.2 73.9
2002: I II III IV .	9,131.1 9,211.7 9,247.5 9,326.7	6,025.3 6,091.5 6,114.5 6,133.4	4,961.2 4,989.4 4,988.5 4,984.5	855.4 863.7 869.3 875.4	4,105.7 4,125.7 4,119.2 4,109.1	1,064.2 1,102.1 1,126.0 1,148.9	700.7 736.2 760.1 783.2	363.4 365.8 365.9 365.8	763.0 763.5 769.1 778.1	8.9 4.0 11.0 18.4	754.1 759.4 758.1 759.7	172.1 167.7 142.9 129.2
2003: I !I !I! !V	9,433.6 9,573.2 9,732.3 9,904.8	6,210 4 6,286.6 6,360.1 6,427.4	5,031.1 5,086.4 5,139.8 5,187.3	895.1 902.3 906.1 909.9	4,135.9 4,184.1 4,233.8 4,277.4	1,179.4 1,200.2 1,220.2 1,240.1	804.8 821.6 838.1 855.4	374.6 378.6 382.1 384.7	778.3 801.4 821.1 840.0	20.5 27.2 28.2 35.1	757.8 774.1 793.0 804.8	137.7 125.4 120.4 143.2
2004          	10,091.2 10,210.9 10,242.4 10,559.3	6,528.2 6,602 1 6,724.2 6,895.8	5,256.3 5,316.6 5,422.0 5,562.9	928.8 936.3 942.8 950.0	4,327.5 4,380.3 4,479.2 4,612.9	1,271.9 1,285.5 1,302.3 1,332.9	877.0 887.5 897.9 919.6	394.9 398.0 404.4 413.4	870.2 898.4 889.1 900.9	44.8 44.1 29.7 24.6	825.4 854.2 859.4 876.3	144.2 141.8 122.1 128.7
2005: I II III IV p	10,750 4 10,878 0 10,719.6	7,001.7 7,060.2 7,155.4 7,237.3	5,629 9 5,672.3 5,741.6 5,803.6	961 8 967.3 975.0 981.6	4,668.1 4,705.0 4,766.6 4,822.0	1,371.8 1,387.9 1,413.8 1,433.7	950.0 964.4 986.8 1,003.7	421.9 423.5 427.0 430.0	917.9 936.6 932.4 964.2	24.7 19.6 18.0 17.9	893.2 917.1 914.3 946.3	118.0 104.4 -11-1 84.5

See next page for continuation of table.

TABLE B-28.—National income by type of income, 1959-2005—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Corpora	te profits	with inve	ntory valu	ation and	capital	consumpt	on adjust	ments					
		Profi	its with in	ventory va	umption a	djustmer idjustme	nt and wit	hout		Net interest	Taxes		Busi- ness	Cur- rent
Year or					Profits			Inven-	con-	and miscel-	on produc-	Less: Sub-	trans-	surplus of
quarter	Total	Total	Drafito	Taxes on	Prof	its after	tax	tory valu-	sump- tion	laneous pay-	tion and	sı- dies	fer pay-	govern- ment
		Total	Profits before tax	corpo- rate income	Total	Net divi- dends	Undis- tributed profits	ation adjust- ment	adjust- ment	ments	imports		ments (net)	enter- prises
959	55.7	53.5	53.8	23.7	30.0	12.6	17.5	-0.3	2.2	9.6	41.1	1,1	1.8	1.
960	53.8 54.9 63.3 69.0 76.5 87.5 93.2 91.3 98.8 95.4	51.5 51.8 57.0 62.1 68.6 78.9 84.6 82.0 88.8 85.5	51.6 57.0 62.1 69.1 80.2 86.7 83.5 92.4 91.4	22.8 22.9 24.1 26.4 28.2 31.1 33.9 32.9 39.6 40.0	28.8 28.7 32.9 35.7 40.9 49.1 52.8 50.6 52.8 51.4	13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2	15.5 14.8 17.9 19.5 22.7 28.9 32.1 29.1 29.3 27.2	2 .3 .0 .1 5 -1.2 -2.1 -1.6 -3.7 -5.9	3 0 6.2 6.8 7.9 8.6 8.6 9.3	10.6 12.5 14.2 15.2 17.4 19.6 22.4 25.5 27.1 32.7	47.0 50.4 53.4 57.3 60.8 63.3	2.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.9 3.8 4.2	1.9 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.3 4.9	1 1. 1. 1.
970 971 972 973 974 975 977 977 978	83.6 98.0 112.1 125.5 115.8 134.8 163.3 192.4 216.6 223.2	74.4 88.3 101.2 115.3 109.5 135.0 165.6 194.7 222.4 231.8	81.0 92.9 107.8 134.8 147.8 145.5 179.7 210.4 246.1 271.9	34.8 38.2 42.3 50.0 52.8 51.6 65.3 74.4 84.9 90.0	46.2 54.7 65.5 84.9 95.0 93.9 114.4 136.0 161.3 181.9	24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 33.0 39.0 44.8 50.8 57.5	21.9 29.7 38.6 55.0 61.8 60.9 75.4 91.2 110.5	-6.6 -4.6 -6.6 -19.6 -38.2 -10.5 -14.1 -15.7 -23.7 -40.1	9.7 10.9 10.2 6.2 -2.3 -2.3 -5.8	39.1 43.9 47.9 55.2 70.8 81.6 85.5 101.1 115.0 138.9	117.3 125.0 135.5 146.6 159.9	4.7 6.6 5.2 3.3 4.5 5.1 7.1 8 9	4 5 4 3 4 9 6.0 7.1 9.4 9.5 8.4 10.6 13.0	-3 -3 -1 -2 -1 -2
980 981 982 983 984 985 987 988 988	201 1 226 1 209 7 264 2 318 6 330 3 319 5 368 8 432 6 426 6	211.4 219.1 191.0 226.5 264.6 257.5 253.0 301.4 363.9 367.4	253.5 243.7 198.5 233.9 268.6 257.4 246.0 317.6 386.1 383.7	87.2 84.3 66.5 80.6 97.5 99.4 109.7 130.4 141.6 146.1	166.3 159.4 132.0 153.3 171.1 158.0 136.3 187.2 244.4 237.7	64.1 73.8 77.7 83.5 90.8 97.6 106.2 112.3 129.9 158.0	102.2 85.6 54.3 69.8 80.3 60.5 30.1 74.9 114.5	-42.1 -24.6 -7.5 -7.4 -4.0 .0 7.1 -16.2 -22.2 -16.3	7.0 18.6 37.8 54.0 72.9 66.5 67.5 68.7	181.8 232.3 271.1 285.3 327.1 341.3 366.8 366.4 385.3 432.1	323.7	15.0 21.2 21.0 21.3 24.8 30.2 29.4	14 4 17.6 20.1 22.5 30.1 34.8 36.6 33.8 34.0 39.2	-4 -4 -4 -3 -1 1 1 2 4
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998	437.8 451.2 479.3 541.9 600.3 696.7 786.2 868.5 801.6 851.3	396.6 427.9 458.3 513.1 564.6 656.0 736.1 812.3 738.5 776.8	409.5 423.0 461.1 517.1 577.1 674.3 733.0 798.2 718.3 775.9	145.4 138.6 148.7 171.0 193.7 218.7 231.7 246.1 248.3 258.6	264.1 284.4 312.4 346.1 383.3 455.6 501.4 552.1 470.0 517.2	169.1 180.7 187.9 202.8 234.7 254.2 297.6 334.5 351.6	95.0 103.7 124.5 143.3 148.6 201.4 203.8 217.6 118.3 179.9	-12.9 4.9 -2.8 -4.0 -12.4 -18.3 3.1 14.1 20.2 1.0	23.3 21.1 28.8 35.7 40.7 50.1 56.2 63.1	442.2 418.2 388.5 365.7 366.4 367.1 376.2 415.6 487.1 495.4	503.4 545.6 558.2 581.1	27.3 29.9 36.4 32.2 34.0 34.3 32.9 35.4	39.4 39.9 42.4 40.7 43.3 46.9 53.1 49.9 64.7 67.4	1 5 7 7 8 11 12 12 10
000 001 002 003 004	817.9 767.3 886.3 1,031.8 1,161.5	759.3 719.2 766.2 923.9 1,019.7	773.4 707.9 768.4 937.2 1,059.3	265.2 204.1 192.6 232.1 271.1	508.2 503.8 575.8 705.1 788.2	377.9 370.9 399.2 423.2 493.0 514.2	130.3 132.9 176.6 281.9 295.2	-14.1 11.3 -2.2 -13.3 -39.6	48.1 120.1 107.9	559.0 566.3 520.9 528.5 505.5 497.1	728.6 762.8 801.4	55.3 38 4 46.7 43.5	87.1 92.8 84.3 81.6 91.1 79.4	5 -1 1 -3 -11
002: I II III IV	829.4 864.3 895.4 956.1	707.0 740.5 774.5 842.7	693.8 742.1 786.4 851.5	174.9 188.5 196.9 210.2	518.9 553.6 589.5 641.3	382.5 396.1 406.1 412.0	136.4 157.5 183.4 229.3	13.3 -1.6 -11.8 -8.8	123.8 120.8	545.8 519.3 507.0 511.5	771.6	37.0	91.1 85.8 81.4 78.8	$ \begin{array}{c} -1 \\ -1 \\ 4 \\ 2 \end{array} $
003:            	951.5 1,005.0 1,057.5 1,113.1	858.0 891.0 944.0 1,002.6	883.0 893.1 949.0 1,023.4	223.9 221.7 235.3 247.5	659.1 671.4 713.8 775.9	416.3 419.9 424.6 432.0	242.8 251.5 289.2 343.9	-25.0 -2.1 -5.1 -20.8	114.0 113.5	530.9 532.4 528.1 522.7	783.8 794.7	42.1 54.6 44.5	79.0 80.5 82.5 84.3	4 1 -1
004: I II III IV	1,147.3 1,162.0 1,117.2 1,219.5	1,001.2 1,016.5 981.3 1,079.7	1,030.2 1,064.9 1,018.2 1,124.1	257.9 274.7 259.0 293.0	772.3 790.2 759.2 831.1	445.9 460.9 475.9 589.3	326.4 329.2 283.4 241.8	-28.9 -48.3 -36.9 -44.4	145.4 135.8	519.9 512.2 497.5 492.7	847.8	43.2	88.2 90.7 83.0 102.6	-1 -2 -3 -5
005:1 II III	1,288.2 1,347.5 1,293 1	1,339.2 1,393.3 1,365.1	1,378.3 1,412.2 1,392.6	362.6 372.5 360.3	1,015.7 1,039.7 1,032.3	494.9 506.3 520.1 535.4	520.8 533.4 512.2	-39.1 -18.9 -27.5	-51.0 -45.8	498.3 488.7 497.6 503.8	883.8 900.1 909.5 919.3	50.6 52.1 56.1	99.0 99.6 21.8 97.2	-6 -7 -22 -8

TABLE B-29.—Sources of personal income, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				Compensat	tion of em	ployees, re	ceived			rietors' ind ith invento		Rental
V	Personal		Wage an	d salary of ments	disburse-	Suppleme	nts to wages ries Employer	Employer	va	aluation ar capital onsumptio	nd n	of persons with
Year or quarter	income	Total	Total	Private indus- tries	Govern- ment	Total	contribu- tions for employee pension and insur- ance funds	contribu- tions for govern- ment so- cial insur- ance	Total	Farm	Non- farm	capital con- sumptio adjust- ment
959	392.8	281 0	259 8	213.8	46 1	21.1	13.3	7.9	50.7	10.0	40.6	16
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 966 967	411 5 429.0 456.7 479.6 514.6 555.7 603.9 648.3 712.0 778.5	296.4 305.3 327.1 345.2 370.7 399.5 442.7 475.1 524.3 577.6	272.9 280.5 299.4 314.9 337.8 363.8 400.3 429.0 518.3	223.7 228.0 243.0 254.8 272.9 293.8 321.9 342.5 375.3 412.7	49 2 52.5 56.3 60.0 64 9 69.9 78.4 86.5 96.7 105 6	23 6 24.8 27.8 30.4 32.9 35.7 42.3 46.1 52.3 59.3	14.3 15.2 16.6 18.0 20.3 22.7 25.5 28.1 32.4 36.5	9.3 9.6 11 2 12 4 12.6 13.1 16.8 18.0 20.0 22.8	50.8 53.2 55.4 56.5 59.4 63.9 68.2 69.8 74.3 77.4	10.5 11.0 11.0 10.8 9.6 11.8 12.8 11.5 11.5	40.3 42.2 44.4 45.7 49.8 52.1 55.4 58.4 62.8 64.7	17, 17, 18, 19, 19, 20, 20, 21, 20, 21,
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 977 977	838.8 903.5 992.7 1.110.7 1.222.6 1.335.0 1.474.8 1.633.2 1.837.7 2,062.2	617.2 658.3 725.1 811.3 890.7 949.0 1,059.2 1,180.4 1,335.8 1,501.0	551.6 584.0 638.8 778.8 772.8 814.7 899.6 994.1 1,120.9 1,256.0	434.3 457.4 501.2 560.0 611.8 638.6 710.8 791.6 901.2 1,018.7	117.2 126.6 137.6 148.8 161.0 176.1 188.8 202.5 219.7 237.3	65.7 74.4 86.4 102.5 118.0 134.3 159.6 186.4 214.9 245.0	41.8 47.9 55.2 62.7 73.3 87.6 105.2 125.3 143.4 162.4	23.8 26.4 31.2 39.8 44.7 46.7 54.4 61.1 71.5 82.6	78.4 84.8 95.9 113.5 113.1 119.5 132.2 145.7 166.6 180.1	12.7 13.2 16.8 28.9 23.2 21.7 17.0 15.7 19.6 21.8	65.7 71.6 79.1 84.6 89.9 97.8 115.2 130.0 147.1 158.3	21. 22. 23. 24. 24. 23. 22. 20. 22. 23.
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989	2,307.9 2,591.3 2,775.3 2,960.7 3,289.5 3,526.7 3,722.4 3,947.4 4,253.7 4,587.8	1.651.8 1.825.7 1.925.9 2.043.0 2.255.4 2.424.9 2.570.1 2.750.2 2.967.2 3.145.2	1,377.7 1,517.5 1,593.7 1,685.0 1,854.9 1,995.7 2,114.8 2,270.7 2,452.9 2,596.3	1,116.2 1,231.7 1,286.2 1,359.8 1,507.0 1,621.6 1,717.9 1,848.1 2,001.6 2,116.2	261.5 285.8 307.5 325.2 347.9 374.1 397.0 422.6 451.3 480.2	274.2 308.3 332.1 358.0 400.5 429.2 455.3 479.5 514.2 548.9	185.2 204.7 222.4 238.1 261.5 281.5 297.5 313.2 329.6 355.2	88.9 103.6 109.8 119.9 139.0 147.7 157.9 166.3 184.6 193.7	174.1 183.0 176.3 192.5 243.3 262.3 275.7 302.2 341.6 363.3	11.3 18.7 13.1 6.0 20.6 20.8 22.6 28.7 26.8 33.0	162.8 164.3 163.3 186.5 222.7 241.5 253.1 273.5 314.7 330.3	30. 38. 38. 37. 40. 41. 33. 33. 40. 43.
990	4.878 6 5.051 0 5.362.0 5.558.5 6.152.3 6.520.6 6.915.1 7.423.0 7.802.4	3,338.2 3,445.3 3,651.2 3,794.9 3,979.6 4,177.0 4,386.9 4,664.6 5,020.1 5,352.0	2,754.0 2,823.0 2,980.3 3,082.7 3,232.1 3,419.3 3,619.6 3,877.6 4,183.4 4,466.3	2,236.3 2,276.2 2,411.1 2,496.0 2,625.9 2,793.8 2,975.2 3,209.5 3,486.2 3,736.9	517.7 546.8 569.2 586.8 606.2 625.5 644.4 668.1 697.3 729.3	584.2 622.3 670.9 712.2 747.5 757.7 767.3 787.0 836.7 885.7	377.8 407.1 442.5 472.4 493.3 493.6 492.5 529.7 562.4	206.5 215.1 228.4 239.8 254.1 264.0 274.9 289.5 307.0 323.3	380.6 377.1 427.6 453.8 473.3 492.1 543.2 576.0 627.8 678.3	31.9 26.7 34.5 31.2 33.9 22.7 37.3 34.2 29.4 28.6	348.7 350.4 393.0 422.6 439.4 469.5 505.9 541.8 598.4 649.7	50 60 78 95 119 122 131 128 137
0000	8,429 7 8,724 1 8,881.9 9,169.1 9,713 3 10,238.2	5,782 7 5,942.1 6,091 2 6,321.1 6,687.6 7,113.6	4,829.2 4,942.8 4,980.9 5,111.1 5,389.4 5,711 9	4,054.5 4,126.9 4,115.0 4,207.8 4,450.0 4,740.4	774 7 815.9 865 9 903.3 939.5 971.4	953.4 999.3 1.110.3 1.210.0 1.298.1 1.401.8	609.9 642.7 745.1 830.0 895.5 976.2	343.5 356.6 365.2 380.0 402.7 425.6	728.4 771.9 768.4 810.2 889.6 937.8	22.7 19.7 10.6 27.7 35.8 20.1	705.7 752.2 757.8 782.4 853.8 917.7	150. 167. 152. 131. 134. 73.
002: I	8,814,7 8,892.0 8,895.4 8,925.5	6,025.3 6.091 5 6,114.5 6,133 4	4,961.2 4,989.4 4,988.5 4,984.5	4,105.7 4,125.7 4,119.2 4,109.1	855.4 863.7 869.3 875.4	1,064.2 1,102.1 1,126.0 1,148.9	700.7 736.2 760.1 783.2	363.4 365.8 365.9 365.8	763.0 763.5 769.1 778.1	8.9 4.0 11.0 18.4	754.1 759.4 758.1 759.7	172. 167. 142. 129.
003    1  11  1V .	9,013.7 9,118.6 9,215.4 9,328.7	6,209.0 6,288.0 6,360.1 6,427.4	5.029.7 5.087.8 5.139.8 5,187.3	4.135.9 4.184.1 4.233.8 4.277 4	893 7 903.7 906 1 909 9	1,179.4 1,200.2 1,220.2 1,240.1	804 8 821.6 838 1 855 4	374.6 378.6 382.1 384.7	778.3 801.4 821.1 840.0	20.5 27.2 28.2 35.1	757.8 774.1 793.0 804.8	137. 125. 120. 143.
1004   	9,484.8 9,614.3 9,729.2 10,024 8	6,526.7 6,603 6 6,724 2 6,895.8	5,254 8 5,318 1 5,422.0 5,562.9	4,327.5 4,380.3 4,479.2 4,612.9	927.3 937.7 942.8 950.0	1.271.9 1,285.5 1.302.3 1,332.9	877.0 887.5 897.9 919.6	394.9 398.0 404.4 413.4	870.2 898.4 889.1 900.9	44.8 44.1 29.7 24.6	825.4 854.2 859.4 876.3	144 141. 122. 128.
005:            V P	10.073.4 10.185 7 10.231.0 10.462.6	7.001 7 7.060 2 7.155.4 7.237 3	5,629 9 5,672.3 5,741 6 5,803.6	4,668.1 4,705.0 4,766.6 4,822.0	961 8 967.3 975 0 981 6	1.371.8 1,387.9 1,413.8 1,433.7	950.0 964.4 986.8 1.003.7	421.9 423.5 427.0 430.0	917.9 936.6 932.4 964.2	24.7 19.6 18.0 17.9	893.2 917 1 914.3 946.3	118 104 -11 84

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consists of aid to families with dependent children and, beginning with 1996, assistance programs operating under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.

See next page for continuation of table.

TABLE B-29.—Sources of personal income, 1959-2005—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

		Personal	income re	ceipts on			Person	al current ti	anster rece	pts			
		-	assets				Governm	ent social be	enefits to pe	ersons			Less:
	Year or quarter	Total	interest	Personal dividend income	Total	Total	Old-age, survivors, disability, and health insur- ance ben- efits	Govern- ment unem- ployment insur- ance benefits	Veterans benefits	Family assis- tance <sup>1</sup>	Other	Other current transfer receipts, from business (net)	Contribu- tions for govern- ment social insurance
1959		34 6	22.0	12.6	24.2	22.9	10.2	2.8	4.6	0.9	4 5	1.3	13.8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		37.9 40.1 44.1 47.9 53.8 59.4 64.1 69.0 75.2 84.1	24.5 26.2 29.1 31.7 35.6 39.2 43.4 47.5 51.6 59.9	13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2	25.7 29.5 30.4 32.2 33.5 36.2 39.6 48.0 56.1 62.3	24.4 28.1 28.8 30.3 31.3 33.9 37.5 45.8 53.3 59.0	11.1 12.6 14.3 15.2 16.0 18.1 20.8 25.8 30.5 33.1	3.0 4.3 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.2	4.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.6 5.9	1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.5	4.7 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.4 7.0 8.1 9.9 11.9	1 4 1 5 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.8	16.4 17.0 19.1 21.7 22.4 23.4 31.3 34.9 38.7 44.1
1976		93.5 101.0 109.6 124.7 146.4 162.2 178.4 205.3 234 8 274 7	69.2 75.9 82.8 94.8 113.2 129.3 139.5 160.6 184.0 217.3	24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 32.9 39.0 44.7 50.7 57.4	74.7 88.1 97.9 112.6 133.3 170.0 184.0 194.2 209.6 235.3	71.7 85.4 94.8 108.6 128.6 163.1 177.3 189.1 203.2 227.1	38.6 44.7 49.8 60.9 70.3 81.5 93.3 105.3 116.9 132.5	4.0 5.8 5.7 4.4 6.8 17.6 15.8 12.7 9.1	7.7 8.8 9.7 10.4 11.8 14.5 14.4 13.8 13.9	4.8 6.2 6.9 7.2 8.0 9.3 10.1 10.6 10.8 11.1	16.6 20.0 22.7 25.7 31.7 40.2 43.7 46.7 52.5 59.6	2.7 3.1 3.9 4.7 6.8 6.7 5.1 6.5	46.4 51.2 59.2 75.5 85.2 89.3 101.3 113.1 131.3
1986 1987 1988		338.7 421.9 488.4 529.6 607.9 654.0 695.5 717.0 769.3 878.0	274.7 348.3 410.8 446.3 517.2 556.6 589.5 604.9 639.5 720.2	64.0 73.6 77.6 83.3 90.6 97.4 106.0 112.2 129.7 157.8	279.5 318.4 354.8 383.7 400.1 424.9 451.0 467.6 496.6 543.4	270.8 307.2 342.4 369.9 380.4 402.6 428.0 447.4 476.0 519.9	154.8 182.1 204.6 222.2 237.8 253.0 268.9 282.6 300.2 325.6	15.7 15.6 25.1 26.2 15.9 15.7 16.3 14.5 13.2	15.0 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.4 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.9 17.3	12.5 13.1 12.9 13.8 14.5 15.2 16.1 16.4 16.9 17.5	72.8 80.2 83.4 91.0 95.9 102.0 109.9 117.3 128.8 145.3	11.2 12.4 13.8 19.7 22.3 22.9 20.2 20.6	166.2 195.7 208.9 226.0 257.5 281.4 303.4 361.5 385.2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998		932.0 910.9 901.8 950.8 1,016.4 1,089.2 1,181.7 1,283.2	755.2 751.7 723.4 699.6 716.8 763.2 793.0 848.7 933.2 928.6	168.8 180.3 187.4 202.2 234.0 253.2 296.2 333.0 349.9 335.6	595.2 666.4 749.4 790.1 827.3 877.4 925.0 951.2 978.6 1.022.1	573.1 648.5 729.8 775.7 812.2 858.4 902.1 931.8 952.6 988.0	351.8 381.7 414.4 443.4 475.4 506.8 537.7 563.2 575.1 588.9	18.0 26.6 38.9 34.1 23.5 21.4 22.0 19.9 19.5 20.3	17.8 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.1 20.9 21.7 22.5 23.4 24.3	19.2 21.1 22.2 22.8 23.2 22.6 20.3 17.9 17.4 17.9	166.2 200.8 234.9 255.3 270.0 286.7 300.4 308.3 317.3 336.7	22.2 17.9 19.6 14.4 15.1 19.0 22.9	410.1 430.2 455.0 477.7 508.2 532.8 555.2 624.2 661.4
2003		1,387.0 1,380.0 1,333.2 1,338.7 1,396.5 1,456.7	1,011.0 1,011.0 936.1 917.6 905.9 945.0	376.1 369.0 397.2 421.1 490.6 511.7	1.084.0 1.193.9 1.286.2 1.344.0 1.427.5 1,525.5	1.041.6 1.143.9 1.248.9 1.313.5 1,394.5 1,483.9	620.8 668.5 707.5 739.3 789.3 845.1	20.3 31.7 53.2 52.8 36.0 28.9	25.1 26.7 29.6 32.0 34.2 36.4	18.4 18.1 17.7 18.4 18.5 18.8	357.0 398.9 440.9 471.1 516.5 554.7	50.0	702.7 731.1 750.0 776.6 822.2 869.4
2002:	I II III	1,340.6 1,336.5 1,327.4 1,328.5	960.1 942.4 923.3 918.4	380.5 394.1 404.1 410.0	1,260.9 1,284.0 1,292.7 1,307.1	1,218.6 1,245.4 1,257.3 1,274.2	698.4 704.5 710.3 716.7	42.8 60.1 56.8 53.1	28.8 29.4 29.9 30.4	17.7 17.6 17.6 17.8	430.9 433.8 442.7 456.2	38.6 35.4	747.1 751.1 751 1 750.9
2003:		1,334.6 1,340.5 1,337.6 1,342.1	920.6 922.6 915.1 912.2	414.0 417.9 422.4 429.9	1,319.8 1,336.9 1,356.8 1,362.3	1,288.2 1,306.1 1,326.7 1,333.0	726.6 736.0 742.6 751.9	51 1 54 5 54.4 51 3	31.5 31.9 32.2 32.3	18.1 18.3 18.5 18.5	460 8 465.4 479 1 478.9	31 6 30.8 30.1 29.3	765.8 773 6 780.7 786.3
2004:	    	1,350.4 1,363.9 1,378.2 1,493.6	906.6 905.1 904.7 907.4	443.9 458.8 473.5 586.2	1,399.6 1,419.8 1,441.5 1,449.2	1,370.6 1,390.8 1,397.1 1,419.5	772.9 784.9 793.7 805.5	43 1 35.3 33.3 32.4	33 8 34 0 34 4 34 8	18.4 18.5 18.5 18.6	502.4 518.3 517.1 528.2	29.0 28.9 44.4 29.8	806 3 813.0 825.9 843.5
2005:	        V p	1,407.9 1,439.8 1,468.9 1,510.3	915.4 936.0 951.2 977.5	492.5 503.8 517.6 532.9	1,488.8 1,509.6 1,558 1 1,545.5	1.459.7 1,480.4 1,483.2 1.512.4	828.0 842.2 850.1 860.2	29.4 28.0 28.5 29.7	36.2 36.4 36.4 36.7	18.7 18.7 18.8 18.9	547 3 555.1 549.3 566.9	29 1 29.2 74 8 33.1	861.0 864.9 872.6 879.2

TABLE B-30.—Disposition of personal income, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

				L	ess Person	al outlays	D-			ent of dispo sonal incon	
	Personal	Less. Personal	Equals: Dispos-		Personal	Personal	Per- sonal cur-	Equals	Persona	al outlays	-
Year or quarter	income	current	able personal income	Total	con- sumption expendi- tures	interest pay- ments 1	rent trans- fer pay- ments	Personal saving	Total	Personal con- sumption expendi- tures	Personal saving
1959	392 8	42.3	350 5	323.9	317 6	5 5	0.8	26.7	92 4	90 6	7 6
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	411.5 429.0 456.7 479.6 514.6 555.7 603.9 648.3 712.0 778.5	46 1 47.3 51 6 54 6 52 1 57.7 66 4 73 0 87 0 104.5	365.4 381 8 405 1 425 1 462.5 498 1 537.5 575.3 625 0 674.0	338 8 349 6 371.3 391 8 421.7 455.1 493.1 520.9 572.2 621 4	331.7 342.1 363.3 382.7 411.4 443.8 480.9 507.8 558.0 605.2	6 2 6 5 7 0 7.9 8 9 9 9 10.7 11 1 12 2 14.0	8 10 11 12 13 14 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.2	26.7 32 2 33 8 33 3 40.8 43.0 44 4 51 4 52.8 52.5	92.7 91.6 91.7 92.2 91.2 91.4 91.7 90.5 91.6 92.2	90.8 89.6 89.7 90.0 89.0 89.1 89.5 88.3 89.3	7.3 8.4 8.3 7.8 8.8 8.6 8.3 9.5 8.4 7.8
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	838.8 903.5 992.7 1.110.7 1.222.6 1.335.0 1.474.8 1.633.2 1.837.7 2.062.2	103.1 101.7 123.6 132.4 151.0 147.6 172.3 197.5 229.4 268.7	735.7 801 8 869 1 978.3 1,071.6 1,187.4 1,302.5 1,435.7 1,608.3 1,793.5	666.2 721.2 791.9 875.6 958.0 1.061.9 1.180.2 1.310.4 1.465.8 1.634.4	648 5 701 9 770.6 852 4 933 4 1,034.4 1,151 9 1,278 6 1,428.5 1,592.2	15 2 16 6 18.1 19.8 21.2 23.7 23.9 27.0 31 9 36 2	2.6 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.8 4.4 5.4 5.9	69.5 80.6 77.2 102.7 113.6 125.6 122.3 125.3 142.5 159.1	90 6 89 9 91 1 89.5 89 4 90 6 91 3 91 1	88.1 87.5 88.7 87.1 87.1 87.1 88.4 89.1 88.8 88.8	9 4 10 1 8.9 10.5 10.6 10.6 9.4 8.7 8.9 8.9
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	2,307.9 2,591.3 2,775.3 2,960.7 3,289.5 3,526.7 3,722.4 4,253.7 4,587.8	298.9 345.2 354.1 352.3 377.4 417.4 437.3 489.1 505.0 566.1	2,009.0 2,246.1 2,421.2 2,608.4 2,912.0 3,109.3 3,285.1 3,458.3 3,748.7 4,021.7	1.807.5 2.001.8 2.150.4 2.374.8 2.597.3 2.829.3 3.016.7 3.216.9 3,475.8 3,734.5	1,757.1 1,941.1 2,077.3 2,290.6 2,503.3 2,720.3 2,899.7 3,100.2 3,353.6 3,598.5	43.6 49.3 59.5 69.2 77.0 90.4 96.1 93.6 96.8 108.2	6 8 11 4 13 6 15 0 16.9 18.6 20.9 23.1 25.4 27.8	201 4 244 3 270.8 233 6 314.8 280.0 268 4 241 4 272.9 287.1	90.0 89.1 88.8 91.0 89.2 91.0 91.8 93.0 92.7 92.9	87.5 86.4 85.8 87.8 86.0 87.5 88.3 89.6 89.5	10.0 10.9 11.2 9.0 10.8 9.0 8.2 7.0 7.3 7.1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	4,878.6 5,051.0 5,362.0 5,558.5 5,842.5 6,152.3 6,520.6 6,915.1 7,423.0 7,802.4	592 8 586.7 610 6 646.6 690.7 744.1 832.1 926.3 1.027.0 1.107.5	4.285.8 4.464.3 4.751.4 4.911.9 5.151.8 5.408.2 5.688.5 5.988.8 6.395.9 6.695.0	3,986.4 4,140.1 4,385.4 4,627.9 4,902.4 5,157.3 5,460.0 5,770.5 6,119.1 6,536.4	3,839 9 3,986.1 4,235.3 4,477.9 4,743.3 4,975.8 5,256.8 5,547.4 5,879.5 6,282.5	116.1 118.5 111.8 107.3 112.8 132.7 150.3 163.9 174.5 181.0	30.4 35.6 38.3 42.7 46.3 48.9 52.9 59.2 65.2 73.0	299 4 324 2 366.0 284.0 249 5 250.9 228.4 218 3 276.8 158.6	93.0 92.7 92.3 94.2 95.2 95.4 96.0 96.4 95.7	89 6 89.3 89.1 91 2 92.1 92.0 92 4 92.6 91 9	7.0 7.3 7.7 5.8 4.8 4.0 3.6 4.3 2.4
2000	8,429.7 8,724.1 8,881.9 9,169.1 9,713.3 10,238.2	1,235.7 1,237.3 1,051.8 999.9 1,049.1 1,206.9	7,194.0 7,486.8 7,830.1 8,169.2 8,664.2 9,031.3	7,025.6 7,354.5 7,645.3 7,996.3 8,512.5 9,072.8	6.739.4 7.055.0 7.350.7 7,709.9 8.214.3 8,745.9	204.7 212.2 196.4 183.2 186.7 206.4	81 5 87 2 98.2 103.3 111 5 120.5	168.5 132.3 184.7 172.8 151.8 -41.6	97.7 98.2 97.6 97.9 98.2 100.5	93.7 94.2 93.9 94.4 94.8 96.8	2.3 1.8 2.4 2.1 1.8 5
2002. I	8,814.7 8,892.0 8,895.4 8,925.5	1,063.2 1,050.3 1.050.0 1,043.8	7,751.5 7,841.7 7,845.4 7,881.7	7,526.1 7,620.5 7,692.4 7,742.4	7,230.3 7,323.0 7,396.6 7,453.1	199.2 200.6 197.0 188.8	96.6 96.8 98.9 100.5	225.4 221.2 153.0 139.3	97 1 97 2 98.0 98.2	93.3 93.4 94.3 94.6	2.9 2.8 2.0 1.8
2003 I II . IV	9.013.7 9.118.6 9.215.4 9.328.7	1.024.3 1.026.9 940.8 1.007.6	7,989.4 8,091.7 8,274.6 8,321.0	7,835 4 7,922 1 8,069.5 8,158.4	7,555.2 7,635.3 7,782.4 7,866.6	179 3 184 8 185.2 183.4	101 0 102.0 101.9 108.4	154.0 169.6 205.1 162.6	98 1 97.9 97.5 98.0	94 6 94 4 94 1 94.5	1.9 2.1 2.5 2.0
2004 I II IV	9,484.8 9,614.3 9,729.2 10,024.8	1,009.6 1,034.0 1,058.4 1,094.3	8,475.3 8,580.3 8,670.9 8,930.4	8,319 4 8,439 1 8,566.3 8,725.0	8,032.3 8,145.6 8,263.2 8,416.1	178.0 182.2 190.3 196.2	109.2 111.3 112.8 112.7	155.8 141.2 104.6 205.4	98 2 98.4 98.8 97.7	94.8 94.9 95.3 94.2	1.8 1.6 1.2 2.3
2005: I III	10,073.4 10,185.7 10,231.0 10,462.6	1,171.4 1,206.0 1,215.9 1,234.3	8.902.0 8,979.7 9,015.1 9,228.3	8,854 6 9,001 2 9,173 9 9,261.6	8,535.8 8.677.0 8,844.0 8,926.9	198 1 205.3 210.0 212 1	120 8 118.8 119.9 122.7	47 4 -21.5 -158 9 -33 3	99.5 100.2 101.8 100.4	95.9 96.6 98.1 96.7	- 2 -1.8 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consists of nonmortgage interest paid by households.
<sup>2</sup> Percents based on data in millions of dollars

Source. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-31.—Total and per capita disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, and per capita gross domestic product, in current and real dollars, 1959–2005

[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except as noted]

	Dis	sposable per	sonal incon	ne	Person	nal consump	tion expend	itures		lomestic	
Year or	Total (bi doll	llions of ars)		apita lars)	Total (bi dolla	llions of ars)	Per o	capita lars)	per o	duct apita lars)	Popula- tion
quarter	Current dollars	Chained (2000) dollars	Current dollars	Chained (2000) dollars	Current dollars	Chained (2000) dollars	Current dollars	Chained (2000) dollars	Current dollars	Chained (2000) dollars	(thou- sands) <sup>1</sup>
1959	350.5	1,715.5	1,979	9,685	317.6	1,554.6	1,793	8,776	2,860	13,782	177.130
1960	365.4	1,759 7	2,022	9,735	331.7	1,597.4	1.835	8.837	2,912	13.840	180,760
1961	381.8	1,819 2	2,078	9,901	342.1	1,630.3	1,862	8.873	2,965	13.932	183,742
1962	405.1	1,908 2	2,171	10,227	363.3	1,711.1	1,947	9.170	3,139	14.552	186,590
1963	425.1	1,979 1	2,246	10,455	382.7	1,781.6	2,022	9.412	3,263	14.971	189,300
1964	462.5	2,122 8	2,410	11,061	411.4	1,888.4	2,144	9.839	3,458	15.624	191,927
1965	498.1	2,253.3	2,563	11,594	443.8	2,007.7	2,283	10.331	3,700	16.420	194,347
1966	537.5	2,371 9	2,734	12,065	480.9	2,121.8	2,446	10.793	4,007	17.290	196,599
1967	575.3	2,475 9	2,895	12,457	507.8	2,185.0	2,555	10.994	4,189	17.533	198,752
1968	625.0	2,588 0	3,114	12,892	558.0	2,310.5	2,780	11.510	4,533	18.196	200,745
1969	674.0	2,668.7	3,324	13,163	605.2	2,396.4	2,985	11,820	4,857	18.573	202,736
1970	735.7	2,781.7	3,587	13,563	648.5	2,451.9	3,162	11,955	5.064	18,391	205,089
1971	801.8	2,907.9	3,860	14,001	701.9	2,545.5	3,379	12,256	5.427	18,771	207,692
1972	869.1	3,046.5	4,140	14,512	770.6	2,701.3	3,671	12,868	5.899	19,555	209,924
1973	978.3	3,252.3	4,616	15,345	852.4	2,833.8	4,022	13,371	6.524	20,484	211,939
1974	1,071.6	3,228.5	5,010	15,094	933.4	2,812.3	4,364	13,148	7.013	20,195	213,898
1975	1,187.4	3,302.6	5,498	15,291	1.034.4	2,876.9	4,789	13,320	7,586	19,961	215,981
1976	1,302.5	3,432.2	5,972	15,738	1.151.9	3,035.5	5,282	13,919	8.369	20,822	218,086
1977	1,435.7	3,552.9	6,517	16,128	1.278.6	3,164.1	5,804	14,364	9.219	21,565	220,289
1978	1,608.3	3,718.8	7,224	16,704	1.428.5	3,303.1	6,417	14,837	10.307	22,526	222,629
1979	1,793.5	3,811.2	7,967	16,931	1.592.2	3,383.4	7,073	15,030	11.387	22,982	225,106
1980	2.009.0	3.857.7	8.822	16,940	1,757.1	3,374.1	7,716	14.816	12.249	22,666	227,726
	2.246.1	3.960.0	9.765	17,217	1,941.1	3,422.2	8,439	14.879	13.601	23,007	230,008
	2.421.2	4.044.9	10.426	17,418	2,077.3	3,470.3	8,945	14.944	14.017	22,346	232,218
	2.608.4	4.177.7	11.131	17,828	2,290.6	3,668.6	9,775	15.656	15.092	23,146	234,333
	2.912.0	4.494.1	12.319	19,011	2,503.3	3,863.3	10,589	16.343	16.638	24,593	236,394
	3.109.3	4.645.2	13.037	19,476	2,720.3	4,064.0	11,406	17.040	17.695	25,382	238,506
	3.285.1	4.791.0	13.649	19,906	2,899.7	4,228.9	12,048	17.570	18.542	26,024	240,683
	3.458.3	4.874.5	14.241	20,072	3,100.2	4,369.8	12,766	17.994	19.517	26,664	242,843
	3.748.7	5.082.6	15.297	20,740	3,353.6	4,546.9	13,685	18.554	20.827	27,514	245,061
	4.021.7	5.224.8	16.257	21,120	3,598.5	4,675.0	14,546	18.898	22.169	28,221	247,387
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	4,285.8 4,464.3 4,751.4 4,911.9 5,151.8 5,408.2 5,688.5 5,988.8 6,395.9 6,695.0	5,324.2 5,351.7 5,536.3 5,594.2 5,746.4 5,905.7 6,080.9 6,295.8 6,663.9 6,861.3	17,131 17,609 18,494 18,872 19,555 20,287 21,091 21,940 23,161 23,968	21,281 21,109 21,548 21,493 21,812 22,153 22,546 23,065 24,131 24,564	3,839.9 3,986.1 4,235.3 4,477.9 4,743.3 4,975.8 5,256.8 5,547.4 5,879.5 6,282.5	4,770.3 4,778.4 4,934.8 5,099.8 5,290.7 5,433.5 5,619.4 5,831.8 6,125.8 6,438.6	15,349 15,722 16,485 17,204 18,004 18,665 19,490 20,323 21,291 22,491	19,067 18,848 19,208 19,593 20,082 20,382 20,835 21,365 22,183 23,050	23,195 23,650 24,668 25,578 26,844 27,749 28,982 30,424 31,674 33,181	28,429 28,007 28,556 28,940 29,741 30,128 30,881 31,886 32,833 33,904	250,181 253,530 256,922 260,282 263,455 266,588 269,714 272,958 276,154 279,328
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	7,194.0 7,486.8 7,830.1 8,169.2 8,664.2 9,031.3	7.194.0 7.333.3 7,562.2 7,741.8 8,004.3 8,114.5	25,472 26,236 27,165 28,065 29,475 30,429	25,472 25,698 26,236 26,596 27,230 27,340	6,739.4 7,055.0 7,350.7 7,709.9 8,214.3 8,745.9	6,739.4 6,910.4 7,099.3 7,306.6 7,588.6 7,858.1	23,862 24,723 25,502 26,487 27,944 29,468	23.862 24.216 24.630 25.101 25.816 26.476	34,759 35,491 36,323 37,691 39,919 42,047	34,759 34,660 34,863 35,456 36,590 37,504	282,429 285,366 288,240 291,085 293,951 296,798
2002: I	7,751.5	7,549.9	26,994	26,292	7,230.3	7.042.2	25.179	24,524	35,985	34.745	287,154
II	7,841.7	7,585.2	27,246	26,355	7,323.0	7.083.5	25,444	24,612	36,227	34.855	287,812
III	7,845.4	7,555.5	27,187	26,182	7,396.6	7.123.2	25,631	24,684	36,481	34.967	288,575
IV	7,881.7	7,559.3	27,241	26,127	7,453.1	7.148.2	25,760	24,706	36,606	34.894	289,328
2003: I	7,989.4	7,605.5	27,552	26,228	7,555.2	7.192.2	26,054	24,803	36,958	34,963	289,977
II	8,091.7	7,690.5	27,839	26,459	7,635.3	7.256.8	26,269	24,967	37,311	35,197	290,656
III	8,274.6	7,826.2	28,392	26,853	7,782.4	7.360.7	26,703	25,256	38,043	35,722	291,442
IV .	8,321.0	7,844.8	28,475	26,846	7,866.6	7.416.4	26,921	25,380	38,451	35,941	292,217
2004:1	8,475.3	7,915.1	28,939	27,026	8,032.3	7,501.4	27.426	25,613	39,120	36,236	292,872
II	8,580.3	7,938.8	29.231	27,045	8,145.6	7,536.6	27.750	25,675	39,743	36,466	293,540
III	8,670.9	7,993.3	29.461	27,159	8,263.2	7,617.5	28.076	25,882	40,157	36,726	294,315
IV	8,930.4	8,169.2	30,265	27,685	8,416.1	7,698.8	28.522	26,091	40,651	36,930	295,077
2005:	8,902 0	8,098 1	30,103	27,384	8,535.8	7,764.9	28.864	26,258	41.251	37,195	295,720
	8,979.7	8,102.6	30,298	27,338	8,677.0	7,829.5	29.276	26,417	41,763	37,415	296,383
	9,015.1	8,060.8	30,338	27,127	8,844.0	7,907.9	29.762	26,612	42,421	37,699	297,155
	9,228.3	8,198.0	30,975	27,516	8,926.9	7,930.2	29,963	26,617	42,745	37,705	297,933

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Population of the United States including Armed Forces overseas; includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1960. Annual data are averages of quarterly data. Quarterly data are averages for the period.

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census).

TABLE B-32.—Gross saving and investment, 1959–2005 [Billions of dollars, except as noled; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

						Gross sa	aving					
					Net s	aving				Consu	mption of	fixed
Year or quarter	Total			Net priva	te saving		Net go	vernment	saving		capital	
	gross saving	Total net saving	Total	Personal saving	Undis- tributed cor- porate profits 1	Wage accruals less dis- burse- ments	Totał	Federal	State and local	Total	Private	Govern- ment
1959	106.2	53.2	46.0	26.7	19.4	0 0	7.1	3.3	3.8	53.0	38.6	14.5
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	111 3 114 3 124 9 133 2 143 4 158 5 168 7 170 5 182 0 198 3	55.8 57.1 65.7 70.8 78.4 89.1 93.1 89.0 93.6	44.3 50.2 57.9 59.7 71.0 79.2 83.1 91.4 88.4 83.7	26.7 32.2 33.8 33.3 40.8 43.0 44.4 52.8 52.5	17.6 18 1 24 1 26 4 30.1 36.2 38.7 36 9 35.6 31.2	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	11.5 6.9 7.8 11.1 7 4 9.9 10.0 -2 4 5.2 16.7	2 6 2.5 5.4 1.0 3.3 2.3 -9.4 -2.3	4.3 4.3 5.2 5.7 6.4 6.5 7.8 7.0 7.5 8.0	55.6 57.2 59.3 62.4 65.0 69.4 75.6 81.5 88.4 97.9	40.5 41.6 42.8 44.9 50.5 55.5 59.9 65.2 73.1	15.0 15.6 16.5 17.5 18.1 18.9 20.1 21.6 23.1 24.8
1970	192.7 208.9 237.5 292.0 301.5 297.0 342.1 397.5 478.0 536.7	86.01 93.9 111.01 152.7 139.01 109.2 137.0 167.5 215.7 236.6	94 0 115.8 119.8 148.3 143.4 175.8 181.3 198.5 223.5 234.9	69.5 80.6 77.2 102.7 113.6 125.6 122.3 125.3 142.5 159.1	24.6 34.8 42.9 45.6 29.8 50.2 59.0 73.2 81.0 75.7	.0 .4 .3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	-8.1 -21.9 -8.8 4.4 -4.4 -66.6 -44.4 -31.0 -7.8	-28.4 -24.4 -11.3 -13.8 -69.0 -51.7 -44.1 -26.5	7.1 6.5 15.6 15.7 9.3 2.5 7.4 13.1 18.7	106.7 115.0 126.5 139.3 162.5 187.7 205.2 230.0 262.3 300.1	80.0 86.7 97.1 107.9 126.6 147.8 162.5 184.3 212.8 245.7	26.7 28.3 29.5 31.4 35.9 40.0 42.6 45.7 49.5 54.5
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	549.4 654.7 629.1	206.5 266.6 202.2 165.6 300.9 260.7 202.2 234.9 317.4 300.4	251.3 312.3 336.2 333.7 445.0 413.4 372.0 367.4 434.0 409.7	201.4 244.3 270.8 233.6 314.8 280.0 268.4 241.4 272.9 287.1	49.9 68 0 65.4 100.1 130.3 133.4 103.7 126.1 161.1 122.6	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	-44.8 -45.7 -134.1 -168.1 -144.1 -152.6 -169.9 -132.6 -116.6 -109.3	-53.3 -131.9 -173.0 -168.1 -175.0 -190.8 -145.0 -134.5	8.8 7.6 -2.2 4.9 23.9 22.3 21.0 12.4 17.9 20.8	343.0 388.1 426.9 443.8 472.6 506.7 531.3 561.9 597.6 644.3	281.1 317.9 349.8 362.1 385.6 414.0 431.8 455.3 483.5 522.1	77.1
1990	1.598.7	258.0 238.2 196.3 186.0 237.1 306.2 373.0 486.6 568.6 573.0	422.7 456.1 493.0 458.6 438.9 491.1 489.0 503.3 477.8 419.0	299.4 324.2 366.0 284.0 249.5 250.9 228.4 218.3 276.8 158.6	123.3 131.9 142.7 168.1 171.8 223.8 256.9 287.9 201.7 255.3	0 0 -15.8 6.4 17.6 16.4 3.6 -2.9 7 5.2	-164.8 -217.9 -296.7 -272.6 -201.9 -184.9 -116.0 -16.7 90.8 154.0	-213.7 -297.4 -273.5 -212.3 -197.0 -141.8 -55.8 38.8	7.2 -4.2 .7 .9 10.5 12.0 25.8 39.1 52.0 50.4	682.5 725.9 751.9 776.4 833.7 878.4 918.1 974.4 1,030.2 1,101.3	551.6 586.9 607.3 624.7 675.1 713.4 748.8 800.3 851.2 914.3	144.6 151.8 158.6 165.0 169.3 174.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	1,770.5 1,657.6 1,489.1 1,474.1 1,572.0	582.7 376.1 197.1 142.7 136.8	343.3 324.6 479.2 549.3 549.1	168 5 132 3 184 7 172 8 151 8 -41.6	174.8 192.3 294.5 376.5 397.3	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0	239.4 51.5 -282.1 -406.5 -412.3	46.7 -247.9 -382.7	50.0 4.8 -34.2 -23.8 -5.9	1,187.8 1,281.5 1,292.0 1,331.3 1,435.3 1,574.1	1,080.3 1,112.8 1,206.2	206.0 211.6 218.5
2002:1	1,535.7 1,512.6 1,461.5 1,446.6	253.7 224.4 166.7 143.8	497.4 500.9 445.4 473.3	225.4 221.2 153.0 139.3	272.0 279.7 292.4 334.0	.0 .0 .0	-243.8 -276.5 -278.7 -329.5	-241.4 -247.3	-35.3 -35.1 -31.4 -34.9	1,282.0 1,288.2 1,294.9 1,302.7	1,073.1 1,077.5 1,082.4 1,088.4	208.9 210.8 212.5 214.3
2003: I II III IV	1,413.3 1,456.8 1,470.0 1,556.2	101.4 133.0 132.8 203.7	465.2 532.9 602.8 596.2	154 0 169.6 205.1 162.6	311.3 363.4 397.7 433.6	.0 .0 .0	-363.8 -399.9 -469.9 -392.5	-373.8 -456.2	$ \begin{array}{r} -67.8 \\ -26.1 \\ -13.8 \\ 12.5 \end{array} $	1,311.8 1,323.8 1,337.2 1,352.5	1,095.7 1,105.8 1,117.8 1,131.8	219.3
2004-1	1,534 7 1,546 4 1,590.1 1,617.0	163.6 152.6 56.0 174.9	599.4 567.6 486.9 542.6	155.8 141.2 104.6 205.4	443.5 426.4 382.3 337.2	.0 .0 .0	-435.8 -415.0 -430.9 -367.7	-413 4 -411 6	$ \begin{array}{r} -6.5 \\ -1.6 \\ -19.3 \\ 4.0 \end{array} $	1,371.1 1,393.8 1,534.1 1,442.0	1,147.8 1,165.8 1,303.5 1,207.6	223.3 228.1 230.6 234.5
2005: I II III	1,635.5 1,628.4 1,696.0	187.1 171.2 -167.8	478.1 447.2 253.8	47.4 -21.5 -158.9 -33.3	430.7 468.7 412.6	.0 .0 0	-290.9 -276.1 -421.6	-297.3		1,448.4 1,457.2 1,863.8 1,526.9	1,216.9 1,603.6	260.2

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm I}$  With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments See next page for continuation of table.

TABLE B-32.—Gross saving and investment, 1959-2005—Continued [Billions of dollars, except as noted; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Gross	i actions	nvestment s, and net	, capital lending. I	account NIPA	trans-				Ad	denda:			
			mestic inv						Gross g	overnment	saving		Gross saving	
Year or quarter	Total	Total	Gross private domes- tic invest- ment	Gross govern- ment invest- ment <sup>2</sup>	Cap- Ital ac- count trans- ac- tions (net) 3	Net lending or net bor- rowing (-), NIPA 4	Statis- tical discrep- ancy	Gross private saving	Total	Federal	State and local	Net domes- tic invest- ment	as a per-cent of gross na-tional in-come	as a per- cent of gross na-
1959	106.7	107.8	78.5	29.3		-1.2	0.5	84.6	21.6	13 6	8.0	54.8	20.9	10.4
1960	110.4 113.8 125.3 132.4 144.2 160.0 175.0 175.1 186.6 201.5	107.2 109.5 121.4 127.4 136.7 153.8 171.1 171.6 184.8 199.7	78.9 78.2 88.1 93.8 102.1 118.2 131.3 128.6 141.2 156.4	28.3 31.3 33.3 33.6 34.6 35.6 39.8 43.0 43.6 43.3		3.2 4.3 3.9 5.0 7.5 6.2 3.9 3.6 1.7 1.8	9 6 8 8 1.6 6.3 4.6 4.6 3.2	84.8 91.8 100.7 104.6 117.9 129.7 138.6 151.3 153.7 156.8	26.5 22.5 24.3 28.6 25.5 28.8 30.1 19.2 28.3 41.5	17.8 13.5 14.0 17.5 13.4 16.0 15.5 4.7 12.5 24.2	8.7 9.0 10.3 11.1 12.1 12.8 14.6 14.5 15.8 17.3	51.6 52.3 62.2 65.0 71.7 84.4 95.5 90.1 96.5 101.8	21.0 20.8 21.2 21.4 21.5 21.9 21.4 20.5 20.0 20.1	10. 10. 11. 11. 12. 11. 10. 10.
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	200.0 220.5 246.6 300.7 312.3 314.7 367.2 419.8 504.6 582.8	196.0 219.9 250.2 291.3 305.7 293.3 358.4 428.8 515.0 581.4	152.4 178.2 207.6 244.5 249.4 230.2 292.0 361.3 438.0 492.9	63.1 66.4 67.5 77.1		4.0 -3.6 9.3 6.6 21.4 8.9 -9.0 -10.4	7.3 11.6 9.1 8.6 10.9 17.7 25.1 22.3 26.6 46.0	174.1 202.5 216.8 256.3 270.0 323.6 343.8 382.8 436.3 480.5	18.6 6.4 20.7 35.8 31.5 -26.6 -1.7 14.7 41.7 56.2	.9 -11.9 -7.7 5.8 4.5 -49.3 -30.3 -21.0 -1.5 15.7	17.7 18.3 28.5 30.0 27.0 22.7 28.6 35.7 43.2 40.5	89.3 104.9 123.7 152.1 143.2 105.6 153.2 198.8 252.7 281.2	18.6 19.2 21.1 20.0 18.2 18.8 19.6 20.9 21.1	8. 9. 11. 9. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986	590.9 685.6 629.4 655.1 788.0 784.1 780.5 818.5 984.3	579.5 679.3 629.5 687.2 875.0 895.0 919.7 969.2 1,007.7 1,072.6	479.3 572.4 517.2 564.3 735.6 736.2 746.5 785.0 821.6 874.9	100.3 106.9 112.3 122.9 139.4 158.8 173.2 184.3 186.1 197.7	-0.2 2 3 3 4 5 3	11 4 6.3 .0 -31 8 -86 7 -110.5 -138.9 -150 4 -111.7 -88.0	41.4 30.9 .3 45.7 14.6 16.7 47.0 21.7 -19.5 39.7	532.4 636.0 695.8 830.6 827.3 803.9 822.7 917.5 931.8	17.0 24.4 -56.9 -86.5 -57.2 -59.9 -70.4 -25.9 -2.5	-23.6 -19.4 -94.2 -132.3 -123.5 -126.9 -139.2 -89.8 -75.2 -66.7	40.6 43.9 37.3 45.8 66.3 67.0 68.8 63.9 72.7 79.6	236.6 291.2 202.6 243.4 402.4 388.3 388.4 407.3 410.1 428.4	19.7 20.9 19.1 17.3 19.6 18.1 16.5 16.8 17.8	7. 8. 6. 4. 7. 6. 4. 5. 6.
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998	1,006.7 1,036.6 1,051.0 1,102.0 1,213.2 1,285.7 1,384.8 1,531.7 1,584.1	1,076.7 1,023.2 1,087.9 1,172.4 1,318.4 1,376.7 1,485.2 1,641.9 1,771.5 1,912.4	861 0 802 9 864 8 953 4 1.097 1 1,144 0 1,240 3 1,389 8 1,509 1 1,625.7	215.7 220.3 223.1 219.0 221.4 232.7 244.9 252.2 262.4 286.8	6.6 4.5 6 1.3 1.7 9 .7 1.0 .7 4.8	-76.6 9.0 -37.5 -71.7 -106.9 -91.9 -101.0 -111.3 -188.1 -278.7	66.2 72.5 102.7 139.5 142.5 101.2 93.7 70.7 -14.6 -35.7	974.3 1.042.9 1.100.4 1.083.3 1.114.0 1.204.5 1.237.8 1.303.6 1.328.9 1.333.3	-33.8 -78.8 -152.1 -120.8 -43.2 -19.9 53.3 157.5 269.8 341.0	-104.1 -141.5 -222.7 -195.5 -132.2 -115.1 -59.7 26.7 121.6 188.5	70.3 62.7 70.6 74.7 88.9 95.2 113.0 130.7 148.2 152.5	394.2 297.3 336.0 395.9 484.7 498.4 567.1 667.5 741.3 811.2	16.3 16.2 15.1 14.7 15.4 16.2 16.6 17.7 18.2 17.9	4 4 3 2 3 4 4 5 6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 "	1,643.3 1,567.9 1,468.1 1,521.1 1,648.9	2,040.0 1,938.3 1,926.4 2,025.6 2,300.6 2,499.4	1,735.5, 1,614.3 1,582.1 1,670.4 1,928.1 2,099.5	304.5 324.0 344.3 355.3 372.5 399.9	8 1.1 1.4 3.2 1.6	-397.4 -371.5 -459.7 -507.7 -653.4	-127.2 -89.6 -21.0 47.1 76.8	1,334.1 1,400.1 1,559.6 1,662.1 1,755.3	436.4 257.5 -70.5 -188.0 -183.2	276.6 134.9 -159.1 -292.5 -312.7	159.8 122.6 88.6 104.5 129.4	852.1 656.9 634.4 694.3 865.3 925.4	17.7 16.2 14.2 13.4 13.4	5. 3. 1. 1.
2002: I II III	1,482.1 1,455.9 1,476.1 1,458.3	1,903.1 1,915.4 1,939.7 1,947.4	1,564.1 1,571.4 1,592.9 1,600.1	339.0 343.9 346.8 347.4	1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6	-422.2 -460.7 -465.1 -490.7	-53.6 -56.7 14.6 11.7	1,570.5 1,578.3 1,527.7 1,561.7	-34.9 -65.7 -66.2 -115.2	-119.9 -152.8 -158.4 -205.1	85.0 87.0 92.2 90.0	621.1 627.2 644.8 644.7	14.7 14.4 13.9 13.6	2. 2. 1. 1.
1003: I II III IV .	1,429.8 1,471.2 1,555.3 1,628.2	1,958.9 1,974.5 2,054.4 2,114.7	1,610.0 1,619.3 1,694.2 1,757.9	349.0 355.2 360.1 356.8	1.7 6.4 3.3 1.4	-530.8 -509.6 -502.4 -487.9	16.6 14.4 85.3 72.0	1,560.9 1,638.7 1,720.6 1,728.1	-147.7 -181.9 -250.6 -171.9	-206.4 -283.4 -365.7 -314.3	58.7 101.6 115.1 142.5	647.1 650.6 717.2 762.2	13.2 13.4 13.3 13.8	1. 1. 1.
2004: I II IV .	1,612.5 1,654.5 1,680.9 1,647.6	2,178.7 2,303.4 2,334.0 2,386.2	1,818.2 1,928.5 1,961.2 2,004.5	360.4 375.0 372.9 381.7	1.7 1.5 1.6 1.8	-567.9 -650.4 -654.7 -740.4	77.8 108.1 90.8 30.6	1,747.2 1,733.4 1,790.4 1,750.2	-212.5 -187.0 -200.3 -133.2	-337.6 -320.0 -317.3 -275.7	125.1 133.0 117.1 142.5	807.5 909.6 799.9 944.2	13.4 13.3 13.5 13.5	1. 1. 1.
1005: I II III IV p	1,675.0 1,706.6 1,762.5	2,441.9 2,453.5 2,503.6 2,598.8	2,058.5 2,054.4 2,099.5 2,185.7	383.4 399.1 404.1 413.1	17.3 .5 .5	-784.3 -747.3 -741.6	39.4 78.3 66.5	1,688.9 1,664.1 1,857.4	-53.4. -35.7 -161.5	-201.4 -199.6 -316.0	148.0 163.9 154.6	993.5 996.3 639.8 1,071.9	13.4 13.2 13.5	1. 1. -1.

For details on government investment, see Table B-20.
 Consists of capital transfers and the acquisition and disposal of nonproduced nonfinancial assets.
 Prior to 1982, equals the balance on current account, NIPA (see Table B-24).

TABLE B-33.—Median money income (in 2004 dollars) and poverty status of families and persons, by race, selected years, 1991-2004

			Famili		ietteu y		Pers	000	Modian n	nanov incom	200A	dollare)
					overty leve	i	belo	OW.	of perso	noney incom ns 15 years incon	old and ov	er with
Vees	Num-	Median money	Tot		Fem househ	ale			Ma	les	Fema	ales
Year	ber (mil- lions)	income (in 2004 dol- lars) <sup>2</sup>	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent	Num- ber (mil- lions)	Per- cent	All persons	Year- round tull-time workers	AII persons	Year- round tull-time workers
ALL RACES  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004	67.2 68.2 68.5 69.3 69.6 70.2 70.2 73.8 74.3 75.6 76.2 77.0	\$48.608 48.255 47.578 48.895 50.705 52.307 54.091 55.647 54.857 54.285 54.096 54.061	7 7 8.1 8.4 8.1 7.5 7.7 7.3 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.8 7.2 7.6 7.9	11 5 11 9 12 3 11 6 10 8 11 0 10 3 10 0 9 3 8 7 9 6 10 0 10 2	4.2 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.0	35.6 35.4 35.6 34.6 32.4 32.6 31.6 29.9 27.8 25.4 26.5 28.0 28.4	35.7 38.0 39.3 38.1 36.4 36.5 35.6 34.5 32.8 31.6 32.9 34.6 35.9 37.0	14.2 14.8 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.7 13.3 12.7 11.9 11.3 11.7 12.1	\$27.684 26.989 27.165 27.384 27.771 28.570 29.590 30.660 30.937 31.089 31.054 30.712 30.735 30.513	\$41,023 40,680 40,006 39,855 39,633 40,202 41,368 41,956 42,450 42,659 42,829 42,549 42,618 41,667	\$14,169 14,136 14,220 14,456 14,930 15,361 16,082 16,700 17,347 17,619 17,729 17,659 17,723 17,629	\$28,734 29,150 28,925 29,332 29,266 29,889 30,549 31,080 31,945 32,461 32,531 32,504 32,101
WHITE 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001	57.2 57.7 57.9 58.4 58.9 59.5 60.1 61.1 61.3 61.6	51.102 51.022 50.592 51.545 52.492 53.649 54.872 56.736 57.898 58.167 57.695	5.0 5.3 5.5 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.6	8.8 9.1 9.4 9.1 8.5 8.6 7.3 7.1 7.4	2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9	28.4 28.5 29.2 29.0 26.6 27.3 27.7 24.9 22.5 21.2	23.7 25.3 26.2 25.4 24.4 24.7 24.4 23.5 22.2 21.6 22.7	11 3 11 9 12.2 11.7 11 2 11.0 10.5 9.8 9.5 9.9	28,937 28,244 28,297 28,580 29,412 29,906 30,649 31,996 32,491 32,684 32,269	41.864 41.648 40.978 40.899 41.253 41.644 42.389 43.048 44.447 44.153 43.527	14,500 14,465 14,503 14,663 15,159 15,536 16,187 16,917 17,401 17,637 17,769	29.153 29.488 29,581 30,125 29.866 30,396 31,666 31,738 32,853 32,919
Alone 5 2002 2003 2004	62.3 62.6 63.2	57,387 57,267 56,700	4 9 5.1 5.3	7 8 8.1 8.4	2 0 2.2 2.3	22.6 24.0 24.8	23.5 24.3 25.3	10 2 10 5 10.8	31,914 31,558 31,335	43,460 43,275 42,601	17,687 17,890 17,648	32,983 33,057 32,683
Alone or in combination b	63.0 63.5 64.1	57,193 57,098 56,568	5.0 5.2 5.4	7 9 8.1 8.5	2.1 2.2 2.3	22.6 24.2 24.9	24 1 25 0 26.0	10.3 10.6 10.9	31,844 31,482 31,269	43.398 43.210 42.490	17,652 17,858 17,618	32,970 33,045 32,649
BLACK 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001	7.7 8 0 8 0 8.1 8 5 8 4 8.5 8 7 8 7	29.144 27.844 27.731 31.138 31.966 31.792 33.568 34.030 36.102 36.939 35.853	2 3 2 5 2 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 0 1 9 1 .7 1 8	30 4 31 1 31 3 27.3 26.4 26.1 23 6 23 4 21.8 19 3 20.7	1.8 19 19 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3	51 2 50 2 49.9 46 2 45 1 43 7 39 8 40.8 39.2 34 3 35.2	10 2 10.8 10.9 10.2 9.9 9.7 9.1 9.1 8.4 8.0 8.1	32 7 33.4 33.1 30.6 29.3 28.4 26 5 26 1 23.6 22.5 22 7	17,531 17,237 18,801 18,889 19,701 19,768 21,238 22,361 23,170 23,411 22,907	30,605 30,335 30,337 30,769 30,523 32,528 31,567 31,794 34,180 33,443 34,063	11.924 11.726 12.240 13.294 13.492 14.111 15.314 15.204 16.749 17.420 17.375	25,879 26,729 26,152 26,007 25,946 26,359 26,717 27,619 28,497 28,245 29,129
Alone 7. 2002 2003 2004 Alone or an	8 9 8.9 8 9	35,215 35,293 35,158	1 9 2.0 2 0	21 5 22.3 22.8	1 4 1 5 1 5	35 8 36 9 37.6	8.6 8.8 9.0	24 1 24.4 24.7	22,648 22,577 22,714	33,541 34,327 31,732	17,572 17,027 17,383	29,017 28,364 29,145
combination 5 2002 2003 2004	9 1 9 1 9 1	35.329 35,537 35,328	2 0 2.0 2 1	21 4 22 1 22.8	1.5 1.5 1.5	35.7 36.8 37.6	8.9 9.1 9.4	23.9 24.3 24.7	22,593 22,525 22,740	33.577 34.363 31,724	17,511 16,985 17,369	29,099 28,419 29,191

The term "family" refers to a group of two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together. Every family must include a reference person

Current dollar median money income adjusted by CPI-U-RS

Based on 1990 census adjusted population controls, comparable with succeeding years Reflects implementation of Census 2000-based population controls comparable with succeeding years Retlects household sample expansion

Data are for white alone, for white alone or in combination, for black alone, and, for black alone or in combination. (Black is also Black or African American.) Beginning with data for 2002 the Current Population Survey allowed respondents to choose more than one race; for earlier years respondents could report only one race group.

Note. Poverty rates (percent of persons below poverty level) for all races for years not shown above are: 1959, 22.4, 1960, 22.2; 1961, 21.9, 1962, 21.0, 1963, 19.5, 1964, 19.0, 1965, 17.3, 1966, 14.7, 1967, 14.2; 1968, 12.8, 1969, 12.1, 1970, 12.6; 1971, 12.5, 1972, 11.9; 1973, 11.1, 1974, 11.2; 1975, 12.3, 1976, 11.8, 1977, 11.6; 1978, 11.4, 1979, 117; 1980, 13.0, 1981, 14.0; 1982, 15.0; 1983, 15.2, 1984, 14.4, 1985, 14.0, 1986, 13.6; 1987, 13.4, 1988, 13.0; 1989, 12.8, and 1990, 13.5.

Poverty thresholds are updated each year to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI-U).

For details see "Current Population Reports," Series P-60

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

## POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, AND PRODUCTIVITY

TABLE B-34.—Population by age group, 1929-2005
[Thousands of persons]

	T				Age (years)			
July 1	Total	Under 5	5-15	16-19	20-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over
929 933 939	. 125,579 . 130,880	11,734 10,612 10,418	26,800 26,897 25,179	9,127 9,302 9,822	10,694 11,152 11,519	35,862 37,319 39,354	21,076 22,933 25,823	6,47 7,36 8,76
940 941 942 943 944	. 133,402 . 134,860 . 136,739	10,579 10,850 11,301 12,016 12,524	24,811 24,516 24,231 24,093 23,949	9,895 9,840 9,730 9,607 9,561	11,690 11,807 11,955 12,064 12,062	39,868 40,383 40,861 41,420 42,016	26,249 26,718 27,196 27,671 28,138	9,03 9,28 9,58 9,86 10,14
945 946 947 948 949	. 141,389 144,126 146,631	12,979 13,244 14,406 14,919 15,607	23,907 24,103 24,468 25,209 25,852	9,361 9,119 9,097 8,952 8,788	12,036 12,004 11,814 11,794 11,700	42,521 43,027 43,657 44,288 44,916	28,630 29,064 29,498 29,931 30,405	10,49 10,82 11,18 11,53 11,92
950 951 952 953 954	. 152,271 154,878	16,410 17,333 17,312 17,638 18,057	26,721 27,279 28,894 30,227 31,480	8,542 8,446 8,414 8,460 8,637	11,680 11,552 11,350 11,062 10,832	45,672 46,103 46,495 46,786 47,001	30,849 31,362 31,884 32,394 32,942	12,39 12,80 13,20 13,61 14,07
955	. 165,931 168,903	18,566 19,003 19,494 19,887 20,175	32,682 33,994 35,272 36,445 37,368	8,744 8,916 9,195 9,543 10,215	10,714 10,616 10,603 10,756 10,969	47,194 47,379 47,440 47,337 47,192	33,506 34,057 34,591 35,109 35,663	14,52 14,93 15,38 15,80 16,24
960 961 962 963 964	. 180,671 . 183,691 . 186,538 . 189,242	20,341 20,522 20,469 20,342 20,165	38,494 39,765 41,205 41,626 42,297	10,683 11,025 11,180 12,007 12,736	11,134 11,483 11,959 12,714 13,269	47,140 47,084 47,013 46,994 46,958	36,203 36,722 37,255 37,782 38,338	16,67 17,08 17,45 17,77 18,12
965 966 967 968	194,303 196,560 198,712 200,706	19,824 19,208 18,563 17,913 17,376	42,938 43,702 44,244 44,622 44,840	13,516 14,311 14,200 14,452 14,800	13,746 14,050 15,248 15,786 16,480	46,912 47,001 47,194 47,721 48,064	38,916 39,534 40,193 40,846 41,437	18,45 18,75 19,05 19,36 19,68
970 971 972 973 974	205,052 207,661 209,896 211,909	17,166 17,244 17,101 16,851 16,487	44,816 44,591 44,203 43,582 42,989	15,289 15,688 16,039 16,446 16,769	17,202 18,159 18,153 18,521 18,975	48,473 48,936 50,482 51,749 53,051	41,999 42,482 42,898 43,235 43,522	20,10 20,56 21,02 21,52 22,06
975 976 977 978 979	215,973 218,035 220,239 222,585	16,121 15,617 15,564 15,735 16,063	42,508 42,099 41,298 40,428 39,552	17,017 17,194 17,276 17,288 17,242	19,527 19,986 20,499 20,946 21,297	54,302 55,852 57,561 59,400 61,379	43,801 44,008 44,150 44,286 44,390	22,69 23,27 23,89 24,50 25,13
980 981 982 983 984	227,726 229,966 232,188 234,307	16,451 16,893 17,228 17,547 17,695	38,838 38,144 37,784 37,526 37,461	17,167 16,812 16,332 15,823 15,295	21,590 21,869 21,902 21,844 21,737	63,470 65,528 67,692 69,733 71,735	44,504 44,500 44,462 44,474 44,547	25,70 26,22 26,78 27,36 27,8
985 986 987 988 988	238,466 240,651 242,804 245,021	17,842 17,963 18,052 18,195 18,508	37,450 37,404 37,333 37,593 37,972	15,005 15,024 15,215 15,198 14,913	21,478 20,942 20,385 19,846 19,442	73,673 75,651 77,338 78,595 79,943	44,602 44,660 44,854 45,471 45,882	28,4 29,00 29,62 30,12 30,68
990 991 992 993 994	250,132 253,493 256,894 260,255	18,856 19,208 19,528 19,729 19,777	38,632 39,349 40,161 40,904 41,689	14,466 13,992 13,781 13,953 14,228	19,323 19,414 19,314 19,101 18,758	81,291 82,844 83,201 83,766 84,334	46,316 46,874 48,553 49,899 51,318	31,24 31,8 32,3 32,9 33,3
995 996 997 998	266,557 269,667 272,912 276,115	19,627 19,408 19,233 19,145 19,136	42,510 43,172 43,833 44,332 44,755	14,522 15,057 15,433 15,856 16,164	18,391 17,965 17,992 18,250 18,672	84,933 85,527 85,737 85,663 85,408	52,806 54,396 56,283 58,249 60,362	33,70 34,14 34,40 34,6 34,7
2000 <sup>1</sup>	282,402 285,329 288,173 291,028	19,187 19,361 19,548 19,791 20,071	45,166 45,186 45,141 45,081 44,962	16,205 16,248 16,302 16,359 16,534	19,189 19,875 20,408 20,840 21,064	85,159 84,918 84,632 84,372 84,276	62,419 64,414 66,557 68,642 70,705	35,07 35,32 35,58 35,94 36,29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Revised total population data are available as follows: 2000, 282,403; 2001, 285,335; 2002, 288,216, 2003, 291,089; and 2004, 293,908. Note.—Includes Armed Forces overseas beginning 1940. Includes Alaska and Hawaii beginning 1950. All estimates are consistent with decennial census enumerations. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE B-35.—Civilian population and labor force, 1929-2005 [Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

					Civilia	an labor i	force			Cool	Civil-	Harris
	Year or m	onth	Civilian noninsti- tutional			mptoymer		Un-	Not in labor	Civil- ian labor force	em- ploy- ment/	Unem- ploy- ment rate.
	real of An	yiitii	popula- tion <sup>1</sup>	Total	Total	Agrı- cul- tural	Non- agri- cultural	employ- ment	force	par- tici- pation rate <sup>2</sup>	pop- ula- tion ratio <sup>3</sup>	civil- ian work- ers4
			1	Thousands	s of person	s 14 year	s of age a	nd over		-	Percent	
929				49,180	47,630	10,450	37,180	1,550				3.2
933 939				51,590	38,760 45,750	10,090 9,610	28,670 36,140	12,830 9,480				24.9
940			99.840	55,230 55,640	47.520	9.540	37.980	8.120	44.200	55.7	47.6	17.2 14.6
941 942			99.900 98.640	55,910 56,410	50,350 53,750	9,100 9,250	41,250 44,500	5,560 2,660	43.990 42.230	56 0 57.2	50.4 54.5	9.9
943			94.640 93.220	55,540 54,630	54.470 53.960	9.080 8,950	45,390 45,010	1,070	39,100 38,590	58.7 58.6	57.6 57.9	1.9
945			94.090	53.860	52.820	8,580	44 240	1.040	40.230	57.2	56.1	1.9
946 947			103.070 106.018	57,520 60,168	55.250 57.812	8.320 8,256	46,930 49,557	2,270 2,356	45.550 45.850	55.8 56.8	53.6 54.5	3.9
				Thousands	of person	s 16 year	s of age a	nd over				
947 948			101,827 103,068	59,350 60,621	57,038 58,343	7,890 7,629	49,148 50,714	2,311 2,276	42.477 42.447	58.3 58.8	56.0 56.6	3.9
949			103,994	61,286	57,651	7,658	49,993	3,637	42,708	58 9	55.4	5.9
950 951 .			104.995 104,621 105,231	62,208 62,017 62,138	58,918 59,961 60,250	7.160 6,726	51,758 53,235 53,749	3,288 2,055	42,787 42,604	59.2 59.2	56.1 57.3	5.3
952 953 <sup>5</sup>			105.231 107.056	62,138 63,015	60,250 61,179	6.500 6.260	53,749 54,919	1,883 1,834	43.093 44.041	59.0 58.9	57.3 57.1	3.
954			108,321	63,643	60,109	6,205	53,904	3,532	44.678	58.8	55.5	5.
155 156			109,683 110.954	65,023 66,552	62,170 63,799	6,450 6,283	55,722 57,514	2,852 2,750	44.660 44,402	59.3 60.0	56.7 57.5	4. 4.
57 . 58			112,265 113,727	66,929 67,639	64,071 63,036	5,947 5,586	58,123 57,450	2,859 4,602	45,336 46,088	59.6 59.5	57.1 55.4	4. 6.
59 60 <sup>5</sup>			115,329	68,369 69,628	64,630 65,778	5,565 5,458	59,065 60,318	3,740	46,960	59.3 59.4	56.0	5.
161			117.245 118.771 120,153	70.459	65.746	5.200	60.546	3,852 4,714	47.617 48.312	59.3	56 1 55.4	5.
)62 <sup>5</sup>			122,416	70.614 71.833	66,702 67,762	4,944 4,687	61,759 63,076	3,911 4,070	49,539 50,583	58.8 58.7	55.5 55.4	5. 5.
164 165 .			124,485 126,513	73,091 74,455	69,305 71,088	4.523	64,782 66,726	3.786 3.366	51.394 52.058	58 7	55.7 56.2	5.1 4.1
966			128.058	75.770	72 895	3,979	68,915	2 875	52,288	58.9 59.2	56.9	3.
968			129.874 132,028	77,347 78,737	74,372 75,920	3.844 3.817	70,527 72,103	2.975 2.817	52,527 53,291	59.6 59.6	57.3 57.5	3. 3.
969 970			134,335 137,085	80,734 82,771	77,902 78,678	3,606 3,463	74,296 75,215	2,832 4.093	53,602 54.315	60 1 60.4	58.0 57.4	3.
971 972 5			140,216 144,126	84,382 87,034	79,367 82,153	3,394 3,484	75,972 78,669	5,016 4,882	55.834 57.091	60.2	56.6 57.0	5.
973 5			147,096	89,429	85,064	3,470	81,594	4,365	57,667	60.8	57.8	4.
174 175			150,120 153,153	91,949 93,775	86,794 85,846	3,515 3,408	83.279 82.438	5,156 7,929	58,171 59,377	61.3	57 8 56.1	5. 8.
76			156,150 159,033	96,158 99,009	88,752 92,017	3,331 3,283	85.421 88.734	7.406	59,991 60,025	61.6	56.8 57.9	7.
78 <sup>5</sup> 79			161,910 164,863	102.251 104.962	96.048 98.824	3,387 3,347	92,661 95,477	6,991 6,202	59,659	62.3 63.2 63.7	59.3 59.9	6.
80			167,745	106,940	99,303	3.364	95,938	6,137 7,637	59,900 60,806	63.8	59.2	5.
81 . 82			170,130 172,271	108,670 110,204	100,397 99,526	3,368 3,401	97,030 96,125	8,273 10,678	61,460 62,067	63.9 64.0	59.0 57.8	7. 9
83 84			172,271 174,215 176,383	111,550 113,544	100,834 105,005	3,383 3,321	97,450 101,685	10.717	62,665 62,839	64.0 64.4	57.9 59.5	9.6 7.5
85			178,206	115.461	107,150	3,179	103,971	8.312	62,744	648	60.1	7.2
)86 <sup>5</sup> )87			178,206 180,587 182,753	117,834 119,865	109,597 112,440	3,163 3,208	106,434 109,232	8,237 7,425	62,752 62,888	65.3 65.6	60.7	7.t 6.:
988 989			184,613 186,393	121,669 123,869	114,968 117,342	3,169 3,199	111,800	6,701 6,528	62,944 62,523	65.6 65.9 66.5	61.5 62.3 63.0	5.5
990 s			189,164	125,840	118,793	3,223 3,269	115,570	7.047	63,324	66.5 66.2	62.8	5.8
991 992			190.925 192,805	126,346 128,105	117,718 118,492	3.269 3,247	114,449 - 115,245	8,628 9,613	64.578 64.700	66.2 66.4	61.7 61.5	6.8
993 994 <sup>5</sup> .			194,838 196,814	128,105 129,200 131,056	118,492 120,259 123,060	3,115 3,409	117,144 119,651	8.940 7.996	65,638 65,758	66.3 66.6	61.7 62.5	6.9
995 996			198,584	132 304	124,900	3,440	121,460	7.404	66.280	66.6	62.9	5.6
997 5			200,591 203,133	133,943 136,297	126,708 129,558	3,443 3,399	123,264 126,159	7,236 6,739	66,647 66,837	66.8 67.1	63.2 63.8	5.4 4.9
9985 9995			205,220 207,753	137,673 139,368	131,463 133,488	3,378 3,281	128,085 130,207	6,210 5,880	67,547 68,385	67.1 67.1	64 1 64.3	4.5 4.2

<sup>!</sup> Not seasonally adjusted
2 Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.
3 Civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.
4 Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force.

TABLE B-35.—Civilian population and labor force, 1929-2005—Continued [Monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

			Civilia	in labor	force			Cavil-	Civil- ian	Unem-
	Civilian noninsti-		En	nplaymer	nt		Not in	ian Jabor	em- ploy-	ploy- ment
Year or month	tutional popula- tion 1	Total	Total	Agri- cul- tural	Non- agri- cultural	Un- employ- ment	labor torce	force par- tici- pation rate <sup>2</sup>	ment/ pop- ula- tion ratio <sup>3</sup>	rate, civil- ian work- ers <sup>4</sup>
		Thousand	s of persons	s 16 year	rs of age a	nd over			Percent	
0005 6 001 002 003 5 004 5	215,092 217,570 221,168 223,357	142,583 143,734 144,863 146,510 147,401 149,320	136,891 136,933 136,485 137,736 139,252 141,730	2,464 2,299 2,311 2,275 2,232 2,197	134,427 134,635 134,174 135,461 137,020 139,532	5.692 6.801 8.378 8.774 8,149 7,591	69.994 71,359 72,707 74,658 75,956 76,762	67 1 66.8 66.6 66 2 66 0 66 0	64 4 63.7 62.7 62.3 62.3 62.7	4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1
002: Jan Feb Feb Mar Apr May June	216,663 216,823 217,006 217,198	143,883 144,663 144,485 144,718 144,933 144,803	135,698 136,442 136,195 136,136 136,546 136,415	2,385 2,397 2,369 2,373 2,263 2,170	133,230 134,126 133,816 133,833 134,277 134,153	8,184 8,221 8,290 8,582 8,387 8,388	72,623 72,000 72,338 72,287 72,265 72,605	66.5 66.8 66.6 66.7 66.7	62.7 63.0 62.8 62.7 62.9 62.7	5 5 5 5 5 5
July	217,866 218,107 218,340 218,548	144,803 145,007 145,562 145,313 145,050 145,065	136,410 136,695 137,305 137,001 136,517 136,400	2,336 2,132 2,284 2,440 2,255 2,349	134,082 134,584 135,108 134,587 134,183 134,073	8,392 8,311 8,257 8,312 8,533 8,665	72.827 72.859 72.545 73.027 73,499 73,676	66.5 66.6 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3	62.7 62.7 63.0 62.7 62.5 62.4	5. 5. 5. 5. 6.
003: Jan <sup>5</sup> Feb <sup>5</sup> Mar Apr May June	220,114 220,317 220,540 220,768	145,937 146,104 146,004 146,452 146,480 147,031	137,424 137,472 137,461 137,637 137,547 137,784	2,343 2,240 2,267 2,157 2,183 2,197	135,032 135,288 135,223 135,538 135,356 135,454	8,513 8,632 8,543 8,816 8,933 9,246	73.961 74.011 74,314 74,088 74,288 73,984	66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.5	62.5 62.4 62.4 62.3 62.3	5. 5. 6. 6.
July	221,252 221,507 221,779 222,039	146,505 146,427 146,546 146,716 147,063 146,773	137,478 137,525 137,601 137,986 138,453 138,400	2.205 2,304 2,336 2,435 2,364 2,247	135,211 135,193 135,373 135,603 136,052 136,153	9,027 8,902 8,945 8,730 8,610 8,373	74,748 75,080 75,232 75,323 75,216 75,736	66.2 66.1 66.1 66.2 66.0	62 1 62.1 62.0 62 1 62.3 62.2	6. 6 6 5 5
004: Jan <sup>5</sup> Feb Mar Apr May June	222,550 222,757 222,967	146,817 146,681 146,849 146,800 147,021 147,427	138,472 138,495 138,452 138,659 138,843 139,181	2.211 2,227 2,189 2,250 2,296 2,251	136,205 136,294 136,291 136,420 136,524 136,816	8,345 8,186 8,397 8,140 8,178 8,247	75,344 75,675 75,701 75,957 75,946 75,768	66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 65.9 66.1	62.3 62.2 62.2 62.3 62.3 62.4	5. 5. 5. 5. 5.
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Oec	223,677 223,941 224,192 224,422	147,773 147,558 147,476 147,808 148,250 148,173	139,591 139,558 139,495 139,768 140,276 140,133	2,242 2,317 2,223 2,163 2,192 2,190	137,329 137,227 137,391 137,675 138,045 137,944	8,182 8,000 7,981 8,040 7,974 8,040	75,649 76,119 76,465 76,384 76,172 76,467	66.1 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.0	62.5 62.4 62.3 62.3 62.5 62.4	5. 5. 5. 5. 5.
005: Jan <sup>5</sup> Feb Mar Apr May June	224,837 225,041 225,236 225,441 225,670	147,956 148,271 148,217 148,839 149,201 149,243	140.234 140.285 140.601 141.196 141.571 141,750	2,138 2,161 2,199 2,253 2,216 2,321	138.076 138,111 138,416 138,926 139,322 139,333	7,723 7,986 7,616 7,644 7,629 7,493	76,881 76,770 77,019 76,601 76,469 76,668	65.8 65.9 65.8 66.0 66.1 66.1	62.4 62.3 62.4 62.6 62.7 62.7	5. 5. 5. 5. 5.
July	226,153 226,421 226,693 226,959 227,204	149,605 149,792 150,083 150,043 150,183 150,153	142,111 142,425 142,435 142,625 142,611 142,779	2,332 2,157 2,140 2,126 2,154 2,130	139.772 140.294 140,421 140,577 140,427 140,638	7.494 7,367 7,648 7,418 7,572 7,375	76,548 76,629 76,610 76,916 77,021 77,271	66.2 66.2 66.2 66.1 66.1	62.8 62.9 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8	5. 4. 5. 4. 5. 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Not strictly comparable with earlier data due to population adjustments or other changes. See *Employment and Earnings* for details on breaks in series.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Beginning in 2000, data for agricultural employment are for agricultural and related industries: data for this series and for non-agricultural employment are not strictly comparable with data for earlier years. Because of independent seasonal adjustment for these two series, monthly data will not add to total civilian employment.

Note.—Labor force data in Tables B-35 through B-44 are based on household interviews and relate to the calendar week including the 12th of the month. For definitions of terms, area samples used, historical comparability of the data, comparability with other series, etc., see Employment and Earnings.

TABLE B-36.—Civilian employment and unemployment by sex and age, 1959-2005 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			Civilia	n employ:	nent					Uner	nployme	nt		
			Males			Females				Males			Females	
Year or month	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
1959	64,630	43,466	2.198	41.267	21,164	1,640	19,524	3,740	2.420	398	2.022	1.320	256	1.063
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	65.778 65.746 66.702 67.762 69.305 71.088 72.895 74.372 75.920 77.902	43,904 43,656 44,177 44,657 45,474 46,340 46,919 47,479 48,114 48,818	2,361 2,315 2,362 2,406 2,587 2,918 3,253 3,186 3,255 3,430	41,543 41,342 41,815 42,251 42,886 43,422 43,668 44,294 44,859 45,388	21.874 22.090 22.525 23.105 23.831 24.748 25.976 26.893 27.807 29.084	1.768 1.793 1.833 1.849 1.929 2.118 2.468 2.496 2.526 2.687	20.105 20.296 20.693 21.257 21.903 22,630 23,510 24.397 25,281 26,397	3,852 4,714 3,911 4,070 3,786 3,366 2,875 2,975 2,817 2,832	2.486 2.997 2.423 2.472 2.205 1.914 1.551 1.508 1.419 1.403	426 479 408 501 487 479 432 448 426 440	2,060 2,518 2,016 1,971 1,718 1,435 1,120 1,060 993 963	1.366 1.717 1.488 1.598 1.581 1.452 1.324 1.468 1.397 1.429	286 349 313 383 385 395 405 391 412 413	1,080 1,368 1,175 1,216 1,195 1,056 921 1,078 985 1,015
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	78.678 79.367 82.153 85.064 86.794 85.846 88.752 92.017 96.048 98.824	48.990 49.390 50.896 52.349 53.024 51.857 53.138 54.728 56.479 57.607	3.409 3.478 3.765 4.039 4.103 3.839 3.947 4.174 4.336 4.300	45.581 45.912 47.130 48.310 48.922 48.018 49.190 50.555 52.143 53.308	29.688 29.976 31.257 32.715 33.769 33.989 35.615 37.289 39.569 41.217	2,735 2,730 2,980 3,231 3,345 3,263 3,389 3,514 3,734 3,783	26,952 27,246 28,276 29,484 30,424 30,726 32,226 33,775 35,836 37,434	4.093 5.016 4.882 4.365 5.156 7.929 7.406 6.991 6.202 6.137	2.238 2.789 2.659 2.275 2.714 4.442 4.036 3.667 3.142 3.120	599 693 711 653 757 966 939 874 813	1.638 2.097 1.948 1.624 1.957 3.476 3.098 2.794 2.328 2.308	1.855 2.227 2.222 2.089 2.441 3.486 3.369 3.324 3.061 3.018	506 568 598 583 665 802 780 789 769	1.349 1.658 1.625 1.507 1.777 2.684 2.588 2.535 2.292 2.276
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987 1988	99,303 100,397 99,526 100,834 105,005 107,150 109,597 112,440 114,968 117,342	57.186 57.397 56.271 56.787 59.091 59.891 60.892 62.107 63.273 64.315	4.085 3,815 3,379 3,300 3,322 3,328 3,323 3,381 3,492 3,477	53,101 53,582 52,891 53,487 55,769 56,562 57,569 58,726 59,781 60,837	42,117 43,000 43,256 44,047 45,915 47,259 48,706 50,334 51,696 53,027	3,625 3,411 3,170 3,043 3,122 3,105 3,149 3,260 3,313 3,282	38,492 39,590 40,086 41,004 42,793 44,154 45,556 47,074 48,383 49,745	7.637 8.273 10.678 10,717 8,539 8,312 8.237 7,425 6,701 6,528	4.267 4.577 6.179 6.260 4.744 4.521 4.530 4.101 3.655 3.525	913 962 1.090 1.003 812 806 779 732 667 658	3,353 3,615 5,089 5,257 3,932 3,715 3,751 3,369 2,987 2,867	3.370 3.696 4.499 4.457 3.794 3.707 3.324 3.046 3.003	755 800 886 825 687 661 675 616 558 536	2.615 2.895 3.613 3.632 3.107 3.129 3.032 2.709 2.487 2.467
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	118,793 117,718 118,492 120,259 123,060 124,900 126,708 129,558 131,463 133,488	65,104 64,223 64,440 65,349 66,450 67,377 68,207 69,685 70,693 71,446	3.427 3.044 2.944 2.994 3.156 3.292 3.310 3.401 3.558 3.685	61,678 61,178 61,496 62,355 63,294 64,085 64,897 66,284 67,135 67,761	53,689 53,496 54,052 54,910 56,610 57,523 58,501 59,873 60,771 62,042	3,154 2,862 2,724 2,811 3,005 3,127 3,190 3,260 3,493 3,487	50,535 50,634 51,328 52,099 53,606 54,396 55,311 56,613 57,278 58,555	7,047 8,628 9,613 8,940 7,996 7,404 7,236 6,739 6,210 5,880	3,906 4,946 5,523 5,055 4,367 3,983 3,577 3,266 3,066	667 751 806 768 740 744 733 694 686 633	3,239 4,195 4,717 4,287 3,627 3,239 3,146 2,882 2,580 2,433	3,140 3,683 4,090 3,885 3,629 3,421 3,356 3,162 2,944 2,814	544 608 621 597 580 602 573 577 519 529	2,596 3,074 3,469 3,288 3,049 2,819 2,783 2,585 2,424 2,285
2000	136.891 136.933 136.485 137.736 139.252 141.730	73,305 73,196 72,903 73,332 74,524 75,973	3.671 3.420 3.169 2.917 2.952 2.923	69,634 69,776 69,734 70,415 71,572 73,050	63.586 63.737 63.582 64.404 64.728 65.757	3,519 3,320 3,162 3,002 2,955 3,055	60,067 60,417 60,420 61,402 61,773 62,702	5,692 6,801 8,378 8,774 8,149 7,591	2.975 3,690 4.597 4.906 4.456 4.059	599 650 700 697 664 667	2.376 3.040 3.896 4.209 3.791 3.392	2,717 3.111 3,781 3,868 3,694 3,531	483 512 553 554 543 519	2,235 2,599 3,228 3,314 3,150 3,013
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	138.472 138.495 138.452 138.659 138.843 139.181	74.344 74.047 74.043 74.081 74.082 74.462	3,004 2,941 2,851 2,947 2,909 2,921	71.340 71.105 71.192 71.134 71.173 71.541	64.128 64,449 64.409 64.578 64.761 64.719	2,960 2,954 2,922 2,964 3,017 2,917	61.168 61.495 61.487 61.614 61.745 61.802	8,345 8,186 8,397 8,140 8,178 8,247	4.506 4.449 4.527 4.459 4.552 4.441	640 607 643 672 667 642	3,866 3,841 3,883 3,787 3,885 3,799	3,839 3,737 3,870 3,681 3,626 3,806	580 562 516 498 544 549	3,259 3,175 3,354 3,183 3,082 3,257
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	139,591 139,558 139,495 139,768 140,276 140,133	74,769 74,756 74,667 74,850 75,192 74,937	2,987 2,977 2,933 2,980 3,051 2,900	71,782 71,780 71,733 71,870 72,140 72,037	64.822 64.801 64.828 64.918 65,084 65,196	2,913 2,937 2,945 2,948 2,971 3,027	61.909 61.864 61.883 61.970 62.113 62.169	8,182 8,000 7,981 8,040 7,974 8,040	4.398 4.417 4.411 4.434 4.398 4.457	647 660 664 713 686 767	3.751 3.757 3.747 3.721 3.712 3.689	3,784 3,583 3,570 3,606 3,576 3,583	628 545 523 513 500 525	3.156 3.038 3.048 3.093 3.076 3,058
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	140,234 140,285 140,601 141,196 141,571 141,750	74,980 75,075 75,436 75,773 75,998 76,099	2.888 2.829 2.924 2.918 2.890 2.921	72,092 72,246 72,513 72,855 73,108 73,178	65,254 65,209 65,165 65,423 65,573 65,652	3.018 2,989 3.036 2,997 3.058 3.099	62.236 62.220 62.129 62,426 62,515 62,552	7,723 7,986 7,616 7,644 7,629 7,493	4.197 4.415 4.181 4.085 4.047 3.966	639 732 729 738 711 673	3.558 3.683 3.453 3.347 3.337 3.294	3.525 3.572 3.434 3.559 3.582 3.526	501 508 483 523 569 496	3,024 3,064 2,952 3,036 3,013 3,030
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	142,111 142,425 142,435 142,625 142,611 142,779	76.258 76.404 76.257 76.396 76.410 76.529	2,913 2,924 2,926 2,896 2,970 3,061	73.345 73,479 73.331 73.500 73.441 73,468	65,853 66,022 66,178 66,229 66,200 66,250	3,110 3,121 3,104 3,068 3,031 3,000	62.744 62.901 63.074 63.162 63.170 63.249	7,494 7,367 7,648 7,418 7,572 7,375	3,928 3,951 4,076 3,853 3,984 3,902	654 644 615 573 702 584	3,274 3,307 3,461 3,281 3,282 3,318	3.566 3.416 3.572 3.565 3.588 3,473	497 539 518 552 535 507	3,070 2,877 3,055 3,013 3,053 2,966

Note.—See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE B-37.—Civilian employment by demographic characteristic, 1959-2005 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	All -		Whit	e <sup>1</sup>			Black an	d other I		Black	r Africa	an Amer	ican <sup>1</sup>
Year or month	civilian workers	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19
1959	64.630	58,006	39,494	18,512	3,475	6.623	3.971	2,652	362				
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	65.778 65.746 66.702 67.762 69.305 71.088 72.895 74.372 75.920 77.902	58,850 58,913 59,698 60,622 61,922 63,446 65,021 66,361 67,750 69,518	39,755 39,588 40,016 40,428 41,115 41,844 42,331 42,833 43,411 44,048	19,095 19,325 19,682 20,194 20,807 21,602 22,690 23,528 24,339 25,470	3,700 3,693 3,774 3,851 4,076 4,562 5,176 5,114 5,195 5,508	6.928 6.833 7.003 7.140 7,383 7,643 7,877 8,011 8.169 8.384	4.149 4,068 4,160 4,229 4,359 4,496 4,588 4,646 4,702 4,770	2,779 2,765 2,843 2,911 3,024 3,147 3,289 3,365 3,467 3,614	430 414 420 404 440 474 545 568 584 609				
1970 1971 1972 1973 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	78.678 79,367 82,153 85,064 86,794	70.217 70.878 73.370 75.708 77.184 76.411 78.853 81.700 84.936 87.259	44,178 44,595 45,944 47,085 47,674 46,697 47,775 49,150 50,544 51,452	26.039 26.283 27.426 28.623 29.511 29.714 31.078 32.550 34.392 35.807	5.571 5.670 6.173 6.623 6.796 6.487 6.724 7.068 7.367 7,356	8,464 8,488 8,783 9,356 9,610 9,435 9,899 10,317 11,112 11,565	4.813 4.796 4.952 5.265 5.352 5,161 5.363 5,579 5.936 6,156	3,650 3,692 3,832 4,092 4,258 4,275 4,536 4,739 5,177 5,409	574 538 573 647 652 615 611 619 703 727	7,802 8,128 8,203 7,894 8,227 8,540 9,102 9,359	4.368 4.527 4.527 4.275 4.404 4.565 4.796 4.923	3,601 3,677 3,618 3,823 3,975 4,307	509 570 554 507 508 571 579
1980	00 303	87,715 88,709 87,903 88,893 92,120 93,736 95,660 97,789 99,812 101,584	51.127 51,315 50.287 50,621 52,462 53,046 53,785 54,647 55,550 56,352	36,587 37,394 37,615 38,272 39,659 40,690 41,876 43,142 44,262 45,232	7.021 6,588 5,984 5.799 5,836 5,768 5,792 5,898 6.030 5,946	11,588 11.688 11.624 11,941 12,885 13,414 13,937 14,652 15,156 15,757	6.059 6.083 5.983 6.166 6.629 6.845 7.107 7.459 7.722 7.963	5,529 5.606 5.641 5.775 6,256 6,569 6,830 7,192 7,434 7,795	689 637 565 543 607 666 681 742 774 813	9,313 9,355 9,189 9,375 10,119 10,501 10,814 11,309 11,658 11,953	4,798 4,794 4,637 4,753 5,124 5,270 5,428 5,661 5,824 5,928	4,561 4,552 4,622 4,995 5,231 5,386 5,648 5,834	547 505 428 416 474 532 536 587 601
1990	118,793 117,718 118,492 120,259 123,060 124,900 126,708 129,558 131,463 133,488	102.261 101.182 101.669 103.045 105.190 106.490 107.808 109.856 110.931 112.235	56,703 55,797 55,959 56,656 57,452 58,146 58,888 59,998 60,604 61,139	45.558 45.385 45.710 46.390 47.738 48.344 48.920 49.859 50.327 51.096	5,779 5,216 4,985 5,113 5,398 5,593 5,667 5,807 6,089 6,204	16,533 16,536 16,823 17,214 17,870 18,409 18,900 19,701 20,532 21,253	8.401 8.426 8.482 8.693 8.998 9.231 9.319 9.587 10.089 10.307	8.131 8.110 8.342 8.521 8.872 9.179 9,580 10.014 10.443 10.945	801 690 684 691 763 826 832 853 962 968	12,175 12,074 12,151 12,382 12,835 13,279 13,542 13,969 14,556 15,056	5.961 5.930 6,047 6.241 6.422 6.456	6.113 6.221 6.334 6.595 6.857 7.086 7.362 7.685	598 492 492 552 586 613 633 736 69
2000	136.891 136,933 136,485 137,736 139,252 141,730	114.424 114.430 114.013 114.235 115.239 116.949	62,289 62,212 61,849 61,866 62,712 63,763	52.136 52.218 52.164 52.369 52.527 53.186	6.160 5,817 5,441 5.064 5.039 5.105					15.156 15.006 14.872 14.739 14.909 15.313	6.938 6.959 6.820	8.068 7.914 7.919 7.997	711 637 611 516 520 536
2004: Jan	138,472 138,495 138,452 138,659 138,843 139,181	114.648 114.696 114.525 114.783 114.974 115.204	62.581 62.382 62.248 62.401 62.310 62,618	52.068 52.313 52.276 52.382 52.663 52,585	5.119 5.053 4.945 5.061 5.079 4.985					14.892 14.887 14.944 14.893 14.808 14.803	6.892 6.931 6.844 6,883	7,995 8,013 8,049 7,925	507 514 507 492 504 499
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	139.591 139.558 139.495 139.768 140.276 140,133	115,608 115,480 115,362 115,653 115,962 115,908	63.050 62,915 62,748 62,996 63,191 63,069	52,558 52,565 52,614 52,656 52,770 52,840	5,066 5,013 5,017 5,036 5,091 5,009					14,907 14,939 14,952 14,999 14,938 14,936	6,888 6,930 6,962 6,960	8,050 8,022 8,037 7,978	500 569 533 546 552 515
2005: Jan	140,234 140,285 140,601 141,196 141,571 141,750	116,072 116,081 116,187 116,624 116,845 116,811	63,196 63,248 63,492 63,659 63,802 63,873	52.875 52,833 52,694 52,965 53,043 52,939	5,058 5,014 5,073 5,042 5.080 5,131					14.965 14.941 15.069 15.206 15.347 15.392	6,929 7,026 7,141 7,202	8.012 8.043 8.064	546 510 558 536 542 550
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	142,111	117,168 117,446 117,354 117,396 117,598 117,729	63,853 64,004 63,812 63,954 64,054 64,166	53,316 53,441 53,542 53,441 53,544 53,564	5,126 5,175 5,222 5,074 5,123 5,110					15,581 15,476 15,455 15,591 15,299 15,397	7,241 7,231 7,090	8.179 8.215 8.360 8.209	549 512 490 517 523 598

l Beginning in 2003, persons who selected this race group only. Prior to 2003, persons who selected more than one race were included in the group they identified as the main race. Data for black or African American were for black prior to 2003. Data discontinued for black and other series. See *Employment and Earnings*, for details.

Note.—Beginning with data for 2000, since data for all race groups are not shown here, detail will not sum to total. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35.

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table B-38.—Unemployment by demographic characteristic, 1959-2005 [Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	All		Whi	te <sup>1</sup>			Black an	d other 1		Black	or Africa	n America	in <sup>1</sup>
Year or month	civilian workers	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19	Total	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19
1959	3,740	2,946	1,903	1,043	525	793	517	276	128				
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	3.852 4.714 3.911 4.070 3.786 3.366 2.875 2.975 2.817 2.832	3.065 3.743 3.052 3.208 2.999 2.691 2.255 2.338 2.226 2.260	1.988 2.398 1.915 1.976 1.779 1.556 1.241 1.208 1.142 1.137	1.077 1.345 1.137 1.232 1.220 1.135 1.014 1.130 1.084 1.123	575 669 580 708 708 705 651 635 644 660	788 971 861 863 787 678 622 638 590 571	498 599 509 496 426 360 310 300 277 267	290 372 352 367 361 318 312 338 313	138 159 142 176 165 171 186 203 194 193				- 20
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	4.093 5.016 4.882 4.365 5.156 7.929 7.406 6.991 6.202 6.137	3,339 4,085 3,906 3,442 4,097 6,421 5,914 5,441 4,698 4,664	1,857 2,309 2,173 1,836 2,169 3,627 3,258 2,883 2,411 2,405	1,482 1,777 1,733 1,606 1,927 2,794 2,656 2,558 2,287 2,260	871 1,011 1,021 955 1,104 1,413 1,364 1,284 1,189 1,193	754 930 977 924 1,058 1,507 1,492 1,550 1,505 1,473	380 481 486 440 544 815 779 784 731 714	374 450 491 484 514 692 713 766 774 759	235 249 288 280 318 355 355 379 394 362	906 846 965 1.369 1.334 1.330 1.319	448 395 494 741 698 698 641 636	458 451 470 629 637 695 690 683	279 262 297 330 330 354 360 333
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987 1988	7,637 8,273 10,678 10,717 8,539 8,312 8,237 7,425 6,701 6,528	5.884 6.343 8.241 8.128 6.372 6.191 6.140 5.501 4.944 4.770	3,345 3,580 4,846 4,859 3,600 3,426 3,433 3,132 2,766 2,636	2,540 2,762 3,395 3,270 2,772 2,765 2,708 2,369 2,177 2,135	1,291 1,374 1,534 1,387 1,116 1,074 1,070 995 910 863	1,752 1,930 2,437 2,588 2,167 2,121 2,097 1,924 1,757 1,757	922 997 1.334 1.401 1.144 1.095 1.097 969 888 889	830 933 1.104 1.187 1.022 1.026 999 955 869 868	377 388 443 441 384 394 383 353 316 331	1.553 1.731 2.142 2.272 1.914 1.864 1.840 1.684 1.547 1.544	815 891 1.167 1.213 1.003 951 946 826 771 773	738 840 975 1.059 911 913 894 858 776 772	343 357 396 392 353 357 347 312 288 300
1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	7.047 8.628 9.613 8.940 7.996 7.404 7.236 6.739 6.210 5.880	5.186 6.560 7.169 6.655 5.892 5,459 5.300 4.836 4.484 4.273	2,935 3,859 4,209 3,828 3,275 2,999 2,896 2,641 2,431 2,274	2,251 2,701 2,959 2,827 2,617 2,460 2,404 2,195 2,053 1,999	903 1.029 1.037 992 960 952 939 912 876 844	1,860 2,068 2,444 2,285 2,104 1,945 1,936 1,903 1,726 1,606	971 1,087 1,314 1,227 1,092 984 984 935 835 792	889 981 1,130 1,058 1,011 961 952 967 891 814	308 330 390 373 360 394 367 359 329 318	1.565 1.723 2.011 1.844 1.666 1.538 1.592 1.560 1.426 1.309	806 890 1.067 971 848 762 808 747 671 626	758 833 944 872 818 777 784 813 756 684	268 280 324 313 300 325 310 302 281 268
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	5.692 6.801 8.378 8.774 8.149 7.591	4.121 4.969 6.137 6.311 5.847 5.350	2.177 2.754 3.459 3.643 3.282 2.931	1.944 2.215 2.678 2.668 2.565 2,419	795 845 925 909 890 845					1.241 1.416 1.693 1.787 1.729 1.700	620 709 835 891 860 844	621 706 858 895 868 856	230 260 260 255 241 267
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	8.345 8.186 8.397 8.140 8.178 8,247	6.047 5,949 6.116 5.952 5,958 6.050	3,315 3,317 3,400 3,396 3,482 3,344	2.732 2.632 2.716 2.556 2.477 2,707	880 896 862 922 921 868					1.719 1.586 1.701 1.612 1.645 1.684	853 758 821 782 791 818	866 828 880 830 855 866	260 178 217 188 230 246
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	8.182 8.000 7.981 8.040 7.974 8.040	5,776 5,732 5,660 5,618 5,614 5,599	3,174 3,228 3,184 3,209 3,112 3,163	2,602 2,504 2,476 2,409 2,502 2,436	900 901 873 891 854 936					1,864 1,750 1,732 1,814 1,796 1,808	920 908 893 919 928 943	944 843 840 894 868 864	295 230 214 289 263 249
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	7.723 7.986 7.616 7.644 7.629 7.493	5.419 5.588 5.306 5.383 5.368 5.224	3,039 3,136 3,037 2,923 2,933 2,804	2,380 2,452 2,269 2,460 2,434 2,420	834 917 850 902 907 839					1.758 1.807 1.733 1.746 1.713 1.766	875 931 849 872 852 902	883 876 884 875 861 863	242 242 275 300 304 262
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	7.494 7.367 7.648 7.418 7.572 7.375	5.263 5.193 5.489 5.415 5.215 5.264	2.832 2.847 3.024 2.877 2.782 2.855	2.431 2.345 2.465 2.537 2.433 2.409	804 829 801 838 826 789					1,619 1,654 1,613 1,559 1,819 1,582	793 814 785 774 903 741	826 840 828 785 916 841	268 287 242 248 326 194

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See footnote 1 and Note, Table B-37.

Note —See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE B-39.—Civilian labor force participation rate and employment/population ratio, 1959-2005 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		1		Labor for	ce partic	ipation ra	te		-	1	Employm	ent/popu	lation rati	0	
	Year or month	All civil- ian work- ers	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19 years	White?	Black and other <sup>2</sup>	Black or Atrican Ameri- can <sup>2</sup>	All civil- ian work- ers	Males	Fe- males	Both sexes 16-19 years	White?	Black and other <sup>2</sup>	Black or African Ameri- can <sup>2</sup>
1959 1960		59.3 59.4	83.7 83.3	37.1 37.7	46.7 47.5	58.7 58.8	64.3 64.5		56.0 56.1	79.3 78.9	35.0 35.5	39.9 40.5	55.9 55.9	57.5 57.9	
1961 1962 1963 1964		59.3 58.8 58.7 58.7 58.9 59.2 59.6 60.1	82.9 82.0 81.4 81.0 80.7 80.4 80.4 80.1 79.8	38.1 37.9 38.3 38.7 39.3 40.3 41.1 41.6 42.7	46.9 46.1 45.2 44.5 45.7 48.2 48.4 48.3 49.4	58.8 58.2 58.2 58.4 58.7 59.2 59.3	64.1 63.2 63.0 63.1 62.9 63.0 62.8 62.2 62.1		55.4 55.5 55.4 55.7 56.2 56.9 57.3 57.5 58.0	77.6 77.7 77.1 77.3 77.5 77.9 78.0 77.8 77.6	35.4 35.8 36.3 37.1 38.3 39.0 39.6 40.7	39.1 39.4 37.4 37.3 38.9 42.1 42.2 42.2 43.4	55.3 55.4 55.3 55.5 56.0 56.8 57.2 57.4 58.0	56.2 56.3 56.2 57.0 57.8 58.4 58.2 58.0 58.1	
1010		60.4 60.2 60.4 60.8 61.3 61.2 61.6 62.3 63.2 63.7	79 7 79 1 78.9 78.8 78.7 77.9 77.5 77.7 77.9 77.8	43.3 43.4 43.9 44.7 45.7 46.3 47.3 48.4 50.0 50.9	49.9 49.7 51.9 53.7 54.8 54.0 54.5 56.0 57.8 57.9	60.2 60.1 60.4 60.8 61.4 61.5 61.8 62.5 63.3 63.9	61.8 60.9 60.2 60.5 60.3 59.6 59.8 60.4 62.2 62.2	59.9 60.2 59.8 58.8 59.0 59.8 61.5 61.4	57.4 56.6 57.0 57.8 57.8 56.1 56.8 57.9 59.3 59.9	76.2 74.9 75.0 75.5 74.9 71.7 72.0 72.8 73.8 73.8	40.8 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.6 42.0 43.2 44.5 46.4 47.5	42.3 41.3 43.5 45.9 46.0 43.3 44.2 46.1 48.3 48.5	57.5 56.8 57.4 58.2 58.3 56.7 57.5 58.6 60.0 60.6	56 8 54 9 54 1 55.0 54.3 51.4 52.0 52.5 54.7 55.2	53.7 54.5 53.5 50.1 50.8 51.4 53.6 53.8
1980 1981 1982 1983		63.8 63.9 64.0 64.4 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9	77.4 77.0 76.6 76.4 76.3 76.3 76.2 76.2 76.4	51.5 52.1 52.6 52.9 53.6 54.5 55.3 56.0 56.6 57.4	56.7 55.4 54.1 53.5 53.9 54.5 54.7 54.7 55.3 55.9	64.1 64.3 64.3 64.6 65.0 65.5 65.8 66.2	61.7 61.3 61.6 62.1 62.6 63.3 63.7 64.3 64.0 64.7	61.0 60.8 61.0 61.5 62.2 62.9 63.3 63.8 63.8	59.2 59.0 57.8 57.9 59.5 60.1 60.7 61.5 62.3 63.0	72 0 71.3 69.0 68.8 70.7 70.9 71.0 71.5 72.0 72.5	47.7 48.0 47.7 48.0 49.5 50.4 51.4 52.5 53.4 54.3	46.6 44.6 41.5 43.7 44.4 44.6 45.5 46.8 47.5	60.0 60.0 58.8 58.9 60.5 61.0 61.5 62.3 63.1 63.8	53.6 52.6 50.9 51.0 53.6 54.7 55.4 56.8 57.4 58.2	52.3 51.3 49.4 49.5 52.3 53.4 54.1 55.6 56.3 56.9
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995		66.5 66.2 66.4 66.3 66.6 66.6 67.1 67.1	76.4 75.8 75.8 75.4 75.1 75.0 74.9 75.0 74.9 74.9	57.5 57.4 57.8 57.9 58.8 58.9 59.3 59.8 59.8 60.0	53.7 51.6 51.3 51.5 52.7 53.5 52.3 51.6 52.8 52.0	66.9 66.8 66.8 67.1 67.1 67.2 67.3 67.3	64.4 63.8 64.6 63.8 63.9 64.3 64.6 65.2 66.0 65.9	64.0 63.3 63.9 63.2 63.4 63.7 64.1 65.6 65.8	62.8 61.7 61.5 61.7 62.5 62.9 63.2 63.8 64.1 64.3	72.0 70.4 69.8 70.0 70.4 70.8 70.9 71.3 71.6 71.6	54.3 53.7 53.8 54.1 55.3 55.6 56.0 56.8 57.1 57.4	45.3 42.0 41.0 41.7 43.4 44.2 43.5 43.4 45.1 44.7	63.7 62.6 62.4 62.7 63.5 63.8 64.1 64.6 64.7 64.8	56.3 57.2 58.1 58.6 59.4 60.9	56.7 55.4 54.9 55.0 56.1 57.1 57.4 58.2 59.7 60.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005		67.1 66.8 66.6 66.2 66.0 66.0	74.8 74.4 74.1 73.5 73.3 73.3	59.9 59.8 59.6 59.5 59.2 59.3	52.0 49.6 47.4 44.5 43.9 43.7	67.3 67.0 66.8 66.5 66.3 66.3		65.8 65.3 64.8 64.3 63.8 64.2	64 4 63.7 62.7 62.3 62.3 62.7	71 9 70.9 69 7 68.9 69.2 69.6	57.5 57.0 56.3 56.1 56.0 56.2	45.2 42.3 39.6 36.8 36.4 36.5	64.9 64.2 63.4 63.0 63.1 63.4		60.9 59.7 58 1 57.4 57.2 57.7
2004:	Jan	66.1 66.0 66.0 65.9 65.9 66.1	73.6 73.2 73.2 73.1 73.1 73.3	59.1 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.3	44.4 43.7 42.8 43.7 44.0 43.3	66.4 66.3 66.2 66.2 66.3 66.4		64.2 63.6 64.2 63.6 63.3 63.3	62.3 62.2 62.2 62.3 62.3 62.4	69.4 69.0 69.0 68.9 69.2	55.7 56.0 55.9 56.0 56.1 56.0	36.9 36.4 35.7 36.5 36.6 36.0	63.0 63.0 62.9 63.0 63.0 63.1		57.6 57.5 57.6 57.4 56.9 56.8
	July	66.1 66.0 65.9 65.9 66.1 66.0	73.5 73.4 73.2 73.3 73.5 73.5	59.3 59.1 59.0 59.1 59.1 59.2	44.2 43.9 43.5 44.0 44.3 44.3	66.4 66.3 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.2		64.3 63.9 63.8 64.2 63.8 63.7	62.5 62.4 62.3 62.3 62.5 62.4	69.4 69.3 69.1 69.2 69.4 69.1	56.0 56.0 55.9 55.9 56.0 56.1	36.4 36.2 36.5 37.0 36.4	63.3 63.2 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.2		57.2 57.2 57.1 57.2 56.9 56.9
2005		65.8 65.8 66.0 66.1 66.1	73.0 73.2 73.2 73.4 73.5 73.4	59.1 59.1 58.9 59.1 59.2 59.2	43.2 43.3 43.9 43.9 44.2 43.9	66.2 66.2 66.1 66.3 66.4 66.2		63.6 63.6 63.7 64.2 64.5 64.8	62.4 62.3 62.4 62.6 62.7 62.7	69.1 69.4 69.6 69.8 69.8	56.1 56.0 55.9 56.1 56.2 56.2	36.2 35.7 36.5 36.2 36.4 36.8	63 2 63.2 63.4 63.4 63.4		56.9 56.7 57.1 57.6 58.0 58.1
	July	66.2 66.2 66.2 66.1 66.1	73.4 73.5 73.4 73.2 73.3 73.2	59.4 59.3 59.5 59.5 59.4 59.3	43.7 44.0 43.6 43.0 43.9 43.3	66 4 66 4 66 5 66 4 66 3 66 4		64.8 64.5 64.1 64.3 64.1 63.5	62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8	69.8 69.9 69.7 69.7 69.6 69.7	56.3 56.4 56.5 56.4 56.4 56.4	36.7 36.8 36.7 36.2 36.4 36.7	63.5 63.6 63.5 63.4 63.5		58.7 58.2 58.1 58.5 57.3 57.6

 $<sup>^1</sup>$  Civilian labor force or civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified.  $^2$  See footnote 1, Table 8–37.

Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35  $\,$ 

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE B-40.—Civilian labor force participation rate by demographic characteristic, 1965-2005 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted]

					White 2				ВІ	lack and	other or	black or	African	American	2
V	All civil-			Males			Females				Males			Females	
Year or month	ian work- ers	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
											Bla	ck and o	ther		
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971	58.9 59.2 59.6 59.6 60.1 60.4 60.2	58 4 58.7 59.2 59.3 59 9 60.2 60 1 60 4	80 8 80.6 80.6 80 4 80 2 80.0 79.6 79.6	54 1 55 9 56 3 55.9 56 8 57.5 57 9 60 1	83.9 83.6 83.5 83.2 83.0 82.8 82.3 82.0	38.1 39.2 40.1 40.7 41.8 42.6 42.6 43.2	39.2 42.6 42.5 43.0 44.6 45.6 45.4 48.1	38.0 38.8 39.8 40.4 41.5 42.2 42.3 42.7	62.9 63.0 62.8 62.2 62.1 61.8 60.9 60.2	79.6 79.0 78.5 77.7 76.9 76.5 74.9 73.9	51.3 51.4 51.1 49.7 49.6 47.4 44.7 46.0	83.7 83.3 82.9 82.2 81.4 81.4 80.0 78.6	48 6 49.4 49.5 49.3 49.8 49.5 49.2 48.8	29.5 33.5 35.2 34.8 34.6 34.1 31.2 32.3	51.1 51.6 51.6 51.4 52.0 51.8 51.8 51.2
											Black or	African	America	n <sup>2</sup>	
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1990 1991 1992 1993 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	60 4 8 61 2 3 61 2 61 62 63 2 2 61 63 2 2 61 63 2 63 7 64 0 0 64 4 0 64 8 65 5 66 6 5 66 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	60 4 8 60 8 61.5 61.8 61.5 61.8 62.5 63.3 3 64.1 3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 66.5 65.5 66.2 66.7 67.2 67.3 3 67.0 66.8 66.3 66.3 66.3 66.3 66.3 66.3 66.3	796 794 787 787 786 786 786 786 786 787 771 771 771 771 769 759 758 759 751 758 759 751 758 759 751 748 742 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741	60.0 62.9 61.9 62.3 65.0 64.8 63.7 62.4 65.0 69.4 59.7 59.3 50.0 61.0 60.0 61.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60	82.0 8116 8 80.7 80.1 80.1 80.1 79.8 79.5 78.5 78.5 78.5 77.7 77.3 77.1 77.3 77.2 77.2 77.2 77.2 76.9 76.9 76.9 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77	43.2 444.1 45.9 45.9 48.0 51.2 52.7 55.7 56.4 57.4 57.4 57.4 59.0 59.1 59.5 59.5 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3	48.1 50.1 51.5 52.8 54.5 56.7 57.4 55.4 55.3 56.3 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2	42 7 43 5 46 2 4 45 3 46 2 4 45 3 4 66 2 4 7 3 4 8 7 7 4 8 7 7 5 7 6 6 6 3 3 5 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7	59.9 60.2 558.8 65.5 59.8 61.5 661.6 661.5 662.3 3 663.2 664.1 7 655.6 65.8 8 665.3 664.8 665.3 664.8 665.8 665.3 664.8 663.8	73.6 73.4 77.9 70.9 70.9 70.6 71.5 70.6 70.6 70.6 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8	46.3 45.7 42.6 41.6 43.2 44.9 43.6 43.9 43.7 43.6 43.8 44.6 43.7 43.6 43.7 43.8 44.6 40.7 39.5 40.8 40.7 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5	78.54 78.44 76.00 75.46 76.2 77.62 77.5 74.5 74.7 74.6 74.7 74.6 74.7 74.6 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5	48.7 49.3 448.8 49.8 49.8 49.8 53.1 53.1 53.5 55.5 56.9 58.0 58.7 58.7 60.4 61.8 61.8 61.8 61.5	32 2 34.2 33.4 2 32.9 37.3 36.8 34.9 34.0 33.5 33.0 35.0 37.9 39.6 37.9 34.6 33.5 33.9 39.8 39.9 42.5 38.8 39.8 39.9 42.5 38.8 39.6 37.3 32.7 332.7 332.7 332.7 332.7 332.7	51.2 51.4 51.1 51.1 52.5 55.5 55.5 55.6 55.6 55.6 60.1 60.0 60.0 60.2 60.9 60.2 60.9 60.2 60.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	66 1 66 0 66.0 65.9 65.9 66.1	66 4 66.3 66 2 66.2 66.3 66 4	74 4 74 1 74 0 74 1 74 0 74 1	48.4 47.6 46.1 48.4 47.7 46.6	76.4 76.1 76.1 76.1 76.1 76.3	58 8 58 9 58 9 58.8 59.0 59 1	47.0 46.9 46.2 46.6 47.6 46.3	59.6 59.7 59.8 59.7 59.8 60.0	64 2 63.6 64.2 63.6 63.3 63.3	67.6 66.1 66.9 65.7 66.0 66.4	28.5 24.6 29.2 25.4 26.7 29.3	72.1 70.9 71.2 70.3 70.5 70.6	61.5 61.6 62.0 61.8 61.1 60.8	35.3 32.9 30.9 30.9 34.1 32.2	63.9 64.3 64.9 64.7 63.6 63.5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Oec	66 1 66.0 65.9 65.9 66 1 66 0	66 4 66 3 66 1 66 2 66 3 66 2	74 4 74 2 73 9 74 1 74 1 74 0	47 6 47.3 46 7 48 3 47 8 46 9	76.4 76.3 76.0 76.1 76.2 76.1	58.9 58.8 58.7 58.7 58.9 58.8	47 1 46.5 46 8 45 6 46.3 47 2	59.8 59.6 59.6 59.6 59.7 59.6	64.3 63.9 63.8 64.2 63.8 63.7	66.5 66.7 66.8 67.2 67.2 66.9	30.6 32.5 31.7 34.2 34.8 31.5	70.6 70.6 70.8 71.0 70.9 71.0	62.5 61.6 61.3 61.7 61.0 61.1	35.0 33.3 29.8 34.3 32.0 30.9	65.1 64.2 64.2 64.2 63.7 64.0
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	65.8 65.9 65.8 66.0 66.1 66.1	66.2 66.2 66.1 66.3 66.4 66.2	73 9 74 0 74 2 74 2 74 3 74 1	46 1 46.2 47 0 46 7 46 4 46 2	76.1 76.2 76.3 76.3 76.4 76.3	58.7 58.7 58.4 58.8 58.8 58.7	47 2 47 7 46.6 47.2 48 1 48 0	59.6 59.5 59.2 59.6 59.6 59.4	63.6 63.6 63.7 64.2 64.5 64.8	66.1 66.6 66.7 67.7 68.0 68.5	31.6 32.7 35.5 36.9 35.3 33.8	70.0 70.5 70.2 71.3 71.7 72.5	61 5 61 1 61.3 61.3 61 7 61.7	32.7 28.6 32.3 31.1 33.2 31.9	64.2 64.1 64.0 64.1 64.4 64.5
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	66 2 66.2 66 2 66.1 66 1 66 0	66.4 66.5 66.4 66.3 66.4	74 1 74 2 74 1 74 0 73.9 74 0	45.8 45.9 46.1 45.2 46.3 46.0	76.2 76.3 76.2 76.2 76.0 76.2	59.0 59.0 59.2 59.1 59.1 59.0	47.7 48.7 48.7 47.8 47.1 46.5	59 8 59 8 59 9 59 9 59 9 59 9	64.8 64.5 64.1 64.3 64.1 63.5	68 5 68 1 67 3 67 0 66.7 66 1	31 4 31 3 28 7 28.1 35.3 30.7	72.8 72.3 71.7 71.4 70.4 70.2	61.8 61.5 61.6 62.2 62.0 61.3	34.5 32.9 30.0 33.0 32.3 32.3	64.4 64.2 64.6 64.9 64.8 64.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified <sup>1</sup>See footnote 1, Table B-37 Note —Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35.

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE B-41.—Civilian employment/population ratio by demographic characteristic, 1965-2005 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted]

					White 2		314 35436				other or	black or	African	America	n <sup>2</sup>
	All civil-			Males			Females				Mates			Females	
Year or month	ian work- ers	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
											Bla	ck and o	ther		
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972	56.2 56.9 57.3 57.5 58.0 57.4 56.6 57.0	56.0 56.8 57.2 57.4 58.0 57.5 56.8 57.4	77.9 78.3 78.4 78.3 78.2 76.8 75.7 76.0	47.1 50.1 50.2 50.3 51.1 49.6 49.2 51.5	81.5 81.7 81.7 81.6 81.4 80.1 79.0 79.0	36.2 37.5 38.3 38.9 40.1 40.3 39.9 40.7	33.7 37.5 37.7 37.8 39.5 39.5 38.6 41.3	36.5 37.5 38.3 39.1 40.1 40.4 40.1 40.6	57.8 58.4 58.2 58.0 58.1 56.8 54.9 54.1	73.7 74.0 73.8 73.3 72.8 70.9 68.1 67.3	39.4 40.5 38.8 38.7 39.0 35.5 31.8 32.4	78.7 79.2 79.4 78.9 78.4 76.8 74.2 73.2	44.1 45.1 45.0 45.2 45.9 44.9 43.9 43.3	20.2 23.1 24.8 24.7 25.1 22.4 20.2 19.9	47.3 48.2 47.9 48.2 48.9 48.2 47.3 46.7
										{	Black or	African	America	n <sup>2</sup>	
1972 1973 1974 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003	57.0 57.8 57.8 56.1 56.8 59.3 59.9 59.8 57.9 59.0 60.7 61.5 62.3 63.0 62.5 63.2 63.2 63.2 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 62.7 62.3	57.4 58.2 58.3 57.5 57.5 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 63.1 62.6 63.1 63.7 62.6 64.1 64.6 64.8 64.2 64.2 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3	76.0 76.5 75.9 73.0 73.4 75.0 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.1 77	51.5 54.3 50.6 51.5 51.5 53.4 56.3 51.3 47.4 49.9 49.9 51.7 51.0 47.2 48.1 48.6 48.2 48.1 48.6 48.3 49.4 48.2 48.3 49.4 48.2 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.6	79.0 79.2 78.6 75.7 76.0 77.2 77.3 75.1 73.0 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.7 75.1 75.4 75.1 75.4 75.1 75.4 75.1 75.4 75.1 75.4 75.7 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.0 76.0 76	40.7 41.8 42.0 43.2 44.3 44.3 44.3 44.3 44.3 44.3 44.3	41.3 43.6 44.5 44.2 45.9 48.5 47.9 46.2 44.5 47.0 47.9 45.0 45.9 45.9 47.5 47.6 47.6 47.3 48.3 48.3 48.5	40.6 41.6 42.2 41.9 43.1 44.1 44.1 44.1 47.8 48.5 50.0 552.0 554.9 557.7 57.8 58.0 58.7 7.7 57.3 3	53.7 54.5 55.5 50.8 53.6 53.8 53.8 51.3 54.9 49.5 55.4 55.6 56.9 56.1 57.1 57.1 58.2 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7 59.7	66.8 67.5 65.8 60.6 60.6 63.3 63.4 60.4 65.9 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.6 60.7 61.1 61.1 61.1 63.1 63.1 63.1 63.1 63.1	31.6 32.8 31.4 26.3 25.8 26.3 20.4 24.6 23.9 20.4 23.9 26.5 29.4 30.4 23.8 23.6 25.2 24.9 25.2 24.9 26.7 28.9 26.7 28.9 28.6 28.7 28.6 28.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 28.7	73.0 73.7 71.9 66.5 66.8 66.8 66.5 69.1 69.1 64.6 64.6 65.1 67.0 65.9 64.3 65.0 65.6 66.5 67.1 67.5 67.7 67.5	43.0 43.8 43.5 41.6 42.8 44.8 45.7 45.1 44.1 46.7 45.1 44.1 46.7 50.6 50.9 50.9 50.3 50.6 50.9 50.7 50.6 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.7 50.7	19.2 22.0 20.9 20.9 20.9 21.9 22.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1	46.5.4 47.2.4 46.9.4 44.9.4 44.9.3 49.3.3 49.1.4 49.3.3 49.1.5 47.5 47.5 53.0 53.9 53.9 53.9 61.5 53.0 60.7 61.5 53.0 60.7 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
2004 2005	62.3 62.3 62.7	63.1 63.4	70.4 70.8	39.7 38.8	72.8 73.3	56.1 56.3	40.3 41.8	57.2 57.4	57.2 57.7	59.3 60.2	19.3 20.8	63.9 64.7	55.5 55.7	23.6 22.4	58.5 58.9
2004: Jan	62.3 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.3 62.4	63.0 63.0 62.9 63.0 63.1	70.6 70.3 70.1 70.2 70.1 70.4	41.5 40.4 38.6 39.9 39.1 39.0	72.9 72.7 72.6 72.6 72.5 72.8	55.8 56.1 56.0 56.1 56.3 56.2	39.9 40.0 40.0 40.5 41.7 40.1	57.0 57.2 57.1 57.2 57.4 57.3	57.6 57.5 57.6 57.4 56.9 56.8	60.2 59.6 59.8 59.0 59.2 59.4	16.0 17.2 18.5 17.7 18.5 19.4	65.3 64.4 64.5 63.7 63.9 64.0	55.4 55.8 55.9 56.1 55.1 54.8	26.1 25.5 23.5 23.0 23.2 21.9	58.2 58.6 58.9 59.1 58.1 57.9
July	62.5 62.4 62.3 62.3 62.5 62.4	63.3 63.2 63.0 63.1 63.2 63.2	70.8 70.6 70.3 70.5 70.7 70.5	40.2 39.8 39.3 39.9 40.4 38.4	73.2 73.0 72.7 72.9 73.0 73.0	56.1 56.1 56.1 56.1 56.2 56.2	40.3 39.8 40.3 40.0 40.2 41.0	57.3 57.3 57.2 57.2 57.3 57.3	57.2 57.1 57.2 56.9 56.9	58.6 59.0 59.2 59.4 59.3 58.9	19.3 21.5 20.2 21.5 21.8 19.1	63.1 63.2 63.7 63.7 63.5 63.4	56.0 55.8 55.5 55.5 55.0 55.2	21.9 25.4 23.6 23.3 23.4 23.0	59 2 58.6 58.5 58.5 58.0 58.2
2005: Jan	62.4 62.3 62.4 62.6 62.7 62.7	63.2 63.2 63.2 63.4 63.4 63.4	70.5 70.5 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.0	38.5 37.8 38.7 38.6 38.3 38.9	73.0 73.1 73.3 73.4 73.5 73.5	56.2 56.1 56.0 56.2 56.3 56.1	41.6 41.5 41.6 41.1 41.9 42.1	57.2 57.2 57.0 57.3 57.3 57.1	56.9 56.7 57.1 57.6 58.0 58.1	58.7 58.7 59.5 60.4 60.8 60.9	22.2 21.2 22.7 22.7 22.3 21.1	62.8 63.0 63.7 64.7 65.2 65.5	55.4 55.1 55.2 55.3 55.8 55.8	22.4 20.3 22.7 20.9 21.6 23.3	58.5 58.3 58.3 58.5 59.0 58.9
July	62.8 62.9 62.8 62.8 62.8 62.8	63.5 63.6 63.5 63.4 63.5 63.5	70.9 71.0 70.7 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.9	38.7 38.9 39.0 38.4 39.3 39.7	73.4 73.5 73.2 73.3 73.3 73.3	56.5 56.5 56.6 56.4 56.5 56.5	42.2 42.7 43.2 41.4 41.1 40.5	57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.6 57.6	58.7 58.2 58.1 58.5 57.3 57.6	61.9 61.3 60.7 60.5 59.2 60.0	19.2 18.9 19.1 18.3 19.5 23.4	66.8 66.1 65.5 65.3 63.8 64.2	56.2 55.8 55.9 56.8 55.7 55.6	25.0 22.2 20.2 23.0 22.1 24.1	59.1 58.9 59.3 60.0 58.9 58.6

 $<sup>^1</sup>$  Civilian employment as percent of civilian noninstitutional population in group specified.  $^2$  See footnote 1, Table B-37.

Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-42.—Civilian unemployment rate, 1959-2005 [Percent;1 monthly data seasonally adjusted, except as noted by NSA]

			Males			Females	3			Ву	гасе		His-		Women
Year or month	All civil- ian work- ers	Total	16- 19 years	20 years and over	Total	16- 19 years	20 years and over	Both sexes 16-19 years	White?	Black and other <sup>2</sup>	Black or Afri- can Ameri- can <sup>2</sup>	Asian (NSA) <sup>2</sup>	panic or Latino eth- ni- city <sup>3</sup>	Married men, spouse present	who main- tain fami- lies (NSA)
1959 1950 1961 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 1980 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985	5.5.5 67.7.5 5.7.7.5 5.2.5 3.8.8 3.6.6 4.9.9 5.6.6 8.5.7.7.1.1 6.5.8 7.7.7.1.1 6.5.8 7.7.7.2 7.2	5 2 2 5 4 4 6 5 5 2 2 8 4 4 6 5 3 2 1 2 2 8 8 4 4 4 5 5 3 0 5 5 1 1 6 5 3 3 5 5 1 1 6 5 3 4 7 7 0 9 9 9 7 4 4 7 7 0 9 6 6 2 6 6 2 6 6 6 2 6 6 7 6 7 6 9 9 9 7 6 6 6 2 6 6 7 6 7 6 9 9 9 7 6 6 6 2 6 6 7 6 7 6 9 9 9 7 6 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 9 9 9 7 6 6 7 6 7	15 3 3 15 3 17 11 14 7 17 2 15 8 8 11 11 7 12 3 11 14 15 10 16 16 11 14 15 10 16 16 16 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18	4 7 7 7 4 5 7 6 4 6 5 7 6 4 6 5 9 9 6 6 2 1 5 5 4 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 2 1 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8	5 9 9 7 2 2 6 6 5 5 9 6 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 4 8 8 4 7 7 9 9 4 2 9 7 6 6 2 6 6 6 7 7 9 9 4 2 6 7 7 4 1 7 6 2 6 6 6 7 7 4 1 7 6 2 6 6 6 7 7 4 1 7 6 2 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6	13 5 13 9 16 13 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 18 17 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18	5.2 5.1 6.3 5.4 5.2 4.2 3.3 7.4 4.8 5.5 4.4 9.5 5.4 4.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0	14 6 14 7 16 8 14 7 17 17 2 14 8 12 9 12 7 15 3 16 9 19 9 19 9 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 1	4 8 8 5 0 0 6 0 9 4 9 9 5 0 6 4 9 9 5 0 6 4 9 9 5 0 6 4 9 9 5 0 6 9 5 1 1 4 4 3 4 4 5 0 6 5 2 1 6 6 7 8 8 6 6 6 0 5 3 7 8 6 6 6 0 5 3 7 4 7 9 6 5 2 1 6 6 7 3 7 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	10.7 10.2 12.4 10.9 10.8 9.6 8.1 7.4 6.7 6.7 8.2 9.9 9.9 13.8 13.1 11.9 11.9 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8	10.4 9.4 10.5 14.8 14.0 12.8 12.3 14.3 15.6 18.9 19.5 15.1 14.5 11.3 12.3		7.5.8.1 12.2.2 11.5.10.1 9.1.8.3 10.1 10.4.13.8.8.13.7 10.7 10.5.10.6.6.8.8.8	3 6 3 7 4 4 6 6 3 4 4 3 4 9 2 4 4 3 9 3 4 4 4 3 9 3	4 9 4 4 4 4 5 4 7 3 3 7 .2 7 .1 7 .0 10 .0 10 .1 11 .7 12 .2 10 .3 10 .4 9 8 9 2
1988	5.5 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 4.5 4.0 4.5 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 5.6	5.52 5.7 7.2 7.7 7.2 6.6 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7	16 0 15 9 16 3 19 8 21 5 20 4 19 0 18 4 18 1 16 9 16 2 14 7 14 0 16 1 19 3 18 4 18 6 17 1	4 8 5 5.0 6.4 7.1 6.4 4.8 4.6 6.3 5.6 5.0 4 1 5.1	564 554 554 660 660 664 665 664 667 667 657 657 655 657 655 657 655 657 655 657 657	14 4 14.0 14.7 17.5 18.6 17.5 16.2 15.2 15.2 12.9 13.2 12.1 13.4 14.9 15.6 15.5 14.5 14.9	4 97 4 97 4 97 6 5 5 4 9 8 4 4 4 1 8 6 1 1 1 1 1 9 6 5 4 9 6 5 4 9 7 8 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	15.3 15.0 15.5 18.7 20.1 19.0 17.3 16.7 16.0 14.6 13.9 13.1 14.7 16.5 17.0 16.6	4.7 4.8 6.6 6.6 6.3 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.3,7 3.5 5.1 2.4 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.9	10.4 10.0 10.1 11 11 12.7 11.7 10.5 9.3 8.8 7.8 7.0	11.7 11.4 11.4 12.5 14.2 13.0 11.5 10.0 8.9 8.0 7.6 8.6 10.2 10.8 10.4 10.0	3 6 4 .5 5 .9 9 6.0 4 4 4 0 5 .2 4 .7	8.2 8.0 8.2 10.0 11.6 10.8 9.9 9.3 8.9 7.7 7.2 6.4 5.7 7.5 7.7 7.0 6.0 7.3	3.3 3.0 3.4 4.4 4.4 5.1 4.4 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.8 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.3	8.1 8.3 9.7 8.9 8.2 8.1 7 2.6 6.4 5.9 6.6 8.5 8.0 7 8 8.3
Mar Apr Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec July Aug Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Dec Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	5.07 5.55 5.66 5.56 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44	5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.5.	18.4 18.6 18.6 17.8 18.2 18.5 19.3 20.9 18.1 20.0 20.2 19.7 18.7 18.3 18.0 17.4 16.0	55.12.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3	557 557 558 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552	15.0 15.0 14.4 15.3 15.8 17.7 15.7 15.1 14.8 14.4 14.5 13.7 14.9 15.7 13.8 14.7 14.3 15.0 14.4	52.9.8.0.8.7.7.8.7.7.4.6.7.7.4.6.6.6.6.7.4.6.6.6.4.4.6.6.6.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.4.6.6.5.4.4.4.4	16.7 16.5 17.0 16.9 17.8 16.9 16.5 17.9 16.5 17.6 16.6 17.7 16.3 16.0 15.8 15.9 17.9	4 9 4 9 9 5 0 4 8 4 7 7 4 7 6 4 6 6 4 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		9.8 10.0 10.2 11.1 10.5 10.4 10.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.1 10.6 9.3	4.2 4.4 4.2 5.0 4.3 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.9 4.0 5.2 3.6 4.1 3.9 4.0 5.2 3.6 4.1 3.6 4.3 3.9 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5	7.4 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.9 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 6.5 5.8 6.5 6.5	3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6	8.1 7.5 7.4 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.2 7.7 7.1 8.0 7.7 8.2 8.8 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.2 6.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Unemployed as percent of civilian labor force in group specified <sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Table B-37.
<sup>3</sup> Persons whose ethnicity is identified as Hispanic or Latino may be of any race.

Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over See footnote 5 and Note. Table B-35 NSA indicates data are not seasonally adjusted

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-43.—Civilian unemployment rate by demographic characteristic, 1965-2005 [Percent; 1 monthly data seasonally adjusted]

					White 2				Bla	ck and	other or I	black or	African	Americai	n <sup>2</sup>
	All civil-			Males			Females				Males		T	Females	
Year or month	work- ers	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over	Total	16-19 years	20 years and over
											Blac	ck and o	ther		
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	3.8	4.1 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.1 4.5	3.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 4.0	12.9 10.5 10.7 10.1 10.0 13.7	2.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 3.2	5.0 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.2 5.4	14.0 12.1 11.5 12.1 11.5 13.4	4.0 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.4	8.1 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.4 8.2	7.4 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.3 7.3	23 3 21.3 23 9 22.1 21.4 25.0	6.0 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.7 5.6	9.2 8.7 9.1 8.3 7.8 9.3	31.7 31.3 29.6 28.7 27.6 34.5	7.5 6.6 7.1 6.3 5.8 6.9
1971 1972	5.9	5.4 5.1	4.9 4.5	15.1 14.2	4.0	6.3	15.1	5.3	9.9	9.1	28.8 29.7	7.3 6.9	10.9	35.4 38.4	8.7 8.8
							1				Black or A	1	l		
1972	5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8	5.1 4.3 5.0 7.8 7.0 6.2 5.2 5.1	4.5 3.8 4.4 7.2 6.4 5.5 4.6 4.5	14.2 12.3 13.5 18.3 17.3 15.0 13.5 13.9	3.6 3.0 3.5 6.2 5.4 4.7 3.7 3.6	5.9 5.3 6.1 8.6 7.9 7.3 6.2 5.9	14.2 13.0 14.5 17.4 16.4 15.9 14.4 14.0	4.9 4.3 5.1 7.5 6.8 6.2 5.2 5.0	10.4 9.4 10.5 14.8 14.0 14.0 12.8 12.3	9.3 8.0 9.8 14.8 13.7 13.3 11.8 11.4	31 7 27.8 33.1 38.1 37.5 39 2 36 7 34.2	7.0 6.0 7.4 12.5 11.4 10.7 9.3 9.3	11.8 11.1 11.3 14.8 14.3 14.9 13.8 13.3	40.5 36.1 37.4 41.0 41.6 43.4 40.8 39.1	9.0 8.6 8.8 12.2 11.7 12.3 11.2 10.9
1980	7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3	6.3 6.7 8.6 8.4 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.5	6.1 6.5 8.8 8.8 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.5	16.2 17.9 21.7 20.2 16.8 16.5 16.3 15.5 13.9	5.3 5.6 7.8 7.9 5.7 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.1	6.5 6.9 8.3 7.9 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.2 4.7	14.8 16.6 19.0 18.3 15.2 14.8 14.9 13.4 12.3 11.5	5.6 5.9 7.3 6.9 5.8 5.7 5.4 4.6 4.1	14.3 15.6 18.9 19.5 15.1 14.5 13.0 11.7	14.5 15.7 20.1 20.3 16.4 15.3 14.8 12.7 11.7	37.5 40.7 48.9 48.8 42.7 41.0 39.3 34.4 32.7 31.9	12.4 13.5 17.8 18.1 14.3 13.2 12.9 11.1 10.1	14.0 15.6 17.6 18.6 15.4 14.9 14.2 13.2 11.7	39.8 42.2 47.1 48.2 42.6 39.2 39.2 34.9 32.0 33.0	11.9 13.4 15.4 16.5 13.5 13.1 12.4 11.6 10.4 9.8
1989 1990 1991 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000	5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 4.9 4.5 4.2	4.8 6.1 6.6 6.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.7	4.9 6.5 7.0 6.3 5.4 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.6	14.3 17.6 18.5 17.7 16.3 15.6 15.5 14.3 14.1 12.6	4.3 5.8 6.4 5.7 4.8 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.8	4.7 5.6 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.8	12.6 15.2 15.8 14.7 13.8 13.4 12.9 12.8 10.9 11.3	4.1 5.0 5.5 5.2 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.3	11.4 12.5 14.2 13.0 11.5 10.4 10.5 10.0 8.9 8.0 7.6	11.9 13.0 15.2 13.8 12.0 10.6 11.1 10.2 8.9 8.2	31 9 36.3 42.0 40.1 37.6 37.1 36.9 36.5 30.1 30.9 26.2	10.4 11.5 13.5 12.1 10.3 8.8 9.4 8.5 7.4 6.7	10.9 12.0 13.2 12.1 11.0 10.2 10.0 9.9 9.0 7.8	29 9 36.0 37.2 37.4 32.6 34.3 30.3 28.7 25.3 25 1	9 7 10.6 11.8 10.7 9.8 8.6 8.7 9.8 6.8
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1	4.2 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.4	4.2 5.3 5.6 5.0 4.4	13.9 15.9 17.1 16.3 16.1	3.7 4.7 5.0 4.4 3.8	4.1 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.4	11.4 13.1 13.3 13.6 12.3	3.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 3.9	8.6 10.2 10.8 10.4 10.0	8.0 9.3 10.7 11.6 11.1 10.5	30.4 31.3 36.0 35.6 36.3	8.0 9.5 10.3 9.9 9.2	8.1 9.8 10.2 9.8 9.5	22.8 27.5 28.3 30.3 28.2 30.3	7.0 8.8 9.2 8.9 8.5
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	5.7 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4	5.0 4.9 5.1 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6	5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.8	14.4 15.2 16.2 17.5 18.1 16.3 15.7 16.0 15.9 17.5 15.4 18.2	4.6 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2	5.0 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.5	15.0 14.9 13.4 12.5 13.3 14.5 14.5 13.7 12.3 13.2 13.2	4.4 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.9	10.3 9.6 10.2 9.8 10.0 10.2 11.1 10.5 10.4 10.8 10.7 10.8	10 9 9.9 10.6 10.2 10.3 10.6 11.9 11.6 11.4 11.7 11.8	43.7 30.0 36.7 30.3 30.6 34.0 36.9 36.3 37.2 37.3 39.4	9.4 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.5 10.6 10.5 10.1 10.3 10.3	9.8 9.4 9.9 9.3 9.7 9.9 10.5 9.5 10.0 9.8 9.7	26.2 22.5 23.8 25.5 31.9 32.1 37.2 23.8 20.8 32.1 26.8 25.8	9.0 8.8 9.3 8.6 8.6 8.8 9.1 8.8 9.0 9.0
2005: Jan	5.2 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9	4.5 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3	4.6 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.3	16.4 18.1 17.7 17.5 17.4 15.8 15.5 15.3	4.0 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7	4.3 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.2	11.9 12.8 10.9 12.8 12.9 12.3 11.7 12.4	3.9 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7	10.5 10.8 10.3 10.3 10.0 10.3 9.4 9.7	11.2 11.8 10.8 10.9 10.6 11.1 9.7 10.0	29.8 35.0 36.1 38.5 36.8 37.5 38.9 39.5	10.3 10.6 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.7 8.3 8.6	9.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.6 9.1 9.3	31.5 28.9 29.7 32.9 35.0 26.9 27.4 32.6	8 8 9.1 9 0 8.7 8.3 8.8 8.2 8.2
Sept Oct Nov Dec	5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9	4.5 4.4 4.2 4.3	4.5 4.3 4.2 4.3	15.3 15.1 15.1 13.8	4.0 3.8 3.6 3.8	4.4 4.5 4.3 4.3	11.4 13.3 12.6 12.9	4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8	9.5 9.1 10.6 9.3	9.8 9.7 11.3 9.3	33.7 35.0 44.9 23.6	8.7 8.5 9.4 8.6	9.2 8.6 10.0 9.3	32.5 30.3 31.5 25.2	8.1 7.5 9.0 8.5

 $<sup>^1\,\</sup>mbox{Unemployed}$  as percent of civilian labor force in group specified.  $^2\,\mbox{See}$  footnote 1, Table B–37.

Note.—Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over. See footnote 5 and Note, Table B-35.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-44.—Unemployment by duration and reason, 1959-2005 [Thousands of persons, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted 1]

			D	uration of	unemploy	ment			Reas	on for un	employm	ent	
Year or month	Unem- ploy- ment	Less than 5 weeks	5-14 weeks	15-26 weeks	27 weeks and over	Average (mean) dura- tion (weeks)	Median dura- tion (weeks)	Jo Total	On layoff	3 Other	Job leav- ers	Reen- trants	New en- trant
159	3.740	1.585	1,114	469	571	14 4	-			,			
960 961	3.852 4.714	1.719 1.806	1.176 1.376	503 728	454 804	12 8 15 6 14 7							
)62 )63	3.911 4.070	1.663 1.751	1.134	534 535	585 553	14.0							
164 . 165	3.786 3.366	1.697 1.628	1.117	491 404	482 351	13.3 11.8							
66 67 <sup>2</sup>	2.875 2.975	1.628 1.573 1.634	779 893	287 271	239 177	10 4 8 7	2 3	1.229	394	836	438	945	3
58 59	2.817 2.832	1.594 1.629	810 827	256 242	156 133	8 4 7 8	4.5 4.4	1,070 1,017	334 339	736 678	431 436	909 965	4
70 71	4,093 5,016	2.139	1.290 1.585	428 668	235 519	8.6 11.3	4.9 6.3	1.811 2.323	675 735	1.137 1,588	550 590	1.228 1.472	5 6
72 73	4,882 4,365	2.245 2.242 2.224	1.472	601 483	566 343	12.0 10.0	6.3 6.2 5.2 5.2	2.108 1.694	582 472	1.526 1.221	641 683	1,456 1,340	6
74	5.156 7.929		1.597 2.484 2.196	574 1.303	381 1,203	9.8 14.2	5.2 8.4 8.2	2.242 4.386	746 1,671	1.495 2.714	768 827	1,463 1,892	6 8
76 77	7.406 6.991	2.940 2.844 2.919 2.865	2,132	1.018 913	1,348 1,028	15.8 14.3	7 0	3,679 3,166	1.050 865	2.628	903 909	1,928 1,963	8 9
78 79	6.202 6.137	2,865 2,950	1.923 1.946	766 706	648 535	11 9 10.8	5.9 5.4	2,585 2,635	712 851	1.873 1.784	874 880	1.857 1.806	8
30 31	7.637 8.273	3.295 3.449	2.470 2.539	1.052 1.122	820 1.162	11.9 13.7	6.5 6.9	3.947 4,267	1,488 1,430	2,459 2,837	891 923	1.927	8
32	10.678	3,883 3,570	3.311	1.708	1.776 2,559	15 6 20.0	8.7 10.1	6,268 6,258	2.127 1.780	4.141 4.478	840 830	2.102 2.384 2.412	1.1
84 85	8.539 8.312	3,350 3,498	2,451 2,509	1.104	1,634	18.2 15.6	7 9 6 8	4.421 4.139	1.171	3 250	823 877	2.184 2.256	1.1
36 37	8.237 7.425	3.448 3.246	2.557	1.045 943	1.187	15 0 14.5	6.9 6.5	4.033 3.566	1,090 943	2.982 2.943 2.623	1,015 965	2.160 1.974	1.0
88 89	6.701 6.528	3.084 3.174	2.196 2.007 1.978	801 730	809 646	13 5 11 9	5.9 4.8	3.092 2.983	851 850	2.241 2.133	983 1,024	1.809 1.843	8
90	7.047 8.628	3.265 3.480	2.257 2.791	822 1.246	703 1.111	12.0 13.7	5.3 6.8	3.387 4.694	1.028	2.359 3.402	1.041	1.930 2.139	6
92	9.613 8.940	3.376 3.262	2.830	1.453	1,954 1,798	17 7 18.0	8 7 8 3	5.389 4,848	1.260	4.129 3.733	1.002	2.285	g
94	7.996 7.404	2.728	2.584 2.408 2.342	1.237	1.623	18.8 16.6	9 2 8 3	3.815 3.476	977	2.838 2.446	976 791 824	2.786 2.525	6
96 97	7.236 6.739	2.633 2,538	2.287	1.053	1.262	16.7 15.8	8.3 8.0	3.370 3.037	1.021	2.349 2.106	824 774 795	2.512	5
98 99	6.210 5.880	2.622 2.568	1,950	763 755	875 725	14.5 13.4	6.7 6.4	2.822	866 848	1.957 1.774	734 783	2.132 2.005	5
00	5.692 6.801	2.558 2.853	1.815	669 951	649 801	12.6 13.1	5 9 6 8	2.517 3.476	852 1.067	1.664	780 835	1.961 2.031	4
02	8.378 8.774	2.893	2.580 2.612	1.369	1.535	16 6 19 2	9 1 10.1	4.607 4.838	1.124	3.483 3.717	866 818	2.368	5
04 05	8.149 7.591	2.696 2.667	2.382 2.304	1.293	1.779	19 6 18 4	98	4.197 3.667	998 933	3.199 2,734	858 872	2,408 2,386	6
04 Jan Feb	8.345 8.186	2.657 2.419	2.397 2.422	1.446 1.367	1.903 1.865	19.8 20.2	10 6 10.2	4.350 4.258	1.027 1.053	3.323 3,205	815 821	2.559 2.411	6
Mar Apr	8,397 8,140	2.638	2.421 2.387	1,333	1.982	19.8 19.6	10.2	4,548 4,362	1,029	3.519 3.357	847 825	2.429 2.306	6
May . June	8.178 8.247	2.683 2.684	2.390 2.371	1.274 1.325	1,794	19.8 19.9	9.9 10.8	4.225 4.125	963 1,004	3,262 3,121	851 904	2.446 2.443	7
July Aug	8.182 8.000	2 868	2.438	1 227	1 709	18.8 19.2	8.9 9.4	4.243 4.001	1.056	3.187 3.023	905 890	2.297	1
Sept Oct	7.981 8.040	2.638 2.760 2,735	2.438 2.536 2.226 2.297	1.247	1.671 1.718 1.752	19 6 19 6	9.6 9.5	4.007	893 945	3.114 3.108	825 824	2,414	1
Nov Dec	7,974 8,040	2.610	2.360	1,267 1,258 1,276	1.712	19 8 19 4	9.7 9.4	4 040 4.029	955 962	3.085 3.067	865 938	2,373	7
05 Jan	7.723 7.986	2.597 2.743	2.348 2.320	1.191 1.236	1.630	19.2	9.3 9.2	3.982	962	3.020 2.927	815 950	2.336 2.406	6
Feb Mar Apr	7.616 7.644	2.743 2.498 2.670	2 318	1.236	1.626 1.636	19.3	9.2 9.2 8.9	3.886 3.759 3.677	960 955 841	2.804	855 894	2.368	7
Apr May June	7.629 7.493	2.694 2.661	2.271 2.270 2.339	1.122	1,597 1,528 1,335	19.6 18.6 17.2	9.1 9.1	3.664 3.666	898 974	2.836 2,766 2.692	952 838	2.348 2,365 2.240	6
July	7.494	2.616 2,544	2.452 2.268	1.069	1.414	17.7	8.9	3,626	954 874	2 673	825	2 411	6
Aug Sept	7.367 7.648	2,751	2,253	1.229	1,444	18 9 18.2	9.4 8.5	3.474	970	2,600 2,726	839 874	2,455	6
Oct Nov	7.418 7.572 7.375	2.708 2.779 2.764	2.263 2.268 2.240	1.045 1.108 1.068	1.432 1.383 1.350	18.0 17.6 17.3	8 6 8 5 8.5	3.508 3.455 3.486	944 899 935	2,564 2,556 2,552	889 900 841	2,349 2,538 2,430	6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Because of independent seasonal adjustment of the various series, detail will not add to totals <sup>2</sup> Data for 1967 by reason for unemployment are not equal to total unemployment. <sup>3</sup> Beginning January 1994, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs

Note —Data relate to persons 16 years of age and over See tootnote 5 and Note. Table B-35

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table B-45 —Unemployment insurance programs, selected data, 1978-2005

		All programs				State	programs		
Year or month	Covered employ- ment <sup>1</sup>	Insured unemploy- ment (weekly aver- age) 2 3	Total benefits paid (millions of dollars) <sup>2</sup> <sup>4</sup>	Insured unem- ploy- ment <sup>3</sup>	Initial claims	Exhaus- tions <sup>5</sup>	Insured unemploy- ment as percent of covered employ- ment	Total (millions of dollars) 4	Average weekly check (dollars)
	Thous	sands		Weekly	average, th	ousands			
978 979 980 981 982 983 984 984 985 985 986 987	88,804 92,062 92,659 93,300 91,628 91,898 96,474 99,186 101,099 103,936 107,156	2,645 2,592 3,837 3,410 4,592 3,774 2,560 2,699 2,739 2,369 2,135	9,007 9,401 16,175 15,287 24,491 20,968 13,739 15,217 16,563 14,684	2,359 2,434 3,350 3,047 4,059 3,395 2,475 2,617 2,643 2,300 2,081	346 388 488 460 583 438 377 397 378 328 310	39 39 59 57 80 80 50 49 52 46 38	3.3 2.9 3.5 4.6 3.9 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.0	7,717 8,613 13,761 13,262 20,649 18,549 13,237 14,707 15,950 14,211 13,086	83.6 89.6 98.9 106.7 119.3 123.5 123.4 128.1 135.6 140.3 144.7
989 990 991 992 993 994 995 995 996 997 998	109,929 111,500 109,606 110,167 112,146 115,255 118,068 120,567 121,044 124,184	2,205 2,575 3,406 3,348 2,845 2,746 2,639 2,656 2,370 2,260 2,223	14,569 18,387 26,327 726,035 722,629 22,508 21,991 22,495 20,324 19,941 21,024	2,158 2,522 3,342 3,245 2,751 2,670 2,572 2,595 2,323 2,222 2,188	330 388 447 408 341 340 357 356 323 321 298	37 45 67 74 62 57 51 53 48 44	2.1 2 4 3.2 3 1 2.6 2 4 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.8	14,205 17,932 25,479 25,056 21,661 21,537 21,226 21,820 19,735 19,431 20,563	151 4 161.2 169.5 173.3 179.4 181.9 187.0 189.2 200.5 212.1
000 001 002 002 003 004 005 r	129.877 129.636 128.234 127,796 129,278	2.146 3,012 3.624 3,573 2,999 2,710	20,983 32,228 8 42,980 8 42,413 8 35,297	2.110 2.974 3.585 3.531 2.950 2.663	301 404 407 404 345 328	41 54 85 85 68 55	1.6 2.3 2.8 2.8 2.3	20.507 31.680 42.132 41.358 34.432	221.0 238.0 256.2 261.0 262.5
004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov		3,709 3,982 3,576 2,974 2,846 2,871 2,726 2,917 2,403 2,429 2,624	3,696.7 3,630.8 3,880.9 3,007.0 2,650.9 2,856.8 2,630.9 2,773.7 2,391.1 2,224.2 2,543.6	3.160 3.131 3.036 2.982 2.938 2.924 2.888 2.875 2.846 2.797 2.756	355 356 344 345 344 343 340 339 343 339	82 79 77 73 70 68 65 66 57	2 5 2 4 2 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	3.608 3 3.561.5 3.811 8 2.943.0 2.592 5 2.794 0 2.572 7 2.706 0 2.329 4 2.161 9 2.473 4	264 4 266 0 266 0 263 0 260 1 258 0 255 0 261 8 262 1
Dec  Dec  O05. Jan  Feb  Apr  May  June  July  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec	1	2.696 3.659 3.262 2.958 2.662 2.589 2.411 2.619 2.228 2.634 2.475 2.617	2.826.5 3.378.7 3.085.7 2.614.4 2.544.6 2.466.4 2.400.7 2.619.7 2.196.1 2.383.8 2.453.7 2.651.4	2.738 2.723 2.674 2.652 2.593 2.590 2.600 2.582 2.581 2.774 2.825 2.703 2.672	332 329 309 337 323 334 323 317 318 398 350 323 318	55 66 58 57 60 59 53 57 54 46 49	2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0	2,753 4 3,303 4 3,019,4 3,250 9 2,553 8 2,480,7 2,404 9 2,338 3 2,544 4 2,132 8 2,317 1 2,384 0 2,578 6	264 2 268 3 271 7 272 1 270 1 268 5 266 5 263 7 259 0 261 1 267 2

\*\* Monthly data are seasonally adjusted

<sup>\*\*</sup>Monthly data are seasonally adjusted 
1 Through 1996 includes persons under the State, UCFE (Federal employee, effective January 1955), RRB (Railroad Retirement Board) programs, and UCX (unemployment compensation for ex-servicemembers, effective October 1958) programs. Beginning 1997, covered employment data are State and UCFE programs only Workers covered by State programs account for about 97 percent of wage and salary earners. 
Covered employment data beginning 2001 are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Prior data are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).

2 Includes State, UCFE, RR, and UCX Also includes Federal and State extended benefit programs. Does not include FSB (Federal supplemental benefits), SUA (special unemployment assistance), Federal Supplemental Compensation. Emergency Unemployment Compensation, and

TEUC (Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation) programs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Covered workers who have completed at least 1 week of unemployment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Annual data are net amounts and monthly data are gross amounts

<sup>5</sup> Individuals receiving final payments in benefit year 6 For total unemployment only.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Including Emergency Unemployment Compensation, total benefits paid for 1992 and 1993 would be approximately (in millions of dollars), for 1992, 39,990 and for 1993, 34,876

<sup>\*</sup>Including Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation, total benefits paid (not including RRB program) would be approximately (in millions of dollars): for 2002, 52,709, 2003, 63,097; and 2004, 37,932

Note.—Insured unemployment and initial claims programs include Puerto Rican sugar cane workers

Source: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

TABLE B-46.—Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1959-2005
[Thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			Go	ods-producii	ng industrie	es .		Service-p	roviding ind	ustries
Year or month	Total		Natural re-	Con-	M	anufacturing	_		Trade, tra	and
real of month	10101	Total	sources and mining	struc- tion	Total	Dura ble goods	Non- dura- ble goods	Total	Total	Retail trade
1959	53,374	19.163	789	3.050	15.325	8,988	6,337	34.211	10.960	5.453
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1968	54 296 54.105 55.659 56.764 58.391 60.874 64.020 65.931 68.023 70.512	19.182 18.647 19.203 19.385 19.733 20.595 21.740 21.882 22.292 22.893	771 728 709 694 697 694 690 679 671 683	2.973 2.908 2.997 3.060 3.148 3.284 3.371 3.305 3.410 3.637	15,438 15,011 15,498 15,631 15,888 16,617 17,680 17,897 18,211 18,573	9.071 8.711 9.099 9.226 9.414 9.973 10.803 10.952 11.137 11.396	6.367 6.300 6.399 6.405 6.474 6.644 6.878 6.945 7.074 7,177	35.114 35.458 36.455 37.379 38.658 40.279 42.280 44.049 45.731 47.619	11.147 11.040 11.215 11.367 11.677 12.139 12.611 12.950 13.334 13.853	5.589 5.560 5.672 5.781 5.977 6.262 6.530 6.711 6.977 7.295
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	71.006 71.335 73.798 76.912 78.389 77.069 79.502 82.593 86.826 89.932	22.179 21.602 22.299 23.450 23.364 21.318 22.025 22.972 24.156 24.997	677 658 672 693 755 802 832 865 902 1.008	3.654 3.770 3.957 4.167 4.095 3.608 3.662 3.940 4.322 4.562	17.848 17.174 17.669 18.589 18.514 16.909 17.531 18.167 18.932 19.426	10,762 10,229 10,630 11,414 11,432 10,266 10,640 11,132 11,770 12,220	7,086 6,944 7,039 7,176 7,082 6,643 6,891 7,035 7,162 7,206	48.827 49.734 51.499 53.462 55.025 55,751 57.477 59.620 62.670 64.935	14.144 14.318 14.788 15.349 15.693 15.606 16.128 16.765 17.658 18.303	7,463 7,657 8,038 8,371 8,536 8,600 8,966 9,359 9,879 10,180
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	90.528 91.289 89.677 90.280 94.530 97.511 99.474 102.088 105.345 108.014	24.263 24.118 22.550 22.110 23.435 23.585 23.318 23.470 23.909 24.045	1.077 1.180 1.163 997 1.014 974 829 771 770 750	4.454 4.304 4.024 4.065 4.501 4.793 4.937 5.090 5.233 5.309	18,733 18,634 17,363 17,048 17,920 17,819 17,552 17,609 17,906 17,985	11.679 11.611 10.610 10.326 11.050 11.034 10.795 10.767 10.969 11.004	7,054 7,023 6,753 6,722 6,870 6,784 6,757 6,842 6,938 6,981	66.265 67.172 67.127 68.171 71.095 73.926 76.156 78.618 81.436 83.969	18.413 18.604 18.457 18.668 19.653 20.379 20.795 21.302 21.974 22.510	10.244 10.364 10.372 10.635 11.223 11.733 12.078 12.419 12.808 13.108
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	109,487 108,374 108,726 110,844 114,291 117,298 119,708 122,776 125,930 128,993	23.723 22.588 22.095 22.219 22.774 23.156 23.410 23.886 24.354 24.465	765 739 689 666 659 641 637 654 645 598	5.263 4.780 4.608 4.779 5.095 5.274 5.536 5.813 6.149 6.545	17,695 17,068 16,799 16,774 17,021 17,241 17,237 17,419 17,560 17,322	10,736 10,219 9,945 9,900 10,131 10,372 10,485 10,704 10,910 10,830	6.959 6.849 6.854 6.873 6.890 6.752 6.716 6.650 6.492	85,764 85,787 86,631 88,625 91,517 94,142 96,299 98,890 101,576 104,528	22,666 22,281 22,125 22,378 23,128 23,834 24,239 24,700 25,186 25,771	13.182 12.896 12.828 13.021 13.491 13.897 14.143 14.389 14.609 14.970
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	131,785 131,826 130,341 129,999 131,480 133,631	24.649 23.873 22.557 21.816 21.884 22.141	599 606 583 572 591 629	6.787 6.826 6.716 6.735 6.964 7.233	17.263 16.441 15.259 14.510 14.329 14.279	10.876 10.335 9.483 8.963 8.923 8.950	6.388 6.107 5.775 5.547 5.406 5.329	107.136 107.952 107.784 108.182 109.596 111.490	26.225 25.983 25.497 25.287 25.510 25.833	15.280 15.239 15.025 14.917 15.035 15.174
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	130,372 130,466 130,786 131,123 131,373 131,479	21,703 21,699 21,773 21,825 21,888 21,890	575 577 585 589 592 591	6.845 6.841 6.897 6.913 6.949 6.955	14.283 14.281 14.291 14.323 14.347 14.344	8.855 8.864 8.873 8.902 8.925 8.931	5,428 5,417 5,418 5,421 5,422 5,413	108.669 108.767 109.013 109.298 109.485 109.589	25.348 25.367 25.441 25.481 25.511 25.536	14.962 14.977 15.021 15.038 15.052 15.061
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	131.562 131.750 131.880 132.162 132.294 132.449	21.902 21.946 21.947 21.982 21.996 22.022	596 595 597 595 599 602	6,965 6,985 6,998 7,043 7,060 7,086	14.341 14.366 14.352 14.344 14.337 14,334	8,926 8,965 8,957 8,960 8,954 8,957	5.415 5.401 5.395 5.384 5.383 5,377	109.660 109.804 109.933 110.180 110.298 110.427	25.536 25.537 25.555 25.581 25.621 25.620	15.048 15.043 15.038 15.057 15.081 15.077
2005 Jan . Feb Mar Apr May June	132.573 132.873 132.995 133.287 133.413 133.588	22.004 22.066 22.093 22.130 22.138 22.134	607 612 619 623 624 628	7.090 7.133 7.159 7.207 7.213 7.230	14.307 14.321 14.315 14.300 14.301 14.276	8.942 8.962 8.957 8.954 8.961 8.947	5,365 5,359 5,358 5,346 5,340 5,329	110.569 110.807 110.902 111.157 111.275 111.454	25.652 25.714 25.743 25.797 25.842 25,854	15,081 15,125 15,129 15,158 15,186 15,197
July Aug Sept Oct Nov. Dec.	133.865 134.013 134.030 134.055 134.360 134.468	22.134 22.159 22.164 22.197 22.250 22.262	629 632 636 641 644 647	7.235 7.267 7.284 7.299 7.341 7.332	14.270 14.260 14.244 14.257 14.265 14.283	8.940 8.945 8.934 8.954 8.958 8.973	5.330 5.315 5.310 5.303 5.307 5.310	111.731 111.854 111.866 111.858 112.110 112.206	25.922 25.910 25.870 25.870 25.905 25.880	15.249 15.231 15.183 15.178 15.178 15.175

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, and utilities, not shown separately

Note —Data in Tables B-46 and B-47 are based on reports from employing establishments and relate to full- and part-time wage and salary workers in nonagricultural establishments who received pay for any part of the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. Not comparable with labor force data (Tables B-35 through B-44), which include proprietors, self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, and private household workers, which count persons as employed when they are not at work because of industrial disputes, bad

TABLE B-46.—Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by major industry, 1959-2005—Continued [Thousands of persons; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

				Service-p	roviding and	ustries—Co	ntinued			
Year or month	Infor- ma-	Finan- cial activi-	Profes- sional and busi-	Educa- tion and health	Leisure and hos-	Other services		Govern	ment	
	tion	ties	ness	services	pitality	30111003	Total	Federal	State	Local
959	1,718	2,454	3,591	2,822	3,365	1,107	8,192	2,342	1.484	4,36
960	1,735 1,766 1,824 1,908 1,955 1,991 2,048	2,532 2,590 2,656 2,731 2,811 2,878 2,961 3,087 3,234 3,404	3,694 3,744 3,885 3,990 4,137 4,306 4,517 4,720 4,918 5,156	2,937 3,030 3,172 3,288 3,438 3,587 3,770 3,986 4,191 4,428	3,460 3,468 3,557 3,639 3,772 3,951 4,127 4,269 4,453 4,670	1.152 1.188 1.243 1.288 1.346 1.404 1.475 1.558 1.638 1.731	8,464 8,706 9,004 9,341 9,711 10,191 10,910 11,525 11,972	2,381 2,391 2,455 2,473 2,463 2,495 2,690 2,852 2,871 2,893	1,536 1,669 1,747 1,856 1,996 2,141 2,302 2,442 2,533	4,54 4,70 4,88 5,12 5,39 5,70 6,08 6,37 6,66
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978	2,041 2,009 2,056 2,135 2,160	3,532 3,651 3,784 3,920 4,023 4,047 4,155 4,348 4,599 4,843	5,267 5,328 5,523 5,774 5,974 6,034 6,287 6,587 6,972 7,312	4,577 4,675 4,863 5,092 5,322 5,497 5,756 6,052 6,427 6,767	4,789 4,914 5,121 5,341 5,471 5,544 5,794 6,065 6,411 6,631	1,789 1,827 1,900 1,990 2,078 2,144 2,244 2,359 2,505 2,637	12,687 13,012 13,465 13,862 14,303 14,820 15,001 15,258 15,812 16,068	2,865 2,828 2,815 2,794 2,858 2,882 2,863 2,859 2,893 2,894	2,664 2,747 2,859 2,923 3,039 3,179 3,273 3,377 3,474 3,541	7.15 7,43 7.79 8,14 8,40 8.75 8,86 9,02 9,44 9,63
980 981 982 983 984 985 985 986 987	2,382 2,317 2,253 2,398 2,437 2,445 2,507 2,585 2,622	5,025 5,163 5,209 5,334 5,553 5,815 6,128 6,385 6,500 6,562	7,544 7,782 7,848 8,039 8,464 8,871 9,211 9,608 10,090 10,555	7,072 7,357 7,515 7,766 8,193 8,657 9,061 9,515 10,063 10,616	6,721 6,840 6,874 7,078 7,489 7,869 8,156 8,446 8,778 9,062	2.755 2.865 2.924 3.021 3.186 3.366 3.523 3.699 3.907 4,116	16.375 16.180 15.982 16.011 16.159 16.533 16.838 17.156 17.540 17,927	3.000 2.922 2.884 2.915 2.943 3.014 3.044 3.089 3.124 3.136	3,610 3,640 3,640 3,662 3,734 3,832 3,893 3,967 4,076 4,182	9,76 9,61 9,45 9,48 9,68 9,90 10,10 10,33 10,60
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997	2,738 2,843 2,940 3,084	6,614 6,558 6,540 6,709 6,867 6,827 6,969 7,178 7,462 7,648	10,848 10,714 10,970 11,495 12,174 12,844 13,462 14,335 15,147 15,957	10,984 11,506 11,891 12,303 12,807 13,289 13,683 14,087 14,446 14,798	9,288 9,256 9,437 9,732 10,100 10,501 10,777 11,018 11,232 11,543	4,261 4,249 4,240 4,350 4,428 4,572 4,690 4,825 4,976 5,087	18,415 18,545 18,787 18,989 19,275 19,432 19,539 19,664 19,909 20,307	3,196 3,110 3,111 3,063 3,018 2,949 2,877 2,806 2,772 2,769	4.305 4.355 4.408 4.488 4.576 4.635 4.606 4.582 4.612 4,709	10,9 11,0 11,2 11,4 11,6 11,8 12,0 12,2 12,5 12,8
000 001 002 003 004 005	3,631 3,629 3,395 3,188	7,687 7,807 7,847 7,977 8,052 8,227	16,666 16,476 15,976 15,987 16,414 16,935	15,109 15,645 16,199 16,588 16,954 17,344	11,862 12,036 11,986 12,173 12,479 12,748	5,168 5,258 5,372 5,401 5,431 5,467	20,790 21,118 21,513 21,583 21,618 21,795	2,865 2,764 2,766 2,761 2,728 2,719	4,786 4,905 5,029 5,002 4,985 5,030	13,1 13,4 13,7 13,8 13,9 14,0
004- Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	3,143 3,136 3,142 3,146 3,151	7,989 7,997 8,005 8,021 8,037 8,051	16,138 16,153 16,184 16,305 16,384 16,415	16,766 16,787 16,833 16,871 16,913 16,936	12,351 12,367 12,412 12,443 12,474 12,486	5,405 5,402 5,420 5,428 5,434 5,443	21,533 21,551 21,582 21,607 21,586 21,571	2,729 2,731 2,730 2,745 2,729 2,731	4,961 4,971 4,974 4,975 4,967 4,963	13.8 13,8 13,8 13,8 13,8 13,8
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	3,144 3,135 3,127 3,131 3,133 3,127	8,043 8,058 8,083 8,093 8,107 8,128	16,453 16,470 16,514 16,614 16,611 16,674	16,963 17,010 17,019 17,081 17,108 17,142	12,497 12,508 12,522 12,546 12,571 12,589	5,438 5,441 5,436 5,434 5,441 5,447	21,586 21,645 21,677 21,700 21,706 21,700	2,726 2,730 2,730 2,723 2,728 2,706	4,976 4,987 5,000 5,007 5,015 5,020	13,8 13,9 13,9 13,9 13,9 13,9
005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	3.134 3.152 3.146 3,146	8,150 8,165 8,167 8,182 8,189 8,208	16,694 16,775 16,796 16,843 16,851 16,906	17,178 17,186 17,210 17,243 17,289 17,336	12,611 12,650 12,662 12,723 12,736 12,765	5,451 5,457 5,459 5,472 5,468 5,479	21,710 21,733 21,731 21,745 21,754 21,760	2,717 2,720 2,724 2,718 2,722 2,719	5,025 5.027 5.024 5.026 5.023 5,026	13.9 13.9 13.9 14.0 14.0
July Aug Sept Oct Nove Dece	3.146 3.147 3.153 3.142 3.146 3.149	8,227 8,248 8,265 8,289 8,304 8,316	16,964 16,983 17,037 17,051 17,127 17,160	17,377 17,418 17,455 17,443 17,480 17,505	12,801 12,830 12,762 12,755 12,808 12,831	5,477 5,469 5,468 5,458 5,466 5,477	21.817 21.849 21.856 21.850 21.874 21.888	2,719 2,718 2,718 2,716 2,718 2,712	5.034 5.033 5.039 5.037 5.045 5.057	14.09 14.09 14.09 14.11 14.1

Note (cont'd).—weather, etc., even if they are not paid for the time off, which are based on a sample of the working-age population; and which count persons only once—as employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force. In the data shown here, persons who work at more than one job are counted each time they appear on a payroll.

Establishment data for employment, hours, and earnings are classified based on the 2002 North American Industry Classification System

(NAICS).

For further description and details see *Employment and Earnings*. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-47.—Hours and earnings in private nonagricultural industries, 1959–2005? [Monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	Avera	ge weekly	hours	Averag	ge hourly e	arnings	Average v	weekly earn	ings. total	private
Year or month	Total	Manuta	cturing	Totali	orivate	Manu- fac- turing	Le	vel	Percent from ear	year
	private	Total	Over- time	Current dollars	1982 dollars	(current dollars)	Current dollars	1982 dollars	Current dollars	1982 dollars
1959 1960		40 3 39 8	27			\$2 08				
1961 1962		39 9 40 5	2 5 2 4 2.8			2 15 2 20 2 27 2.34			1.0	
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	38 5 38 6 38 5 37 9 37 7 37 5	40 6 40 8 41 2 41 4 40 6 40 7 40 6	2 8 3 1 3 6 3 9 3 3 3 5 3 6	\$2 53 2 63 2 73 2 85 3 02 3 22	\$7 86 8 04 8 13 8 21 8 37 8 45	2 41 2 49 2 60 2.71 2.89 3.07	\$97 41 101 52 105 11 108 02 113 85 120 75	\$302.52 310.46 312.83 311.30 315.37 316.93	4.2 3.5 2.8 5.4 6.1	2.6 8 5 1.3 5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976 1977 1978	37 0 36 8 36 9 36 9 36 4 36 0 36 1 35 8 35 8	39 8 39 9 40 6 40 7 40 0 39.5 40 1 40.3 40 4	2 9 2 3 4 3 8 3 2 2 6 3 1 3 4 3 6 3 3	3.40 3.63 3.90 4.14 4.43 4.73 5.06 5.44 5.87 6.33	8 46 8 64 8 99 8 98 8 65 8 48 8 58 8 66 8 67 8 40	3 23 3 45 3 70 3 97 4 31 4 71 5.09 5.55 6.05	125.80 133.58 143.91 152.77 161.25 170.28 182.67 195.30 210.15 225.35	312.94 318.05 331.59 331.39 314.94 305.16 309.61 310.99 310.41 298.87	4.2 6.2 7.7 6.2 5.6 7.3 6.9 7.6	-1.3 1 6 4 3 -1 -5.0 -3.1 1.5 .4 -2 -3.7
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	35 2 35 2 34 7 34 9 35 1 34 9 34 7 34 7 34 6 34 5	39 7 39 8 38 9 40 1 40 7 40 5 40 7 40 9 41 0 40.9	2.8 2.8 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.8	6.84 7.43 7.86 8.19 8.48 8.73 9.13 9.43 9.80	7 99 7 88 7 86 7 95 7 95 7 91 7 96 7 86 7 81 7 75	7 15 7 86 8 36 8 70 9 05 9 40 9 59 9 77 10 05 10 35	240 77 261.54 272 74 285.83 297.65 304.68 309.52 316.81 326.28 338.10	281.27 277.35 272.74 277.50 279.22 276.23 276.11 272.88 270.32 267.27	6.8 8.4 4.8 4.1 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.6	-5 9 -1 4 -1 7 1 7 6 -1 1 0 -1.2 - 9 -1 1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	34 3 34 1 34 2 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3 34 3	40.5 40.4 40.7 41.1 41.7 41.3 41.3 41.7 41.4	3 8 3 8 4 0 4 4 4 5 0 4 7 4 .8 5 1 8 4 8	10.19 10.50 10.76 11.03 11.32 11.64 12.03 12.49 13.00 13.47	7.66 7.58 7.55 7.52 7.53 7.53 7.57 7.68 7.89 8.00	10 78 11 13 11 40 11.70 12.04 12.34 12.75 13.14 13.45 13.85	349.29 358.06 367.83 378.40 390.73 399.53 412.74 431.25 448.04 462.49	262.43 258.34 257.95 258.12 259.97 258.43 259.58 265.22 271.87 274.64	3.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.3 3.3 4.5 3.9 3.2	-1 8 -1 6 -2 1 7 -6 4 2.2 2.5 1 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	34 3 34 0 33 9 33.7 33 7 33.8	41 3 40 3 40 5 40 4 40 8 40 7	4 7 4 0 4 2 4 2 4 6 4 5	14.00 14.53 14.95 15.35 15.67 16.11	8 03 8 11 8 24 8 27 8 23 8 17	14.32 14.76 15.29 15.74 16.14 16.56	480.41 493.20 506.07 517.30 528.56 543.86	275 62 275 38 278 83 278.72 277 61 275.93	3 9 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.9	- 1 1 3 - 0 - 4 - 6
2004 Jan Feb . Mar Apr May June	33.8 33.8 33.7 33.7 33.8 33.6	41 0 41 0 40 9 40 8 41 0 40 7	4 5 4 5 4 6 4 6 4 5	15.48 15.51 15.54 15.58 15.62 15.64	8 27 8 25 8 23 8 24 8 21 8 20	15 94 15 98 16 01 16 07 16.08 16 12	523 22 524.24 523 70 525.05 527.96 525 50	279.50 279.00 277.38 277.66 277.44 275.42	1.9 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.0	.1 4 .0 4 3 -1.1
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	33 7 33 7 33 8 33 8 33 7 33 7	40 8 40 9 40 8 40 7 40 5 40 5	4 6 4 6 4 5 4 5 4.5	15 70 15 74 15 77 15 81 15.82 15 85	8 23 8 25 8 25 8 22 8 21 8 23	16 16 16 22 16.29 16 27 16.29 16.34	529 09 530 44 533 03 534 38 533 13 534 15	277.45 278.01 278.93 277.89 276.52 277.19	2.3 2.5 3.0 2.9 2.1 2.9	6 -0 6 3 -1.6 5
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	33 7 33 7 33 7 33 8 33.7 33 7	40 7 40 6 40 4 40 5 40 4 40 4	4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4	15.91 15.91 15.95 16.00 16.03	8 24 8 22 8.19 8 16 8 19 8 21	16 42 16 43 16 47 16 53 16 55	535 83 536 17 537.52 540 80 540 21 541 56	277.78 276.95 276.08 275.92 275.90 276.59	2.4 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.3 3.1	- 6 - 7 - 5 - 6 6 4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov <i>r</i> Dec <i>r</i>	33 7 33 7 33 8 33 8 33 8 33 7	40 5 40 5 40.7 41 0 40 8 40.7	45 45 46 45 45	16 14 16 17 16 19 16 28 16 29 16 34	8 20 8 16 8 06 8 10 8 16 8 19	16.55 16.65 16.59 16.70 16.70 16.71	543 92 544 93 547.22 550 26 550 60 550.66	276.24 275.08 272.38 273.63 275.85 276.16	2.8 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.1	4 -1.1 -2.3 -1.5 2 4

Note - - See Note, Table B-46

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$  For production or nonsupervisory workers, total includes private industry groups shown in Table B-46  $^{2}$  Current dollars divided by the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers on a 1982=100 base.

TABLE B-48.—Employment cost index, private industry, 1984-2005

	To	otal priva	te	Goo	ds-produ	icing	Serv	ice-prod	ucing	Ma	nufactur	ing	Nonm	anufacti	Jring
Year and month		Wages and sala- ries	Bene- fits <sup>1</sup>	Total com- pen- sation	Wages and sala- ries	-	Total com- pen- sation	Wages and sala- ries	Bene- fits <sup>1</sup>	Total com- pen- sation	Wages and sala- ries	Bene- fits <sup>1</sup>	Total com- pen- sation	Wages and sala- ries	Bene- fits 1
					In	dex. June	1989=1	00; not	seasonal	ly adjust	ed				
December: 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	84 0 87.3 90.1 93 1 97 6 102.3	84.8 88.3 91.1 94.1 98.0 102.0	81.7 84.6 87.5 90.5 96.7 102.6	85.4 88.2 91.0 93.8 97.9 102.1	86.4 89.4 92.3 95.2 98.2 102.0	83.2 85.7 88.3 90.9 97.3 102.6	82 9 86.6 89.3 92 6 97.3 102.3	83.7 87.7 90.3 93.4 97.8 102.2	80.4 83.6 86.8 90.2 96.1 102.6	85 0 87.8 90.7 93 4 97 6 102.0	86 1 89 2 92.1 95 2 98.1 101.9	82.7 85.0 87.5 89.8 96.6 102.3	83.4 87.0 89.7 92.9 97.5 102.3	84 2 88 0 90 6 93 7 97.8 102 2	81 1 84 4 87 9 91.0 96 8
1990	107 0 111 7 115 6 119 8 123 5 126 7 130 6 135 1 139 8 144 6	106 1 110 0 112 9 116 4 119 7 123 1 127 3 132 3 137 4 142 2	109.4 116.2 122.2 128.3 133.0 135.9 138.6 141.8 145.2 150.2	107.0 111.9 116.1 120.6 124.3 127.3 130.9 134.1 137.8 142.5	105.8 109.7 112.8 116.1 119.6 122.9 126.8 130.6 135.2 139.7	109 9 116 7 123 4 130 3 134 8 137 1 139 7 141 5 143 2 148 2	107 0 111.6 115.2 119 3 122.8 126.2 130.2 135.3 140.5 145.3	106.3 110.2 113.0 116.6 119.7 123.2 127.5 133.1 138.4 143.3	109.0 115.7 121.2 126.7 131.5 134.7 137.4 141.4 145.7 150.7	107 2 112 2 116 5 121 3 125 1 128 3 132 1 135 3 138 9 143 6	106.2 110.3 113.7 117.3 120.8 124.3 128.4 132.2 136.8 141.5	109 5 116.1 122 6 130.0 134.3 136.7 139 8 141 7 142.7 147.8	106.9 111.5 115.1 119.0 122.6 125.9 129.8 134.7 139.7 144.5	106.1 109.8 112.6 116.0 119.1 122.5 126.8 132.1 137.4 142.1	109:116:1122:1127:1132:1135:1137:1141:1145:1150:1150:1150:1150:1150:1150
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	150.9 157.2 162.3 168.8 175.2	147.7 153.3 157.5 162.3 166.2	158.6 166.7 174.6 185.8 198.7	148.8 154.4 160.1 166.5 174.3	145.2 150.5 155.0 158.7 162.4	156.2 162.6 171.0 183.8 201.2	151.7 158.2 163.1 169.7 175.3	148.9 154.5 158.6 163.9 167.9	159 4 168.4 175.9 186.2 196.5	149 3 154.6 160.5 167.1 175.4	146.5 151.7 156.5 160.1 164.0	154 8 160 4 168 9 182 3 200 4	151 1 157.6 162 5 169 0 174 7	147 9 153.5 157.5 162.6 166.6	159. 168. 176 186 197
June Sept	177.2 178.5 179.6	167 4 168.4 169.5	203.3 204.9 206.4	176.9 178.5 179.7	163.6 164.8 166.0	207.0 209.4 210.9	177.1 178.1 179.3	169.0 170.0 171.1	200.5 201.6 203.1	178.2 179.6 180.7	165 3 166 4 167 4	206.7 208.8 210.1	176 5 177.6 178.9	167.7 168.7 169.8	201 203. 204.
1004 Mar	171.5	1025	100.0	170.7		Index, Jur						102.2	170.0	1020	100
2004: Mar	171.5 173.1 174.8 176.2 177.3 178.4 179.8	163.5 164.5 165.7 166.4 167.4 168.4 169.4	190.9 194.1 196.7 199.9 202.0 203.6 206.2	170.7 172.4 174.6 176.3 177.1 178.9 180.9	159.9 160.9 162.3 162.4 163.6 164.8 166.0	192.1 195.0 198.9 203.5 205.3 208.2 211.7	171.9 173.5 174.9 176.2 177.3 178.2 179.4	165.1 166.0 167.2 168.2 169.1 169.9 170.8	190.2 193.5 195.3 197.7 200.1 200.9 202.9	170.9 172.7 174.8 176.6 177.3 179.1 180.6	161.3 162.4 163.8 164.0 165.3 166.4 167.4	192.2 195.6 199.8 203.5 204.4 207.4 210.8	170.8 172.3 173.7 175.1 176.4 177.4 178.7	163.8 164.7 165.9 166.9 167.8 168.6 169.5	190 193 195 198 201 202 204
				Pe	rcent ch	ange fron	12 mo	nths ear	lier, not	seasona	ly adjust	ted			
December 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	4.9 3.9 3.2 3.3 4.8 4.8	4.2 4.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.1	6.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 6.9 6.1	4.7 3.3 3.2 3.1 4.4 4.3	3.8 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.9	6.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 7.0 5.4	5.1 4.5 3.1 3.7 5.1 5.1	4.4 4.8 3.0 3.4 4.7 4.5	6 9 4.0 3.8 3.9 6.5 6.8	5.2 3.3 3.3 3.0 4.5 4.5	4.4 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.9	6.7 2.8 2.9 2.6 7.6 5.9	4.8 4.3 3.1 3.6 5.0 4.9	4.0 4.5 3.0 3.4 4.4 4.5	6 4 3 4 6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	4.6 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.5	4.0 3.7 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.9 3.9	6.6 6.2 5.2 5.0 3.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.4 3.4	4.8 4.6 3.8 3.9 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.4	3.7 3.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.3	7.1 6.2 5.7 5.6 3.5 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.2	4.6 4.3 3.2 3.6 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.9 3.8 3.4	4.0 3.7 2.5 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.5 4.4 4.0 3.5	6.2 6.1 4.8 4.5 3.8 2.4 2.0 2.9 3.0 3.4	5.1 4.7 3.8 4.1 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.4 2.7 3.4	4.2 3.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.5	7.0 6.0 5.6 6.0 3.3 1.8 2.3 1.4 .7	4 5 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.8 3.7	3 8 3.5 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.0 3.4	6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 2. 3.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	4.4 4.2	3.9 3.8 2.7 3.0 2.4	5.6 5.1 4.7 6.4 6.9	4.4 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.7	3.9 3.7 3.0 2.4 2.3	5.4 4.1 5.2 7.5 9.5		3.9 3.8 2.7 3.3 2.4	5.8 5.6 4.5 5.9 5.5	4.0 3.5 3.8 4.1 5.0	3 5 3 5 3 2 2 3	4 7 3.6 5.3 7.9 9 9	4.6 4.3 3.1 4.0 3.4	4.1 3.8 2.6 3.2 2.5	6. 5. 4. 5.
2005: Mar June Sept	3.4 3.2 3.0	2.4 2.4 2.2	5.8 4.9 4.8	3.9 3.9 3.7	2.3 2.4 2.3	6.9 6.7 6.5	3.2 2.8 2.6	2.4 2.3 2.1	5.2 3.9 3.9	3.8 3.7 3.3	2 5 2.5 2.2	6 3 6 0 5 5	3 3 3.0 2 9	2.4 2.4 2.2	5 4. 4
					Percent	change f	om 3 m	onths ea	arlier, sea	asonally	adjusted				
2004 Mar June Sept Dec 2005: Mar June Sept	1 1 .9 1.0 .8 6 .6 8	0.6 .6 .7 .4 .6 .6	2.2 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.1 .8 1.3	1.7 1.0 1.3 1.0 .5 1.0	0.8 .6 .9 .1 .7 .7	3.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 .9 1.4 1.7	0.8 .9 .8 .7 .6 .5	0.5 .5 .7 .6 .5 .5	1.5 1.7 .9 1.2 1.2 4 1.0	1 6 1 1 1 2 1 0 4 1 0 8	0.7 .7 .9 .1 .8 .7 .6	3.9 1.8 2.1 1.9 .4 1.5 1.6	0.8 9 .8 .8 .7 .6	0.6 .5 .7 .6 .5 .5	1.5 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.2 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Employer costs for employee benefits.

Note.—The employment cost index is a measure of the change in the cost of labor, free from the influence of employment shifts among occupations and industries

Data exclude farm and household workers.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-49.—Productivity and related data, business sector, 1959-2005 [Index numbers, 1992=100; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

Vana	Output of all	per hour persons	0u	tput 1		s of all sons?		ensation hour <sup>3</sup>		pensation hour <sup>4</sup>		t labor osts		ator 5
Year or quarter	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector
959 .	48 0	51.3	31 4	31 2	65 5	60 9	13 3	13 9	59 4	618	27.8	27.1	26.8	26.3
960 961 962 963 964	48 9 50 6 52 9 54 9 56.8	51 9 53 5 55 9 57 8 59.6	32 0 32 7 34 8 36 4 38 7	31.8 32.4 34.6 36.2 38.7	65 6 64 6 65.8 66 2 68.1	61 2 60 6 61 9 62 6 64 9	13.9 14.4 15.1 15.6 16.2	14.5 15.0 15.6 16.1 16.6	60.8 62.5 64.6 66.1 67.7	63 3 64.8 66.7 68 1 69.3	28.4 28.5 28.5 28.4 28.5	27.9 28.0 27.8 27.8 27.9	27 1 27 3 27.6 27 7 28.1	26.1 26.1 27 27.1
965	58 8	61 4	41 4	41 4	70.5	67.4	16.8	17.1	69.1	70.5	28.6	27 9	28.5	28.
966	61 2	63 6	44 2	44 4	72.3	69.8	17.9	18.2	71.7	72.6	29.3	28 6	29.2	28.
967	62 5	64 7	45 1	45.1	72.1	69.8	19.0	19.2	73.5	74.5	30.3	29.7	30.0	29.
968	64 7	66 9	47.3	47.5	73.2	71.0	20.5	20.7	76.2	77.1	31.7	31.0	31.2	30.
969	65.0	67.0	48 8	48 9	75.0	73.0	21.9	22.1	77.3	78.1	33.7	33.0	32.6	32.
970	66.3	68 0	48 7	48 9	73.5	71 9	23.6	23.7	78.8	79.2	35.6	34.9	34.1	33.
971	69.0	70 7	50.6	50.7	73.3	71 7	25.1	25.2	80.2	80 7	36.3	35.7	35.5	35:
972	71.2	73 1	53 9	54 1	75.6	74.0	26.7	26.9	82.6	83 2	37.4	36.8	36.8	36.
973	73.4	75 3	57.6	58 0	78.5	77.1	28.9	29.1	84.3	84 8	39.4	38.6	38.7	37.
974	72.2	74 2	56 8	57.3	78.7	77 2	31.7	31.9	83.3	83.8	43.9	43.0	42.4	41.
975	74 8	76.2	56 3	56.3	75.3	73.9	34.9	35.1	84.1	84.5	46.7	46.1	46.6	45.
976	77.1	78.7	60.0	60.2	77.8	76.5	38.0	38.1	86.4	86.6	49.2	48.4	49.0	48.
977	78.4	80.0	63 3	63.6	80.8	79.5	41.0	41.2	87.6	88.0	52.2	51.5	52.0	51.
978	79.3	81.0	67.3	67.8	84.9	83.7	44.5	44.8	89.1	89.6	56.2	55.3	55.6	54.
979	79.3	80.7	69.6	70.0	87.8	86.6	48.9	49.1	89.3	89.7	61.7	60.8	60.4	59.
980	79 1	80 6	68 8	69 2	87 0	85.9	54.1	54.4	89 1	89.5	68.4	67.5	65.8	64.
981	80 8	81 7	70.7	70 7	87 6	86.6	59.3	59.7	89 3	89.8	73.5	73.1	71.8	71.
982	80 1	80 8	68.6	68 4	85 6	84.7	63.6	64.0	90 4	90.8	79.4	79.1	75.9	75.
983	83.0	84 5	72.3	72 9	87.1	86.3	66.3	66.6	90 3	90.9	79.8	78.9	78.5	77.
984	85.2	86 1	78.6	78 9	92.2	91.6	69.1	69.5	90 7	91.1	81.2	80.7	80.8	80.
985	87.1	87.4	82 2	82 2	94.3	94.0	72.5	72.6	92.0	92.2	83.2	87.4	82.7	82.
986	89.8	90.1	85.3	85.4	95.0	94.7	76.2	76.4	95.0	95.2	84.9		84.1	83.
987	90.3	90.6	88 3	88 4	97.7	97.6	79.1	79.2	95.3	95.4	87.6		85.9	85.
988	91.7	92.1	92 1	92.4	100.4	100.4	83.1	83.1	96.6	96.6	90.6		88.6	88.
988	92.6	92.7	95 4	95.7	103.1	103.2	85.3	85.2	95.1	95.0	92.1		91.9	91
990 991 992 993 994	94.5 95.9 100.0 100.4 101.5	94 5 96 1 100 0 100 4 101 6	96 9 96.1 100.0 103.1 108 2	97 1 96 3 100.0 103 4 108.3	102 6 100.2 100 0 102 7 106.7	102 7 100 2 100.0 102 9 106.5	90.6 95.1 100.0 102.2 103.7	90.4 95.0 100.0 102.0 103.7	96.3 97.4 100.0 99.7 99.1	96.0 97.4 100.0 99.5 99.1	96.0 99.1 100.0 101.8 102.2	98.9 100.0	95.1 98.2 100.0 102.1 103.9	94. 98. 100. 102. 104.
1995	101.6	102 1	111 4	111 8	109 6	109 4	105.9	106 0	98.8	98.9	104 2	103.7	105.7	105
1996	104.7	104 9	116 5	116 8	111 3	111 4	109.6	109 5	99.6	99.5	104 7	104.5	107.4	107
1997	106.7	106.6	122 7	122.8	115 0	115.3	113.1	112.9	100.6	100.4	106 1	105.9	109.0	109
1998	109.7	109 5	128.6	128.9	117.3	117 7	120.0	119.7	105.3	105.0	109 4	109.3	109.7	109
1999	112.9	112 6	135 2	135 6	119 7	120 4	125.8	125.2	108.1	107.5	111 4	111.2	110.7	111
2000	116 1	115.6	140 5	140 8	121 0	121 8	134 5	134.0	111.9	111.4	115.9	115 9	112.7	113.
2001	119 0	118.5	141 0	141.3	118 4	119 3	140.2	139.3	113.4	112.6	117.8	117.5	114.9	115.
2002	123 8	123.3	143 1	143 4	115 6	116 3	145.0	144.2	115.4	114.8	117.1	117 0	116.1	116.
2003	128.6	128.0	147 9	148 2	115 0	115 8	150 7	149.9	117.3	116.7	117.2	117.1	117.7	118.
2004	133.0	132.3	154 9	155 3	116 5	117 4	157.7	156.7	119.5	118.7	118.6	118 4	120.6	120.
2001: I II . III IV	117 2 118.8 119 2 121.1	116 6 118 2 118 7 120 5	141 1 141 4 140 3 141 0	141 4 141.9 140 8 141.2	120 4 119 1 117.7 116 4	121.3 120.0 118.7 117.2	138.8 139.9 140.5 141.5	138.0 138.9 139.5 140.6	113.0 113.0 113.3 114.2	112.4 112.2 112.5 113.5	118 5 117 8 117.9 116.9	117.5 117.6	114.1 114.9 115.2 115.6	114 115 115 116
2002   .          V	122 7 123 2 124.6 124 7	122 5 122 7 123 9 124 0	141 9 142 6 143.8 144 0	142 5 143.0 144 1 144 1	115.7 115.7 115.4 115.5	116.3 116.5 116.3 116.2	143.5 145.0 145.7 145.8	142.7 144.2 144.8 145.0	115.4 115.7 115.7 115.1	114.8 115.0 114.9 114.5	116.9 117.7 116.9 116.9	117.5 116.9	115.6 115.9 116.2 116.7	116 116 116 117
2003 I .	125 6	124 9	144 6	144 8	115.2	115.9	147 8	147.0	115 5	114 9	117.7	116 4	117.2	117
II	127.9	126 9	146 4	146 5	114.5	115.4	150.3	149.3	117 3	116.5	117.5		117.4	118
III	130 5	129 9	149 8	150.2	114.8	115.6	152 0	151.2	118 0	117 4	116.4		117.9	118
IV	130.6	130.1	150 8	151.2	115.5	116.2	152 8	152.2	118 4	117.9	117.0		118.3	118
1004         	131 7 132 8 133 3 134 3	130.8 132.2 132.7 133.5	152.6 154.1 155.8 157.2	152 8 154 5 156 3 157.7	115 9 116 1 116 9 117 1	116.8 116.8 117.8 118.2	154.4 155.7 158.2 162.5	153.5 154.9 157.2 161.0	118.5 118.2 119.6 121.8	117.8 117.6 118.8 120.7	117 3 117 2 118 7 121.0	117.1 118.5	119.4 120.5 120.7 121.5	119 120 121 121
2005 I	135 3	134 5	158 9	159 4	117 5	118 5	164 4	163.2	122 5	121.6	121 5	121-3	122.3	122
II	135 5	135 3	160 4	161 2	118 4	119 2	164 3	163.6	121 2	120.6	121 2	120 9	123.1	123
III	137.3	136 8	162 4	163.1	118 3	119 2	166 0	165.0	121.0	120.2	120 9	120.6	123.9	124

<sup>1</sup> Dutput refers to real gross domestic product in the sector. 2 Hours at work of all persons engaged in the sector, including hours of proprietors and unpaid family workers. Estimates based primarily on establishment data

<sup>3</sup> Wages and salaries of employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.

4 Hourly compensation divided by the consumer price index for all urban consumers for recent quarters. The trend from 1978–2004 is based on the consumer price index research series (CPI-U-RS).

5 Current dollar output divided by the output index.

TABLE B-50.—Changes in productivity and related data, business sector, 1959-2005 [Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Voor or	Output of all	per hour persons	0u	tput <sup>1</sup>	Hour per	s of all sons <sup>2</sup>	Comp per	ensation hour <sup>3</sup>	Real comp per h	pensation our <sup>4</sup>		labor sts		cit price lator <sup>5</sup>
Year or quarter	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector		Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nonfarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector	Busi- ness sector	Nontarm business sector
959	3.8	3.8	8.1	8.6	4.2	4.6	4.1	3.9	3.4		0.3	0.1	0.8	1.3
960 961 962 963 964	4.6 3.9	1.2 3.1 4.5 3.5 3.0	1.9 1.9 6.4 4.6 6.4	1.7 2.0 6.8 4.7 6.7	.2 -1.5 1.8 .7 2.9	.6 -1.1 2.2 1.1 3.7	4.2 3.9 4.4 3.6 3.8	4.3 3.3 4.0 3.4 3.1	2.4 2.8 3.4 2.2 2.4	2.5 2.3 3.0 2.1 1.8	2.4 .4 1 3 4	.2 5	1.1 8 1.0 6 1.1	1.0
965 966 967 968	3.5 4.1 2.2 3.4 .5	3.1 3.6 1.7 3.4	7.0 6.8 1.9 5.0 3.0	7.1 7.1 1.7 5.2 3.0	3.4 2.6 3 1.5 2.5	3.9 3.5 0 1.8 2.9	3.7 6.7 5.7 8.1 7.0	3.3 5.9 5.8 7.8 6.8	2.1 3.8 2.5 3.7 1.4	1.7 3.0 2.7 3.5 1.3	2.6 3.4 4.5 6.5	4.0 4.3	1 6 2.5 2 7 4.0 4.6	2.3 3.2 4.0
970 971 972 973 974	2.0 4.1 3.2 3.0 -1.6	1.5 4.0 3.3 3.1 -1.5	0 3.8 6.5 7.0 -1.4	1 3.8 6.7 7.3 -1.4	-2.0 3 3.1 3.8 .2	-1.6 2 3.2 4.1	7.7 6.3 6.3 8.4 9.6	7.2 6.4 6.5 8.1 9.8	1.9 1.8 3.0 2.1 -1.3	1.4 1.9 3.2 1.8 -1.2	5.6 2.1 3.0 5.2 11.4	2.3 3.1 4.9	4.4 4.2 3.6 5.2 9.6	4.5 4.3 3.2 3.6
975 976 977 978	3.5 3.1 1.7 1.1 0	2.7 3.3 1.6 1.3 3	-1.0 6.6 5.6 6.3 3.4	-1.7 7.0 5.6 6.6 3.2	-4.3 3.3 3.8 5.1 3.4	-4.3 3.6 3.9 5.2 3.6	10.2 8.6 8.0 8.7 9.7	10.1 8.4 8.1 8.9 9.6	1.0 2.7 1.4 1.7	9 2.5 1.5 1.8 .2	6.5 5.3 6.2 7.5 9.8	5.0 6.4 7.5	9.8 5.3 6.0 7.1 8.5	5.6 6.3 6.3
980 981 982 983	2 2.1 8 3.6 2.7	2 1.4 -1.0 4.5 2.0	-1.1 2.8 -3.0 5.4 8.7	-1.0 2.1 -3.2 6.5 8.2	9 .7 -2.3 1.8 5.8	8 .7 -2.2 1.9 6.1	10.8 9.6 7.2 4.1 4.4	10.8 9.8 7.1 4.2 4.2	2 .2 1.2 0 .4	2 .4 1.1 .0 .2	11.0 7.4 8.0 .6 1.7	8.3 8.2	8.9 9.2 5.7 3.4 2.9	9.6 6.2 3.1
985 986 987 988 989	2.3 3.0 .6 1.5 1.0	1.5 3.1 .5 1.7	4.6 3.7 3.5 4.3 3.7	4.2 3.9 3.6 4.6 3.5	2.3 .7 2.9 2.7 2.7	2.6 .8 3.0 2.9 2.7	4.8 5.2 3.7 5.1 2.7	4.6 5.2 3.7 4.9 2.6	1.4 3.3 3 1.4 -1.6	1.2 3.3 .3 1.2 -1.6	2.5 2.1 3.1 3.5 1.7	2.0 3.2	2.4 1.6 2.2 3.1 3.7	1.7 2.2 3.0
990 991 992 993	2.0 1.5 4.3 4 1.0	1.9 1.7 4.1 .4 1.2	1.5 8 4.0 3.1 5.0	1.5 8 3.9 3.3 4.8	5 -2.3 2 2.7 3.9	4 -2.4 2 2.9 3.5	6.3 4.9 5.2 2.2 1.5	6.1 5.1 5.2 2.0 1.7	1.2 1.2 2.6 3 6	1.1 1.4 2.7 5 4	4.1 3.3 .9 1.8	1.1 1.6	3.6 3.2 1.8 2.1 1.8	3 4 1.9 2 1
995 996 997 998	3.0 1.9 2.8 3.0	2.7 1.6 2.8 2.8	2.9 4.6 5.3 4.8 5.1	3.2 4.5 5.2 5.0 5.2	2.7 1.6 3.3 2.0 2.1	2.7 1.8 3.5 2.1 2.3	2.1 3.5 3.2 6.1 4.8	2.1 3.4 3.1 6.0 4.6	3 .8 1.1 4.6 2.7	3 .7 .9 4.5 2.5	1.9 .5 1.3 3.2 1.8	1.4 3.1	1 8 1.6 1.5 6	1.4
000 001 002 003	2.8 2.5 4.0 3.9 3.4	2.7 2.5 4.0 3.8 3.4	3.9 .3 1.5 3.4 4.8	3.8 .4 1.5 3.3 4.8	1.1 -2.2 -2.4 5 1.3	1.1 -2.0 -2.5 5 1.4	7.0 4.2 3.4 3.9 4.6	7.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.5	3.5 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.9	3.6 1.1 1.9 1.6 1.8	4.0 1.6 5 .0 1.2	1 4 5	1.8 2.0 1.0 1.4 2.4	1.9 1.1 1.3
001:    [ 	5 5.5 1.4 6.6	4 5.6 1.5 6.5	-1.1 .8 -3.1 1.8	-1.1 1.2 -2.9 1.2	6 -4.4 -4.4 -4.5	7 -4.2 -4.3 -5.0	6.9 3.0 2.0 2.8	6.8 2.5 1.8 3.2	3.0 2 1.1 3.4	2.8 6 1.0 3.8	7.4 -2.4 .6 -3.6	.4	2.7 3.0 1.0 1.3	.7
002:1 II III IV	5.3 1.8 4.8 .1	6.5 .8 4.1 .2	2.6 2.1 3.6 .5	3.5 1.4 3.1 .1	-2.5 .3 -1.1	-2.8 .6 9 0	5.6 4.4 2.0 .1	6.1 4.2 1.8 .4	4.1 1.1 1 -1.9	4.5 .9 3 -1.6	.3 2.6 -2.6 .0	4 3.4 -2,2 .2	1.0 1.0 1.7	9
003: I II III	2.8 7.6 8.4 .3	3.1 6.6 9.6 .8	1.7 4.9 9.9 2.6	2.0 4.7 10.4 2.8	-1 1 -2.6 1.3 2.3	-1.1 -1.8 .8 2.0	5.5 7.0 4.5 2.3	5.8 6.2 5.1 2.7	1.3 6.5 2.3 1.4	1.5 5.8 2.9 1.8	2.6 6 -3.6 2.1	2.6 3 -4 1 2.0	1.8 6 1.6 1.6	1.9 _4 1.0 8
004: I II III	3.4 3.4 1.4 3.1	2.1 4.5 1.3 2.5	4.9 4.0 4.4 3.6	4.2 4.6 4.6 3.9	1.5 .6 3.0 .5	2.0 .1 3.3 1.4	4.2 3.3 6.5 11.3	3.5 3.7 6.1 10.2	.3 -1.0 4.8 7.5	5 7 4.4 6.4	.8 1 5.0 7.9	1.3 8 4.8 7.6	3.7 3.8 .7 2.4	3 6 3.2 1.5 2.6
005:1 11 111	2.9 .8 5.4	3.2 2.1 4.7	4.4 4.0 5.0	4.3 4.4 4.8	1.4 3.1 4	1.1 2.2 .1	4.7 1 4.2	5.5 .9 3.7	2.3 -4 0 8	3.1 -3.1 -1.4	1.7 9 -1.1	2.2 -1 2 -1.0	2.7 2.6 2.8	3.0 2.7 3.1

<sup>1</sup> Output refers to real gross domestic product in the sector.
2 Hours at work of all persons engaged in the sector. See footnote 2, Table B-49.
3 Mages and salaries of employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans. Also includes an estimate of wages, salaries, and supplemental payments for the self-employed.
4 Hourly compensation divided by a consumer price index. See footnote 4, Table B-49.
5 Current dollar output divided by the output index.

1 Current plans are besed to expend data and may differ slightly from necrept changes based on indexes in Table B-49.

Note.—Percent changes are based on original data and may differ slightly from percent changes based on indexes in Table B-49. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

## PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

TABLE B-51.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1959-2005 [2002=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	Total		Manufa			Mining	Herber -
Year or month	industrial production <sup>1</sup>	Total 1	Durable	Nondurable	Other (non-NAICS) <sup>1</sup>	Mining	Utilities
)59	25 5						
60 61	26 0 26 2 28 4 30 1	23.7 23.8 25.9 27.4 29.3 32.5 35.4 36.1					
62	28 4	25.9					
53 54	32.1 35.3	29 3					
55 66	35 3 38 4	32 5 35 4					
57	38 4 39 2 41 4 43.3	38.1					
59	43.3	39 8					
70 71	41 9 42 5 46.6 50.4 50.2	38.0 38.6				106.8	
72	46.6 50.4	38.6 42.7 46.5 46.4	31.6 35.5 35.3	63.8	65.6 67.6	100.8	
74 . 75	50.2 45.7	46.4 41.5 45.2	35.3 30.6 33.4	64 1 59 5	68.0 64.8 66.8 73.2 75.7	105.8 103.3	
76 77	45.7 49.3 53.1	45.2 49.1	33.4 36.7	64 9 69 4	66.8 73.2	104.0 106.4	
78 79	56.0 57.7	52.1 53.7	39.6 41.6	61 0 63 8 64 1 59 5 64 9 69 4 71 8 72 2	75.7 77.3	105.4 105.8 103.3 104.0 106.4 109.8 113.1	
80 .		51.7	39.7	70.0	70 0	1151	
81 82	56.2 56.9 54.0	52 3 49.5	40.2 36.7	70.6 69.6 72.8 76.2 76.8 78.9 83.1 85.9	81.8 82.8 85.0	113.1 118.1 112.3 106.4 113.3 111.1	
83	55 4	49.5 51.7 56.9	38.5 44.0	72.8 76.2	85.0 88.9	106.4 113.3	
85 86	61 2	56.9 57.9 59 1	45.0 45.8	76 6	88.9 92.4 94.2 99.7	111.1	
87	64.9	62 4 65 6	48.4 51.8	83 1	99.7 99.3	103.0 103.9 106.5	
88 89	61 2 61 8 64.9 68.2 68.8	66 1	51.8 52.4	86.4	97.8 97.8	105.3	
90 . 91	69 4 68 3	66 6 65 3	52 5 50 9	87 8 87 <b>1</b>	96.7 92.8	106.9 104.5 102.2 102.2 104.6 104.4 106.2 108.0 106.4 101.2	
92	68 3 70.3 72.6 76 5	65.3 67.7 70.1	50.9 53.5 56.5	87.4 89.7 91.0	92.8 91.0 91.8	102 2	
94	76.5	74 3 78 3	61.5 66.8	94 1	90.9	104.6	
95 96	80.2 83.6	81 8	72.4	96.1	90.9 90.9 90 2 97.7	106.2	
97 . 98 .	89 7 94 9	88 8 94 7	72 4 81 2 89.8	94 1 95.8 96 1 99 6 101.1	104.1	106.4	
99 00	99.3 103.5	99.7 104.3	97.6 105.3	101 8 102.4	107,4 109.5	101.2	
01	99 9 100 0 100 6	99 9 100.0 100.5	100.2 100.0	99.0 100 0	103.1 100.0	104.5 100.0	1
02	100 6	100.5	1023	98 9	97.0	99.8	1
04 05 <i>r</i>	104 7 108 1	105.4 109.5	109 8 116.9	98 9 101.0 101.8	98.8 101.6	99.8 99.5 97.2	i 1
04 Jan Feb	102.7	102 6 103.6 103 7	106 2 107 4	99.3 99.8 99.9	95.5	101.0 99.8	1 1
Mar	103.5 103.2	103.7 104.6	107.6 108.4	99.9	97.5	100.0	i
Apr May	104.0 105.0 104.4	104 6 105 5 104 9	109.2 109.0	100.8 101.8 100.8	97.6 97.5 98.6 99.2 98.2	99.7 99.8	1
June July .	104 4	105.7	110.2	100 8	99.0	99.4 100.3	
Aug Sept	105 0 105 3 105 1 105 8 106 0 106 7	106.4	111.0 110.9	101 3 101 6 101 1 101.8 101 8 101.9	101.1 99.3 99.0	99.3 97.2	1 1 1 1
Oct Nov	105 8	106.9 106.9 107.5	112 1 112 1	101.8	99.0 99.1	97.9 99.9	i
Dec	106.7	107.5	112.9	101.9	101.1	100.4	1
05.Jan . Feb	106 9 107 4	108.1 108.6 108.2 108.3	113 7 114 8	102.1 102.2 101.9 101.9	102.5 101.5 102.4 102.5 103.2 102.0	99.9 100.9	1
Mar Apr	107 4 107 3 107 2	108 2	114 2 114.3	101.9	102.4	100.4 100.5	1 1 1 1
May June	107.4 108.3	108 7 109 0	115.0 115.5	101.9 102.1	103.2	99.8 100.8	i
July	100 2				101.0		1
Aug Sept	108 6	109 1 109 5 108.9	115.9 117.3 11 <b>7</b> 5	102.1 101.5 100.1	100.9 100.4	99.8 99.2 90.3	1 1 1
Oct P Nov P	108.5 108.6 107.2 108.2 109.1 109.8	110.9 111.4 111.6	120 8 120 7	100.7 102.0	101.5 100.2	88.3 92.5	1 1 1
Dec /	109 8	111.6	120 6	102.6	100.2	94.8	i

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Total industry and total manufacturing series include manufacturing as defined in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) plus those industries—logging, and newspaper, periodical, book and directory-publishing—that have traditionally been considered to be manufacturing and included in the industrial sector

Source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Note.—Data based on the North American Industry Classification System; see footnote 1

TABLE B-52.—Industrial production indexes, market groupings, 1959-2005 [2002=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

	Total				Final pr	oducts				Nonindi	istrial su	pplies	N	aterials	
Year or	indus-			Consume	r goods		E	quipmen	t						_
month	pro- duc- tion	Total	Total	Auto- motive prod- ucts	Other dura- ble goods	Non- durable goods	Total <sup>1</sup>	Busi- ness	De- fense and space	Total	Con- struc- tion	Busi- ness	Total	Non- en- ergy	Ener- gy
1959	25.5	25.0	30.7	19.0	19.2	37.0	17.9	13.0	49.1	26 2	38.1	21.2	25.0		51 1
1960 1961	26.0 26.2 28.4 30.1 32.1 35.3 38.4 39.2 41.4 43.3	25.9 26.1 28.3 29.9 31.6 34.7 38.0 39.5 41.4 42.7	31.8 32.5 34.7 36.6 38.7 41.7 43.8 44.9 47.6 49.4	21.7 19.8 24.0 26.3 27.6 33.9 33.8 29.7 35.4 35.6	19.4 20.0 21.7 23.4 25.6 29.0 31.9 32.3 34.6 36.9	38.2 39.4 41.3 43.2 45.3 47.2 49.5 52.0 54.1 55.9	18.4 18.1 20.2 21.4 22.6 25.6 29.8 31.7 32.6 33.4	13.4 13.0 14.1 14.8 16.6 19.0 22.0 22.4 23.4 24.9	50.5 51.3 59.4 64.1 62.0 68.6 80.7 92.0 92.2 87.8	26.4 26.9 28.5 30.1 32.1 34.1 36.2 37.7 39.9 42.1	37.2 37.5 39.8 41.7 44.2 46.9 50.2 52.8 55.1	22.0 22.6 24.0 25.6 27.4 29.2 31.5 33.1 35.2 37.4	25.4 25.4 27.7 29.5 31.8 35.5 38.7 38.3 40.8 43.2	31.5 33.8 35.9	51 8 52 2 54 0 57.2 59.5 62 2 66.1 68.4 71.6 75 2
1970	41 9 42.5 46.6 50.4 50.2 45.7 49.3 53.1 56.0 57.7	41.2 41.6 45.1 48.6 48.5 45.6 48.8 52.7 55.9 57.8	48.8 51.6 55.8 58.3 56.6 54.4 58.8 62.5 64.5 63.5	29.9 38.1 41.1 44.7 38.6 37.1 42.3 47.9 47.6 42.9	35.8 37.9 43.4 46.3 43.6 38.1 42.8 47.9 50.1 50.3	56.9 58.5 62.2 64.2 63.1 67.0 69.5 71.9 71.5	31.1 29.1 31.8 36.2 38.0 34.4 36.1 40.3 44.8 50.1	24.0 22.9 26.0 30.0 31.7 28.0 29.7 34.3 38.8 43.8	74.3 66.8 65.0 71.5 73.9 74.9 72.8 65.1 65.6 70.3	41 4 42.7 47 7 51 0 50.5 45.3 48 4 52.5 55.4 57.2	53.1 54.8 62.2 67.5 65.9 55.8 60.2 65.6 69.3 71.0	37.5 38.7 42.6 45.2 45.1 41.6 44.2 47.9 50.5 52.3	41.7 42.4 46.6 50.8 50.7 45.2 49.2 52.6 55.2 56.8	33 8 34 4 38.5 42 7 42 6 36.6 40.8 44 2 47 1 48 4	78.9 79.6 82.6 84.7 84.3 83.5 85.4 88.1 91.6
1980	56.2 56.9 54.0 55.4 60.4 61.2 61.8 64.9 68.2 68.8	57.5 58.9 57.6 58.5 63.4 65.1 66.1 69.0 72.5 73.2	61.1 61.5 61.3 63.6 66.5 67.1 69.5 72.3 75.1 75.4	33.0 34.1 33.1 38.4 43.0 43.0 46.2 49.2 51.9 53.9	46.7 47.0 43.6 47.1 52.7 52.7 55.8 58.7 61.7 62.4	71.6 71.9 73.1 74.0 75.5 76.4 78.2 81.0 83.7 83.4	52.3 54.7 52.1 51.4 58.9 61.9 61.0 63.9 68.6 70.0	44.5 45.8 41.9 41.8 48.2 50.2 49.3 52.4 57.2 59.0	83.9 91 2 109 1 109.7 124 6 139.6 148 2 151 1 152.0 152.0	54.8 55.4 53.4 56.3 61.2 62.8 64.9 68.8 71.1 71.8	65 7 64 5 58.6 62.6 68 2 69 9 72 3 76 7 78.4 78.0	51.0 52.3 51.7 54.1 58.8 60.4 62.4 66.1 68.6 69.6	54 6 54 9 50 7 52.1 57.0 57.0 57 0 60.0 63.3 63.8	45 5 45 7 41 2 44 0 49 1 49 1 50.1 53 4 56.8 57.2	92 3 93 2 89 2 86 4 91 8 91.3 87 7 89.8 92 9
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	69 4 68.3 70.3 72.6 76.5 80.2 83.6 89.7 94.9 99.3	73.9 72.9 74.6 77.0 80.3 83.6 86.7 92.2 97.4 100.1	75.8 75.7 77.9 80.6 84.4 86.9 88.7 91.9 95.1 97.1	50.5 47.2 55.2 61.0 68.3 70.4 72.6 78.0 83.2 91.2	62.3 60.5 63.2 68.8 75.4 79.7 83.6 88.8 94.8 100.1	84.8 86.0 86.7 87.9 90.1 92.2 93.4 95.6 97.7 97.7	71.2 68.8 69.5 71.3 74.0 78.6 84.1 94.3 103.7 107.8	61.0 59.8 62.1 64.5 68.2 73.8 80.5 92.3 102.8 108.6	145.8 135.2 125.5 118.6 111.5 108.2 104.5 102.2 105.9 103.1	72.9 71.1 73.2 75.7 79.4 82.4 85.6 91.2 96.4 100.2	77 3 73.0 76 0 79.4 85.2 87.0 90.9 95.3 100 2 102.7	71 3 70.4 72 1 74 4 77 3 80.7 83.6 89.7 95 0 99 3	64 2 63.3 65 4 67.6 72.1 76.3 80 0 86 7 92.0 98 0	57 3 56.1 58 9 61 6 66.7 71 4 75.6 83.9 90 3 97 8	95.7 95.8 94.9 95.1 96.7 98.1 99.5 99.5 99.7
2000	103.5 99.9 100.0 100.6 104.7 108.1	103.1 100.7 100.0 101.0 105.1 109.6	99.0 97.8 100.0 101.0 103.1 105.4	93.4 90.5 100.0 107.1 109.3 112.4	103 5 97.9 100.0 100.5 104 4 105.7	99.2 99.3 100.0 99.8 101.6 103.8	113 3 107.9 100.0 100.9 110.0 120.6	116.6 108.4 100.0 100.0 109.4 119.4	92 2 100.1 100.0 105.0 113.1 125.6	104.3 99.9 100.0 100.3 104.1 107.8	105 0 100 2 100 0 99 1 104 6 108 5	104 0 99 8 100.0 100.7 103.9 107 5	103.7 99.0 100.0 100.4 104.6 106.6	104 5 98 6 100.0 100.6 106.5 110 2	101.1 100.0 100.0 99.6 99.6 97.8
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	102.7 103.5 103.2 104.0 105.0 104.4	103 1 104.1 103.6 104.5 105.3 104.3	102.7 103.4 102.5 103.2 103.8 102.4	111 6 111 2 110.4 110.7 108.8 105.8	104.3 104.3 103.7 104.7 105.2 104.4	100.5 101.5 100.6 101.3 102.5 101.3	104.2 105.9 106.4 107.9 108.9 109.4	103.7 105.3 105.7 107.2 108.3 108.8	106.4 108.6 109.5 110.9 112.1 112.0	101.9 102.7 102.3 103.3 104.4 104.1	102.4 102.3 102.7 103.5 104.9 104.6	101 7 102 8 102 2 103 2 104 1 103 8	102 5 103.2 103.1 103 8 104 9 104 5	103.2 104.3 104.6 105.2 106.3 106.3	100.6 100.2 99.3 99.8 101.0 99.8
July Aug Sept Dct Nov Dec	105.0 105.3 105.1 105.8 106.0 106.7	105.0 105.6 105.2 106.3 106.5 107.2	102.3 103.2 102.6 103.6 103.7 104-1	105.7 109.5 107.0 110.7 109.9 110.1	104.4 104.6 103.8 104.5 104.4 104.1	101.2 101.7 101.4 101.9 102.2 102.9	111.8 111.5 112.1 113.4 113.8 115.0	111.3 110.9 111.3 112.6 112.9 114.1	114.2 114.6 116.1 116.7 117.6 119.0	104 7 104 9 104 4 105 1 105.2 106.2	105 7 105 7 104 9 106 1 105 7 106 1	104 3 104 5 104 2 104 7 105 0 106.2	105 1 105 2 105.1 105 6 105 9 106.5	107.2 107.8 107.7 108.3 108.3 108.8	99 7 98 4 98 2 98 5 99 3 100 4
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	106.9 107.4 107.3 107.2 107.4 108.3	107.3 108.2 108.2 108.0 108.5 109.6	103.9 104.7 104.6 104.1 104.6 105.8	108.2 113.9 110.3 107.8 109.3 111.7	104 3 105.0 104 7 103.9 104 6 104 9	102.9 102.8 103.4 103.3 103.5 104.7	116 1 117.0 117 4 118.1 118.8 119 5	115.2 115.9 116.3 116.8 117.9 118.4	119 4 121 6 122 5 124 5 124 1 124 9	106 5 106 2 106.4 106.9 106.9 107 4	106.0 106.4 106.2 107.3 107.5 106.9	106 7 106 1 106 5 106 7 106 7 107 6	106.7 107.0 106.8 106.5 106.5 107.3	109 6 109 7 109 4 109.2 109.3 109 5	99 4 99 7 99.8 99 2 99 2 101 3
July Aug Sept Oct " Nov P Dec P	108.3 108.6 107.2 108.2 109.1 109.8	109.7 110.0 109 4 111 3 111 1 111 4	105.2 105.6 106.4 106.0 105.3 105.5	109.5 114.4 117.8 117.3 111.1 108.0	104 4 105 2 107 0 108 5 108 2 107 8	104.4 103.9 103.9 103.3 103.6 104.5	121.2 121.4 117.0 124.9 126.3 126.8	120 0 120.1 115 1 123.5 125 1 125.7	126 8 127.4 124 6 128.1 128 4 130.6	107 4 108.0 108 4 109 3 109 9 110 0	107 5 108 2 109 8 112 1 112 7 111 6	107 4 107 9 107 8 108 1 108 8 109 3	107.2 107.4 104.5 104.8 106.7 108.0	109 8 110 2 109.4 110 8 112.0 112 7	100.3 100.0 92.8 90.8 94.1 96.6

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 1}$  includes other items, not shown separately

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Note.—See footnote 1 and Note, Table B-51

TABLE B-53.—Industrial production indexes, selected manufacturing industries, 1967–2005 [2002=100; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			D	urable m	anufactu	ring				None	lurable m	nanufactur	ng	
Year or	Prim me:		Fabri- cated	Ma-	elec'	ter and tronic ducts	Transp	ortation pment			Print-		Plas- tics and	
month	Total	Iron and steel prod- ucts	metal prod- ucts	chin- ery	Total	Se- lected high- tech- nology	Total	Motor vehicles and parts	Ap- parel	Paper	and sup- port	Chem- ical	rub- ber prod- ucts	Food
1967 1968 1969						0.3 3 .3								
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	120.9 140.6 144.2 111.8 118.7 119.8 127.4 130.4	128 7 154 3 165 0 122 4 127 0 124 0 133 2 137 9	69 3 76 6 75.4 65.1 69 8 75 7 79 4 82 9	68 4 79 0 82 9 72 3 75 5 82 4 88 8 93 8	1 5 1 7 1 9 1 7 2 0 2.5 3.1 3 8	3 .3 .4 .5 .5 .6 8 1.0 1.3	53.2 60.8 56.0 50.8 56.8 61.7 65.7 66.5	44 2 50 6 43 4 37 8 48 3 55 0 57 3 52 5	159 5 164 4 153 0 149.7 158.1 168 1 173 0 163 9	66 1 71 4 74 5 64 6 71 1 74.2 77.6 78.7	51 5 54 1 52.5 49.0 52 6 57 0 60.3 62 1	48.3 52.9 55.0 48.3 54.1 58.8 61.7 63.1	35.2 39.6 38.6 33.0 36.5 42.9 44.4 43.8	58.5 58.7 59.3 58.1 62.8 64.0 65.9 65.3
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	114 4 114 6 80 9 82.8 90.8 83.9 81 9 88.2 98 8 96 6	116 9 121.2 74 5 75 1 82.7 76 8 75 0 85.3 99 3 95 8	78.2 77.7 69.6 70.2 76.4 77.5 77.0 78.4 82.4 81.7	89 3 88 4 74 0 66.9 77 9 78 1 76.9 78 3 86 2 89 3	4 6 5 3 6 0 6.9 8 6 9 2 9 6 10.8 11 9 12 2	1.5 1.8 2.1 2.5 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.3	59.0 56.9 52.2 57.6 65.2 68.7 70.3 72.8 77.3 78.8	38 6 37 6 33 9 43 3 52 0 54 0 53 9 55 9 59 7 59 1	166 4 165.4 167 6 172 5 175 0 168 2 170 1 171.2 168 1 159 9	78 6 79.6 78 4 83 4 87.6 85 9 89 4 92 4 96 1 97.1	62 6 64 2 69 0 74.2 80 8 84 0 88.2 94 8 97 8 98.2	59.6 60.5 56.7 60.6 64.1 63.6 66.5 71.8 75.8 77.3	39.0 41.3 40.5 44.1 50.9 52.9 55.1 61.0 63.7 65.9	66.5 67.4 70.0 70.8 72.1 74.8 75.9 77.5 79.5 79.7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	95 4 89.5 91 7 96 1 103.5 104.5 107 0 111 6 113.5 113 2	94 7 86.5 90 6 96 0 103 6 105 2 107.7 111 0 110 8 111 6	80.7 77 0 79 4 82.4 89 6 95 1 98 6 103 0 106 3 107 1	87 1 81 8 81 6 87 6 96 0 102 7 106 2 112 2 115.0 112 7	13.2 13.7 15.5 17.1 20.3 26.4 33.6 45.2 58.3 77.2	6.0 6.4 7.7 9.1 11.8 16.6 23.3 34.6 48.4 70.5	76.4 73.3 76.0 78.2 81.8 81.9 83.4 91.0 99.0 104.4	55.5 53.1 60.6 76.7 79.0 79.6 85.8 90.2	156 6 157 5 160 6 164 5 167 8 168 0 163 4 161 3 152 6 146.2	97.0 97.3 99.6 100.8 105.1 106.7 103.3 105.5 106.4 107.2	101.9 98.7 104.1 104.4 105.5 107.1 107.9 110.0 111.2 112.3	79.1 78.8 80.0 81.0 83.0 84.4 86.1 91.2 92.7 94.6	67.7 67.0 72.1 77.2 83.6 85.7 38.6 94.0 97.4 102.5	82.1 83.6 85.2 87.5 88.0 90.2 88.4 90.8 94.8 95.8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	109 5 99 1 100 0 97 6 103 4 100 5	110.5 99.9 100.0 99.0 108.4 101.8	111 3 103 2 100.0 98 6 103 2 106.8	118 4 104 8 100 0 99 0 110 7 115 6	102 5 103.6 100.0 112 6 130 7 156 6	100.7 102.6 100.0 117.6 141.2 171.5	99.5 95.7 100.0 101.8 105.6 111.2	99 5 90.6 100 0 104 0 108 0 111 9	139.1 119.1 100.0 91.7 87.6 84.4	105.0 99.0 100.0 95.9 98.0 97.8	113 0 106 0 100.0 95.8 96.0 97.7	96.0 94.3 100.0 99.7 102.8 102.6	103.6 97.6 100.0 99.4 102.5 104.8	97.5 97.5 100.0 99.6 100.8 103.3
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	98 5 101 2 101 6 101 6 103 2 103.4	102.6 105.4 106.2 104.0 106.5 106.2	100 7 101 2 100 9 102 3 103 4 103 5	104 1 107 4 108 0 109 3 110 6 111 0	121 3 123 6 125 0 125 3 128 2 129 8	130.5 133.5 135.0 135.5 138.3 140.4	105.3 106.0 105.4 105.8 104.8 103.2	109 0 109.3 108 6 108 9 107 2 104 9	88 7 89 1 89 7 90 1 89.3 88 3	95.5 95.9 95.7 97.5 98.4 98.5	95.2 95.4 94.9 95.3 95.9 96.2	100.5 100.8 101.5 102.5 102.9 102.3	100.1 100.9 101.0 102.3 103.6 103.5	99.4 99.9 99.9 100.7 101.7 100.4
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	106.4 104.7 105.2 105.3 105.8 104.4	112 2 110.3 112 0 112 4 112.9 110 2	104 0 104 3 103.8 104 8 104 6 104 6	113 5 111 8 112 8 113 3 113 1 113 1	131 9 134 4 136 1 136 4 136 9 139 7	142 4 145 7 147.6 147.0 147.8 151.0	103 5 106 0 104 7 107 3 107 4 108.1	104 5 108 4 106 5 109 8 109 2 110 0	85 8 84 9 86.3 85.9 86.8 86.2	99.5 98.6 98.7 99.2 99.1 99.0	96.7 96.6 95.6 96.2 96.8 97.2	103.1 103.8 103.4 104.4 104.1 104.5	103.5 103.0 102.3 103.6 102.8 103.3	101.3 101.5 101.6 101.2 101.2 101.2
2005-Jan . Feb . Mar Apr May June	103 8 101.9 102.3 99.5 98 9 95 5	108 1 105.5 104 5 99 0 96 4 92 4	105 4 105 3 105 0 105 5 105 7 105 6	114 1 114 0 114 3 114 3 114 5 115.0	144 3 146 8 147 4 149 5 152.2 153 6	157.8 160.4 160.4 163.1 166.2 167.9	107.2 111.1 109.1 108.6 109.4 111.0	108 6 113 4 109 8 107 9 108 8 111 4	85.3 85.1 84.3 84.6 82.3 81.9	99 9 99.6 99 8 98 2 96 8 97 8	97.9 97.0 96.4 96.5 97.0 96.5	103.8 104.6 103.8 104.1 103.9 103.9	104.0 103.7 103.5 103.8 103.1 102.9	102.3 102.7 102.5 102.0 103.2 103.0
July Aug Sept Oct# Nov# Dec/	95.3 98.2 101.8 102.1 102.7 103.8	90 5 98 9 103 7 104 4 108 1 110 2	106 1 106 6 106 8 109 1 109 7 109 3	116 3 114 1 116 1 119 2 119 6 120 2	156 5 160 1 162 1 165 1 169 4 173 4	171 6 176 7 179.6 181.3 185.4 190 4	109 8 112.7 108 8 115 3 112 2 110 6	109 2 113 1 116.3 116 1 110 5 107 4	83 7 84.0 84 5 83 8 85 2 87 0	96 6 96 2 96.5 98 8 97 6 96.3	97.9 97.2 97.9 98.3 98.8 98.2	103.7 102.7 97.5 99.1 101.1 102.2	103.2 104.1 106.5 106.2 107.8 108.2	103.4 102.7 103.5 103.5 104.7 106.2

 $<sup>^{\</sup>dagger}$  Computers and office equipment, communications equipment, and semiconductors and related electronic components.

Note —See footnote 1 and Note, Table B-51

Source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

TABLE B-54.—Capacity utilization rates, 1959-2005

[Percent 1; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			Manufa	cturing				Sta	age-of-proces	S
Year or month	Total industry <sup>2</sup>	Total <sup>2</sup>	Ourable goods	Non- durable goods	Other (non- NAICS) <sup>2</sup>	Mining	Utilities	Crude	Primary and semi- finished	Finished
1959		81.6			×				83.0	81 1
1960		80 1 77.3 81.4 83.5 85.6 89.5							79.8 77 9 81.5 83.8 87.8 91.0	80.5 77.2 81.6 83.4 84.6 88.8
1966 1967 1968 1969	87.0 87.3 87.4	91.1 87.2 87.1 86.6	87.5 87.3 86.9	86.3 86.5 86.2		81.2 83.6 86.8	94 5 95.1 96.8	81 1 83.4 85.7	91.4 85.0 86.8 88.1	91 1 88.2 87.0 85 4
1970	81.2 79.6 84.6 88.4 85.2 75.6 79.6 83.1 84.8 85.0	79.4 77.9 83.3 87.6 84.4 73.5 78.1 82.2 84.3 84.2	77.5 75.1 81.8 88.5 84.7 71.6 76.2 80.9 83.9 84.5	82.2 81.9 85.3 86.6 84.2 76.0 80.9 84.1 84.9 83.6	85.7 84.7 82.7 77.2 77.4 83.4 85.1 85.3	89.3 88.0 90.9 92.0 91.1 89.2 89.7 89.7 89.8 91.1	96.3 94.7 95.2 94.3 87.4 84.5 85.2 85.3 84.2 85.5	85 2 84.4 88 6 90.6 91 3 83.9 87 1 89.0 88.3 89.3	81.5 81.6 88.1 92.2 87.4 75.1 80.0 84.3 85.9 85.8	77.9 75.3 79.4 83.0 80.2 73.5 76.4 79.5 82.1 82.0
1980	80.7 79.7 73.7 74.7 80.4 79.4 78.6 81.2 84.2 83.6	78.7 77.1 71.0 73.4 79.4 78.3 78.3 81.0 84.0	77.6 75.3 66.6 68.4 76.7 75.8 75.3 77.6 82.0 81.4	79.4 78.8 76.7 79.8 82.4 80.8 81.8 84.8 86.3 85.2	87.3 87.7 86.8 87.4 89.6 90.5 88.8 90.7 88.5	91.5 91.4 83.7 78.5 84.7 83.3 76.5 79.6 83.6 84.9	85.1 84.3 80.4 79.7 82.9 83.1 82.3 83.9 86.1 86.6	89 1 89.5 82.0 78 7 84 9 83.1 78.4 82.7 86.5 87.2	78.6 77 1 70 4 74.2 81 1 79.9 79 9 83.0 86.0 84 9	79 6 78.0 73 6 73.4 77.6 77 1 77.1 78.5 81.3
1990	82.4 79.6 80.4 81.4 83.6 83.9 83.0 83.9 82.7 81.9	81.6 78.3 79.6 80.4 82.8 83.0 81.8 83.0 81.7	79.1 75.0 77.1 78.8 82.1 82.4 81.4 82.5 80.9	84.4 82.3 82.5 82.2 83.8 83.9 82.4 83.3 82.1 80.5	83.9 81.6 80.8 82.5 82.2 82.1 80.9 85.1 86.8	86.9 84.9 84.4 85.8 87.6 87.9 90.3 91.3 89.1	86.0 86.8 85.2 87.7 88.8 89.9 90.4 89.1 91.1 92.4	88.2 85.3 85.2 85.3 87.4 88.5 88.2 89.7 87.0 86.6	82.6 79.7 81.3 83.6 86.7 85.6 85.8 83.9	80.3 77.9 78 1 78 0 79 1 79 4 78.7 80.2 80.4 78.5
2000	81.8 76.3 75.1 75.7 78.6 80.0	80.3 74.1 73.3 73.7 77.1 78.8	80.3 71.7 70.0 70.7 75.0 77.4	79.4 76.2 76.9 76.7 79.1 79.9	87.5 82.7 81.9 82.1 84.4 86.1	90.9 90.9 86.7 88.0 88.1 86.8	92.2 88.7 87.5 86.2 84.7 85.9	88.4 85.6 84.0 84.9 86.8 85.5	84.4 77.5 77.1 77.4 80.6 81.7	77.3 72.8 71.2 71.7 74.3 76.9
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	77.2 77.8 77.6 78.1 78.8 78.4	75.3 76.0 76.1 76.7 77.3 76.9	73.0 73.8 73.9 74.4 74.9 74.7	77.5 78.0 78.1 78.8 79.7 78.9	81.7 83.6 83.5 84.4 84.9 84.0	89.2 88.2 88.3 88.1 88.2 87.9	86.7 87.4 83.6 84.1 85.9 85.3	85.9 85.6 86.1 86.5 86.9 86.9	79 3 80.0 79 5 80.0 81 0 80.8	72.9 73.5 73.4 74.1 74.5 73.6
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	78.8 79.0 78.7 79.2 79.3 79.7	77.4 77.9 77.5 78.1 78.0 78.3	75.4 75.9 75.6 76.3 76.1 76.4	79.4 79.6 79.2 79.8 79.8 80.0	84.6 86.3 84.7 84.3 84.4 86.0	88.8 88.0 86.2 86.9 88.7 89.3	83.7 82.1 84.2 83.8 83.9 85.6	87.7 87.1 86.0 86.6 88.2 88.5	80 9 81 0 81.0 81.2 81.0 81.7	74.2 74 7 74 3 75.2 75.2 75 5
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	79.8 80.0 79.9 79.7 79.8 80.3	78.6 78.9 78.5 78.4 78.6 78.7	76.8 77.3 76.7 76.5 76.7 76.8	80.2 80.2 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.2	87.2 86.2 87.0 87.0 87.6 86.6	88.9 89.9 89.5 89.7 89.1 90.0	83.7 82.7 85.2 83.8 83.7 88.0	88.2 88.8 88.5 88.2 87.6 88.4	81.7 81.4 81.4 81.2 81.0 81.7	75.6 76.4 76.1 76.0 76.5 76.8
July Aug Sept Oct P Nav P Dec P	80.2 80.3 79 l 79.8 80.3 80.7	78.6 78.8 78.2 79.5 79.6 79.6	76.8 77.4 77.2 79.1 78.8 78.4	80.2 79.7 78.7 79.2 80.2 80.6	85.7 85.6 85.1 86.1 84.9 84.7	89.1 88.6 80.7 78.9 82.6 84.7	88.0 88.2 88.0 85.4 85.8 88.1	87 5 86.8 78.2 78.0 81.9 84 1	81.6 81.8 81.9 82.0 82.3 82.4	76 8 77 1 76.6 78 2 78.0 78 1

Output as percent of capacity.
2 See footnote 1 and Note, Table B-51.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-55.—New construction activity, 1964-2005 [Value put in place, billions of dollars; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

					Privat	e constru	ction				Public	construc	tion
Vara as month	Total new			dential lings <sup>1</sup>		Nonresi		uildings a	and other				C4-4-
Year or month	construc- tion	Total		New housing units 3	Total	Lodg- ing	Office	Com- mer- cial <sup>4</sup>	Manu- tac- turing	Other <sup>5</sup>	Total	Federal	State and local
1964 1 1965 1966 1967 1968	75 1 81 9 85.8 87.2 96 8 104 9	54.9 60.0 61.9 61.8 69.4 77.2	30.5 30.2 28.6 28.7 34.2 37.2	24 1 23 8 21.8 21.5 26.7 29 2	24.4 29.7 33.3 33.1 35.2 39.9						20.2 21.9 23.8 25.4 27.4 27.8	3.7 3.9 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.2	16.5 18.0 20.0 22.1 24.2 24.6
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 977	105 9 122 4 139 1 153 8 155 2 152 6 172 1 200 5 239 9 272 9	78.0 92.7 109.1 121.4 117.0 109.3 128.2 157.4 189.7 216.2	35.9 48.5 60.7 65.1 56.0 51.6 68.3 92.0 109.8 116.4	27.1 38.7 50.1 54.6 43.4 36.3 50.8 72.2 85.6 89.3	42.1 44.2 48.4 56.3 61.1 57.8 59.9 65.4 79.9 99.8						27.9 29.7 30.0 32.3 38.1 43.3 44.0 43.1 50.1 56.6	3.1 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.1 6.1 6.8 7.1 8.1	24.8 25.9 25.8 27.6 33.0 37.2 36.0 42.0 48.1
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987	273.9 289.1 279.3 311.9 370.2 403.4 433.5 446.6 462.0 477.5	210.3 224.4 216.3 248.4 300.0 325.6 348.9 356.0 367.3 379.3	100 4 99.2 84 7 125 8 155.0 160 5 190.7 199.7 204 5 204 3	69.6 69.4 57.0 95.0 114.6 115.9 135.2 142.7 142.4 143.2	109.9 125.1 131.6 122.6 144.9 165.1 158.2 156.3 162.8 175.1						63 6 64 7 63 1 63.5 70.2 77.8 84 6 90.6 94 7 98 2	9.6 10 4 10 0 10.6 11 2 12 0 12 4 14 1 12.3 12.2	54.0 54.3 53.1 52.9 59.0 65.8 72.2 76.6 82.5 86.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997	476.8 432.6 463.7 491.0 539.2 557.8 615.9 653.4 706.3 769.5	369.3 322.5 347.8 375.1 419.0 427.9 476.6 502.7 552.0 599.7	191.1 166.3 199.4 225.1 258.6 247.4 281.1 289.0 314.6 350.6	132.1 114.6 135.1 150.9 176.4 171.4 191.1 198.1 224.0 251.3	178.2 156.2 148.4 150.0 160.4 180.5 195.5 213.7 237.4 249.2	4 6 4.7 7 1 10.9 12.9 14.8 16.0	20.0 20.4 23.0 26.5 32.8 40.4 45.1	34.4 39.6 44.1 49.4 53.1 55.7 59.4	23.4 28.8 35.4 38.1 37.6 40.5 35.1	67.7 66.9 70.9 70.6 77.3 86.0 93.7	107 5 110.1 115 8 116 0 120.2 129.9 139 3 150 7 154 3 169 7	12.1 12.8 14.4 14.4 15.8 15.3 14.1 14.3 14.0	95.4 97.3 101.5 101.5 105.8 114.2 123.9 136.6 140.0 155.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	835.3 868.3 876.8 925.1 1.027.7	649.8 662.2 659.7 701.6 798.5	374 5 388.3 421 9 475.9 563 4	265.0 279.4 298.8 345.7 416.1	275 3 273 9 237.7 225.7 235.1	16.3 14.5 10.5 9.9 11.5	52.4 49.7 35.3 30.6 33.1	64 1 63.6 59 0 57 2 61.6	37 6 37 8 22.7 21 4 23.5	104.9 108.2 110.2 106.5 105.4	185 5 206 1 217.2 223.5 229 3	14 2 15 1 16 6 17.9 18 0	171.4 191.0 200.6 205.6 211.3
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr . May June	966 2 965.9 998 8 1,010.9 1,019.1 1 022 9	747.1 749.6 769.3 779.6 788.7 790.4	524.8 522.0 535.9 546.4 558.3 561.8	386.1 385.4 396.1 405.3 416.1 417.2	222 4 227.6 233 4 233.2 230.4 228.5	8.6 9.9 10.9 11.2 11.3 11.7	31.2 32.5 33.1 33.8 33.7 33.4	56.7 56.9 57.4 58.9 61.3 62.2	21.7 22.7 22.0 22.0 22.5 20.9	104 2 105 6 110.1 107 3 101.7 100 4	219.0 216.3 229.5 231.3 230.4 232.5	17.3 16.1 18.0 18.9 19.0 17.6	201.7 200.1 211.5 212.4 211.4 214.9
July . Aug Sept Oct Nov . Dec .	1,037.5 1,044.4 1,048.7 1,048.5 1,063.4 1,073.5	803.5 815.3 820.7 821.1 827.8 839.8	567 7 580 2 576.8 581 7 585.1 597 8	419.5 429.8 429.1 430.0 429.4 432.3	235.7 235.1 243.8 239.4 242.7 242.0	12.0 12.5 12.8 12.9 12.6 12.2	34 3 32.7 32.5 33.0 32.8 32.8	64.1 63.0 64.1 64.1 63.9 64.1	22.5 22.8 23.3 25.5 27.2 28.2	102 9 104.1 111.2 103.9 106.3 104 7	234 0 229.1 228 0 227.4 235.5 233.7	18.2 18.3 18.3 15.5 18.8 18.3	215.8 210.7 209.7 211.9 216.7 215.4
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	1.083.7 1.103.6 1.106.4 1.102.1 1.106.4 1.101.4	853.3 863.5 864 1 859 4 859.7 854 1	610 0 621 4 619.7 613 3 615 8 613.3	440 7 446 6 448 0 449 3 455.6 462 4	243.3 242.1 244.3 246.1 243.9 240.7	11.6 11.6 12.0 12.8 11.7 10.9	33 6 34 1 34 7 35.0 34 8 34.9	64.2 63.0 64.5 66.7 66.8 64.7	27.3 27.4 29.0 28.4 28.0 27.9	106.6 106.1 104.1 103.2 102.6 102.4	230.4 240.1 242.3 242.7 246.7 247.3	17.4 17.5 17.5 16.3 16.1 17.4	212 9 222.6 224.9 226.4 230.6 229 8
July Aug Sept Oct " Nov."	1.107 7 1.121 5 1.135.6 1.144.2 1.146 4	860.3 871.3 886.7 891.0 892.4	617.3 622.4 636.2 642.1 641.9	468 0 472 8 483 1 488.9 495.1	242 9 248.9 250.5 249.0 250.5	11.3 11.5 11.9 11.7 11.8	35.0 34.6 36.1 34.4 35.2	66.3 68.1 67.9 68.4 70.3	26 7 29.2 29.0 29.8 29.0	103.7 105.4 105.7 104.7 104.3	247 5 250 3 248 9 253.2 253 9	17.7 19.3 17.1 18.7 17.7	229.7 231.0 231.8 234.5 236.2

Note.—Data beginning 1993 reflect reclassification

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

lincludes farm residential buildings
Includes residential improvements, not shown separately
New single- and multi-family units.
Including farm
Health care, educational, religious, public safety, amusement and recreation, transportation, communication, power, highway and street, sewage and waste disposal, water supply, and conservation and development

TABLE B-56.—New private housing units started, authorized, completed and houses sold, 1959-2005 [Thousands; monthly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Ne	w housing u	ınıts started		Ne	w housing	units authori	zed 1	New	
Year or month		Type of st	ructure			Type o	fstructure		housing units	New houses
	Total	1 unit	2 to 4 units 2	5 units or more	Total	1 unit	2 to 4 units	5 units or more	completed	sold
959	1,517.0	1,234.0	283	.0	1,208.3	938.3	77.1	192.9		
960 961 962 963 964 964 965 966 967	1,252.2 1,313.0 1,462.9 1,603.2 1,528.8 1,472.8 1,164.9 1,291.6 1,507.6 1,466.8	994.7 974.3 991.4 1,012.4 970.5 963.7 778.6 843.9 899.4 810.6	257 338 471 590 108.3 86.7 61.2 71.7 80.7 85.1	.7 .5	998.0 1,064.2 1,186.6 1,334.7 1,285.8 1,240.6 971.9 1,141.0 1,353.4 1,322.3	746.1 722.8 716.2 750.2 720.1 709.9 563.2 650.6 694.7 624.8	64.6 67.6 87.1 118.9 100.8 84.8 61.0 73.0 84.3 85.2	187.4 273.8 383.3 465.6 464.9 445.9 347.7 417.5 574.4 612.4	1,319 8	56 56 57 46 48 49
970 971 973 973 973 974 975 976 977 977 979	1,337.7 1,160.4 1,537.5 1,987.1	812.9 1,151.0 1,309.2 1,132.0 888.1 892.2 1,162.4 1,450.9 1,433.3 1,194.1	84.9 120.5 141.2 118.2 68.0 64.0 85.8 121.7 125.1 122.0	535.9 780.9 906.2 795.0 381.6 204.3 289.2 414.4 462.0 429.0	1,351.5 1,924.6 2,218.9 1,819.5 1,074.4 939.2 1,296.2 1,690.0 1,800.5 1,551.8	646.8 906.1 1,033.1 882.1 643.8 675.5 893.6 1,126.1 1,182.6 981.5	88.1 132.9 148.6 117.0 64.3 63.9 93.1 121.3 130.6 125.4	616.7 885.7 1.037 2 820.5 366.2 199.8 309.5 442.7 487.3 444 8	1.418 4 1.706 1 2.003.9 2.100.5 1.728 5 1.317 2 1.377.2 1.657 1 1.867.5 1.870.8	48 65 71 63 51 54 64 81
980 981 982 983 984 985 985 986 987	1,062.2 1,703.0 1,749.5 1,741.8 1,805.4	852.2 705.4 662.6 1,067.6 1,084.2 1,072.4 1,179.4 1,146.4 1,081.3 1,003.3	109.5 91.2 80.1 113.5 121.4 93.5 84.0 65.1 58.7 55.3	330.5 287.7 319.6 522.0 543.9 576.0 408.7 348.0 317.6	1,190.6 985.5 1,000.5 1,605.2 1,681.8 1,733.3 1,769.4 1,534.8 1,455.6 1,338.4	710 4 564 3 546.4 901.5 922.4 956.6 1,077.6 1,024.4 993.8 931.7	114.5 101.8 88.3 133.6 142.6 120.1 108.4 89.3 75.7 67.0	365.7 319.4 365.8 570.1 616.8 656.6 583.5 421.1 386.1 339.8	1.501.6 1.265.7 1.005.5 1.390.3 1.652.2 1.703.3 1.756.4 1.668.8 1.529.8 1.422.8	5; 4; 4 6; 6; 6; 7; 6; 6; 6;
990	1,013.9 1,199.7 1,287.6 1,457.0 1,354.1 1,476.8 1,474.0 1,616.9	894.8 840.4 1,029.9 1,125.7 1,198.4 1,076.2 1,160.9 1,133.7 1,271.4 1,302.4	37.6 35.6 30.9 29.4 35.2 33.8 45.3 44.5 42.6 31.9	260.4 137.9 139.0 132.6 223.5 244.1 270.8 295.8 302.9 306.6	1,110.8 948.8 1,094.9 1,199.1 1,371.6 1,332.5 1,425.6 1,441.1 1,612.3 1,663.5	793.9 753.5 910.7 986.5 1.068.5 997.3 1.069.5 1.062.4 1.187.6 1.246.7	54.3 43.1 45.8 52.3 62.2 63.7 65.8 68.5 69.2 65.8	262.6 152.1 138.4 160.2 241.0 271.5 290.3 310.3 355.5 351.1	1,308.0 1,090.8 1,157.5 1,192.7 1,346.9 1,312.6 1,412.9 1,400.5 1,474.2 1,604.9	5. 56 66 6. 7. 8. 8.
000 001 002 003 004		1,230.9 1,273.3 1,358.6 1,499.0 1,610.5 1,714.3	38.7 36.6 38.5 33.5 42.3 40.9	299.1 292.8 307.9 315.2 303.0 309.5	1,592.3 1,636.7 1,747.7 1,889.2 2,070.1 2,147.6	1,198.1 1,235.6 1,332.6 1,460.9 1,613.4 1,681.2	64.9 66.0 73.7 82.5 90.4 84.0	329.3 335.2 341.4 345.8 366.2 382.5	1,573.7 1,570.8 1,648.4 1,678.7 1,841.9 1,930.3	8 9 1,0 1,2 1,2
004: Jan	1,852 2,007 1,968	1,562 1,485 1,638 1,624 1,649 1,526	30 29 32 36 56 26	335 338 337 308 269 275	1,963 1,984 2,064 2,069 2,129 2,014	1,546 1,574 1,633 1,610 1,660 1,606	94 90 101 92 88 83	323 320 330 367 381 325	1,734 1,716 1,793 1,956 1,909 1,857	1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2
July	2,062 1,807	1,661 1,689 1,555 1,666 1,484 1,713	64 68 31 41 39	261 268 326 355 284 289	2,114 2,058 2,039 2,093 2,093 2,093 2,081	1,625 1,606 1,593 1,603 1,588 1,620	105 85 78 87 90 90	384 367 368 403 415 371	1,888 1,909 1,784 1,841 1,725 1,911	1.10 1.20 1.30 1.11 1.24
005: Jan	2,188 2,228 1,833 2,027 2,041	1,769 1,808 1,550 1,640 1,724 1,716	48 52 34 47 37 37	371 368 249 340 280 312	2,136 2,093 2,021 2,148 2,062 2,132	1,635 1,624 1,552 1,640 1,628 1,653	84 83 85 78 85 87	417 386 384 430 349 392	1,883 1,922 1,797 1,944 2,097 1,963	1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
July	2,062 2,081 2,160 2,051 2,121	1,732 1,719 1,791 1,732 1,798 1,577	36 43 59 33 33	294 319 310 286 290 322	2.171 2.138 2.219 2.103 2.163 2.075	1,690 1,676 1,767 1,707 1,724 1,645	99 86 88 82 81	382 376 364 314 358 349	1,889 1,933 1,953 1,948 1,882 1,953	1,3 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,2

 $<sup>^1 \ \</sup>text{Authorized by issuance of local building permits in permit-issuing places:} \ \text{beginning } 2004, 20,000 \ \text{places:} 19,000 \ \text{for } 1994-2003; 17,000 \ \text{for } 1988-93; 16,000 \ \text{for } 1978-83; 14,000 \ \text{for } 1972-77; 13,000 \ \text{for } 1967-71; 12,000 \ \text{for } 1963-66; \text{and } 10,000 \ \text{prior to } 1963 \ \text{$^2$ Monthly data derived}$ 

Source. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

Note.—Data beginning 1999 for new housing units started and completed and for new houses sold are based on new estimation methods and are not directly comparable with earlier data.

TABLE B-57.—Manufacturing and trade sales and inventories, 1965-2005 [Amounts in millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Year	Total ma	nufacturing trade	and		Manufac- turing			Merchant holesalers			Retail trade		Retai
or month	Sales 1	Inven- tories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sales <sup>1</sup>	Inven- tories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sates 1	Inven- tories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	Sales 14	Inven- tories <sup>2</sup>	Ratio <sup>3</sup>	service
1 <i>C</i> - 5 965 966 967	80.283 87.187 90,820	120,929 136,824 145,681	1 51 1.57 1 60	40.995 44.870 46.486	68.207 77.986 84.646	1 66 1 74 1.82	15.611 16,987 19.576	18.317 20.765 25.786 27.166	1 17 1 22 1 32	23.677 25.330 24.757 27,445	34.405 38.073 35.249	1 45 1 50 1.42	
168 169	98,685 105,690	156,611 170,400	1 59 1 61	50.229 53,501	90.560 98.145	1.80 1.83	21,012 22,818	29,800	1 29 1 31	29,371	38,885 42,455	1.42 1.45	
170 171	108.221 116.895 131.081 153.677 177.912 182.198 204.150	178.594 188.991 203.227 234.406 287.144 288.992 318.345	1.65 1.62 1.55 1.53 1.61 1.59 1.56	52.805 55.906 63.027 72,931 84.790 86.589 98,797	101,599 102,567 108,121 124,499 157,625 159,708 174,636	1 92 1.83 1.72 1.71 1.86 1.84	24,167 26,492 29,866 38,115 47,982 46,634 50,698	33.354 36.568 40.297 46.918 58.667 57.774 64.622	1.38 1.35 1.23 1.22 1.24 1.27	31.249 34.497 38.189 42.631 45.141 48.975 54.655	43.641 49.856 54.809 62.989 70.852 71,510 79.087	1 40 1 45 1 44 1 48 1 57 1 46 1 45	
177	229.513 260.320 297.701	350,706 400,931 452,640	1.53 1.54 1.52	113.201 126,905 143.936	188.378 211.691 242.157	1.66 1.67 1.68	56.136 66.413 79.051	73,179 86,934 99,679	1 30 1 31 1.26	60.176 67.002 74.713	89.149 102.306 110.804	1 48 1.53 1.48	
880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887	327.233 355.822 347.625 369.286 410.124 422.583 430.419 457.735	508.924 545.786 573.908 590.287 649.780 664.039 662.738 709.848 767.222	1.56 1.53 1.67 1.56 1.53 1.56 1.55 1.50	154.391 168.129 163.351 172.547 190.682 194.538 194.657 206.326 224.619	265.215 283.413 311.852 312.379 339.516 334.749 322.654 338.109 369,374	1.72 1.69 1.95 1.78 1.73 1.73 1.68 1.59	93.099 101.180 95.211 99.225 112.199 113.459 114.960 122.968	122.631 129.654 127.428 130.075 142.452 147.409 153.574 163.903 178.801	1 32 1 28 1 36 1 28 1 23 1 28 1 32 1 29 1 30	79.743 86.514 89.062 97.514 107.243 114.586 120.803 128.442 138.017	121.078 132.719 134.628 147.833 167.812 181.881 186.510 207.836 219.047	1.52 1.53 1.49 1.44 1.49 1.52 1.56	
89 90 91	497,157 527.039 545,909 542,815	815,455 840,594 834,609	1.52 1.52 1.53	236.698 242.686 239.847	391.212 405.073 390.950	1 63 1.65 1.65	134,521 143,760 149,506 148,306	187,009 195,833 200,448	1 28 1 29 1 33	146.581 153.718 154.661	237,234 239,688 243,211	1.54 1.58 1.56 1.54	
92 IVCS. 5 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99	567.176 541.017 567.951 610.510 655.297 687.557 724.012 742.836 786,597	842.809 836.555 863.467 926.578 985.395 1.004.682 1.045.825 1.078.402 1.138.602	1.48 1.52 1.50 1.46 1.48 1.46 1.42 1.43 1.40	250.394 242.002 251.708 269.843 289.973 299.766 319.558 324.984 335.991	382,510 378,732 379,650 399,926 424,896 430,593 443,723 449,182 463,709	1.54 1.57 1.50 1.44 1.43 1.37 1.38 1.35	154,150 148,639 155,405 165,981 181,369 191,936 199,788 203,495 217,449	208.302 198.884 206.774 223.958 240.473 243.194 260.713 273.910 291.290	1 32 1 31 1 30 1 29 1.30 1 27 1 26 1 32 1.30	162.632 150.376 160.838 174.686 183.955 195.855 204.666 214.356 233.157	251.997 258.939 277.043 302.694 320.026 330.895 341.389 355.310 383.603	1.52 1.67 1.67 1.66 1.71 1.66 1.64 1.62 1.59	167. 178. 193. 203. 216. 226. 237. 256.
00 01 02 03 04	834.353 822.999 823,870 850,144 936,136	1.197.793 1.140.044 1.142.517 1.160.136 1.249.976	1.41 1.43 1.37 1.35 1.30	350,715 335,242 326,713 331,654 364,465	481.651 447.583 423.265 418.536 450,637	1.36 1.40 1.31 1.27 1.20	235.053 231.939 235.368 245.539 278.196	309.820 297.182 300.671 306.556 339.639	1 29 1 32 1 26 1 23 1 17	248,584 255,819 261,789 272,951 293,476	406.322 395.279 418,581 435.044 459.700	1.59 1.58 1.55 1.57 1.54	274, 282, 289, 302, 325,
04 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	882.057 888.982 919.851 917.654 928.045 927,942	1.160.617 1.169.540 1.178.635 1.186.243 1.194.376 1.206.898	1.32 1.32 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.30	342.696 342.327 358.320 357.831 359.378 363.501	418.985 421.149 423.155 425.094 429.200 433.106	1.22 1.23 1.18 1.19 1.19	258.049 263.485 271.880 273.761 275.440 275.861	306.364 310.581 312.803 312.981 317.009 320.389	1.19 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.16	281,312 283,170 289,651 286,062 293,227 288,580	435,268 437,810 442,677 448,168 448,167 453,403	1 55 1.55 1.53 1 57 1.53 1.57	311. 313. 320. 317. 324. 319.
July Aug Sept . Oct . Nov Dec .	935.235 945.827 947.748 958.291 964.138 975.644	1.219.242 1.230.178 1.229.158 1.234.960 1.247.803 1.249.976	1.30 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29	365.217 371.976 368.539 373.313 375.710 380.511	437,473 440,509 441,152 445,357 450,148 450,637	1.20 1.18 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.18	277.722 281.122 281.412 284.409 287.839 291.456	325.410 329.038 330.201 334.739 338.711 339.639	1 17 1 17 1 17 1 18 1 18 1 18	292.296 292.729 297.797 300.569 300.589 303.677	456,359 460,631 457,805 454,864 458,944 459,700	1 56 1 57 1 54 1 51 1 53 1 51	323. 324. 329. 332. 332. 336.
05: Jan Feb Mar . Apr May . June .	978.620 975.100 983.324 991.433 993.287 1.001,155	1.260,850 1.267,111 1.272,133 1.275,463 1.277,275 1.276,804	1 29 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29	382.257 378.367 384.622 383.583 386.344 386.436	456.853 459.282 461.291 461.687 461.219 461.511	1.20 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.19 1.19	292,430 290,976 291,624 295,487 295,647 297,096	343.126 345.294 347.275 349.626 350.764 352.337	1 17 1 19 1 19 1 18 1 19 1 19	303,933 305,757 307,078 312,363 311,296 317,623	460.871 462.535 463.567 464.150 465.292 462.956	1.52 1.51 1.51 1.49 1.49 1.46	336, 338, 340, 346, 344, 351,
July Aug Sept Oct . Nov"	1.008.882 1.015.597 1.022.252 1.028.132 1.029.174	1.271.304 1.276.131 1.282.217 1.287.238 1.293.509	1.26 1.25 1.25 1.25	386.858 395.009 393.566 396.181 397.047	464.221 463.115 463.591 466.414 467.144	1 20 1 17 1 18 1 18 1 18	298.514 303.781 311.199 314.028 311.714	352.670 354.386 356.354 357.212 358.647	1 18 1 17 1 15 1 14 1.15	323.510 316.807 317.487 317.923 320.413	454.413 458.630 462.272 463.612 467.718	1 40 1 45 1 46 1 46 1 46	357. 350. 351. 352. 355.

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Annual data are averages of monthly not seasonally adjusted figures.
<sup>2</sup> Seasonally adjusted, end of period. Inventories beginning January 1982 for manufacturing and December 1980 for wholesale and retail trade are not comparable with earlier periods.
<sup>3</sup> Inventory/Sales ratio. Annual data are beginning 1982, averages of monthly ratios, for 1965–81, ratio of December inventories to monthly average sales for the year, and for earlier years, weighted averages. Monthly ratios are inventories at end of month to sales for month.
<sup>4</sup> Food services included on SIC basis and excluded on NAICS basis. See last column for retail and food services sales.
<sup>5</sup> Effective in 2001, data classified based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Data on NAICS basis available begining 1992. Earlier data based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).

Oata include semiconductors

Note —Earlier data are not strictly comparable with data beginning 1967 for wholesale and retail trade

TABLE B-58.—Manufacturers' shipments and inventories, 1965-2005 [Millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		Shipments	1				In	ventories <sup>2</sup>				
		Durable	Nondur-		D	urable good	ds industri	es	Nond	urable goo	ds indust	ries
Year or month	Total	goods indus- tries	able goods indus- tries	Total	Total	Mate- rials and supplies	Work in proc- ess	Finished goods	Total	Mate- rials and supplies	Work in proc- ess	Finished goods
SIC: 3	40,995	22,193	18,802	68.207	42,189	13,298	18,055	10.836	26,018	10,487	3.825	11,706
1965	44,870	24,617	20,253	77,986	49,852	15,464	21,908	12,480	28,134	11,197	4.226	12,711
1966	46,486	25,233	21,253	84.646	54,896	16,423	24,933	13,540	29,750	11,760	4.431	13,559
1967	50,229	27,624	22,605	90,560	58,732	17,344	27,213	14,175	31,828	12,328	4.852	14,648
1968	53,501	29,403	24,098	98,145	64,598	18,636	30,282	15,680	33,547	12,753	5.120	15,674
1970	52,805	28,156	24,649	101.599	66.651	19.149	29.745	17,757	34.948	13.168	5,271	16,509
	55,906	29,924	25,982	102.567	66.136	19.679	28.550	17,907	36.431	13.686	5,678	17,067
	63,027	33,987	29,040	108.121	70.067	20.807	30.713	18,547	38.054	14.677	5,998	17,379
	72,931	39,635	33,296	124.499	81,192	25.944	35.490	19,758	43.307	18.147	6,729	18,431
	84,790	44,173	40,617	157.625	101.493	35.070	42.530	23,893	56.132	23.744	8,189	24,199
	86,589	43,598	42,991	159.708	102.590	33.903	43.227	25,460	57.118	23.565	8,834	24,719
	98,797	50,623	48,174	174.636	111.988	37.457	46.074	28,457	62.648	25.847	9,929	26,872
	113,201	59,168	54,033	188.378	120.877	40.186	50.226	30,465	67.501	27.387	10,961	29,153
	126,905	67,731	59,174	211.691	138.181	45.198	58.848	34,135	73.510	29.619	12,085	31,806
	143,936	75,927	68,009	242.157	160,734	52.670	69.325	38,739	81.423	32.814	13,910	34,699
1980	154,391	77,419	76,972	265,215	174,788	55.173	76,945	42.670	90.427	36.606	15.884	37.937
	168,129	83,727	84,402	283,413	186,443	57.998	80,998	47.447	96.970	38.165	16.194	42,611
	163,351	79,212	84,139	311,852	200,444	59.136	86,707	54.601	111.408	44.039	18.612	48,757
	172,547	85,481	87,066	312,379	199,854	60.325	86,899	52.630	112.525	44.816	18.691	49,018
	190,682	97,940	92,742	339,516	221,330	66.031	98,251	57.048	118.186	45.692	19.328	53,166
	194,538	101,279	93,259	334,749	218,193	63.904	98,162	56.127	116.556	44.106	19.442	53,008
	194,657	103,238	91,419	322,654	211,997	61.331	97,000	53.666	110.657	42.335	18.124	50,198
	206,326	108,128	98,198	338,109	220,799	63.562	102,393	54.844	117.310	45,319	19.270	52,721
	224,619	118,458	106,161	369,374	242,468	69.611	112,958	59.899	126.906	49.396	20,559	56,951
	236,698	123,158	113,540	391,212	257,513	72.435	122,251	62.827	133.699	50,674	21.653	61,372
1990 1991 1992 NAICS: <sup>3</sup>	242.686 239.847 250.394	123,776 121,000 128,489	118,910 118,847 121,905	405.073 390.950 382,510	263,209 250,019 238,105	73,559 70,834 69,459	124,130 114,960 104,424	65,520 64,225 64,222	141,864 140,931 144,405	52.645 53.011 54.007	22,817 22,815 23,532	66,402 65,105 66,866
NAICS:3 1992	242.002 251.708 269.843 289.973 299.766 319,558 324,984 335,991	126.572 133,712 147.005 158.568 164,883 178,949 185,966 193,895	115,430 117,996 122,838 131,405 134,883 140,610 139,019 142,096	378.732 379.650 399.926 424.896 430.593 443.723 449.182 463.709	238,008 238,627 253,054 267,375 272,533 281,119 290,735 296,591	69,764 72,681 78,593 85,512 86,259 92,300 93,587 97,886	104,001 101,779 106,347 106,511 110,448 109,873 115,195 114,095	64.243 64.167 68.114 75.352 75.826 78,946 81.953 84.610	140.724 141.023 146.872 157.521 158,060 162,604 158.447 167.118	53.239 54,342 57,230 60.802 59,173 60.220 58.259 61,103	23.338 23.341 24.417 25.783 26.461 28.514 27.085 28.808	64,147 63,340 65,225 70,936 72,426 73,870 73,103 77,207
2000	350,715	197,807	152,908	481,651	306,743	106.107	111,194	89,442	174.908	61.503	30,107	83,298
	335,242	183,592	151,650	447,583	279,602	94.157	103,330	82,115	167.981	58.230	27,617	82,134
	326,713	177,341	149,372	423,265	260,427	87,738	92,867	79,822	162.838	56.572	28,207	78,059
	331,654	178,164	153,490	418,536	253,559	83.897	91,862	77,800	164.977	57.557	28,517	78,903
	364,465	196,508	167,957	450,637	274,800	94,073	96,704	84,023	175.837	59.830	29,009	86,998
2004: Jan	342.696	184,413	158.283	418,985	253,486	84.038	92,063	77,385	165,499	57.812	28.695	78,992
	342.327	186,455	155.872	421,149	254,184	84.591	92,152	77,441	166,965	58.524	29.013	79,428
	358.320	195,675	162.645	423,155	255,537	85,791	92,099	77,647	167,618	58.379	29.340	79,899
	357.831	193,562	164.269	425,094	257,157	87,176	92,670	77,311	167,937	58.484	29.560	79,893
	359.378	192,750	166,628	429,200	259,110	87,419	93,049	78,642	170,090	58.390	28,891	82,809
	363.501	195,759	167,742	433,106	262,103	88,649	93,941	79,513	171,003	58,494	29,224	83,285
July	365.217	195,468	169.749	437,473	264,967	89.969	95.079	79,919	172.506	59.324	28.712	84,470
	371,976	199,813	172,163	440,509	267,232	90.483	95.123	81,626	173.277	59.334	28.663	85,280
	368,539	199,408	169.131	441,152	268,297	91.076	94.323	82,898	172.855	59.211	28.105	85,539
	373,313	198,980	174,333	445,357	270,894	92.560	95.398	82,936	174.463	59.772	28.406	86,285
	375,710	199,412	176,298	450,148	274,026	93.809	96.868	83,349	176,122	59.905	28.731	87,486
	380.511	207,145	173,366	450,637	274,800	94.073	96.704	84,023	175,837	59.830	29,009	86,998
2005: Jan	382,257	206.217	176.040	456.853	278.433	95,534	97,708	85.191	178,420	60.525	28.109	89.786
Feb	378,367	203.141	175.226	459.282	280,129	95,484	98,776	85.869	179,153	60.586	28.740	89.827
Mar	384,622	204.445	180.177	461.291	281,005	95,717	98,528	86.760	180,286	61.134	29.102	90.050
Apr	383,583	204.389	179.194	461.687	281,087	96,020	98,164	86.903	180,600	61.099	28.401	91.100
May	386,344	205.944	180.400	461.219	281,584	96,028	98,321	87.235	179,635	61.211	27.946	90.478
June	386,436	206.451	179.985	461.511	280,518	95,896	97,938	86.684	180,993	61.480	28.073	91.440
July	386,858	205,013	181,845	464.221	282,815	95,506	99.581	87,728	181.406	61.489	27,815	92.102
	395,009	209,844	185,165	463.115	282,007	95,405	98.740	87,862	181.108	61.914	27,844	91.350
	393,566	209,831	183,735	463.591	282,301	95,566	99.316	87,419	181.290	61.931	27,938	91.421
	396,181	212,334	183,847	466.414	283,704	95,729	100.326	87,649	182.710	62,316	28,708	91.686
	397,047	212,409	184,638	467.144	285,228	96,154	101.083	87,991	181.916	61.810	28,905	91.201

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Annual data are averages of monthly not seasonally adjusted figures.
<sup>2</sup> Seasonally adjusted, end of period. Data beginning 1982 are not comparable with earlier data
<sup>3</sup> Effective in 2001, data classified based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Data on NAICS basis available beginning 1992. Earlier data based on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).

Oata include semiconductors.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE B-59.—Manufacturers' new and unfilled orders, 1965-2005 [Amounts in millions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

		Ne orde				Unfilled orders 2		Unfilled	orders—ship ratio <sup>2</sup>	ments
Year or month		Durable indus	goods tries	Non- durable		Durable	Non- durable		Durable	Non- durable
	Total	Total	Capital goods, non- defense	goods industries	Total	goods industries	goods industries	Total	goods industries	goods indus- tries
SIC: 3 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	42.137 46.420 47.067 50.657 53.990	23,286 26,163 25,803 28,051 29,876	6.314 7.046	18,851 20,258 21,265 22,606 24,114	78,249 96,846 103,711 108,377 114,341	74.459 93.002 99.735 104.393 110.161	3.790 3.844 3.976 3.984 4.180	3.25 3.74 3.66 3.79 3.71	3.86 4.48 4.37 4.58 4.45	0.79 .75 .73 .69
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	52.022 55.921 64.182 76.003 87.327 85.139 99.513 115.109 131.629 147.604	27,340 29,905 35,038 42,627 46,862 41,957 51,307 61,035 72,278 79,483	6.072 6.682 7.745 9.926 11.594 9.886 11.490 13.681 17.588 21.154	24,682 26,016 29,144 33,376 40,465 43,181 48,206 54,073 59,351 68,121	105,008 105,247 119,349 156,561 187,043 169,546 178,128 202,024 259,169 303,593	100,412 100,225 113,034 149,204 181,519 161,664 169,857 193,323 248,281 291,321	4,596 5,022 6,315 7,357 5,524 7,882 8,271 8,701 10,888 12,272	3.61 3.32 3.26 3.80 4.09 3.69 3.24 3.24 3.57 3.89	4.36 4.00 3.85 4.51 4.93 4.45 3.88 3.85 4.20 4.62	.76 .76 .86 .91 .62 .82 .74 .71
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	156,359 168,025 162,140 175,451 192,879 195,706 195,204 209,389 228,270 239,572	79,392 83,654 78,064 88,140 100,164 102,356 103,647 110,809 122,076 126,055	21,135 21,806 19,213 19,624 23,669 24,545 23,982 26,094 31,108 32,988	76,967 84,371 84,077 87,311 92,715 93,351 91,557 98,579 106,194 113,516	327,416 326,547 311,887 347,273 373,529 387,196 393,515 430,426 474,154 508,849	315,202 314,707 300,798 333,114 359,651 372,097 376,699 408,688 452,150 487,098	12,214 11.840 11.089 14.159 13.878 15.099 16,816 21,738 22,004 21,751	3.85 3.87 3.84 3.53 3.60 3.67 3.59 3.63 3.64 3.96	4.58 4.68 4.74 4.29 4.37 4.47 4.41 4.43 4.46 4.85	.75 .69 .62 .69 .64 .68 .70
1990 1991 1992 NAICS: 3	244.507 238.805 248.212	125,583 119,849 126,308	33,331 30,471 31,524	118,924 118,957 121,905	531,131 519,199 492,893	509,124 495,802 469,381	22,007 23,397 23,512	4.15 4.08 3.51	5.15 5.07 4.30	.76 .79 .79
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1997	246,668 266,641 285,542 297,282 314,986 317,345 329,770	128.672 143.803 154.137 162,399 174,377 178,327 187,674	40,681 45,175 51,011 54,066 60,697 62,133 64,392			450,975 425,833 434,941 447,487 488,915 513,202 496,385 505,750			4.85 4.35 4.01 3.86 4.15 4.04 3.78 3.74	
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	346,789 326,435 318,008 329,219 361,177	193,881 174,786 168,636 175,729 193,220	69,278 58,232 52,442 54,847 61,073			549,646 511,596 468,123 505,626 547,944			4.03 4.21 4.05 4.06 3.94	
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	336,711 337,355 361,145 354,388 356,415 359,932	178,428 181,483 198,500 190,119 189,787 192,190	53,765 53,813 62,962 58,295 59,396 59,679			505,686 506,979 516,232 519,325 523,228 526,286			4.10 4.09 3.99 4.03 4.05 4.00	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	364,652 367,598 364,352 366,812 375,215 375,820	194,903 195,435 195,221 192,479 198,917 202,454	66,582 61,282 62,490 60,162 65,347 66,430			532,903 535,674 538,394 538,987 545,701 547,944			4.00 3.99 4.01 4.01 4.07 3.94	
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr Apr May June	372,642 374,908 376,107 376,033 391,656 395,324	196.602 199.682 195,930 196.839 211.256 215.339	64,908 66,527 63,297 66,012 78,376 76,688	**************************************		545,812 549,247 547,243 546,771 559,106 574,800			3.90 3.98 3.92 3.93 3.99 4.09	
July Aug Sept Oct Nov p	385.553 396,767 391,151 397,614 407,711	203,708 211,602 207,416 213,767 223,073	70,886 73,722 67,293 71,771 85,809			580,753 589,978 594,816 603,370 621,432			4.18 4.12 4.19 4.16 4.27	

Annual data are averages of monthly not seasonally adjusted figures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Annual data are averages of monthly not seasonally adjusted figures.

<sup>2</sup> Unfilled orders are seasonally adjusted, end of period. Ratios are unfilled orders at end of period to shipments for period (excludes industries with no unfilled orders). Annual ratios relate to seasonally adjusted data for December.

<sup>3</sup> Effective in 2001, data classified based on North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Data on NAICS basis available beginning 1992. Earlier data based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).

Data on SIC basis include semiconductors. Data on NAICS basis do not include semiconductors

Note —For data beginning 1992 on NAICS basis, since there are no unfilled orders for manufacturers' nondurable goods, manufacturers' nondurable new orders and nondurable shipments are the same (see Table B-58).

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

## **PRICES**

TABLE B-60.—Consumer price indexes for major expenditure classes. 1959-2005 [For all urban consumers; 1982-84=100, except as noted]

	Allitems	Food bever			Hous-	Trans-	Medical	Enter-	Recrea-	Educa-	Other	Enor
Year or month	(CPI-U)	Total <sup>1</sup>	Food	Apparel	ing	ta- tion	care	tain- ment	tion 2	tion and communi- cation <sup>2</sup>	goods and services	Ener gy <sup>3</sup>
959	29.1		29.7	45.0		29.8	21.5				************	21
960	29.6		30.0	45.7		29.8	22.3					22
961	29.9		30.4	46.1		30.1	22.9 23.5					22
962	30.2 30.6		30.6 31.1	46.3 46.9		30.8 30.9	23.5					22
963 964	31.0		31.1	47.3		31.4	24.1					22 22
965	31.5		31.5 32.2	47.8		31.9	25.2					27
100	32.4		33.8	49.0		32.3	26.3					23
16 /	33.4	35.0	34.1	51.0	30.8	33.3	28.2	40.7			35.1	23
68	34.8	36.2	35.3	53.7	32.0	34.3	29.9	43.0			36.9	2
169		38.1	37.1	56.8	34.0	35.7	31.9	45.2			38.7	2
170	38.8	40.1	39.2	59.2	36.4	37.5	34.0	47.5			40.9	25
171 172	40.5 41.8	41.4	40.4 42.1	61.1 62.3	38.0 39.4	39.5 39.9	36.1 37.3	50.0 51.5			42.9 44.7	26
72 73	44.4	48.8	48.2	64.6	41.2	41.2	38.8	52.9			46.4	2
174		55.5	55.1	69.4	45.8	45.8	42.4	56.9			49.8	38
75	53.8	60.2	59.8	72.5	50.7	50.1	47.5	62.0			53.9	42
76	56.9	62.1	61.6	75.2	53.8	55.1	52.0	65.1			57.0	4
177	60.6	65.8 72.2	65.5	78.6	57.4	59.0	57.0	68.3			60.4	45
178 179	65.2 72.6	79.9	72.0 79.9	81.4 84.9	62.4 70.1	61.7 70.5	61.8 67.5	71.9 76.7		***************************************	64.3 68.9	5
												6
80	82.4 90.9	86.7	86.8	90.9	81.1 90.4	83.1 93.2	74.9 82.9	83.6 90.1			75.2	81
981 982	00.5	93.5 97.3	93.6 97.4	95.3 97.8	96.9	97.0	92.5	96.0		***************************************	82.6 91.1	9
83	99.6	99.5	99.4	100.2	99.5	99.3	100.6	100.1	***************************************		101.1	9
84	103.9	103.2	103.2	102.1	103.6	103.7	106.8	103.8			107.9	100
85	107.6	105.6	105.6	105.0	107.7	106.4	113.5	107.9			114.5	10
86	109.6	109.1	109.0	105.9	110.9	102.3	122.0	111.6			121.4	. 8
87	113.6	113.5	113.5	110.6	114.2	105.4	130.1	115.3			128.5	88
188	118.3 124.0	118.2	118.2 125.1	115.4	118.5	108.7 114.1	138.6	120.3 126.5	***************************************		137.0 147.7	89 92
189		124.9		118.6	123.0		149.3					-
990		132.1	132.4	124.1	128.5	120.5	162.8	132.4 138.4			159.0	102
991 992	136.2 140.3	136.8	136.3 137.9	128.7 131.9	133.6 137.5	123.8 126.5	177.0 190.1	142.3			171.6 183.3	102
993		141.6	140.9	133.7	141.2	130.4	201.4	145.8	90.7	85.5	192.9	10
94	148.2	144.9	144.3	133.4	144.8	134.3	211.0	150.1	92.7	88.8	198.5	104
995	152.4	148.9	148.4	132.0	148.5	139.1	220.5	153.9	94.5	92.2	206.9	10
996	156.9	153.7	153.3	131.7	152.8	143.0	228.2	159.1	97.4	95.3	215.4	110
97 198	160.5 163.0	157.7 161.1	157.3 160.7	132.9 133.0	156.8 160.4	144.3 141.6	234.6 242.1	162.5	99.6 101.1	98.4 100.3	224.8 237.7	11
198 199		164.6	164.1	131.3	163.9	141.6	250.6		102.0	100.3	258.3	100
		168.4	167.8	129.6	169.6	153.3	260.8		103.3	102.5	271.1	124
000		173.6	173.1	127.3	176.4	154.3	272.8		104.9	105.2	282.6	129
002	179.9	176.8	176.2	124.0	180.3	152.9	285.6		106.2	107.9	293.2	12
003	184.0	180.5	180.0	120.9	184.8	157.6	297.1		107.5	109.8	298.7	13
U4	188.9	186.6	186.2	120.4	189.5	163.1	310.1		108.6	111.6	304.7	15
05		191.2	190.7	119.5	195.7	173.9	323.2		109.4	113.7	313.4	17
04: Jan	185.2	184.3	183.8	115.8	186.3	157.0	303.6		107.9	111.1	301.4	13
Feb	186.2	184.5	184.1	118.6	187.0	158.8	306.0		108.4	111.2	302.3 303.1	14:
Mar	187.4 188.0	184.9 185.0	184.4 184.5	123.5 124.3	187.9 188.4	160.5 161.8	307.5 308.3		108.8 109.0	111.1 110.9	303.1	14
Apr Mav		186.5	186.1	123.4	188.9	165.2	309.0		108.8	110.6	303.8	15
May June	189.7	186.8	186.3	120.1	190.3	165.7	310.0		108.9	110.8	304.1	15
July	189.4	187.2	186.8	115.9	190.9	164.0	311.0		108.7	110.9	305.1	15
Aug Sept	189.5	187.3	186.8	116.5	191.2	162.9	311.6		108.5	111.7	305.5	15
Sept	189.9	187.2	186.7	121.2	191.0	162.9	312.3		108.6	112.9 112.5	306.3	15 15
Oct	190.9 191.0	188.4 188.6	187.9 188.2	124.1 123.0	191.0 190.8	166.4 167.2	313.3 314.1		108.7 108.7	112.7	306.8 307.0	15
Nov Dec	190.3	188.9	188.5	118.8	190.7	164.8	314.9		108.5	112.6	307.8	15
05: Jan		189.5	189.1	116.1	191.8	164.0	316.8		108.9	112.7	309.3	15
Feb	191.8	189.3	188.8	118.7	192.7	166.1	319.3		109.0	112.8	310.8	15
Mar	193.3	189.6	189.1	123.5	194.1	168.8	320.7		109.0	112.7	311.2	160
Apr	194.6	190.7	190.2	123.7	194.4	173.2	321.5		109.2	112.9	311.6	17
May	194 4	191.1	190.6	122.4	194.5	172.1	322.2 322.9		109.5	1127	312.5	16
June		190.9	190.4	118.3	195.5	171.8	322.9		109.1	112 8 112 9	312.5	17
July	195.4	191.3	190.8	113.8	196.6	174.4 177.7	324.1 323.9		109.1 109.3	112 9	314 1 314 4	17
Aug	196.4 198.8	191.3 191.8	190.9 191.4	115.8 120.5	196.9 197.0	186.5	323.9		109.3	115.7	314.4	208
Sept Oct	190.6	192.5	191.4	120.5	198.4	184.0	324.6		109.7	115.3	315.3	20
Nov		192.8	192.4	121.5	198.5	175.6 172.7	328.1		109.8	115.3	316 2	18
Dec		193.2	192.9	117.5	198.3	172.7	328.4		109.7	115.3	317.3	180

Includes alcoholic beverages, not shown separately.
 December 1997=100.
 Household fuels—gas (piped), electricity, fuel oil, etc.—and motor fuel. Motor oil, coolant, etc. also included through 1982.

Note.—Data beginning 1983 incorporate a rental equivalence measure for homeowners' costs.

Series reflect changes in composition and renaming beginning in 1998, and formula and methodology changes beginning in 1999. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-61.—Consumer price indexes for selected expenditure classes, 1959-2005 [For all urban consumers, 1982-84=100, except as noted]

		Fo	od and b	everages					Н	ousing				
				Food	-			Shelter			Fuels an	d utilitie	S	
	Year or								Owners'			Fuels		Furnish- ings
	month	Total <sup>1</sup>	Total	At home	Away from home	Total	Total?	Rent of primary resi- dence	lent rent of pri- mary resi- dence 3	Total?	Total	Fuel oil and other fuels	Gas (piped) and elec- tricity	and opera- tions
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1970 1970 1971 1972 1973 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1980 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990	Jan Feb Mar May Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	35 0 36 2 38 1 40 1 41 44 43 1 48 8 55 56 0 2 62 1 165 8 72 2 2 105 6 1 113 5 118 2 1 124 9 148	29 7 7 30 0 0 31 1 1 3 1 5 3 32 2 2 3 33 4 1 3 5 3 3 3 4 1 3 5 3 3 7 1 3 9 2 4 40 4 4 2 1 4 8 2 2 1 5 5 9 8 8 6 8 9 3 6 6 5 5 5 7 2 0 0 1 1 3 5 5 1 1 8 2 5	31.2 31.3 31.2 31.3 32.0 32.4 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33	home  24 8 25 4 4 266 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 29 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 29 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 29 7 27.3 8 28 4 7 29 7 20 7 20 7 20 7 20 7 20 7 20 7 20 7 20	30 8 32 0 3 34 0 36 4 38 0 39 4 41 2 8 45 5 7 4 4 5 5 7 4 4 6 2 4 4 5 6 7 7 5 1 4 4 2 1 1 8 5 7 1 4 1 2 1 1 8 5 1 5 6 8 8 1 6 0 4 4 1 8 1 8 1 9 3 1 9 0 9 1 9 1 2 1 8 1 8 7 0 1 8 1 8 7 0 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1	24 7 7 25 2 2 25 4 8 8 30 1.1 32 8 8 8 10 5 96 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	38 2 38.7 39.2 39.7 40.1 40.5 40.9 41.5 42.2 43.3 44.7 46.5 52.5 55.2 55.2 61.1 64.8 69.3	resi-	25 4 26.0 26.3 26.3 26.6 26.6 26.7 27 1 27.4 28.0	70141 21 4 4 21.7 7 25.7 7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 5.7 27.5 27.5	other	22.4 23.3 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 23.5	42 0 43 6 45 2 46 8 48 6 49 7 51 1 56 8 49 7 74 7 79 9 86 3 98 0 100 2 101 9 103 8 105 2 107 1 111 2 113 3 121 0 123 0 124 6 125 7 125 4 125 5 125 6 125 7 125 2 125 1 125 3

 $<sup>^1\,\</sup>mbox{lincludes}$  alcoholic beverages, not shown separately  $^2\,\mbox{lincludes}$  other items, not shown separately  $^3\,\mbox{December}$   $1982{=}100$ 

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-61.—Consumer price indexes for selected expenditure classes, 1959-2005—Continued
[For all urban consumers; 1982-84=100, except as noted]

				Transp	ortation				N	Medical care	
				Private tra	insportation	1					
Year or month	Total	Total <sup>2</sup>	New ve		Used cars and	Motor fuel	Motor vehicle mainte- nance	Public trans- porta- tion	Total	Medical care com- modities	Medical care services
			Total <sup>2</sup>	New	trucks		and repair				
1959	29.8	30.8	52.3	52.2	26.8	23.7	26.0	21.5	21.5	46.8	18.7
1960	29.8 30.1	30.6 30.8	51.6 51.6	51.5 51.5	25.0 26.0	24.4 24.1	26.5 27.1	22.2 23.2	22.3 22.9	46.9 46.3	19.5 20.2
1962	30.8	31.4 31.6	51.4	51.5 51.3 51.0	28.4 28.7	24.3 24.2	27.5 27.8	24.0	23.5 24.1	45.6 45.2	20.9 21.5
1963 1964	31.4	32.0	50.9	50.9	30.0	24.1	28.2	24.7	24.6	45.1	22.0
1965 1966	31.9 32.3	32.5 32.9	49.8 48.9	49.7 48.8	29.8 29.0	25.1 25.6	28.7 29.2	25.2 26.1	25.2 26.3	45.0 45.1	22.7 23.9
1967	33.3	33.8	49.3	49.3 50.7	29.9	26.4 26.8	30.4 32.1	27.4 28.7	28.2 29.9	44.9 45.0	26.0 27.9
1968 1969		34.8 36.0	50.7 51.5	51.5	30.9	27.6	34.1	30.9	31.9	45.4	30.2
1970 1971	37.5 39.5	37.5 39.4	53.1 55.3	53.0 55.2	31.2 33.0	27.9 28.1	36.6 39.3	35.2 37.8	34.0 36.1	46.5 47.3	32.3 34.7
1972	39.9	39.7	54.8 54.8	54.7 54.8	33.1 35.2	28.4 31.2	41.1 43.2	39.3 39.7	37.3 38.8	47.4 47.5	35.9 37.5
1973 1974	45.8	41.0 46.2	58.0	57.9	36.7	42.2	47.6	40.6	42.4	49.2	41.4
1975 1976	50.1	50.6 55.6	63.0 67.0	62.9 66.9	43.8 50.3	45.1 47.0	53.7 57.6	43.5 47.8	47.5 52.0	53.3 56.5	46.0 51.3
1977	59 0	59.7	70.5	70.4	54.7	49.7	61.9	50.0	57.0	60.2	56.4
1978 1979	61.7 70.5	62.5 71.7	75.9 81.9	75.8 81.8	55.8 60.2	51.8 70.1	67.0 73.7	51.5 54.9	61.8 67.5	64 4 69.0	61.2 67.2
1980		84.2	88.5	88.4	62.3 76.9	97.4 108.5	81.5 89.2	69.0 85.6	74.9 82.9	75.4 83.7	74.1 82.1
1981		93.8 97.1	93.9 97.5	93.7 97.4	88.8	102.8	96.0	94.9	92.5	92.3	92.0
1983	99.3	99.3 103.6	99.9 102.6	99.9	98.7 112.5	99.4 97.9	100.3 103.8	99.5 105.7	100.6 106.8	100.2 107.5	100.1 106.
1985	106.4	106.2	106.1	106.1	113 7	98.7	106.8	110.5	113.5	115.2	113.
1986 1987	102.3 105.4	101.2	110.6 114.4	110.6 114.6	108.8 113.1	77.1 80.2	110.3	117.0 121.1	122.0 130.1	122.8 131.0	121.
1988 1989	108.7	107.6 112.9	116.5 119.2	116.9 119.2	118.0 120.4	80.9 88.5	119.7 124.9	123.3 129.5	138.6 149.3	139.9 150.8	138. 148.
1990	120.5	118.8	121 4	121.0	117.6	101.2	130.1	142.6	162.8	163.4	162. 177.
1991		121.9 124.6	126.0 129.2	125.3 128.4	118.1 123.2	99.4 99.0	136.0 141.3	148.9 151.4	177.0 190.1	176.8 188.1	190.
1993	130.4	127.5 131.4	132.7 137.6	131.5 136.0	133.9 141.7	98.0 98.5	145.9 150.2	167.0 172.0	201.4 211.0	195.0 200.7	202. 213.
1994 1995	139.1	136.3	141.0	139.0	156.5	100.0	154.0	175.9	220.5	204.5	224.
1996		140.0 141.0	143.7 144.3	141.4 141.7	157.0 151.1	106.3	158.4 162.7	181.9 186.7	228.2 234.6	210.4 215.3	232. 239.
1998	141.6	137.9	143.4 142.9	140.7 139.6	150.6 152.0	92.2 100.7	167.1 171.9	190 3 197.7	242.1 250.6	221.8 230.7	246. 255.
2000	153.3	149.1	142.8	139.6	155 8	129.3	177.3	209.6	260.8	238.1	266.
2001	154.3 152.9	150.0 148.8	142.1 140.0	138.9 137.3	158.7 152.0	124.7 116.6	183.5 190.2	210.6 207.4	272.8 285.6	247.6 256.4	278. 292.
2003	. 157.6	153.6	137.9	134.7	142.9	135.8	195.6	209.3	297.1	262.8	306.
2004	163.1 173.9	159.4 170.2	137.1 137.9	133.9 135.2	133.3 139.4	160.4 195.7	200.2 206.9	209.1 217.3	310.1 323.2	269.3 276.0	321. 336.
2004: Jan Feb		153.2 154.9	138.0 138.3	134.7 134.8	130.8 131.0	136.7 143.1	198.2 198.2	206.3 208.1	303.6 306.0	265.5 266.7	313. 316.
Mar	160.5	156.6	137.9	134.6	131.2	150.5	198.5	209.9	307.5	267.3	318. 319.
Apr May		157.9 161.5	137.6 137.4	134.3 134.4	131.3 131.8	155.9 170.5	198.6 199.0	211.5 210.7	308.3 309.0	268.5 269.1	319.
June	. 165.7	161.9	137.2 135.9	134.2	130.6	173.3 165.2	199.7 200.3	212.3 214.4	310.0 311.0	269.6 269.9	321. 322.
July Aug	. 162.9	160.0 159.1	134.9	133.0 132.0	132.1 133.8	162.0	200.8	209.7	311.6	270.0	323.
Sept Oct	. 162.9	159.4 162.9	134.9 135.9	131.9 133.0	136.5 136.8	161.2 173.1	200.7	205.3 206.5	312.3 313.3	270.9 271.7	323. 324.
Nov Dec	. 167.2	163.6 161.3	137.9 138.8	134.9 135.5	136.7 137.3	171.9 161.2	202.9 203.3	208.6 205.4	314.1 314.9	271 2 270.8	326. 327.
2005: Jan	. 164.0	160.5	139.8	136.4	137.5	156.4	204.0	204.4	316.8	271 6	329.
Feb Mar	. 166.1	162.6 165.2	139.9 139.1	136.4 135.7	137.6 137.7	164.3 175.9	203.9 204.7	205.9 210.1	319.3 320.7	272.8 273.2	332. 334.
Apr	. 173.2	169.6	138.8	135.6	138.1	193.9	205.0	215.0	321.5 322.2	273.5 274.6	335. 335.
May June		168.3 167.7	138.7 138.1	135.5 135.1	138.8 139.9	188.2 185.5	205.6 206.1	218.0 222.4	322.9	275.6	336.
July	. 174.4	170.3	136.3	133.9	141.0 142.0	197.5 212.7	206.7 207.3	226 1 223.3	324.1 323.9	276.3 276.8	337. 337.
Aug Sept	. 186.5	173.8 183.1	135.0 135.8	132.7 133.6	141.5	249.5	208.7	220.7	324.6	277.7	337.
Oct Nov	. 184.0	180.5 171.8	137.1 138.0	135.1 136.1	140.6 139.4	237.1	209.8 210.5	222 7 220.8	326.2 328.1	278.9 280.3	339. 341.
Dec		168.9	138.3	136.6	139.2	187.3	210.7	217.6	328 4	280.8	342.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-62.—Consumer price indexes for commodities, services, and special groups, 1960-2005 [For all urban consumers; 1982-84=100, except as noted]

		Commo	dities	Ser	vices		Special	ındexes		,	All items	
Year or month	All items (CPI-U)	All com- modities	Com- modi- ties less food	AII	Services less medical care services	All items less food	All items less energy	All items less food and energy	All items less medical care	CPI-U- X1 (Dec. 1982= 97.6)1	CPI-U- RS (Dec. 1977= 100) <sup>2</sup>	C-CPI- U (Dec. 1999= 100) <sup>3</sup>
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	29 6 29 9 30 2 30 6 31 0 31 5 32 4 33 4 34 8 36 7	33 6 33 8 34 1 34 4 35 2 36 8 38 1 39 9	36 0 36.1 36 3 36 6 36 9 37 2 37 7 38 6 40 0 41 7	24 1 24 5 25 0 25 5 26 0 26 6 27 6 28 8 30.3 32 4	25 0 25 4 25 9 26.3 26.8 27 4 28 3 29.3 30.8 32 9	29 7 30.0 30 3 30.7 31 1 31 6 32 3 33 4 34 9 36 8	30 4 30 7 31 1 31.5 32 0 32.5 33 5 34 4 35.9 38 0	30.6 31.0 31.4 31.8 32.3 32.7 33.5 34.7 36.3 38.4	30.2 30.5 30.8 31.1 31.5 32.0 33.0 33.7 35.1 37.0	32.2 32.5 32.8 33.3 33.7 34.2 35.2 36.3 37.7 39.4		
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1976 1977 1978	38 8 40 5 41 8 44 4 49 3 53 8 56 9 60 6 65.2 72 6	41 7 43 2 44 5 47 8 53 5 58 2 60 7 64 2 68 8 76 6	43 4 45.1 46.1 47.7 52.8 57 6 60 5 63.8 67.5 75 3	35 0 37 0 38 4 40 1 43 8 48 0 52 0 56 0 60 8 67 5	35.6 37.5 38.9 40.6 44.3 48.3 52.2 55.9 60.7 67.5	39.0 40.8 42.0 43.7 48.0 52.5 56.0 59.6 63.9 71.2	40.3 42.0 43.4 46.1 50.6 55.1 58.2 61.9 66.7 73.4	40.8 42.7 44.0 45.6 49.4 53.9 57.4 61.0 65.5 71.9	39.2 40.8 42.1 44.8 49.8 54.3 57.2 60.8 65.4 72.9	41.3 43.1 44.4 47.2 51.9 56.2 59.4 63.2 67.5 74.0	104.3	
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	82 4 90 9 96 5 99 6 103 9 107 6 109 6 113 6 118 3 124 0	86 0 93 2 97 0 99 8 103 2 105 4 104 4 107 7 111 5 116.7	85.7 93.1 96.9 100.0 103.1 105.2 101.7 104.3 107.7 112.0	77 9 88 1 96.0 99 4 104 6 109 9 115 4 120.2 125 7 131.9	78 2 88 7 96 4 99.2 104 4 109 6 114.6 119 1 124.3 130.1	81.5 90.4 96.3 99.7 104.0 108.0 109.8 113.6 118.3 123.7	81 9 90 1 96 1 99 6 104 3 108 4 112 6 117 2 122 3 128 1	80.8 89.2 95.8 99.6 104.6 109.1 113.5 118.2 123.4 129.0	82.8 91.4 96.8 99.6 103.7 107.2 108.8 112.6 117.0 122.4	82.3 90.1 95.6 99.6 103.9 107.6 109.6 113.6 118.3 124.0	126.7 138.6 146.8 152.9 159.0 164.3 167.3 173.0 179.3 187.0	
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	130 7 136 2 140 3 144 5 148 2 152 4 156.9 160 5 163.0	122 8 126 6 129 1 131 5 133 8 136.4 139 9 141 8 141.9	117 4 121 3 124.2 126.3 127.9 129 8 132 6 133.4 132.0 134 0	139.2 146.3 152.0 157.9 163.1 168.7 174.1 179.4 184.2 188.8	136.8 143.3 148.4 153.6 158.4 163.5 168.7 173.9 178.4 182.7	130.3 136.1 140.8 145.1 149.0 153.1 157.5 161.1 163.4 167.0	134.7 140.9 145.4 150.0 154.1 158.7 163.1 167.1 170.9 174.4	135.5 142.1 147.3 152.2 156.5 161.2 165.6 169.5 173.4 177.0	128.8 133.8 137.5 141.2 144.7 148.6 152.8 156.3 158.6 162.0	130.7 136.2 140.3 144.5 148.2 152.4 156.9 160.5 163.0 166.6	196.3 203.4 208.5 213.7 218.2 223.5 229.5 234.4 237.7 242.7	
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2004 Jan Feb Mar	172 2 177 1 179 9 184 0 188 9 195 3 185 2 186 2 187 4	149 2 150 7 149 7 151 2 154 7 160 2 151 1 152 3 153.7	139 2 138.9 136.0 136.5 138.8 144.5 134.7 136.3 138.0	195.3 203.4 209.8 216.5 222.8 230.1 219.1 219.9 221.0	188 9 196.6 202 5 208.7 214 5 221.2 211 0 211.7 212.7	173.0 177.8 180.5 184.7 189.4 196.0 185.5 186.6 188.0	178.6 183.5 187.7 190.6 194.4 198.7 191.9 192.7 193.7	181.3 186.1 190.5 193.2 196.6 200.9 194.0 194.9	167.3 171.9 174.3 178.1 182.7 188.7 179.1 180.1 181.3	172.2 177.1 179.9 184.0 188.9 195.3 185.2 186.2 187.4	272 9	110.2 113.3 108.3 108.9 109.6
Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	188.0 189.1 189.7 189.4 189.5 189.9 190.9 191.0 190.3	154 3 156 0 155 8 154 5 154 2 154 9 157 1 157 2 155 8	138 9 140 6 140 3 138 2 137 7 138 8 141 4 141 4	221 5 221 9 223.3 224 1 224.5 224 5 224 6 224 6	213 2 213 6 215 0 215 8 216 2 216 1 216.0 216.1 216.0	188.6 189.6 190.3 189.9 189.9 190.4 191.4 191.5 190.6	194 1 194.3 194 4 194 5 194 7 195 2 196 0 196.0 195 8	196.5 196.5 196.6 196.6 196.8 197.4 198.2 198.1 197.8	181.8 182.9 183.5 183.2 183.2 183.6 184.6 184.7 183.9	188.0 189.1 189.7 189.4 189.5 189.9 190.9 191.0 190.3	275.3 276.2 275.9 275.9 276.5 278.0 278.2 277.1	110.6 110.5 110.5 110.8 111.3 111.3 110.9
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	190.7 191.8 193.3 194.6 194.4 194.5 195.4 198.8 199.2 197.6 196.8	155 4 156 5 158 2 160.3 159 8 159 5 161 1 165 6 165 1 161 5	138 6 140 2 142 5 144 9 144 0 142 8 143 5 145 7 151 8 150 8 143 3	225 6 226 8 228 0 228 6 228 8 229 8 230 9 231 3 231 7 233 0 233 5 233 2	217 0 218 0 219 2 219 7 219 9 220 9 222 5 222 8 224 1 224 4 224 2	190.9 192.3 194.0 195.3 195.1 195.2 196.1 197.3 200.0 200.4 198.5 197.4	196 4 197 3 198.3 198.6 198.6 198.5 198.7 198.9 199.2 200.1 200.2	198 4 199.5 200.7 200 9 200.8 200.6 200.8 201 0 201.3 202 3 202 1	184.2 185.3 186.8 187.9 187.9 188.8 192.3 192.6 190.9	190.7 191.8 193.3 194.6 194.4 194.5 195.4 196.4 198.8 199.2 197.6	281.5 283.4 283.1 283.2 284.5 286.0 289.5 290.1 287.7	111.7 112.5 113.1 113.1 113.0 113.4 113.8 114.7 115.0 114.4

<sup>\*</sup>CPI-U-X1 is a rental equivalence approach to homeowners' costs for the CPI-U for years prior to 1983, the first year for which the official index incorporates such a measure CPI-U-X1 is rebased to the December 1982 value of the CPI-U (1982-84=100) and is identical with CPI-U data from December 1982 forward. Data prior to 1967 estimated by moving the series at the same rate as the CPI-U for each year.

\*CPI research series using current methods (CPI-U-RS) introduced in June 1999. Data for 2005 are preliminary. All data are subject to re-

Source Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics

vision annually <sup>3</sup> Chained consumer price index introduced in August 2002 Data for 2004 and 2005 are subject to revision.

TABLE B-63.—Changes in special consumer price indexes, 1960-2005 [For all urban consumers; percent change]

All items less

All items less food

All items less

All items less

All items

Year or month			foo		ener		and en		medical	
Year or month	Dec. to Dec. <sup>1</sup>	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. <sup>1</sup>	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec.1	Year to year	Dec to Oec.1	Year to year
1960	1.4	1.7	1.0	1.7	13	1.7	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3
1961	.7	1.0	1.3	1.0	.7	1.0	1.3	1.3	.3	1.0
1962	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1 3	1.0
1963	1.6	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.9	1.3	1.6	1.3	16	1.0
1964	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.2	16	io	1 3
1965	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.9	1.6
1966	3.5	2.9	3.5	2.2	3.4	3 1	3.3	2.4	3.4	3.1
	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.2	2.7	3.8	3.6	2.7	2.1
	4.7	4.2	5.0	4.5	4.9	4.4	5.1	4.6	4.7	4.2
		5.5	5.6	5.4	6.5	5.8	6.2	5.8	6.1	5.4
1969	6.2	5.5	3.6	5.4	0.0	3.6	0.2	3.8	1.0	-
1970	5.6	5.7	6.6	6.0	5.4	6.1	6.6	6.3	5.2	5.9
1971	3.3	4.4	3.0	4.6	3.4	4.2	3.1	4.7	3.2	4.1
1972	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.9	3.5	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.2
1973	8.7	6.2	5.6	4.0	8.2	6.2	4.7	3.6	9.1	6.4
1974	12.3	11.0	12.2	9.8	11.7	9.8	11.1	8.3	12.2	11.2
1975	6.9	9.1	7.3	9.4	6.6	8.9	6.7	9.1	6.7	9.0
1976	4.9	5.8	6.1	6.7	4.8	5.6	6.1	6.5	4.5	5.3
	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.7	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.7	6.3
	9.0	7.6	8.3	7.2	9.1	7.8	8.5	7.4	91	7.6
						10.0	11.3	9.8	13.4	11.5
1979	13.3	11.3	14.0	11.4	11.1	10.0		3.0		11.5
1980	12.5	13.5	13.0	14.5	11.7	11.6	12.2	12.4	12.5	13.6
1981	8.9	10.3	9.8	10.9	8.5	10.0	9.5	10.4	8.8	10.4
1982	3.8	6.2	4.1	6.5	4.2	6.7	4.5	7.4	3.6	5.9
1983		3.2	4.1	3.5	4.5	3.6	4.8	4.0	3.6	2.9
1984	3.9	4.3	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.7	4.7	5.0	3.9	4.1
1985	3.8	3.6	4.1	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.3	3.5	3.4
1986	1.1	1.9	- 5	1.7	3.8	3.9	3.8	4.0	.7	1.5
	4.4	3.6	4.6	3.5	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.3	3.5
	4.4	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.7	4.4	1.7	4.4	4.2	3.9
	4.6	4.8	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.6
	4.0						***			
1990	6.1	5.4	6.3	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.0	5.9	5.2
1991	3.1	4.2	3.3	4.5	3.9	4.6	4.4	4.9	2.7	3.9
1992	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.7	2.7	2.8
1993	2.7	3.0	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	2.6	2.7
1994	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.5	2.5
1995	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.7
	3.3	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.7	3.3	2.8
	1.7	2.3	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.2	2.4	1.6	2.3
		1.6	1.5	1.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	1.5	1.5
	1.6					2.0	1.9	2.3	2.6	2.1
1999	2.7	2.2	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0	
2000	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.4	3.3	3.3
2001	1.6	2.8	1.3	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	1.4	2.7
2002	2.4	1.6	2.6	1.5	1.8	2.3	1.9	2.4	2.2	1.4
2003	1.9	2.3	1.5	2.3	1.5	1.5	1.1	1 4	1.8	2.2
2004	3.3	2.7	3.4	2.5	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.8	3.2	2.6
	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	3.3	3.3
2005	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.3	2.2	۷.۷	2.2	4.4	3.3	5.5

				Percent	change from	preceding	month			
	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- sonally ad- justed
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	0.5 .6 .3 .6 .3 2 .1 .2 .5	0.5 3 .4 .2 .6 .3 1 .1 .2 .6 .3	0.6 .6 .8 .3 .5 .4 -2 0 .3 .5	0.5 .3 .5 .3 .5 .3 1 .2 .6	0.2 4 .5 .2 .1 .1 .1 .3 .4 0	0.2 .2 .3 .2 .3 .2 .3 .2 .1	0.2 .5 .6 .2 0 .1 0 .1 .3 .4 1	0.2 .2 .3 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .3 .2 .2	0.5 6 .7 .3 .6 .3 -2 0 .2 .5	0.4 -3 .5 .2 .6 .3 1 0 .2 .6 .2
2005: Jan Feb Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec May Feb May Dec May Dec May Feb M	.2 .6 .8 .7 1 .5 .5 .1 .2 8 4	.1 .4 .6 .5 .5 .5 .5 .1 .2 .2 .6 .1	.2 .7 .9 .7 -1 .1 .5 .6 1.4 9 6	.1 .4 .7 .5 .1 0 .6 .6 .6 .1 4 .2 .7 .7	.3 .5 .5 .2 0 1 .1 .2 .5 .0 0	2 .2 .4 .2 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .3 .3	.3 .6 .6 .1 -0 1 .1 .1 .5	.2 .3 .4 .0 1 1 1 .1 .2 .2	.2 .6 .8 .7 1 0 .5 .5 .1.3 .2 9 5	.1 .3 .6 .5 1 0 .5 .6 1 3 .2 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes. Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-64.—Changes in consumer price indexes for commodities and services, 1929-2005 [For all urban consumers, percent change]

		All it	ems -U)		Commo	odities	-		Serv	ices		Med	ical e <sup>2</sup>	Ener	gy <sup>3</sup>
	Voor			Tot	al	Foo	d	Tot	al	Medica	l care	Doo	Voor	Doc	Voor
	Year	Dec to Dec	Year to year	Dec to Dec 1	Year to year	Dec to Dec	Year to year	Dec to Dec 1	Year to year	Dec to Dec	Year to year	Dec. 1 Dec. 1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. <sup>1</sup>	Year to year
1929		0.6	0			2 5	1.2								
1933		8	-51		0.0	6 9	-2.8		0	1.2	1.2	1.0	0	********	
1939		0 7	-1 4 7	-0 7 1 4	-20 7	-25 25	-2 5 1 7	2	8	0	0	0	1.0		
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949		9 9 9 9 0 3.0 2 3 2 2 2 18 1 8 8 8 3.0 -2 1	5 0 10 9 6 1 1 7 2 3 8 3 14 4 8 1 -1 2	13 3 12 9 4 2 2 0 2 9 24 8 10 3 1 7 -4 1	6 7 14 5 9 3 1 0 3 0 10 6 20 5 7.2 -2.7	25 15.7 17.9 3.0 0 3 5 31 3 11 3 - 8 -3 9	9 2 17.6 11.0 -1.2 2 4 14 5 21.7 8 3 -4 2	2.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.6 5.6 5.9 3.7	8 31 2.3 2.2 1.5 1.4 4.3 6.1 5.1	3.5 5.6 3.2 3.1 9.0 6.4 6.9 1.6	0 3.5 4.5 4.3 3.1 5.1 8.7 7.1 3.3	1.0 3.8 4.6 2.6 2.6 8.3 6.9 5.8 1.4	0 2.9 4.7 3.6 2.6 5.0 8.0 6.7 2.8		
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959		5 9 6 0 8 7 7 4 3.0 2 9 1 8 1 7	1 3 7 9 1 9 8 7 - 4 1 5 3 3 2 8 7	7 8 5.9 - 9 3 -1 6 3 2.6 2 8 1.2	.7 9 0 1 3 3 - 9 - 9 1 0 3 2 2 1	9 8 7 1 -1 0 -1 1 -1 8 7 2.9 2 8 2 4 -1 0	1.6 11.0 1 8 -1 4 4 -1 4 .7 3.2 4.5 -1.7	3.6 5.2 4 4 2 2 0 2 0 3 4 4 2 2.7 3 9	3 0 5.3 4 5 4 3 3 1 2.0 2.5 4 3 3 7 3.1	4.0 5.3 5.8 3.4 2.6 3.2 3.8 4.8 4.9	2 4 4 7 6.7 3.5 3.4 2.6 3.8 4 3 5.3 4 5	3.4 5.8 4.3 3.5 2.3 3.2 4.7 4.5 3.8	2.0 5.3 5.0 3.6 2.9 2.2 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.4	-0.9 4.7	0 1.9
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969		1.4 .7 1.3 1.6 1.0 1.9 3.5 3.0 4.7 6.2	17 1.0 10 13 13 16 29 31 42 55	1.2 0 9 1.5 .9 1.4 2.5 2.5 4.0 5.4	.9 6 9 12 11 26 19 35	3 1 -7 1 3 2.0 1 3 3.5 4.0 1.2 4.4 7.0	1 0 1 3 7 1 6 1 3 2 2 5 0 .9 3 5 5 1	2.5 2.1 1.6 2.4 1.6 2.7 4.8 4.3 5.8 7.7	3 4 1 7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 3.8 4.3 5.2 6.9	3.7 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.3 3.6 8.3 8.0 7.1 7.3	4.3 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.3 3.2 5.3 8.8 7.3 8.2	3.2 3.1 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.8 6.7 6.3 6.2 6.2	3.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.4 4.4 7.2 6.0 6.7	1.3 -1.3 2.2 9 0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.9	2.3 .4 .4 0 4 1.8 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.5
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978		5.6 3.3 3.4 8.7 12.3 6.9 4.9 6.7 9.0	57 444 32 62 110 91 58 65 76	3 9 2 8 3.4 10 4 12 8 6 2 3 3 6.1 8 8 13.0	4.5 3.6 3.0 7.4 11.9 8.8 4.3 5.8 7.2 11.3	2.3 4 3 4 6 20.3 12.0 6.6 .5 8.1 11.8 10.2	5.7 3 1 4.2 14 5 14.3 8.5 3 0 6 3 9 9 11 0	8 1 4 1 3 4 6.2 11.4 8 2 7 2 8.0 9 3 13 6	8.0 5.7 3.8 4.4 9.2 9.6 8.3 7.7 8.6 11.0	8 1 5.4 3.7 6.0 13.2 10.3 10.8 9 0 9 3 10.5	7.0 7.4 3.5 4.5 10.4 12.6 10.1 9.9 8.5 9.8	7.4 4.6 3.3 5.3 12.6 9.8 10.0 8.9 8.8	6.6 6.2 3.3 4.0 9.3 12.0 9.5 9.6 8.4 9.2	4.8 3.1 2.6 17.0 21.6 11.4 7.1 7.2 7.9 37.5	2.8 3.9 2.6 8.1 29.6 10.5 7.1 9.5 6.3 25.1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988		12 5 8 9 3 8 3 8 3 9 3 8 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 6	13 5 10 3 6.2 3 2 4 3 3.6 1 9 3 6 4 1 4 8	11 0 6 0 3 6 2 9 2 7 2 5 -2 0 4 6 3 8 4 1	12 3 8 4 4 1 2 9 3 4 2 1 - 9 3 5 4 7	10 2 4 3 3 1 2 7 3 8 2 6 3 8 3.5 5 2 5 6	8.6 7.8 4.1 2.1 3.8 2.3 3.2 4.1 4.1 5.8	14.2 13.0 4.3 4.8 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.3 4.8 5.1	15 4 13 1 9.0 3.5 5.2 5 1 5.0 4.2 4 6 4 9	10.1 12.6 11.2 6.2 5.8 6.8 7.9 5.6 6.9 8.6	11.3 10.7 11.8 8.7 6.0 6.1 7.7 6.6 6.4 7.7	9.9 12.5 11.0 6.4 6.1 6.8 7.7 5.8 6.9 8.5	11.0 10.7 11.6 8.8 6.2 6.3 7.5 6.6 6.5 7.7	18.0 11.9 1.3 5 .2 1.8 -19.7 8.2 5	30.9 13.6 1.5 .7 1.0 .7 -13.2 .5 .8 5.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999		61 31 29 27 27 25 33 17 16 27	5 4 2 3 0 3 0 2 6 2 3 3 0 2 1 6 2 2	6 6 2 2 0 1 5 2 3 1 4 4 3 2 2 4 7 2 7	5 2 3 1 2 0 1 9 1 7 1 9 2 6 1 4 1 8	5 3 1 9 1 5 5 2 9 1 2 2 2 4 3 5 2 3 1 9	5.8 2.9 1.2 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.2 2.1	5 7 4 6 3 3 9 3 3 3 2 2 6 2 6	551 399 334 330 225	9.9 8.0 7.0 5.9 5.4 4.4 3.2 2.9 3.6	9.3 8.9 7.6 5.2 5.1 2.2 3.4	9.6 7.9 6.6 5.4 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.7	9.0 8.7 7.4 5.9 4.5 3.5 2.8 3.5	18.1 -7.4 2.0 -1.4 2.2 -1.3 8.6 -3.4 -8.8 13.4	8.3 .4 .5 1.2 .4 .6 4.7 1.3 -7.7 3.6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005		3 4 1 6 2 4 1 9 3 3 3 4	3 4 2 8 1 6 2 3 2 7 3 4	2 7 -1 4 1 2 5 3 6 2 7	3 3 1 0 - 7 1 0 2 3 3 6	2.8 2.8 1.5 3.6 2.7 2.3	2.3 3.2 1.8 2.2 3.4 2.4	3.9 3.7 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.8	3 4 4 1 3 1 3 2 2 9 3 3	4.6 4.8 5.6 4.2 4.9 4.5	4.3 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.0 4.8	4.2 4.7 5.0 3.7 4.2 4.3	4.1 4.6 4.7 4.0 4.4 4.2	14.2 -13.0 10.7 6.9 16.6 17.1	16.9 3.8 -5.9 12.2 10.9 17.0

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

<sup>1</sup> Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.
2 Commodities and services
3 Household fuels—gas (piped), electricity, fuel oil, etc.,—and motor fuel. Motor oil, coolant, etc., also included through 1982.

TABLE B-65.—Producer price indexes by stage of processing, 1959-2005 [1982=100]

					Fin	ished god	ods			
		Con	sumer to	ods	Fini	shed god	ods excludi	ng consume	r foods	
Year or month	Total finished	Total	Crude	Proc-		C	onsumer g	oods	Capital equipment  32 7 32 8 32 9 33 0 33 1 33 4 6 35 8 3 7 0 3 8 3 7 0 9 0 9 7 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Total finishe consum
	goods	iotai	Crude	essed	Total	Total	Durable	Non- durable	equipment	goods
9	33.1	34.8	37.3	34.7		33.3	43.9	28 2		33
9	. 33.4 33.4	35.5 35.4	39.8 38.0	35.2		33.5 33.4	43.8 43.6	28 4 28 4	32 8	33
1	33.5	35.7	38.4 37.8	35.3 35.6		33.4	43 4	28.4	33.0	33 33
i3i4	33.4	35.3 35.4	37.8 38.9	35.2 35.2		33 4 33.3	43.1 43.3	28.5 28.4	33.1	33
5	34.1	36.8	39.0	36.8		33.6	43.3	28 8	33.4	3
6	35.2	39.2	41.5	39.2		34.1	43.4	29.3 30.0	34 6	3
7 8	35.6 36.6	38.5 40.0	39.6 42.5	38.8 40.0	35.0 35.9	34.7 35.5	44 1 45.1	30.0	37.0	3!
9	38.0	42.4	45.9	42.3	36.9	36.3	45 9	31.5	38.3	3
		43.8	46 0	43.9	38.2	37.4	47.2	32.5		3! 4!
1 2	. 40.5 41.8	44.5 46.9	45.8 48.0	44.7 47.2	39.6 40.4	38.7 39.4	48.9 50.0	33 5 34 1	41.7	4
3	45.6	56.5	63.6 71.6	55.8	42.0	41.2	50 9	36.1	44 2	4
4	52.6	64.4 69.8	71.6 71.7	63.9 70.3	48.8 54.7	48.2 53.2	55.5 61.0	44.0 48.9		5 5
5 6	60.8	69.6	76.7	69.0	58 1	56.5	63 7 67.4	52.4	62 1	6
7	64.7	73.3	79.5	72.7 79.4	58 1 62.2 66.7	60.6 64.9	67.4 73.6	56 8 60 0	66.1	6
8 9	69.8 . 77.6	79.9 87.3	85.8 92.3	79.4 86.8	74.6	73.5	80.8	69 3		7
0		92.4	93.9	92.3	86.7	87.1	91.0	85.1	85.8	8
1	96.1	97.8	104.4	97.2	95.6	96.1	96.4	95.8	94 6	. 9
2 3	100.0	100.0 101.0	100.0 102.4	100.0 100.9	100.0 101.8	100.0	100.0 102.8	100 0 100.5		10
4	103.7	105.4	1114	104.9	103 2	101.2 102.2	104.5	1011	105.2	10 10
5	104.7	104.6	102.9	1048	104.6	1033	106.5	101.7	107.5	10 10
5 6 7	103.2 105.4	107.3 109.5	105.6 107.1	107 4 109.6	101.9 104.0	98.5 100.7	108.9 111.5	93 3 94.9	109.7	10
8	108.0	112.6	109.8	112.7	106.5	103.I	113.8	97.3	1143	10
9	113.0	118.7	119.6	118.6	111.8	108.9	117.6	103.8		11
0 1	119.2 121.7	124.4	123.0 119.3	124.4	117.4	115.3 118.7	120 4 123.9	111.5 115.0	122 9	11 12 12
2	123.2	124.1 123.3 125.7	107.6	124.4 124.4	120.9 123.1	120.8	125.7	117 3	129.1	12
3	124 7	125.7	1144	126 5 127.9	124.4	121.7	128.0 130 9	117 6 116 2		12
4 5 6 7	125.5 . 127.9	126.8 129.0	111.3 118.8	127.9	125.I 127.5	121.6 124.0	130.7	118.8	134.1	12 12
6	. 131.3	133.6	129.2	129.8 133.8	130.5	124.0 127.6	134.2	123.3	138.3	12
78	131.8	134.5 134.3	126.6 127.2	135.I 134.8	130.9 129.5	128 2 126.4	133 7 132.9	124.3	138.2	13 12
8 9	133.0	135.1	125.5	135.9	132.3	130 5	133.0	122.2 127.9	137.6	13
0	138.0	137.2	123 5 127.7	138.3	138.1	138 4	133 9	138.7	138 8	13
0	140.7	141.3 140.1	127.7 128.5	142 4 141.0	140 4 138.3	141.4 138.8	134.0 133.0	142.8 139.8		14 13
3	143.3	145 9	130.0	147.2	142.4 147.2	144.7	133.1	1484	139 5	14
4	148.5 155.7	152.7	138.2 139.4	153.9	147.2	150.9 162.0	135.0 136.7	156.6 172.1	1414	15 16
5		155.6		156.9	155.5					
4- Jan Feb Mar Apr Apr May June July Aug Soot	145.4 145.3	148 1 148.4	141.5 134.8	148 6 149 5	144.5 144.3	147.4 147.3	134.3 134.2	151.7 151.6	140.5	14 14
Mar	146.3	150.7	145.8 130.8	151.0	144.9 145.7	148.0	134.7	151 6 152 4	140.5	14
Apr	147.3	152.7 155.5	130.8	154-5 157-4	145.7 147.0	149.1 150.9	134.4 134.8	154.3 156.7	140 6	15 15
June	148.7	155.0	120.0	158.0	146.8	150.5	134 9	156.0	141 1	15
July	148.5	152.3 152.2	117.5 127.3	155.2 154.3	147.2 147.3	151.4 151.3	133.6 133.6	158.0 157.9		15
Sent	148.5 148.7	152.2	140.2	154 3	147.5	151.5	133.5	158.2	141.2	15
Oct	152 0	155.1	162 9 159 0	154.3	150.9	155.6 155.3	137.8	162 1	143.4	15
Sept	151.7 150.6	154.7 154.9	159.0 146.4	154.2 155.5	150.7 149.2	155.3	137.4 137.2	161.8 158.5	143 4	15 15
r 1	1514						137.8	160 7		15
5: Jan Feb	151.4 152.1	154 2 155.4	131.4 142.3	156 I 156.4	150 5 151.0	154.6 155.5	137.0	162.4	143 9	15
Mar	153.6	156.3	142.3 145.5	156.4 157.2 157.2	152 6	155.5 157.8	137.0	165.7	144 2	15
Apr	154.4 154.3	156.3 156.7	144 6 140 3	157 2 158.0	153 6 153.5	159.2 158.8	136 9 136 8	167 9 167 4	144 5	15
June	154.3	155.5 154.4	137.0	157.1	153 6	159.3	135.6	168 7	144 2	15
	155.5	154.4	128 0	156.6	155.5	162 1	135 8	172 6 175 4	144 4 144 4	16 16
Aug I Sent	156.3 158.9	154.0 155.9	126 3 14 I 0	156.3 157.1	156.6 159.4	163.8 168.0	135.4 135.5	1814	144 5	16
Oct	1610	155.6 155.9 157.1	141.0 135.7 142.9	157.2	162.1	1713	138 0	185 1	145 9	16
Nov	158 4 158 8	155.9	142.9 157.9	156.9 157.0	158 8 158.9	166.5 166.7	137.1 137.0	178 5 178.9	145 5 145 5	16 16

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$  Data have been revised through August 2005; data are subject to revision  $\overline{4}$  months after date of original publication. See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-65.—Producer price indexes by stage of processing, 1959-2005—Continued [1982=100]

		ŀr	ntermedia	e materials.	supplies, and	d compon	ents		Crude materials for further processing			ssing	
V				Materia	als and	Proc- essed				Food-		Other	
Year or month	Total	Foods and feeds?	Other	For manufac- turing	For construc- tion	fuels and lubri- cants	Con- tainers	Supplies	Total	stuffs and feed- stuffs	Total	Fuel	Other
1959	30 8		30 5	33 3	32 9	16 2	33.0	33.5	31 1	38.8		10.4	28.1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	30 8 30 6 30 7 30 8 31 2 32 0 32 2 33 0 34 1	41 8 41 5 42 9	30 7 30 3 30 2 30 1 30 3 30 7 31 3 31 7 32 5 33 6	33 3 32 9 32 7 32 7 33 1 33 6 34 3 34 5 35 3 36 5	32 7 32 2 32 1 32 2 32 5 32 8 33 6 34 0 35 7 37.7	16 6 16 8 16 7 16 6 16 2 16 5 16 8 16 9 16 5	33 4 33 2 33 6 33.2 32 9 33 5 34 5 35 0 35 9 37.2	33.3 33.7 34.5 35.0 34.7 35.0 36.5 36.8 37.1 37.8	30 4 30.2 30.5 29 9 29.6 31 1 33 1 31.3 31.8 33 9	38.4 37.9 38.6 37.5 36.6 39.2 42.7 40.3 40.9 44.1	21.1 21.6 22.5	10.5 10.5 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.5	26.9 27.2 27.1 26.7 27.2 27.7 28.3 26.5 27.1 28.4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	35 4 36 8 38 2 42 4 52 5 58 0 60 9 64 9 69 5 78 4	45 6 46 7 49 5 70.3 83 6 81 6 77 4 79 6 84 8 94 5	34 8 36 2 37 7 40 6 50 5 56 6 60 0 64 1 68 6 77.4	38.0 38.9 40.4 44.1 56.0 61.7 64.0 67.4 72.0 80.9	38 3 40 8 43.0 46.5 55.0 60.1 64 1 69 3 76 5 84 2	17.7 19.5 20.1 22.2 33.6 39.4 42.3 47.7 49.9 61.6	39 0 40 8 42.7 45.2 53.3 60.0 63 1 65 9 71 0 79 4	39 7 40 8 42 5 51 7 56.8 61 8 65 8 69.3 72 9 80.2	35.2 36.0 39.9 54.5 61.4 61.6 63.4 65.5 73.4 85.9	45.2 46.1 51.5 72.6 76.4 77.4 76.8 77.5 87.3 100.0	23.8 24.7 27.0 34.3 44.1 43.7 48.2 51.7 57.5 69.6	13.8 15.7 16.8 18.6 24.8 30.6 34.5 42.0 48.2 57.3	29.1 29.4 32.3 42.9 54.5 50.0 54.9 56.3 61.9 75.5
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989	90 3 98 6 100 0 100 6 103 1 102 7 99 1 101 5 107 1 112 0	105.5 104.6 100.0 103.6 105.7 97.3 96.2 99.2 109.5 113.8	89 4 98 2 100 0 100 5 103 0 103 0 99 3 101 7 106 9 111 9	91 7 98 7 100 0 101 2 104 1 103 3 102 2 105.3 113.2 118.1	91 3 97.9 100.0 102.8 105.6 107.3 108.1 109.8 116.1 121.3	85 0 100 6 100.0 95.4 95 7 92 8 72.7 73.3 71 2 76.4	89 1 96.7 100 0 100 4 105.9 109 0 110.3 114.5 120 1 125 4	89.9 96.9 100.0 101.8 104.1 104.4 105.6 107.7 113.7 118.1	95.3 103.0 100.0 101.3 103.5 95.8 87.7 93.7 96.0 103.1	104.6 103.9 100.0 101.8 104.7 94.8 93.2 96.2 106.1 111.2	84.6 101.8 100.0 100.7 102.2 96.9 81.6 87.9 85.5 93.4	69.4 84.8 100.0 105.1 105.1 102.7 92.2 84.1 82.1 85.3	91.8 109.8 100.0 98.8 101.0 94.3 76.0 88.5 85.9 95.8
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	114 5 114 4 114 7 116 2 118 5 124 9 125 7 125 6 123 0 123 2	113.3 111.1 110.7 112.7 114.8 114.8 128.1 125.4 116.2 111.1	114 5 114 6 114 9 116 4 118 7 125 5 125 6 125 7 123 4 123 9	118.7 118.1 117.9 118.9 122.1 130.4 128.6 128.3 126.1 124.6	122.9 124.5 126.5 132.0 136.6 142.1 143.6 146.5 146.8 148.9	85.9 85.3 84.5 84.7 83.1 84.2 90.0 89.3 81.1 84.6	127.7 128.1 127.7 126.4 129.7 148.8 141.1 136.0 140.8 142.5	119.4 121.4 122.7 125.0 127.0 132.1 135.9 135.9 134.8 134.2	108.9 101.2 100.4 102.4 101.8 102.7 113.8 111.1 96.8 98.2	113.1 105.5 105.1 108.4 106.5 105.8 121.5 112.2 103.9 98.7	101.5 94.6 93.5 94.7 94.8 96.8 104.5 106.4 88.4 94.3	84.8 82.9 84.0 87.1 82.4 72.1 92.6 101.3 86.7 91.2	107.3 97.5 94.2 94.1 97.0 105.8 105.7 103.5 84.5 91.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	129 2 129 7 127 8 133 7 142 6 153 9	111 7 115 9 115 5 125 9 137 1 133 8	130 1 130 5 128.5 134 2 143 0 155 0	128.1 127.4 126.1 129.7 137.9 145.8	150.7 150.6 151.3 153.6 166.4 176.6	102.0 104.5 96.3 112.6 124.3 149.8	151.6 153.1 152.1 153.7 159.3 167.0	136 9 138.7 138 9 141.5 146 7 151.9	120.6 121.0 108.1 135.3 159.0 182.1	100.2 106.1 99.5 113.5 127.0 122.6	130.4 126.8 111.4 148.2 179.2 223.2	136.9 151.4 117.3 185.7 211.4 279.1	118.0 101.5 101.0 116.9 149.2 176.8
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	136 2 137 3 138 3 140 2 142 0 142.8 143 5 144 8 145 3 146 5 147 4 146 9	132 2 133 7 137 0 143 2 147 7 144.9 142 3 136.3 134 4 131 9 130 7 131 0	136 5 137 6 138 4 140 2 141 9 142 8 143 7 145.3 145.9 147.3 148 3 147 8	131 9 133.2 134 3 136 2 137 7 138 1 139 4 140 6 141 5 142 0 142 8	156 2 159.0 161 9 164 7 166 9 167.5 169 8 170.9 170 7 171.3	116.8 116.8 116.5 118.4 122.3 124.9 126.4 128.5 126.9 130.8 134.0 128.9	153 9 153 7 154 1 154 9 156 7 158 9 159 7 162 0 163 5 164 6 164 9	143.2 143.8 144.8 146.4 147.2 147.3 148.0 147.6 147.9 148.1 148.5	147.8 150.1 152.9 155.7 161.8 163.0 162.5 162.2 154.4 160.5 171.5 165.7	117 1 122.2 131.7 135.4 141.1 137.4 130.9 124.8 122.0 120.1 119.5 121.5	167.3 167.3 164.8 166.6 172.9 178.0 182.2 186.6 174.9 187.3 207.1 195.3	207.9 200.2 182.9 191.8 208.4 229.8 219.9 214.0 186.9 194.1 256.8 243.8	133.3 137.7 143.8 141.4 141.5 136.8 148.9 158.9 156.8 171.4 165.2 155.0
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug : Sept Oct Nov Dec	148 0 148 8 150 4 151 5 151 0 151 7 153 2 153 9 157 5 161 9 159 8 159 3	132.0 131.7 133.3 133.6 135.0 134.8 134.9 134.4 133.6 134.4 133.8 133.8	148 9 149 7 151 3 152 5 151 9 152 6 154 1 154 9 158 7 163 3 161 1 160 6	143 9 144 4 145 2 144 9 144 3 144 6 144 4 146 6 148 8 149 2	173 1 174 7 175 1 175 4 175 5 175 7 175 6 175 7 175 7 177 0 179 3 180 9 181 8	129 5 130.9 136 0 141 5 139 5 142 9 149 3 153 4 165 2 179 7 167 1 163 0	165.5 166.1 166.9 167.5 167.3 167.4 166.8 165.7 166.2 168.4 169.6	149 6 150 0 150 7 151 1 151 4 151 7 152 0 152 2 152 3 153 4 153 8 154 0	163 0 162.5 170 4 175.0 170.6 167.0 175.4 181.8 198.4 211.1 207.6 202 4	123 8 121.5 127.7 124.9 126.2 122.0 120.9 119.6 120.6 120.6 120.7 123.2	188.7 189.7 198.7 208.9 200.2 197.1 212.8 225.1 253.5 275.9 269.7 258.4	217.0 217.8 221.7 252.4 237.1 223.5 250.1 265.0 332.8 394.1 389.3 348.3	160.3 161.4 172.8 170.6 166.1 169.3 177.7 187.8 191.8 190.3 183.8 190.3

<sup>2</sup> Intermediate materials for food manufacturing and feeds

Source Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

TABLE B-66.—Producer price indexes by stage of processing, special groups, 1974-2005 [1982=100]

				shed ods			Interme		iterials, si	upplies.	Crude	materia	ls for fur	ther
				Excli	uding tood energy	ds and								
Year or month	Total	Foods	Energy	Total	Capital equip- ment	Con- sumer goods exclud- ing foods and energy	Total	Foods and feeds <sup>1</sup>	Energy	Other	Total	Food- stuffs and feed- stuffs	Energy	Other
1974	52.6	64.4	26.2	53.6	50.5	55.5	52.5	83.6	33.1	54.0	614	76.4	27.8	83.
1975 1976 1977 1978	58.2 60.8 64.7 69.8 77.6	69.8 69.6 73.3 79.9 87.3	30.7 34.3 39.7 42.3 57.1	59.7 63.1 66.9 71.9 78.3	58.2 62.1 66.1 71.3 77.5	60.6 63.7 67.3 72.2 78.8	58.0 60.9 64.9 69.5 78.4	81.6 77.4 79.6 84.8 94.5	38 7 41.5 46.8 49.1 61.1	60.2 63.8 67.6 72.5 80.7	61 6 63.4 65.5 73.4 85.9	77.4 76.8 77.5 87.3 100.0	33.3 35.3 40.4 45.2 54 9	69.3 80.3 79.3 87.3 106.3
1980 1981 1982 1983	88.0 96.1 100.0 101.6 103.7	92.4 97.8 100.0 101.0 105.4	85.2 101.5 100.0 95.2 91.2	87.1 94.6 100.0 103.0 105.5	85.8 94.6 100.0 102.8 105.2	87.8 94.6 100.0 103.1 105.7	90.3 98.6 100.0 100.6 103.1	105.5 104.6 100.0 103.6 105.7	84 9 100.5 100.0 95.3 95.5	90.3 97.7 100.0 101.6 104.7	95.3 103.0 100.0 101.3 103.5	104 6 103.9 100.0 101 8 104 7	73.1 97.7 100.0 98.7 98.0	113. 111. 100. 105. 111.
1985 1986 1987 1988	104.7 103.2 105.4 108.0 113.6	104.6 107.3 109.5 112.6 118.7	87.6 63.0 61.8 59.8 65.7	108.1 110.6 113.3 117.0 122.1	107.5 109.7 111.7 114.3 118.8	108.4 111.1 114.2 118.5 124.0	102.7 99.1 101.5 107.1 112.0	97.3 96.2 99.2 109.5 113.8	92.6 72.6 73.0 70.9 76.1	105.2 104.9 107.8 115.2 120.2	95.8 87.7 93.7 96.0 103.1	94.8 93.2 96.2 106.1 111.2	93.3 71.8 75.0 67.7 75.9	104. 103. 115. 133. 137.
1990 1991 1992 1993	119.2 121.7 123.2 124.7 125.5	124.4 124.1 123.3 125.7 126.8	75.0 78.1 77.8 78.0 77.0	126.6 131.1 134.2 135.8 137.1	122.9 126.7 129.1 131.4 134.1	128.8 133.7 137.3 138.5 139.0	114.5 114.4 114.7 116.2 118.5	113.3 111.1 110.7 112.7 114.8	85.5 85.1 84.3 84.6 83.0	120.9 121.4 122.0 123.8 127.1	108.9 101.2 100.4 102.4 101.8	113.1 105.5 105.1 108.4 106.5	85.9 80.4 78.8 76.7 72.1	136. 128. 128. 140. 156.
1995 1996 1997 1998	131.8 130.7	129.0 133.6 134.5 134.3 135.1	78.1 83.2 83.4 75.1 78.8	140.0 142.0 142.4 143.7 146.1	136.7 138.3 138.2 137.6 137.6	141.9 144.3 145.1 147.7 151.7	124.9 125.7 125.6 123.0 123.2	114.8 128.1 125.4 116.2 111.1	84.1 89.8 89.0 80.8 84.3	135.2 134.0 134.2 133.5 133.1	102.7 113.8 111.1 96.8 98.2	105 8 121.5 112.2 103.9 98.7	69.4 85.0 87.3 68.6 78.5	173. 155. 156. 142. 135.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	138.0 140.7 138.9 143.3 148.5 155.7	137.2 141.3 140.1 145.9 152.7 155.6	94.1 96.7 88.8 102.0 113.0 132.7	148.0 150.0 150.2 150.5 152.7 156.4	138.8 139.7 139.1 139.5 141.4 144.7	154.0 156.9 157.6 157.9 160.3 164.4	129.2 129.7 127.8 133.7 142.6 153.9	111.7 115.9 115.5 125.9 137.1 133.8	101.7 104.1 95.9 111.9 123.2 149.1	136.6 136.4 135.8 138.5 146.5 154.5	120.6 121.0 108.1 135.3 159.0 182.1	100.2 106.1 99.5 113.5 127.0 122.6	122.1 122.3 102.0 147.2 174.6 233.8	145. 130. 135. 152. 193. 202.
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	145.4 145.3 146.3 148.9 148.7 148.5 148.5 148.7 152.0 151.7 150.6	148.1 148.4 150.7 152.7 155.5 155.0 152.3 152.2 152.7 155.1 154.7	106.0 105.7 107.0 109.5 113.6 112.5 115.4 115.0 115.1 121.1 120.1 114.5	151.8 151.7 152.0 152.1 152.2 152.3 151.9 152.2 152.3 154.7 154.7	140.5 140.2 140.5 140.6 140.8 141.1 140.7 141.2 141.2 143.4 143.4	159.4 159.7 159.8 159.9 160.0 159.4 159.6 159.7 162.2 162.3 162.5	136.2 137.3 138.3 140.2 142.0 142.8 143.5 144.8 145.3 146.5 147.4 146.9	132.2 133.7 137.0 143.2 147.7 144.9 142.3 136.3 134.4 131.9 130.7	115.8 115.8 115.6 117.3 121.1 123.7 125.1 127.1 125.8 129.9 132.7 128.4	140.4 141.7 142.9 144.6 145.7 146.2 146.8 148.3 149.5 150.1 150.6 151.1	147.8 150.1 152.9 155.7 161.8 163.0 162.5 162.2 154.4 160.5 171.5	117.1 122.2 131.7 135.4 141.1 137.4 130.9 124.8 122.0 120.1 119.5 121.5	163.5 158.9 153.0 158.8 172.1 180.0 177.9 181.9 166.6 181.8 208.3 192.7	179. 189. 195. 187. 177. 176. 195. 200. 197. 203. 207.
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug <sup>2</sup> Sept Oct Nov Dec	151 4 152.1 153.6 154.4 154.3 154.2 155.5 156.3 158.9 161.0 158.4	154.2 155.4 156.3 156.7 155.5 154.4 155.9 155.6 155.9	116.4 118.6 123.8 126.9 125.5 127.4 133.2 137.3 147.1 152.7 141.5 141.9	155.8 155.7 155.9 156.1 156.4 155.9 156.2 156.1 156.2 157.6 157.4	144.1 143.9 144.2 144.5 144.7 144.2 144.4 144.5 145.9 145.5	163.8 163.7 163.7 164.0 164.3 163.8 164.2 164.1 165.5 165.5	148.0 148.8 150.4 151.5 151.0 151.7 153.2 153.9 157.5 161.9 159.8 159.3	132.0 131.7 133.3 133.6 135.0 134.8 134.9 134.4 133.6 134.4 133.8 133.8	129.0 130.0 134.9 139.8 138.5 142.3 148.7 153.0 164.9 179.3 166.4 162.4	152.3 153.1 153.8 153.9 153.5 153.3 154.8 156.6 157.4 157.9	163.0 162.5 170.4 175.0 170.6 167.0 175.4 181.8 198.4 211.1 207.6 202.4	123.8 121.5 127.7 124.9 126.2 122.0 120.9 119.6 120.6 120.6 120.7	183.9 186.6 199.7 212.6 203.1 202.1 224.0 237.5 273.9 307.9 295.0 279.0	203 200. 199 204 196. 188. 190. 200 210. 205. 215 214

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Intermediate materials for food manufacturing and feeds.
<sup>2</sup>Data have been revised through August 2005; data are subject to revision 4 months after date of original publication.

TABLE B-67.—Producer price indexes for major commodity groups, 1959-2005 [1982=100]

		roducts and foods and fe				Industrial commodities		
Year or month	Total	Farm products	Processed foods and feeds	Total	Textile products and apparel	Hides, skins, leather, and related products	Fuels and related products and power	Chemicals and allied products <sup>1</sup>
1959	37 6	40 2	35 6	30.5	48.1	35.9	13.7	34.8
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968	37 7 37 7 38 1 37 7 37.5 39 0 41 6 40 2 41 1 43 4	40 1 39.7 40 4 39 6 39 0 40 7 43 7 41 3 42.3 45.0	35 6 36.2 36.5 36.8 36.7 38.0 40.2 39.8 40.6 42.7	30.5 30.4 30.4 30.3 30.5 30.9 31.5 32.0 32.8 33.9	48.6 47.8 48.2 48.2 48.5 48.8 48.9 50.7 51.8	34.6 34.9 35.3 34.3 34.4 35.9 39.4 38.1 39.3 41.5	13.9 14.0 14.0 13.9 13.5 13.8 14.1 14.4 14.3 14.6	34.8 34.5 33.9 33.5 33.6 34.0 34.2 34.1 34.2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	44 9 45.8 49.2 63.9 71.3 74.0 73 6 75 9 83 0 92.3	45 8 46.6 51 6 72.7 77 4 77.0 78 8 79 4 87 7 99.6	44.6 45.5 48.0 58.9 68.0 72.6 70.8 74.0 80.6 88.5	35.2 36.5 37.8 40.3 49.2 54.9 58.4 62.5 67.0 75.7	52.4 53.3 55.5 60.5 68.0 67.4 72.4 75.3 78.1 82.5	42.0 43.4 50.0 54.5 55.2 56.5 63.9 68.3 76.1	15.3 16.6 17.1 19.4 30.1 35.4 38.3 43.6 46.5 58.9	35.0 35.6 37.6 50.2 62.0 64.0 65.9 68.0 76.0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	98.3 101.1 100.0 102.0 105.5 100.7 101.2 103.7 110.0 115.4	102 9 105.2 100 0 102 4 105.5 95.1 92.9 95.5 104.9 110.9	95.9 98.9 100.0 101.8 105.4 103.5 105.4 107.9 112.7 117.8	88.0 97.4 100.0 101.1 103.3 103.7 100.0 102.6 106.3 111.6	89.7 97.6 100.0 100.3 102.7 102.9 103.2 105.1 109.2 112.3	94.7 99.3 100.0 103.2 109.0 108.9 113.0 120.4 131.4 136.3	82.8 100.2 100.0 95.9 94.8 91.4 69.8 70.2 66.7 72.9	89.0 98.4 100.0 100.3 102.9 103.7 102.6 106.4 116.3 123.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	118.6 116.4 115.9 118.4 119.1 120.5 129.7 127.0 122.7 120.3	112.2 105.7 103.6 107.1 106.3 107.4 122.4 112.9 104.6 98.4	121.9 121.9 122.1 124.0 125.5 127.0 133.3 134.0 131.6	115.8 116.5 117.4 119.0 120.7 125.5 127.3 127.7 124.8 126.5	115.0 116.3 117.8 118.0 118.3 120.8 122.4 122.6 122.9 121.1	141.7 138.9 140.4 143.7 148.5 153.7 150.5 154.2 148.0 146.0	82.3 81.2 80.4 80.0 77.8 78.0 85.8 86.1 75.3 80.5	123.6 125.6 125.9 128.2 132.1 142.5 142.1 143.6 143.9
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	122.0 126.2 123.9 132.8 142.0 141.2	99.5 103.8 99.0 111.5 123.3 118.4	133.1 137.3 136.2 143.4 151.2 153.1	134.8 135.7 132.4 139.1 147.6 160.2	121.4 121.3 119.9 119.8 121.0 122.8	151.5 158.4 157.6 162.3 164.5 165.3	103.5 105.3 93.2 112.9 126.9 156.4	151.0 151.8 151.9 161.8 174.4 191.2
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	136 8 138.4 142.8 145 6 149 3 147.2 143.8 140.6 139.9 140.0 139.5	117 4 120 4 129 1 129 6 135 1 129 7 124 4 119 0 118 7 118 0 118 4	146 4 147.3 149.4 153.3 156.1 155.8 153.3 151.4 150.4 150.3 150.1	142.2 142.8 143.3 144.8 146.5 147.3 148.2 149.3 149.1 151.8 153.5 152.0	120.3 120.1 120.2 120.5 121.0 121.0 121.1 121.0 121.4 121.6	165.4 165.1 164.8 163.1 162.8 163.2 165.0 165.0 165.0 165.0	118.9 118.0 117.5 120.4 126.0 127.8 129.4 130.7 127.7 134.6 139.7	166.6 167.5 168.0 170.1 170.9 172.2 173.7 176.5 179.4 181.0 183.0
2005 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	140 6 140.5 143 0 142 2 143 1 141 3 140 4 139 6 140 6 140 8	118 8 117 6 123 0 120 7 121 5 118 3 116 3 114 5 116 4 115 4 117 1 120 8	151.8 152.3 153.4 153.3 154.3 153.2 153.0 152.7 153.1 153.8 153.1	152.7 153.6 155.6 157.2 156.3 156.6 159.1 160.8 165.5 170.3 167.5	122.1 122.1 122.3 122.5 122.6 122.8 122.7 122.8 123.2 123.3 123.9 123.6	165.3 165.5 165.6 164.8 164.8 165.7 165.8 165.6 165.2 165.1 165.5	132 3 134 2 140 9 146 5 146 0 154 8 160 7 176 2 190 4 177 4 173 1	185.5 186.4 188.9 189.0 188.4 187.2 189.3 193.6 193.6 198.7 198.5

See next page for continuation of table

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Prices for some items in this grouping are lagged and refer to 1 month earlier than the index month. <sup>2</sup> Data have been revised through August 2005; data are subject to revision 4 months after date of original publication.

Table B-67.—Producer price indexes for major commodity groups, 1959-2005—Continued [1982=100]

				Indus	strial commod	lities—Contii	nued	-		
	0.11		Puip,						ortation iment	
Year or month	Rubber and plastic products	Lumber and wood products	paper, and allied products	Metals and metal products	Machinery and equipment	Furniture and household durables	Non- metallic mineral products	Total	Motor vehicles and equip- ment	Miscel- laneous prod- ucts
1959	42.6	34.7	33.7	30.6	32.8	48.0	30.3		39.9	33.4
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1964 1966 1966 1967	42.7 41.1 39.9 40.1 39.6 39.7 40.5 41.4 42.8 43.6	33.5 32.0 32.2 32.8 33.5 33.7 35.2 35.1 39.8 44.0	34.0 33.0 33.4 33.1 33.0 33.3 34.2 34.6 35.0 36.0	30.6 30.5 30.2 30.3 31.1 32.0 32.8 33.2 34.0 36.0	33.0 33.0 33.1 33.3 33.7 34.7 35.9 37.0 38.2	47.8 47.5 47.2 46.9 47.1 46.8 47.4 48.3 49.7 50.7	30.4 30.5 30.5 30.3 30.4 30.7 31.2 32.4 33.6	40.4	39.3 39.2 38.9 39.1 39.2 39.2 39.8 40.9 41.7	33.6 33.7 33.9 34.2 34.4 34.7 35.3 36.2 37.0 38.1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977	44.9 45.2 45.3 46.6 56.4 62.2 66.0 69.4 72.4 80.5	39.9 44.7 50.7 62.2 64.5 62.1 72.2 83.0 96.9 105.5	37.5 38.1 39.3 42.3 52.5 59.0 62.1 64.6 67.7 75.9	38.7 39.4 40.9 44.0 57.0 61.5 65.0 69.3 75.3 86.0	40.0 41.4 42.3 43.7 50.0 57.9 61.3 65.2 70.3 76.7	51.9 53.1 53.8 55.7 61.8 67.5 70.3 73.2 77.5 82.8	35.3 38.2 39.4 40.7 47.8 54.4 58.2 62.6 69.6 77.6	41.9 44.2 45.5 46.1 50.3 56.7 60.5 64.6 69.5 75.3	43.3 45.7 47.0 47.4 51.4 57.6 61.2 65.2 70.0 75.8	39.8 40.8 41.5 43.3 48.1 53.4 55.6 59.4 66.7 75.5
1980	90.1 96.4 100.0 100.8 102.3 101.9 103.0 109.3 112.6	101.5 102.8 100.0 107.9 108.0 106.6 107.2 112.8 118.9 126.7	86.3 94.8 100.0 103.3 110.3 116.1 121.8 130.4 137.8	95.0 99.6 100.0 101.8 104.8 104.4 103.2 107.1 118.7 124.1	86.0 94.4 100.0 102.7 105.1 107.2 108.8 110.4 113.2	90.7 95.9 100.0 103.4 105.7 107.1 108.2 109.9 113.1 116.9	88.4 96.7 100.0 101.6 105.4 108.6 110.0 111.2 112.6	82.9 94.3 100.0 102.8 105.2 107.9 110.5 112.5 114.3 117.7	83.1 94.6 100.0 102.2 104.1 106.4 109.1 111.7 113.1 116.2	93.6 96.1 100.0 104.8 107.0 109.4 111.6 114.9 120.2 126.5
1990	113.6 115.1 115.1 116.0 117.6 124.3 123.8 123.2 122.6 122.5	129.7 132.1 146.6 174.0 180.0 178.1 176.1 183.8 179.1 183.6	141.2 142.9 145.2 147.3 152.5 172.2 168.7 167.9 171.7	122.9 120.2 119.2 119.2 124.8 134.5 131.0 131.8 127.8 124.6	120.7 123.0 123.4 124.0 125.1 126.6 126.5 125.9 124.9	119.2 121.2 122.2 123.7 126.1 128.2 130.4 131.3 131.7	114.7 117.2 117.3 120.0 124.2 129.0 131.0 133.2 135.4 138.9	121.5 126.4 130.4 133.7 137.2 139.7 141.7 141.6 141.2 141.8	118.2 122.1 124.9 128.0 131.4 133.0 134.1 132.7 131.4 131.7	134.2 140.8 145.3 145.4 141.9 145.4 147.7 150.9 156.0 166.6
2000	125.5 127.2 126.8 130.1 133.8 143.9	178.2 174.4 173.3 177.4 195.6 196.4	183.7 184.8 185.9 190.0 195.7 202.5	128.1 125.4 125.9 129.2 149.6 160.8	124.0 123.7 122.9 121.9 122.1 123.7	132.6 133.2 133.5 133.9 135.1 139.5	142.5 144.3 146.2 148.2 153.2 164.3	143.8 145.2 144.6 145.7 148.6 151.0	132.3 131.5 129.9 129.6 131.0 131.4	170.8 181.3 182.4 179.6 183.2 195.5
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	131.4 131.6 132.0 132.4 132.9 133.4 133.9 135.1 136.5	183.3 189.0 194.1 197.7 201.6 198.4 196.5 202.1 202.5 196.7 191.9	191.2 192.2 192.9 193.9 194.7 195.4 196.2 197.3 198.3 198.7	135.9 140.2 143.9 146.5 147.0 147.3 151.3 154.0 154.7 157.1 158.6 159.0	121.4 121.6 122.0 122.1 122.2 122.1 122.2 122.3 122.5 122.5 122.5	133.6 133.9 133.7 134.0 134.9 135.6 135.6 135.9 137.0	149.5 150.5 150.5 151.1 151.9 152.6 153.4 154.4 155.5 155.8 156.3	147.8 147.7 148.0 147.7 148.0 148.4 147.2 147.4 147.3 151.8 151.1	130.9 130.6 130.9 130.3 130.8 130.9 129.1 128.6 134.4 133.3 133.2	181.3 181.4 181.8 182.1 181.9 182.5 182.8 183.4 184.6 185.4
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr Apr June July Aug 2 Sept Oct Nov Dec	139.7 140.6 141.2 141.7 141.9 142.4	194.6 198.2 198.6 198.3 195.2 197.6 194.1 197.4 198.0 194.1 195.3	200.8 201.5 202.1 202.1 202.2 202.6 202.6 202.3 202.7 203.2 203.9 204.2	160.1 160.5 160.4 161.1 159.4 157.6 157.4 158.4 158.4 158.2 165.2	123.1 123.3 123.5 123.7 123.7 123.7 123.8 123.9 124.0 124.2 123.8 123.7	137.5 138.2 138.6 138.7 139.2 139.3 139.8 139.6 139.9 140.1 141.0	159.2 160.3 160.8 162.1 162.7 163.1 164.8 165.4 166.7 167.5 169.4 169.5	151 9 151.0 151.0 151.0 151.0 149 7 150.1 150.0 150.1 152.9 151.8 151.3	133.6 132.4 132.0 132.0 131.7 130.0 130.3 129.8 133.2 131.7 131.0	189.5 191.5 192.2 192.8 193.4 194.4 195.3 196.1 198.2 200.1 200.7 202.1

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE B-68.—Changes in producer price indexes for finished goods, 1965-2005 [Percent change]

		tal	Finis		Fii	nished go	ods exclu	ding cons	umer foo	ds	Finis		Finished	
Year or		shed ods	cons		To	tal	Cons		Cap equip	ntal ment	god	ds	and e	
month	Dec. to Dec. 1	Year to year	Oec to Oec 1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. 1	Year to year	Dec. to	Year to year	Oec. to Dec. 1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. 1	Year to year	Dec. to Dec. 1	Year to year
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	3.3 20 17 3.1 49	1 8 3.2 1 1 2 8 3 8	9.1 1.3 - 3 4.6 8.1	4 0 6 5 -1 8 3.9 6.0	2.5	2.6	0 9 1.8 2 0 2.0 2.8	0.9 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.3	1.5 3.8 3.1 3.0 4.8	1.2 2.4 3.5 3.4 3.5				
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	2 1 3.3 3 9 11 7 18 3 6.6 6.7 9.3 12 8	3 4 3.1 3.2 9 1 15 4 10.6 4 5 6.4 7.9 11 2	-2 3 5.8 7 9 22.7 12 8 5 6 -2.5 6.9 11 7	3 3 1 6 5 4 20 5 14.0 8.4 -3 5.3 9.0 9.3	4.3 2.0 2.3 6.6 21.1 7.2 6.2 6.8 8.3 14.8	3.5 3.7 2.0 4.0 16.2 12.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 11.8	3.8 2.1 7.5 20.3 6.8 6.0 6.7 8.5 17.6	3.0 3.5 1.8 4.6 17.0 10.4 6.2 7.3 7.1 13.3	4.8 2.4 2.1 5.1 22.7 8.1 6.5 7.2 8.0 8.8	4.7 4.0 2.6 3.3 14.3 15.2 6.7 6.4 7.9 8.7	16.3 11.6 12.0 8.5 58.1	17.2 11.7 15.7 6.5 35.0	17.7 6.0 5.7 6.2 8.4 9.4	11.4 11.4 5.7 6.0 7.5 8.9
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	11 8 7.1 3.6 6 1.7 1 8 -2 3 2 2 4 0 4.9	13.4 9.2 4.1 1 6 2.1 1 0 -1 4 2 1 2.5 5.2	7 5 1.5 2.0 2.3 3.5 6 2.8 2 5.7 5.2	5.8 5.8 2.2 1 0 4 4 8 2.6 2.1 2.8 5.4	13.4 8.7 4.2 0 1.1 2.2 -4.0 3.2 3.2 4.8	16.2 10.3 4.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 -2.6 2.1 2.4 5.0	14.1 8.6 4 2 - 9 .8 2.1 -6.6 4.1 3.1 5.3	18.5 10.3 4.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 -4.6 2.2 2.4 5.6	11.4 9.2 3.9 2.0 1.8 2.7 2.1 1.3 3.6 3.8	10.7 10.3 5.7 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.3 3.9	27.9 14.1 -9.2 -4.2 -2. -38.1 11.2 -3.6 9.5	49.2 19.1 -1.5 -4.8 -4.2 -3.9 -28.1 -1.9 -3.2 9.9	10.8 7.7 4.9 1.9 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.1 4.3 4.2	11.2 8.6 5.7 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 3.3 4.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	5.7 1 1.6 2 1.7 2.3 2.8 -1.2 0 2.9	4.9 2.1 1.2 1.2 6 1.9 2.7 4 8 1.8	2 6 -1 5 1 6 2 4 1.1 1 9 3.4 8	4.8 2 6 1.9 .9 1.7 3.6 .7 1	6.9 .3 1.6 4 1.9 2.3 2.6 -1.2 1 3.5	5.0 3.0 1.8 1.1 .6 1.9 2.4 .3 -1.1 2.2	8.7 7 1.6 -1.4 2.0 2.3 3.7 -1.5 1 5.1	5.9 2.9 1.8 .7 -1 2.0 2.9 .5 -1.4 3.2	3.4 2.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 .4 6 0	3.5 3.1 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.2 1 4	30.7 -9.6 3 -4.1 3.5 1.1 11.7 -6.4 -11.7 18.1	14.2 4.1 4 .3 -1.3 1.4 6.5 .2 -10.0 4.9	3.5 3.1 2.0 .4 1.6 2.6 .6 0 2.5	1.2 1.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	3.6 -1.6 1.2 4.0 4.2 5.4	3.8 2.0 -1 3 3 2 3.6 4.8	1.7 1.8 6 7 7 3.1 1 4	1.6 3.0 8 4.1 4.7 1.9	4.1 -2.6 1.7 3.0 4.5 6.5	4.4 1.7 -1.5 3.0 3.4 5.6	5.5 -3.9 2.9 4.1 5.5 9.0	6.1 2.2 -1.8 4.3 4.3 7.4	1.2 0 6 .8 2.4 1.3	.9 .6 4 .3 1.4 2.3	16.6 -17.1 12.3 11.4 13.4 23.9	19.4 2.8 -8.2 14.9 10.8 17.4	1.3 .9 5 1.0 2.3 1.7	1.3 1.4 .1 .2 1.5 2.4

Percent	change	from	preceding	month

	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed	Unad- justed	Sea- son- ally ad- justed
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug	0 6 1 7 .7 1.1 1 1	0.3 1 .5 .7 .6 -1	-1 5 .2 1.5 1 3 1.8 -3 -1 71	1 4 1.3 1.4	1 2 1 .4 .6 .9 1	1 .3 .6 .3	1.7 1 .5 .7 1.2 3	1.0 1 .3 .7 .5 1	0.2 2 .2 .1 .1 .2 3	.1	5.0 -3 1.2 2.3 3.7 -1.0 2.6 -3	2.6 4 .3 1.8 1.4 8 2.5	0.3 1 .2 .1 .1 .1 3	0.3 1 .3 .3
Sept Oct Nov Dec 2005 Jan	.1 2.2 - 2 7	1 5 7 - 3	1 6 - 3 1 1 - 5	1.5 1.5 2	2 3 -1 -1 0	1 1.4 8 4	2.7 2 -1 5	2.0 1.0 7	0 1.6 0	.2 .3 .2 .3	3 .1 5.2 8 -4.7	2 5.7 2.7 -2.4 -1.0	1.6 0 .1	.33
Feb Mar Apr May June	5 1 0 5 - 1 - 1	- 5 - 5 0	8 6 0 3 8	.6 - 2 - 2 8	3 1 1 7 1 1	.4 .9 .7 -6	.6 1.5 .9 3	.3 .6 1.2 .8 9	1 .2 .2 .1 3	3 3	1.9 4.4 2.5 -1.1 1.5	1.8 3.3 1.8 -3.3 1.8	.6 1 .1 .1 .2 3	
July Aug? Sept Oct Nov Dec	8 5 1 7 1.3 -1 6 3	1 0 6 1 7 7 7 9	7 3 1 2 2 2 8	5 3 1 4 - 1 5	1 2 .7 1 8 1.7 -2.0 .1	1.4 8 1.8 9 -1.0	1.8 1.0 2.6 2.0 2.8		0 .1 1.0 3	.3 2 1	4.6 3.1 7.1 3.8 -7.3 .3	4.6 3.6 6.9 4.1 -4.0 3.1	1 1 .9 1	.4 0 .1 3 .1

Source-Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Changes from December to December are based on unadjusted indexes.

2 Data have been revised through August 2005; data are subject to revision 4 months after date of original publication.

## MONEY STOCK, CREDIT, AND FINANCE

TABLE B-69.—Money stock and debt measures, 1959-2005 [Averages of daily figures, except debt end-of-period basis; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

	Ml	M2	M3	Debt <sup>1</sup>		Percent	change	
Year and month	Sum of currency, demand deposits, travelers checks,	M1 plus retail MMMF balances, savings deposits (including	M2 plus large time deposits, RPs, Euro-	Debt of domestic	From ye	ear or 6 r earlier <sup>2</sup>	nonths	From previous period 3
	and other checkable depos- its (OCDs)	MMDAs), and small time deposits	dollars, and in- stitution-only MMMF balances	nonfinancial sectors	Ml	M2	М3	Debt
December:  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1978  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2007  Apr	140.0 140.0 140.7 145.2 147.8 153.3 160.3 167.8 172.0 183.3 197.4 203.9 214.4 228.3 249.2 287.1 306.2 2330.9 357.3 381.8 408.5 436.7 474.8 521.4 551.6 619.8 724.7 750.2 786.7 792.9 824.7 897.1 1,050.0 1,129.7 1,150.3 1,126.8 1,080.0 1,072.2 1,094.9 1,123.1 1,087.6 1,129.2 1,304.2 1,304.2 1,304.2 1,304.2 1,304.2 1,304.3 1,319.9 1,329.6 1,336.5 1,341.2 1,343.5 1,354.1 1,360.5 1,374.1	deposits  297.8 312.4 335.5 362.7 393.2 4247 459.2 524.8 566.8 587.9 626.5 710.3 805.5 902.1 1.016.2 1.152.0 1.270.3 1.366.0 1.473.7 1.599.8 1.755.4 1.910.3 2.126.5 2.3495.7 2.732.3 2.126.5 2.3495.7 2.732.3 2.3495.7 2.3495	MMMF balances  299.7 315.2 340.8 377.3 405.9 442.4 482.1 505.4 567.9 667.2 6615.9 988.0 1.069.9 1.170.2 1.309.9 1.470.4 1.644.5 1.808.7 1.995.5 2.254.5 2.460.6 2.697.4 2.990.6 3.208.1 3.499.1 3.686.5 3.928.8 4.077.1 4.154.7 4.210.3 4.222.6 4.285.6 4.369.8 4.363.3 4.985.5 5.460.9 6.551.9 6.551.5 7.117.6 8.035.5 7.117.6 8.035.5 7.117.6 8.035.9 9.002.0 9.082.4 9.151.1 9.245.6 9.277.6 9.284.6 9.316.3 9.335.8	688.5 724.3 767.8 820.6 876.0 940.0 1,007.2 1,074.7 1,152.7 1,242.8 1,330.1 1,420.2 1,555.2 1,711.2 1,895.5 2,069.9 2,261.8 2,505.3 2,826.6 3,211.2 3,603.0 3,953.5 4,361.7 4,783.4 5,359.2 6,146.2 7,127.3 7,970.6 8,673.9 9,458.1 10,162.1 11,306.2	0.5.2 1.3.7 4.6.7 2.6.6 6.7.7 3.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 4.7.7 8.0.9 6.9.7 8.0.9 6.9.7 8.0.9 6.9.7 8.0.9 6.9.7 6.0.1 6.0.2 6.0.2 6.0.3 6.0.2 6.0.3 6.	7,44 8,14 8,44 8,64 8,13 8,00 8,00 13,4 11,3 12,6 13,4 11,3 11,3 11,3 11,3 11,3 11,3 11,4 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,5	5.2 8.1 8.9 9.3 9.0 4.8 8.8 8.1 4.6 11.2 11.2 8.6 6.6 10.3 11.8 11.8 11.9 9.6 9.6 10.3 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9	7.8 5.0 6.0 6.9 6.8 7.3 7.8 7.1 6.7 7.3 7.8 7.0 6.8 9.5 10.0 10.7 9.2 9.3 10.8 12.8 13.8 12.2 9.5 10.4 10.1 12.0 14.8 15.7 11.9.0 9.1 7.3 3 6.5 4.8 4.6 6.5 3 5.2 5.3 6.7 6.4 4 8 8.1 8.7 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
Dec   2005: Jan	1,372.1 1,367.0 1,369.5 1,373.0 1,369.5 1,370.7 1,369.5 1,362.5 1,370.4 1,369.2 1,370.0 1,368.9	6,422.1 6,436.4 6,455.7 6,475.8 6,492.1 6,518.3 6,538.5 6,568.9 6,600.0 6,629.6 6,652.0 6,680.5	9,435.8 9,492.1 9,530.5 9,570.2 9,669.6 9,729.2 9,766.0 9,868.8 9,955.7 10,037.7 10,083.3	24,090.5 24,668.4 25,168.0 25,742.1	4.6 3.5 2.3 1.8 .7 5 4 7 .1 8 1 1	4 2 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.9 5.0	3.4 4.5 4.7 4.6 5.6 5.8 6.2 5.8 7.0 8.1 8.6 8.7 9.0	9.6 8.1 9.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Consists of outstanding credit market debt of the U.S. Government, State and local governments, and private nonfinancial sectors. 
<sup>2</sup> Annual changes are from December to December; monthly changes are from 6 months earlier at a simple annual rate. 
<sup>3</sup> Annual changes are from fourth quarter to fourth quarter. Quarterly changes are from previous quarter at annual rate.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

 $\begin{array}{lll} \text{TABLE B--}70. & ---Components \ of \ money \ stock \ measures, \ 1959-2005 \\ & \text{[Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]} \end{array}$ 

Year and month	Currency	Nonbank travelers checks	Demand deposits	Other checkable deposits (OCOs)	Small denomi- nation time deposits <sup>1</sup>	Savings deposits, including money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) <sup>2</sup>
December 1959	28.8	0.3	110.8	0.0	11.4	146.5
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	28.7 29.3 30.3 32.2 33.9 36.0 40.0 43.0 45.7	.3 4 .4 .5 .5 .6 .6	111.6 115.5 117.1 120.6 125.8 131.3 133.4 142.5 153.6 157.3	.0 .0 .0 .1 .1 .1 .1	12.5 14.8 20.1 25.5 29.2 34.5 55.0 77.8 100.5 120.4	159.1 175.5 194.8 214.4 235.2 256.9 253.1 263.7 268.9 263.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1977	48.6 52.0 56.2 60.8 67.0 72.8 79.5 87.4 96.0 104.8	.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.5	164.7 175.1 191.6 200.3 205.1 211.3 221.5 236.4 249.5 256.6	.1 .2 .3 .4 .9 2.7 4 2 8.5 16.8	151.2 189.7 231.6 265.8 287.9 337.9 390.7 445.5 521.0 634.3	261.0 292.2 321.4 326.8 338.6 388.9 453.2 492.2 481.9 423.8
1980	115.3 122.5 132.5 146.2 156.1 167.8 180.4 196.7 212.0 222.3	3.9 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.0 6.9	261.2 231.4 234.1 238.5 243.4 267.0 302.9 287.7 287.1 278.6	28.1 78.7 104.1 132.1 147.1 179.5 235.2 259.2 280.6 285.1	728.5 823.1 850.9 784.1 888.8 885.7 858.4 921.0 1,037.1 1,151.3	400.3 343.9 400.1 684.9 704.7 815.3 940.9 937.4 926.4 893.7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	246.5 267.1 292.2 321.6 354.0 372.2 394.1 424.5 459.8 517.8	7.7 7.7 8.2 8.0 8.6 9.0 8.8 8.4 8.5	276.8 289.7 340.0 385.4 383.6 389.0 401.6 393.8 377.0 353.4	293.7 332.6 384.6 414.7 404.2 356.6 275.5 245.4 249.6 243.3	1,173.4 1,065.6 868.1 782.0 816.4 931.4 946.9 968.3 952.0 954.5	922.9 1,044.6 1,187.2 1,219.4 1,150.0 1,134.2 1,272.9 1,399.9 1,605.1 1,740.3
200D 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	531.2 581.1 626.2 662.3 697.3 723.8	8.3 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.3	309.9 335.7 306.1 324.7 340.3 321.0	238.2 257.4 279.1 309.5 327.0 316.9	1,044.8 973.7 892.0 809.6 816.8 973.7	1,877.9 2,312.8 2,778.8 3,169.4 3,519.9 3,620.5
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	663.9 665.6 667.4 670.2 673.6 677.8 684.9 686.5 689.9 692.9 697.7	7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6	320.5 327.9 332.4 339.7 330.2 325.0 332.7 338.3 334.1 340.0 340.3	313.8 318.6 322.0 321.7 322.2 325.6 325.9 327.4 324.7 326.3 328.7 327.0	807.0 804.5 801.8 798.6 793.8 792.7 793.6 797.3 801.2 806.4 811.1 816.8	3,193.2 3,234.2 3,277.9 3,323.0 3,393.1 3,403.5 3,417.8 3,430.5 3,456.5 3,482.7 3,504.5 3,519.9
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	699.0 700.8 702.9 703.9 705.8 708.4 710.0 712.8 716.1 717.4 720.3 723.8	7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.3	336.4 338.6 339.3 331.0 332.8 334.2 327.4 330.0 324.2 325.9 323.4 321.0	324.1 322.6 323.4 323.3 324.7 319.6 317.8 320.2 319.8 318.5 319.0 316.9	829.0 841.1 854.7 869.4 885.9 900.7 914.9 929.3 942.5 952.6 963.9 973.7	3,528,6 3,538,4 3,543,6 3,541,7 3,533,9 3,560,2 3,560,2 3,569,4 3,585,1 3,597,3 3,603,8 3,603,8

Small denomination deposits are those issued in amounts of less than \$100,000, 2 Data prior to 1982 are savings deposits only, MMDA data begin December 1982.

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-70.—Components of money stock measures, 1959-2005—Continued [Averages of daily figures; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Year	Money i mutua (MMMF) 1	l tund	Large denomi-	Over- night and term repur-	Over- night
and month	Retail	Institu- tion only	nation time deposits <sup>3</sup>	night and term	and term Euro- dollars (net)
December: 1959	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	2.0 3.9 7.0 10.8 15.2 21.2 23.1 30.9 37.4 20.4	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0	2.4 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	.0 .0 .0 .1 1.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 5.8 33.9	.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .5 .6 1.0 3.5	45.2 57.7 73.3 110.9 144.7 129.7 118.1 145.2 195.6 223.1	3.0 5.2 6.6 12.8 14.5 13.8 24.0 32.2 44.4	2.7 2.4 2.9 3.8 5.8 8.5 10.0 15.2 21.7 35.1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	62.5 151.7 184.5 136.1 164.9 208.4 222.8 244.3 320.6	16.0 38.2 48.8 40.9 62.3 65.3 86.2 93.7 93.8 112.0	260.2 304.3 325.6 316.1 402.2 421.7 419.0 461.9 512.4 528.1	67.8 71.8 97.3 107.3 121.2 145.8 178.0 196.5	61.4 88.8 104.2 116.6 108.9 104.2 115.7 121.5 131.7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	357.7 372.4 352.8 353.1 380.9 448.2 515.5 591.4 731.7 830.9	139.6 188.5 212.8 216.8 210.8 264.4 324.2 396.9 541.2 638.2	481.7 418.6 355.7 339.2 378.9 438.9 521.1 631.1 683.7 758.9	131.1 141.5 172.6 196.3 198.3 210.3 253.9 293.2	103.3 92.3 79.5 72.8 86.3 94.0 114.6 147.5 150.2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	921.1 981.7 910.2 796.1 713.2 717.4	791.9 1,196.7 1,247.7 1,117.4 1,068.4 1,136.2	836.9 802.9 817.2 887.1 1.073.3 1,359.4	373.7 473.4 494.8 492.6	195.2 211.4 230.7 295.3 379.4 430.2
2004: Jan	782.2 773.5 763.6 755.9 757.2 751.4 740.5 735.3 728.7 719.4 714.2 713.2	1,118.8 1,116.0 1,123.8 1,127.6 1,132.1 1,126.4 1,112.2 1,105.9 1,094.6 1,075.7 1,071.1 1,068.4	917.6 922.9 943.5 962.0 983.6 996.0 1.013.5 1.024.5 1.031.6 1.036.6 1.050.6 1.073.3	521.0 526.1 520.0 522.3 536.9 526.5 524.7 526.7 510.2 501.0	302.4 310.1 316.0 324.9 327.0 329.5 337.0 343.8 354.1 367.6 370.8
2005: Jan	711.8 706.7 704.5 705.9 701.6 700.2 700.9 699.8 705.1 710.6 714.2	1,062.5 1,054.1 1,049.3 1,057.5 1,057.9 1,069.1 1,078.6 1,091.3 1,107.4 1,119.3 1,120.6 1,136.2	1.127 4 1.141.9 1.153.1 1.196.7 1.208.6 1.235.5 1.223.0 1.265.7 1.292.5 1.335.6 1.359.4	473.1 489.3 487.8 483.8 504.7 504.3 517.6 525.1 534.2 545.0 554.3	392.7 395.5 404.2 405.0 406.3 402.1 408.4 417.7 421.6 421.0 425.9 430.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Large denomination deposits are those issued in amounts of more than \$100,000.

Note.—See also Table B-69. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-71.—Aggregate reserves of depository institutions and the monetary base, 1959-2005 [Averages of daily figures 1; millions of dollars; seasonally adjusted, except as noted]

	Adju	sted for cha	nges in reser	ve requiremen	nts <sup>2</sup>			rings of depo tulions from		
Year and	Rese	rves of depo	sitory institut	ions	Mone-		Feder	al Reserve (f	VSA)	
month	Total	Nonbor- rowed	Required	Execess (NSA)	tary base	Total	Primary	Secondary	Seasonal	Adjust- ment
December:										041
1959	11,109	10.168	10,603	506	40,880	941				941
1960	11.247	11.172	10.503	743	40.977	74 133				74 133
1961 1962	11,499 11,604	11.366 11.344	10.915 11.033	584 572	41.853 42.957	260				260
1963	11.730	11,397	11,239	490	45,003	332				332
1964 .	12.011	11.747	11.605	406	47,161	264				264
1965	12.316	11.872	11.892	423 339	49.620 51.565	444 532				444 532
1966	12,223 13,180	11.690 12.952	11.884 12.805	375	54.579	228				228
1968	13,767	13,021	13,341	426	58.357	746				746
1969	14.168	13,049	13.882	286	61,569	1,119				1,119
1970	14,558	14,225	14.309	249	65,013	332				332 126
1971	15,230	15,104	15,049 16,361	182 284	69,108 75,167	126 1.050				1,050
1972 1973	16,645 17,021	15,595 15,723	16.717	304	81.073	1.298			41	1,257
1974	17,550	16.823	17,292	258	87,535	1,298 727			32	548
1975	17,822	17,692	17.556	266 274	93.887	130			14 13	104 40
1976	18,388 18,990	18.335 18.420	18,115 18,800	190	101.515 110.324	569			55	514
1978	19.753	18.885	19.521	232	120.445	868			135	734
1979	20,720	19.248	20,279	442	131,143	1.473			82	1,390
1980	22.015	20,325	21 501	514	142,004	1.690			116	1,571
1981	22,015 22,443	21.807	22.124	319	149.021	636			54	433
1982	23.600	22,966	23.100	500	160.127	634 774	# # XX		33 96	415 676
1983 1984	25.367 26.913	24.593 23.727	24,806 26,078	561 835	175,467 187,238	3.186			113	469
1985	31.569	30.250	30,505	1.063	203,562	1,318			56	763
1986	38.840	38.014	37.667	1.173	223.425	827			38	486
1987	38.913 40.453	38,135	37,893 39,392	1.019 1.061	239,837 256,892	777 1,716			93 130	201 342
1988 1989	40,433	38,738 40,221	39,545	941	267,755	265			84	162
1990	41.766	41,440	40.101	1,664	293,287	326			76	227
1991	45,515	45,323	44.526	989	317,557	192			38	153
1992	54,421	54,297	53,267	1.154	350,919	124			18	105
1993	60,567 59,454	60,485 59,245	59,497 58,295	1.070 1.159	386,594 418,325	82 209			31 100	51 109
1995	56,483	56,226	55,193	1,290	434,585	257			40	217
1996	50,183	50,028	48,766	1,416	452,081	155			68	87
1997	46,873	46,549	45,189	1.685	479,946	324			79	245
1998 1999	45.515 42.009	45,398 41,778	44.001 40.802	1.514 1.297	514,077 593,635	117 3 320			15 67	101 179
						210			111	99
2000	38,792 41,496	38,582 41,429	37,364 39,846	1.428 1.650	584.831 635.401	67			33	34
2002 .	40,441	40,361	38.432	2.009	681,386	80			45	35
2003	42,772	42,726	41.729	1.043	720.101	46	17	0	29	
2004	46.795 44.798	46.733 44.630	44.886 42.847	1.909 1.951	758,973 786,383	63 169	11 97	0	52 72	
2004 Jan	43.004	42.898	42.112	892	721.878	106	93	0	13	
Feb	42.915	42,873	41,718	1.196	723,993	42	28	ő	14	
Mar	44.662	44.610	42.855	1.807	726,571	51	23	0	28	
Apr	45,788	45.702	43.980	1,808	730,639	86	29 9	0	57	
May June	45.643 46.284	45,531 46,104	43.956 44.351	1,686 1,933	734,231 738,990	112 180	40	0	103 140	***************************************
1.1	46.400	46,155	44,681	1,719	746.307	245	42	0	203	***************************************
Aug	45.481	45,229	43,898	1.583	747,704	243	18	0	233	
Sept	46,488	46,153	44,833	1,655 1,757	751.823	335	97	Ō	233 238	
Oct .	46,344	46.164	44.587	1.757	754.730	179	15	0	164	
Nov Dec	46.368 46.795	46.185 46.733	44.584 44.886	1.784 1.909	759,302 758,973	183 63	105 11	0	78 52	***************************************
2005: Jan .	47,475	47.413	45.734	1,741	760,531	62	39	0	23	***************************************
Feb	45,969	45,927	44,472	1.497	763,479	42	26	0	. 16	
Mar	46,804	46.755	45.021	1.783	765,712	49	13	0	37	
Apr .	46,559 45,873	46.428 45.734	44.884	1.675	766.942	132	52	0	80	
May June .	45.873	45.734	44 336 44.887	1.537 1.782	768.134 771.123	139 249	6 85	0	133 164	
July .	46.085	45.660	44,343	1,762	772.865	425	176	12	237	
Aug .	44,540	44,178	44.343	1,622	774,705	362	63	3	297	
Sept	45,720	45,388	43.673	2.047	777,801	332	12	5	315	
Oct	44.784	44.500	42,883	1,900	780.069	284	35	29	220	
Nov Dec	44.705 44.798	44.579 44,630	42.909 42.847	1.797 1.951	783.668 786.383	126 169	. 20 97	0	106 72	
DCL	44./30	44,030	42.04/	1,901	/00,303	109	9/		. 12	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Data are prorated averages of biweekly (maintenance period) averages of daily figures.
<sup>2</sup> Aggregate reserves incorporate adjustments for discontinuities associated with regulatory changes to reserve requirements. For details on aggregate reserves series see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*<sup>3</sup> Total includes borrowing under the terms and conditions established for the Century Date Change Special Liquidity Facility in effect from October 1, 1999 through April 7, 2000

Note.—NSA indicates data are not seasonally adjusted.

TABLE B-72.—Bank credit at all commercial banks, 1959-2005 [Monthly average; billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted 1]

		Securitie	s in bank c	redit			Loans	and lease	s in bank cr	edit		
Year and month	Total bank credit	Total secu- rities	U.S. Treasury and agency securities	Other secu- rities	Total loans and leases <sup>2</sup>	Com- mercial and indus- trial	Total	Revolv- ing home equity	Other	Con- sumer	Security	Other
December:	100 5	77.4	C1.0	15.5	112.1	20.5	20.1			044		
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1967 1968 1969	189.5 197.6 213.1 231.0 250.7 270.4 297.1 318.6 350.5 390.5 401.6	77.4 79.5 88.2 92.2 92.6 94.7 96.1 97.2 111.4 121.9 112.4	61.9 70.4 70.7 67.4 66.7 64.3 61.0 70.7 73.8 64.2	15.5 15.6 17.9 21.5 25.2 28.1 31.9 36.2 40.6 48.1 48.2	112.1 118.1 124.8 138.8 158.1 175.6 201.0 221.4 239.2 268.6 289.2	39.5 42.4 44.1 47.7 52.5 58.7 69.5 79.3 86.5 96.5 106.9	28.1 28.7 30.2 34.0 38.9 43.5 48.9 53.8 64.8 69.9			24.1 26.3 27.6 30.3 34.2 39.5 45.0 47.7 51.2 57.7 62.6	5.0 5.2 6.1 6.6 7.9 8.3 8.0 8.3 9.6 10.5	15. 15. 16. 20. 24. 25. 29. 32. 33. 39.
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1976 1977 1978 1979	434.4 485.2 555.3 638.6 701.7 732.9 790.7 876.0 989.4 1,111.4	129.7 147.5 160.6 168.4 173.8 206.7 228.6 236.3 242.2 260.7	73.4 79.8 85.4 89.7 87.9 117.9 137.3 137.4 138.4 147.2	56.3 67.7 75.2 78.7 85.9 88.9 91.3 98.9 103.8 113.4	304.6 337.6 394.7 470.1 527.9 526.2 562.1 639.7 747.2 850.7	111.6 118.0 133.6 162.8 193.0 184.3 186.3 205.8 239.0 282.2	72.9 81.7 98.8 119.4 132.5 137.2 151.3 178.0 213.5 245.0		119.4 132.5 137.2 151.3 178.0 213.5 245.0	65.3 73.3 85.4 98.3 102.1 104.6 115.9 138.1 164.6 184.5	10.4 10.9 14.4 11.2 10.6 12.7 17.7 20.7 19.1 17.4	44 53. 62. 78. 89. 87. 91. 97. 110.
1980	1,207.1 1,302.7 1,412.3 1,566.7 1,733.4 1,922.2 2,106.6 2,255.3 2,432.7 2,602.2	296.8 311.1 338.6 403.8 406.6 455.9 510.0 535.0 561.7 584.7	173.2 181.8 204.7 263.4 262.9 273.8 312.8 338.9 366.0 399.5	123.6 129.3 133.9 140.4 143.7 182.2 197.2 196.1 195.7 185.2	910.3 991.6 1,073.7 1,163.0 1,326.9 1,466.3 1,596.5 1,720.2 1,871.0 2,017.5	314.5 353.3 396.4 419.1 479.4 506.5 544.0 575.0 611.7 642.7	265.7 287.5 303.8 334.8 380.8 431.0 499.9 595.7 676.4 769.2	32.2 42.6 53.5	265.7 287.5 303.8 334.8 380.8 431.0 499.9 563.5 633.8 715.6	179.2 182.7 188.2 213.2 253.6 294.5 314.5 327.7 354.8 375.3	17.2 20.2 23.6 26.5 34.1 42.9 38.6 34.8 40.3 40.9	133. 148. 161. 169. 179. 191. 199. 187. 187.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999	2,749.7 2,856.4 2,954.1 3,112.4 3,318.2 3,601.0 3,756.9 4,099.3 4,532.8 4,763.3	634.9 747.2 841.8 915.6 939.9 984.0 984.4 1.098.7 1,237.0 1,282.8	456.0 566.9 664.9 730.8 721.6 701.1 702.6 755.6 797.6 815.6	178.9 180.3 176.9 184.8 218.3 282.9 281.8 343.1 439.5 467.2	2,114.9 2,109.2 2,112.3 2,196.7 2,378.3 2,617.0 2,772.5 3,000.6 3,295.8 3,480.5	645.6 623.4 599.4 590.3 650.3 723.8 784.0 853.4 946.7 998.0	856.6 882.8 906.0 947.0 1,010.7 1,089.5 1,141.2 1,243.3 1,333.6 1,471.8	66.4 74.3 78.5 78.1 80.5 84.5 90.9 105.0 103.9 101.5	790.2 808.5 827.5 868.9 930.2 1,004.9 1,050.3 1,138.3 1,229.6 1,370.3	380.8 363.9 356.3 387.6 448.2 491.4 512.4 502.6 496.9 490.6	44.4 53.9 63.4 86.4 75.8 83.2 75.3 94.4 145.3 149.8	187. 185. 187. 185. 193. 229 259. 306. 373. 370.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	5,216.4 5,417.7 5,884.6 6,251.3 6,793.5 7,483.6	1,348.2 1,487.4 1,721.6 1,850.3 1,937.2 2,045.6	792.4 849.0 1,029.1 1,104.8 1,150.2 1,132.9	555.8 638.4 692.5 745.5 787.0 912.7	3,868.2 3,930.3 4,163.0 4,401.0 4,856.3 5,438.0	1,085.9 1,024.3 960.8 900.4 924.4 1,044.6	1,651.2 1,778.6 2,022.0 2,216.5 2,547.6 2,902.6	130.0 155.7 213.5 280.8 399.9 436.2	1,521.2 1,623.0 1,808.5 1,935.7 2,147.8 2,466.3	539.3 556.0 586.2 643.4 695.2 704.4	177.3 146.0 190.2 215.2 215.9 261.5	414. 425. 403. 425. 473. 525.
2004: Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec	6,321.8 6,442.7 6,520.6 6,541.0 6,550.0 6,550.0 6,602.3 6,632.7 6,702.5 6,713.8 6,759.5 6,793.5	1,855,3 1,930,8 1,980,7 1,953,6 1,930,8 1,934,6 1,909,6 1,915,2 1,925,4 1,918,2 1,924,6 1,937,2	1,106.3 1,170.9 1,204.9 1,200.2 1,189.3 1,189.1 1,180.9 1,182.6 1,177.0 1,145.9 1,150.2	749.0 760.0 775.8 753.4 741.5 745.5 728.7 732.5 748.4 770.1 778.7	4,466.5 4,511.8 4,539.9 4,587.4 4,619.1 4,655.3 4,692.7 4,717.5 4,777.1 4,795.7 4,834.9 4,856.3	901.8 900.1 889.4 885.1 884.7 888.5 894.6 902.9 906.2 906.8 915.2 924.4	2,242.3 2,264.3 2,305.1 2,362.5 2,397.7 2,411.7 2,421.2 2,439.8 2,465.5 2,499.4 2,524.6 2,547.6	291.2 297.6 308.2 318.1 328.1 338.2 348.1 359.2 370.5 384.5 394.2 399.9	1,951.1 1,966.7 1,996.9 2,044.4 2,069.6 2,073.5 2,073.1 2,080.6 2,095.0 2,114.9 2,130.4 2,147.8	651.7 653.9 658.5 658.8 659.8 662.7 691.3 691.7 693.6 689.6 685.6	234 1 244.7 245.5 240.7 235.2 248.9 238.1 247.5 241.6 236.8 215.9	436.1 448.1 440.1 441.1 443.1 451.1 464.1 458.1 472.1 473.1
2005: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	6.892.7 6.999.4 7.084.7 7.112.4 7.166.4 7.221.2 7.281.2 7.360.5 7.409.0 7.420.4 7.438.4 7.483.6	1,991.3 2,039.6 2,058.3 2,044.9 2,072.4 2,055.6 2,063.3 2,066.7 2,069.2 2,058.3 2,045.6	1,182.3 1,217.6 1,218.1 1,193.8 1,200.0 1,172.4 1,177.5 1,174.4 1,166.4 1,159.0 1,141.6 1,132.9	809.0 821.9 840.2 851.1 872.4 883.2 885.9 892.4 911.6	4,901.4 4,959.8 5,026.4 5,067.5 5,094.2 5,165.6 5,217.9 5,293.8 5,330.9 5,351.2 5,438.0	942.9 953.0 960.7 974.3 985.2 990.3 1,004.1 1,014.0 1,018.1 1,025.2 1,033.0	2,572.3 2,600.7 2,654.9 2,682.3 2,691.2 2,734.7 2,787.7 2,825.1 2,825.1 2,864.8 2,877.3 2,902.6	407.3 409.9 418.3 423.0 426.9 431.5 437.3 439.5 438.7 436.8 436.8 436.2	2.165.0 2.190.8 2.236.5 2.259.3 2.269.3 2.303.2 2.349.8 2.385.6 2.402.2 2.427.9 2.440.5 2.466.3	702.7 700.6 708.5 711.2 704.3 707.1 710.5 717.2 719.9 708.7 709.2 704.4	200.5 220.5 226.2 223.9 237.1 248.4 232.5 245.3 246.7 241.8 246.6 261.5	482. 484. 476. 475. 476. 485. 483. 492. 505. 510. 514

Data are prorated averages of Wednesday values for domestically chartered commercial banks, branches and agencies of foreign banks.
New York State investment companies (through September 1996), and Edge Act and agreement corporations.
 Excludes Federal funds sold to, reverse repurchase agreements (RPs) with, and loans to commercial banks in the United States.
 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-73.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-2005

[Percent per annum]

						[I CICCII	t per a						-
	Ві	US Treasu	C	onstant		Corpo bon (Mood	ds	High- grade munici-	New- home	Prime rate	Discount (Federal Res of New Y	erve Bank	Federal
Year and month	(new is	6-	3-	aturities 10-	30-	Aaa³	Baa	pal bonds (Stand- ard &	mort- gage yields 4	charged by banks <sup>5</sup>	Primary credit	Adjust- ment credit	funds rate <sup>7</sup>
	month	month .	year .	year	year .	+		Poor's)					
1929 1933	0 515					4 73 4 49	5.90 7.76	4 27 4 71		5.50-6.00 1.50-4.00		5.16 2.56	
1939 1940	023 014					3 01 2 84	4 96	2 76		1 50 1.50		1.00	
1941	103					2 77	4 33 4 28	2 50 2 10 2 36		1.50 1.50		1.00 81.00	
1942 1943	.326 .373					2 83 2 73 2 72	3.91	2 36 2 06		1 50 1 50		8 1.00 8 1.00	
1944 1945	.375					2.62	3 29	1 86 1 67		1 50		81.00	
1946 1947	375 594					2 53 2 61	3 05 3.24	1 64 2 01		1.50 1.50-1.75		81.00 1.00	
1948 1949	1 040					2 82 2 66	3 47 3 42	2 40 2 21		1.75-2.00		1.34 1.50	
1950	1.218					2 62	3 24 3 41	1 0 0		2.07 2.56 3.00		1.59 1.75	
1951 1952	1.552 1.766					2 86 2 96 3.20	3 52 3 74	2 00 2 19 2 72 2 37		3.00 3.17		1.75	
1953 1954	1.931 953		2 47 1 63	2.85 2.40		2 90	3.51	2 37		3.05		1.60	
1955 1956	1 753 2.658		2 47 3 19	2 82 3.18		3 06 3 36	3.53 3.88	2.53 2.93 3.60		3.16 3.77		1.89 2.77	1.78 2.73
1957 1958	3 267 1 839		3.98 2.84	3 65 3 32		3 89 3.79	4 71 4 73	3 60 3.56		4 20 3.83		3.12 2.15	3.11 1.57
1959	3 405	3 832	4 46	4 33		4 38	5.05	3 95 3 73		4 48 4 82		3.36 3.53	3.30 3.22
1960 . 1961	2 928 2.378	3.247 2.605	3.98 3.54 3.47	4 12 3 88		4.35	5.08	3 46		4 50		3.00	1.96 2.68
1962 1963	2.778 3.157	2.605 2 908 3 253	3 6 7	3 95 4 00		4.33 4.26	5 02 4 86	3.18 3.23	5 89	4.50 4.50		3.00 3.23	3 18
1964 1965	3.549 3.954	3 686 4 055	4 03	4.19		4 40	4.83 4.87	3.22 3.27	5.83 5.81	4 50 4 54		3.55 4.04	3.50 4.07
1966 1967	4 881 4.321	5.082 4.630	4 22 5 23 5 03	4 92 5.07		5 13 5.51	5.67 6.23	3 82 3.98	6.25 6.46	5.63 5.61		4.50 4.19	5.11 4.22
1968 1969	5 339	5 470 6.853	5 68 7 02	5 65 6.67		6.18	6.94 7.81	4.51 5.81	6 97 7.81	6.30 7.96		5.16 5.87	5.66 8.20
1970	6 458	6.562	7 29	7.35		8.04	9.11	6.51	8.45	7 91		5.95	7.18
1971 . 1972	4.348 4.071	4.511 4.466	5.65 5.72	6.16 6.21		7.39 7.21	8.56 8.16	5.70 5.27	7.74 7.60	5.72 5.25 8.03		4.88 4.50	4.66 4.43
1973 1974	7.041 7.886	7.178 7.926	6 95 7.82	6.84 7.56		7 44 8 57	8.24 9.50	5 18 6.09	7.96 8.92	10 81		6.44 7.83	8.73 10.50
1975 1976	5 838 4 989	6.122 5.266	7 49 6.77	7 99 7 61		8 83 8 43	10 61 9 75	6.89 6.49	9.00	7.86 6.84		6.25 5.50	5.82 5.04
1977 1978	5.265 7.221	5.510 7.572	6 6 9	7 42 8 41	7 75 8 49	8 02 8 73	8 97 9 49	5.56 5.90	9.02 9.56	6 83 9 06		5 46 7 46	5.54 7.93
1979	10.041	10 017	8 29 9 71	9 44	8 49 9.28	9.63	10 69	6 39	10.78	12 67 15 27		10.28 11.77	11.19
1980 1981	11 506 14 029	11 374 13 776	11 55 14 44	11 46 13 91	11.27 13.45	11 94 14 17	13.67 16.04	8 51 11.23	12 66 14.70	18.87		13.42	13.36 16.38 12.26
1982 1983	10 686 8 63	11.084 8 75	12.92 10.45	13.00 11.10	12 76 11 18	13 79 12.04	16 11 13 55	11.57 9.47	15.14 12.57	14.86 10.79		11.02 8.50	9.09
1984 1985	9 58 7 48	9.80 7.66	11.89 9.64	12 44 10 62	12.41	12 71 11 37	14 19 12.72	10 15 9 18	12.38 11.55	12.04 9.93		8.80 7.69	10.23
1986 1987	5 98 5 82	6 03 6 05	7.06 7.68	7 68 8 39	7 78 8 59	9 02 9 38	10.39	7.38 7.73 7.76	10 17 9 31	8.33 8.21		6 33 5.66	6.81 6.66
1988 1989	6 69 8 12	6.92 8.04	8 26 8 55	8 85 8 49	8 96 8 45	9 71 9 26	10.83	7.76 7.24	9 19 10 13	9 32 10.87		6.20 6.93	7.57 9.21
1990	7 51	7 47	8 26	8 55	8 6 1	9 32	10.36	7.25	10.05	10.01		6 98	8.10
1991 1992	5 42 3 45	5 49 3 57	6 82 5 30	7 86 7 01	8 14 7 67	8 77 8 14	9 80 8.98 7 93	6 89 6 41	9.32 8.24	8 46 6.25		5.45 3.25	5.69 3.52
1993 1994	3 02 4 29	3 14 4 66	4 44 6 27	5 87 7 09	6.59 7.37	7 22 7 96	7 93 8 62	5 63 6 19	7.20 7.49	6.00 7.15		3 00 3.60	3.02 4.21
1995 1996	5.51 5.02	5 59 5.09	6 25 5 99	6 57 6 44	6 88 6.71	7.59 7.37	8 20 8 05	5.95 5.75	7 87 7 80	8 83 8.27		5.21 5.02	5.83 5.30
1997	5.07 4.81	5 18 4 85	6.10 5.14	6.35 5.26	6 61 5 58	7.26 6.53	7.86 7.22	5.55 5.12	7.71 7.07	8.44 8.35		5 00 4 92	5.46 5.35
1999	4 66	4 76	5.49	5.65	5 87	7 04	7.87	5 43	7.04	8 00		4 62	4.97
2000 2001	5 85 3 45	5 92 3 39	6 22	6.03 5.02	5 94 5 49	7.62 7.08	8 36 7 95	5 77 5 19	7 52 7.00	9.23 6.91		5.73 3.40	6.24 3.88
2002 2003	1.62	1 69 1 06	3 10 2 10	4 61 4 01		6 49 5 67	7.80 6.77	5.05 4.73	6 43 5 80 5 77	4 67 4 12	2.12	1 17	1.67 1.13
2004 2005	1 38 3 16	1.58 3.40	2 78 3 93	4 27 4 29		5 63 5 24	6.39 6.06	4 63 4 29	5 77 5 94	4.34 6.19	2.34 4.19		1.35 3.22

See next page for continuation of table

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Rate on new issues within period, bank-discount basis
<sup>2</sup> Yields on the more actively traded issues adjusted to constant maturities by the Department of the Treasury In February 2002, the Department of the Treasury discontinued publication of the 30-year series
<sup>3</sup> Beginning December 7, 2001, data for corporate Aaa series are industrial bonds only
<sup>4</sup> Effective rate (in the primary market) on conventional mortgages, reflecting fees and charges as well as contract rate and assuming, on the average, repayment at end of 10 years. Rates beginning January 1973 not strictly comparable with prior rates.

TABLE B-73.—Bond yields and interest rates, 1929-2005—Continued [Percent per annum]

		U.S. Treas	,			Corpo	ıds	High- grade	Now	Primo	Discount (Federal Re	window serve Bank	
Year and month	Bi (new is		m.	Constant aturities	2	(Moo	dy's)	munici- pal bonds	New- home mort-	Prime rate charged	of New		Federal funds
month	3- month	6- month	3- year	10- year	30- year	Aaa³	Baa	(Stand- ard & Poor's)	gage yields <sup>4</sup>	by banks <sup>5</sup>	Primary credit	Adjust- ment credit	rate 7
										High-low	High-low	High-low	
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	5.27 4.93 4.50 3.92 3.67 3.48 3.54 3.54 2.87 2.22 1.93 1.72	5.04 4.78 4.36 3.89 3.66 3.44 3.48 3.31 2.84 2.19 1.94 1.81	4.77 4.71 4.43 4.42 4.51 4.35 4.31 4.04 3.45 3.14 3.22 3.62	5.16 5.10 4.89 5.14 5.39 5.28 5.24 4.97 4.73 4.57 4.65 5.09	5.54 5.45 5.34 5.65 5.78 5.61 5.48 5.48 5.32 5.12 5.48	7 15 7.10 6.98 7.20 7.29 7.18 7.13 7.02 7.17 7.03 6.97 6.76	7.93 7.87 7.84 8.07 8.07 7.97 7.97 7.85 8.03 7.91 7.81 8.05	5.15 5.21 5.19 5.33 5.35 5.24 5.22 5.06 5.09 5.07 5.06 5.28	7.20 7.10 7.04 7.07 7.12 7.12 7.11 7.15 6.89 6.73 6.63 6.79	9.50-9.00 8.50-8.50 8.50-8.00 8.00-7.50 7.50-7.00 7.00-6.75 6.75-6.75 6.75-6.50 6.50-6.00 5.50-5.00 5.00-4.75		6.00-5.00 5.00-5.00 5.00-4.50 4 50-4.00 4 00-3.50 3.50-3.25 3.25-3.25 3.25-3.00 3.00-2.50 2.50-2.00 2.00-1.50 1.50-1.25	5 96 5.44 5 3 4.88 4 2 3 9 3.7 3.66 3.00 2.44 2.00
OO2: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	1.66 1.73 1.81 1.72 1.74 1.71 1.68 1.63 1.63 1.60 1.26	1.74 1.83 2.02 1.97 1.88 1.83 1.71 1.62 1.61 1.57 1.29	3.56 3.55 4.14 4.01 3.80 3.49 3.01 2.52 2.32 2.25 2.32 2.23	5.04 4.91 5.28 5.21 5.16 4.93 4.65 4.26 3.87 3.94 4.05 4.03	5.45	6.55 6.51 6.81 6.76 6.75 6.63 6.53 6.37 6.15 6.32 6.31 6.21	7.87 7.89 8.11 8.03 8.09 7.95 7.90 7.58 7.40 7.73 7.62 7.45	5.19 5.14 5.27 5.27 5.22 5.11 5.01 4.92 4.73 4.85 4.98	6.87 6.82 6.76 6.74 6.59 6.47 6.26 6.17 6.09 6.08 6.04	4 75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.75 4.75-4.25 4.25-4.25		1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25 1.25-1.25	1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
003:     Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Sept Oct Nov Dec	1.17 1.16 1.13 1.14 1.08 0.95 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.93	1.21 1.18 1.12 1.15 1.09 0.94 0.95 1.04 1.02 1.01	2.18 2.05 1.98 2.06 1.75 1.51 1.93 2.44 2.23 2.26 2.45	4.05 3.90 3.81 3.96 3.57 3.33 3.98 4.45 4.27 4.29 4.30 4.27		6.17 5.95 5.89 5.74 5.22 4.97 5.49 5.88 5.72 5.70 5.65 5.62	7.35 7.06 6.95 6.85 6.38 6.19 6.62 7.01 6.79 6.66 6.60	4.88 4.80 4.72 4.71 4.35 4.32 4.71 5.08 4.91 4.84 4.74 4.65	6.12 5.82 5.75 5.92 5.75 5.51 5.53 5.77 5.97 5.92 5.59	4.25-4.25 4.25-4.25 4.25-4.25 4.25-4.25 4.25-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00	2.25-2.25 2.25-2.25 2.25-2.25 2.25-2.25 2.25-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00	0.75-0.75	1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	0.89 0.92 0.94 0.94 1.04 1.27 1.35 1.48 1.65 1.75 2.06 2.20	0.98 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.31 1.58 1.68 1.72 1.86 2.00 2.26 2.45	2.27 2.25 2.00 2.57 3.10 3.26 3.05 2.88 2.83 2.83 2.85 3.09 3.21	4.15 4.08 3.83 4.35 4.72 4.73 4.50 4.28 4.13 4.10 4.19 4.23		5.54 5.50 5.33 5.73 6.04 6.01 5.82 5.65 5.46 5.47 5.52 5.47	6.44 6.27 6.11 6.46 6.75 6.78 6.62 6.46 6.27 6.21 6.20 6.15	4.53 4.48 4.39 4.84 5.03 5.00 4.82 4.65 4.49 4.43 4.48	5.48 5.72 5.49 5.77 5.81 5.96 5.88 5.72 5.82 5.82	4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.00-4.00 4.25-4.00 4.25-4.25 4.75-4.50 4.75-4.75 5.00-4.75 5.25-5.00	2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.00-2.00 2.25-2.00 2.25-2.25 2.75-2.25 2.75-2.75 3.00-2.75		1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.24 1.44 1.66 1.77 1.99
Jan	2.32 2.53 2.75 2.79 2.86 2.99 3.22 3.45 3.47 3.70 3.90 3.89	2.60 2.76 3.00 3.06 3.10 3.13 3.41 3.67 3.68 3.98 4.16 4.19	3.39 3.54 3.91 3.79 3.72 3.69 3.91 4.08 3.96 4.29 4.43 4.39	4.22 4.17 4.50 4.34 4.14 4.00 4.18 4.26 4.20 4.46 4.54 4.47		5.36 5.20 5.40 5.33 5.15 4.96 5.09 5.13 5.35 5.42 5.37	6.02 5.82 6.06 6.05 6.01 5.86 5.95 5.96 6.03 6.30 6.39 6.32	4.28 4.14 4.42 4.31 4.16 4.08 4.15 4.21 4.28 4.49 4.53 4.43	6.01 5.75 5.82 5.84 5.82 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.83 5.99 6.03 6.20 6.39	5.25-5.25 5.50-5.25 5.75-5.50 5.75-5.75 6.00-5.625 6.25-6.00 6.25-6.25 6.75-6.50 6.75-6.50 7.00-7.00 7.25-7.00	3 25-3.25 3.50-3.25 3.75-3.50 3.75-3.75 4.00-3.75 4.25-4.25 4.50-4.25 4.50-4.25 4.75-4.50 5.00-5.00 5.25-5.00		2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.1

ties maturing in 1 year or less.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For monthly data, high and low for the period. Prime rate for 1929–33 and 1947–48 are ranges of the rate in effect during the period. 
<sup>6</sup> Primary credit replaced adjustment credit as the Federal Reserve's principal discount window lending program effective January 9, 2003. 
<sup>7</sup> Since July 19, 1975, the daily effective rate is an average of the rates on a given day weighted by the volume of transactions at these rates. Prior to that date, the daily effective rate was the rate considered most representative of the day's transactions, usually the one at which most transactions occurred.

<sup>8</sup> From October 30, 1942, to April 24, 1946, a preferential rate of 0.50 percent was in effect for advances secured by Government securi-

Sources: Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Housing Finance Board, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's.

 $\begin{array}{lll} \textbf{TABLE} & \textbf{B-74.} \\ \hline \textbf{--Credit market borrowing}, & 1997-2005 \\ \textbf{[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]} \end{array}$ 

ltem	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
				*-	+			
NONFINANCIAL SECTORS	762 2	1.020 8	1.027.3	825.2	1.094 6	1,319.1	1.651.3	1.926 1
DOMESTIC COVERNMENT	23 1	-52 6	-71.2	-295 9	-5.6	257.6	396 0	361.9
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT Treasury securities	23 2	-54 6	-71.0	-294 9	-5 1	257.1	398.4	362.5
Budget agency securities and mortgages	- l	2 0	2	-10	5	.5	-2.4	6
NONFEDERAL, BY INSTRUMENT	739 1	1.073 4	1 098 6	1.121 1	1,100.2	1,061.6	1,255.2	1,564.2
Commercial paper Municipal securities and loans Corporate bonds Bank loans ne c Other loans and advances	13 7 56 9 150 5 106 4 43 1	24 4 84 2 235 2 111 4 68 5	37.4 54.4 221.7 82.2 26.1	48 1 23.6 162.6 98 2 79 6	-88 3 122.9 347.7 -81.6 8.9	-64.2 159.4 132.3 -87.0 20.3	-40.0 135.1 158.3 -80.2 10.0	15.8 133.1 77.7 33.6 25.0
Mortgages Home Multifamily residential Commercial Farm Consumer credit	299 1 234 9 7 2 53.8 3.2 69 4	454 0 348.9 26 2 72 2 6 7 95.8	563.8 418.0 39.2 100.6 6.1 113.0	540.8 401.0 26.8 106.1 6.9 168.1	658.3 496.1 40.6 113.9 7.7 132.3	813.7 672.8 37.2 96.0 7.7 87.1	983.6 782.0 69.9 123.6 8.1 88.4	1.188.0 972.7 47.8 159.4 8.1 91.0
NONFEDERAL, BY SECTOR	739 1	1.073 4	1.098.6	1.121 1	1,100.2	1,061.6	1.255.2	1,564.2
Household sector Nonfinancial business Corporate Nonfarm noncorporate Farm	304 9 392 7 291 8 94 7 6.2 41 5	419 1 586.6 396.5 179.9 10.3 67.7	487.5 572.6 373.3 194.3 5.0 38.5	551 1 554.5 346 2 197.1 11.2 15.5	600.5 393.9 220.7 162.7 10.5 105.8	736.2 181.5 25.2 148.5 7.9 143.9	825.2 312.3 148.4 156.1 7.7 117.8	1,011 7 434.3 258.2 164.6 11.5 118.2
FOREIGN BORROWING IN THE UNITED STATES	69.9	37.2	19.0	63.0	-43.8	70.8	54.3	82.2
Commercial paper	3.7	7_8	16.3	31.7	-14 2	36.1	22.3	63 7
Bonds	59.6 8.5 -1.8	28 8 6.6 -6.0	79.9 .5 –5.7	21 2 11 4 -1.3	-18 5 -7.3 -3.8	31.6 5.3 –2.3	41.9 -7.7 -2.1	19.2 2.5 -3.1
NONFINANCIAL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BORROWING	832 2	1.058 0	1,046.3	888.2	1,050.8	1,389.9	1.705.6	2,008.3
FINANCIAL SECTORS								
BY INSTRUMENT	570.5	1,019.6	1,015.6	778.4	877.5	823.3	1,009.2	799.1
Open market paper GSE issues (government-sponsored enterprises) Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pool securi- ties	166.7 99.1	161 0 278 9	176.2 318.8	131.7 235.2	-45.3 304 1	-63.5 219.8	-63.8 243.7	34.2 65.0
ties Corporate bonds Bank loans n e c Other loans and advances Mortgages	114 6 126.4 13 3 35 6 14 9	192.7 243.5 28.5 90.2 24.8	274.6 144.8 -12.8 107.1 6 9	199.7 160.7 3.8 42.5 4 9	338.5 239.4 13.0 25.5 2.2	326.8 323.7 1.5 6.8 8.2	330.5, 463.9 -4.8 31.2 8.3	53.0 534.7 12.4 74.1 25.6
BY SECTOR	570.5	1,019 6	1 015.6	778 4	877.5	823.3	1,009.2	799 1
Commercial banking U.Schartered commercial banks Foreign banking offices in U.S. Bank holding companies Savings institutions Government-sponsored enterprises Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools Asset-backed securities insuers Finance companies REITS (real estate investment trusts) Brokers and dealers Funding corporations Other:	46.1 29.5 -2.4 19.0 19.7 99.1 114.6 133.7 33.8 8.1	72.9 52.8 -4.8 24.9 52.2 278.9 192.7 254.7 57.1 62.7	67.2 41.8 4 25.8 48.0 318.8 274.6 146.8 70.7 12.3 -17.2	60.0 36.8 0 23.2 27.3 235.2 199.7 157.2 81.9 2.6 15.6	52.9 30.2 9 23.6 -2.0 304.1 338.5 230.4 1.3 3.2	49.7 29.9 4 20.3 -23.4 219.8 326.8 181.9 42.2 24.5 -1.7	49.2 13.9 1 35.4 6.1 243.7 330.5 219.5 118.2 31.9 6.4	77.7 18 1 59.5 64.4 65.0 53.0 321 8 117.9 97.6
Funding corporations Other 1	79 9 -4 2	40 0 1 2	91.6.	3 7	-54.6 2.2	5 4.0	-1.4 5.1	-18.9 5.3
BY INSTRUMENT	1,402 6	2.0776	2.061 9	1,666.6	1.928.3	2,213.2	2,714.7	2,807.5
Open market paper Treasury securities Agency- and GSE-backed securities Municipal securities Corporate and foreign bonds Bank loans ne c. Other loans and advances Mortgages Consumer credit	184 1 23 2 213 6 56 9 336 4 128 2 76 9 314 0 69 4	193.1 -54.6 473.6 84.2 507.5 146.5 152.7 478.8 95.8	229.9 -71.0 593.1 54.4 374.5 69.8 127.5 570.7 113.0	211.6 -294.9 433.9 23.6 344.5 113.3 120.8 545.6 168.1	-147 8 -5.1 642.1 122.9 568 6 -75.8 30 6 660.5 132.3	-91.5 257.1 547.2 159.4 487.6 -80.2 24.7 821.9 87.1	-81.6 398.4 571.9 135.1 664.1 -92.6 39.1 991.9 88.4	113.6 362.5 117.5 133.1 631.6 48.5 96.0 1,213.6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Credit unions, life insurance companies, and mortgage companies

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-74.—Credit market borrowing, 1997-2005—Continued [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

ltom.		200	)4		2005			
Item	1	11	III	IV	1	11	III	
NONFINANCIAL SECTORS				-	-			
DOMESTIC	2,034.4	1,701.0	1,922.8	2,046.3	2,311.7	1,998.3	2,296.6	
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	502.9	367.2	266.3	311.2	630.7	5.8	231 9	
Treasury securities	501.9 1.1	370.8 -3.6	266.5 2	310.9 .3	631 5 7	7.2 -1.4	232 3 - 4	
NONFEDERAL, BY INSTRUMENT	1,531.5	1.333.8	1,656 4	1.735.2	1.680.9	1.992.4	2,064 6	
Commercial paper Municipal securities and loans Corporate bonds Bank loans n.e.c. Other loans and advances	33.8 174.0 114.2 -38.4 14.3	32.3 70.2 6.7 85.3 -15.3	22.4 157.3 51.7 -31.5 2	-25.4 130.9 138.3 119.1 100.7	53.7 224 9 34.3 88.5 84.0	9 2 127.7 30.1 210.3 70.2	4 6 240.5 82.7 42.1 23 4	
Mortgages Home Multifamily residential Commercial Farm Consumer credit	1.143.8 964.7 23.7 148.4 7.1 89.7	1,092.9 889.6 67.5, 125.3 10.4 61.8	1,334.6 1,097.9 42.3 185.2 9.1 121.7	1.180.6 938.6 57.6 178.6 5.9 90.9	1.137.8 918.7 30.9 183.1 5.1 57.7	1,459.7 1,137.4 64.2 246.7 11.4 85.2	1.554 3 1,225 3 30.6 289 5 8.8 117.0	
NONFEDERAL, BY SECTOR	1,531.5	1,333.8	1,656.4	1.735.2	1,680.9	1,992.4	2.064.6	
Household sector Nonlinancial business Corporate Nonfarm noncorpurate Farm State and local governments	1,024.4 351.1 207.4 137.5 6.2 156.0	968.7 314.0 131.8 169.0 13.1 51.1	1,063.3 447.9 261.5 168.1 18.3 145.2	990 4 624.3 432.0 183.8 8 5 120.5	929.4 549.3 351.4 195.0 2.9 202.2	1,158.4 728.3 429.8 281.5 17.0 105.7	1,235.9 608.0 362.3 220.6 25.1 220.7	
FOREIGN BORROWING IN THE UNITED STATES	84.2	-63.6	97.5	210.7	17 6	87.5	111.7	
Commercial paper Bonds Bank loans n.e.c. Other loans and advances	99.6 -4.3 -6.7 -4.3	-30.1 -40.1 7.0 4	24.4 86.8 -9.0 -4.8	160.7 34.4 18.5 -2.9	13.7 -4.6 12.1 -3.5	33.6 60.7 -5.3 -1.6	116.7 -3.5 5.2 -6.7	
NONFINANCIAL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BORROWING	2,118.7	1,637.4	2,020.2	2.257.0	2.329 3	2.085.7	2.408.3	
FINANCIAL SECTORS								
BY INSTRUMENT	710.8	926.0	727.4	832.2	598.5	1.302.3	683.8	
Open market paper GSE issues (government-sponsored enterprises) Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pool securities Corporate bonds Bank loans n.e.c. Other loans and advances Mortgages	129.6 .6 126.7 331.0 17.5 79.1 26.5	-2.5 211.9 88.0 490.3 -25.8 148.1 15.9	-31.4 93.1 62.1 554.6 44.2 -15.7 20.6	41.1 -45.5 -64.6 762.8 13.6 85.1 39.6	122 1 -209.6 64.7 563.3 5.8 27.0 25.2	473.2 -84.2 123.5 680.1 -24.0 114.5 19.3	140.2 -243.9 178.4 538.9 39.5 10.8 19.9	
BY SECTOR	710.8	926.0	727.4	832.2	598.5	1.302.3	683.8	
Commercial banking U.Schartered commercial banks Foreign banking offices in U.S. Bank holding companies Savings institutions Government-sponsored enterprises Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools Asset-backed securities insuers Finance companies REITS (real estate investment trusts) Brokers and dealers Funding corporations Other!  ALL SECTORS	182.7 80.0 1 102.8 1.1 .6 126.7 147.1 111.2 67.1 51.9 25.6 -3.0	6.8 -9.5 2 16.1 166.2 211.9 88.0 355.1 -8.4 63.9 2.5 32.1 7.6	60.1 -8 5 60.4 -7.0 93.1 62.1 417.0 115.5 42.1 33.2 -89.6 1.0	61.2 2.6 0 58.7 96.9 -45.5 -64.6 367.9 253.2 217.6 -26.6 -43.6 158.8	163.0 75.4 3 87.9 -30.6 -209.6 64.7 430.3 75.8 76.2 11.2 17.6 1	41.4 19.3 .6 21.4 82.4 -84.2 123.5 688.4 -23.6 92.8 -5.2 381.4 5.4	82.7 30.8 51.7 -7.1 -243.9 178.4 620.6 12.6 65.5 18.0 -43.9	
BY INSTRUMENT	2,829.5	2,563.4	2,747.7	3,089.2	2,927.8	3,388.0	3.092.0	
Open market paper Treasury securities Agency - and GSE-backed securities Municipal securities Corporate and foreign bonds Bank loans n.e.c. Other loans and advances Mortgages Consumer credit	263.0 501.9 128.3 174.0 440.9 -27.6 89.1 1.170.3 89.7	3 370.8 296.3 70.2 456.8 66.5 132.4 1,108.8 61.8	15.4 266.5 155.1 157.3 693.0 3.7 -20.3 1.355.1 121.7	176.4 310 9 -109.8 130.9 935.5 151.3 182.9 1,220.2 90.9	189.4 631.5 -145.7 224.9 593.1 106.4 107.5 1.163.0 57.7	516.0 7.2 37.9 127.7 770.9 180.9 183.1 1.478.9 85.2	261.5 232.3 -65.8 240.5 618.1 86.8 27.5 1,574.1 117.0	

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-75.—Mortgage debt outstanding by type of property and of financing, 1949-2005 [Billions of dollars]

				Nonfarm pr	operties			Nonfarm	properties	by type of	mortgage	
							Go	vernment	underwritt	en	Convent	ional <sup>2</sup>
End of year or quarter	All proper-	Farm proper-	*	1-to 4-	Multi- family	Com- mercial		1- to	4-family h	ouses		1- to 4-
or quarter	ties	ties	Total	family houses	proper- ties	proper- ties	Total <sup>1</sup>	Total	FHA insured	VA guar- anteed	Total	family houses
1949	62.3	5.6	56 7	37 3	8 6	108	17 1	15 0	6.9	8.1	39.6	22.3
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1957 1958	72.7 82.1 91 4 101.2 113 7 130.1 144 7 156 7 172 0 190.9	6.0 6.6 7.2 7.7 8.1 9.0 9.8 10.4 11.1 12.1	66 6 75 6 84 2 93 5 105 6 121 1 134 8 146.3 160 9 178.8	45 1 51 6 58 6 66 1 75 8 88 4 99 2 107 8 117 9 130.9	10.1 11.5 12.3 12.9 13.5 14.3 14.9 15.3 16.8 18.7	11 5 12.5 13 4 14 6 16.3 18 4 20 8 23 2 26 2 29 2	22 1 26 6 29 3 32 1 36 2 42 9 47 8 51.6 55 2 59.3	18 8 22.9 25 4 28.1 32.1 38 9 43.9 47.2 50 1 53 8	8.5 9.7 10.8 12.0 12.8 14.3 15.5 16.5 19.7 23.8	10.3 13.2 14.6 16.1 19.3 24.6 28.4 30.7 30.4 30.0	44 6 49 0 55 0 61 4 69 4 78 1 87 0 94 8 105 8 119 5	26.2 28.8 33.2 38.0 43.7 49.5 55.3 60.6 67.8 77.1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1966 1967	207.5 228.1 251.6 278.7 306.2 333.7 356.9 381.6 411.5 442.3	12 8 13 9 15 2 16 8 18 9 21 2 23.1 25 1 27.5 29 4	194 7 214 2 236 4 261.9 287.3 312.5 333.8 356.5 383.9 412.9	141.9 154.7 169.4 186.6 203.6 220.8 233.3 247.7 265.2 283.6	20.3 23.0 25.8 29.0 33.6 37.2 40.3 43.9 47.3 52.2	32 4 36 5 41.2 46.3 50 1 54.5 60.3 64 8 71 4 77.1	62 3 65 6 69.4 73.4 77 2 81 2 84 1 88.2 93 4 100.2	56.4 59.1 62.2 65.9 69.2 73.1 76.1 79.9 84.4 90.2	26.7 29.5 32.3 35.0 38.3 42.0 44.8 47.4 50.6 54.5	29.7 29.6 29.9 30.9 31.1 31.3 32.5 33.8 35.7	132.3 148.6 167.1 188.5 210.1 231.3 249.7 268.3 290.5 312.7	85.5 95.5 107.3 120.7 134.3 147.6 157.2 167.8 180.8 193.4
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	474 4 525.1 598 1 673.4 734.0 793.5 880.3 1,012.0 1,164.6 1,330.0	30.5 32.4 35.4 39.8 44.9 49.9 55.4 63.8 72.8 86.8	443.9 492.7 562.8 633.6 689.1 743.7 824.9 948.2 1,091.9 1,243.3	297.8 326.2 366.7 407.9 440.7 482.0 544.8 640.6 752.2 868.8	60.1 70.1 82.8 93.2 100.0 100.7 105.9 114.3 125.2 135.0	86.0 96.4 113.3 132.6 148.3 161.0 174.2 193.3 214.5 239.4	109 2 120 7 131.1 135.0 140 2 147.0 154.0 161.7 176.4 199 0	97.3 105.2 113.0 116.2 121.3 127.7 133.5 141.6 153.4 172.9	59.9 65.7 68.2 66.2 65.1 66.1 66.5 68.0 71.4 81.0	37.3 39.5 44.7 50.0 56.2 61.6 67.0 73.6 82.0 92.0	334.7 372.0 431.7 498.6 548.8 596.7 670.9 786.4 915.5 1.044.3	200.6 221.0 253.8 291.6 319.4 354.2 411.3 499.0 598.8 695.9
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988	1.464.8 1.590.1 1.675.5 1.869.1 2.113.1 2.376.8 2.663.3 3.001.5 3.319.6 3.591.3	97.5 107.2 111.3 113.7 112.4 105.9 95.1 87.7 83.0 80.5	1,367.3 1,482.9 1,564.2 1,755.3 2,000.7 2,271.0 2,568.3 2,913.7 3,236.6 3,510.8	966.2 1.044.1 1.089.5 1.211.6 1.351.4 1.523.5 1.726.4 1.953.6 2.188.1 2.421.5	141.1 139.2 141.1 154.3 177.4 205.9 239.3 262.1 279.0 289.9	259 9 299 7 333.6 389.4 471.9 541.6 602.5 698.0 769.6 799.5	225.1 238.9 248.9 279.8 294.8 328.3 370.5 431.4 459.7 486.8	195 2 207.6 217.9 248.8 265 9 288.8 328.6 387.9 414.2 440.1	93.6 101.3 108.0 127.4 136.7 153.0 185.5 235.5 258.8 282.8	101.6 106.2 109.9 121.4 129.1 135.8 143.1 152.4 155.4 157.3	1,142.2 1,244.0 1,315.3 1,475.5 1,705.8 1,942.7 2,197.8 2,482.3 2,776.9 3,024.0	771.1 836.5 871.6 962.8 1,085.5 1,234.7 1,397.8 1,565.7 1,773.9
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	3.807 4 3.952 9 4.062.5 4.195 7 4.363 4 4.550 2 4.819.5 5.133 1 5.611 5 6.215 2	78 9 79 2 79.7 80.7 83.3 85.0 87.6 90 4 96 7 103 9	3.728.5 3.873 7 3.982.7 4.115.0 4.280 0 4.465.2 4.731 9 5.042 8 5.514 8 6.111 3	2.619.5 2.781.7 2.947.3 3.106.0 3.283.2 3.451.2 3.674.7 3.910.0 4.258.5 4.673.9	288.3 284.9 272.0 269.1 269.6 275.5 288.0 301.1 334.5 375.8	820.7 807.1 763.4 739.9 727.2 738.5 769.2 831.7 921.9 1.061.6	517.9 537.2 533.3 513.4 559.3 684.3 620.3 656.7 674.1 731.5	470.9 493.3 489.8 469.5 514.2 537.1 571.2 605.7 623.8 678.8	310.9 330.6 326.0 303.2 336.8 352.3 379.2 405.7 417.9 462.3	160.0 162.7 163.8 166.2 177.3 184.7 192.0 200.0 205.9 216.5	3,210.5 3,336.4 3,449.4 3,601.6 3,720.7 3,881.0 4,111.6 4,386.1 4,840.8 5,379.8	2,148.6 2,288.4 2,457.6 2,636.6 2,769.0 2,914.2 3,103.5 3,304.3 3,634.7 3,995.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	6,760 5 7,421 0 8,243 0 9,235.0 10,463.2	110 2 117 8 125.5 133 6 141 7	6,650.3 7,303.1 8,117.5 9,101.5 10,321.5	5,075.2 5,571.3 6,244 1 7,026 1 8,013.7	405 6 447 8 486 7 557 2 609 0	1,169.4 1,284.0 1,386.7 1,518.2 1,698.8	773.1 772.7 759.3 709.2 661.5	720.0 718.5 704.0 653.3 605.4	499.9 497.4 486.2 438.7 398.1	220.1 221.2 217.7 214.6 207.3	5,877.2 6,530.5 7,358.2 8,392.3 9,660.0	4,355.3 4,852.8 5,540.2 6,372.8 7,408.4
2004     II   III   IV	9.490 1 9.776 7 10.142 1 10.463.2	135 3 138 3 140 5 141 7	9,354 8 9,638 4 10,001 6 10,321 5	7,235.3 7,465.8 7,768.3 8,013.7	564 8 582.0 594.0 609 0	1.554 7 1.590.5 1.639 3 1,698.8	702 1 687 6 676 2 661 5	646.3 631.7 620.3 605.4	433 2 422.0 411.6 398.1	213.1 209.7 208.7 207.3	8,652.7 8,950.8 9,325.4 9,660.0	6,589.0 6,834.2 7,148.0 7,408.4
2005: I II III r	10,716 1 11.093 9 11.499 7	143 0 146 2 148 3	10.573 1 10.947 7 11.351 4	8,210 2 8,502 0 8,821.5	617 6 632 4 641 6	1,745.3 1,813.3 1,888.3	647 9 633 4 619.1	591 6 577 2 562.5	386 1 372 7 359 3	205.5 204.4 203.2	9,925.2 10,314.3 10,732.3	7,618.6 7,924.8 8,259.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes FHA insured multifamily properties, not shown separately <sup>2</sup> Derived figures. Total includes multifamily properties, not shown separately, and commercial properties not shown here but are the same as nonfarm properties—commercial properties.

Source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

TABLE B-76.—Mortgage debt outstanding by holder, 1949-2005 [Billions of dollars]

			Major financi	al institutions		Other ho	lders
End of year or quarter	Total	Total	Savings Institu- tions <sup>1</sup>	Commer- cial banks <sup>2</sup>	Life insur- ance com- panies	Federal and related agen- cies <sup>3</sup>	Indi- viduals and others
1949	62.3	42.9	18.3	11.6	12.9	2.0	17.
950	72.7	51.7	21.9	13.7	16.1	2 6	18.
951 952	82.1 91.4	59.5 67.0	25.5 29.8	14.7 16.0	19.3 21.3	3.3 3.9	19. 20.
953	101.2	75.1	34.8	17.0	23.3	4.4	21
954	113.7 130.1	85.8 99.5	41.1 48.9	18.7 21.2	26.0 29.4	4.7 5.3	23.
956	144.7	111.4	55.5	22.9	33.0	6.2	25 27
957 958	156.7 172.0	120.0 131.7	61.2 68.9	23.6 25.8	35.2 37.1	7.7 8.0	29 32
959	190.9	145.6	78.1	28.2	39.2	10.2	35.
960	207.5	157.6	86.9	28.9	41.8	11.5	38.
961 962	228.1 251.6	172.7 192.6	98.0 111.1	30.6 34.7	44.2 46.9	12.2 12.6	43 46
963	278.7	217.4	127.2	39.6	50.5	11.8	49
964	306.2 333.7	241.3 265.0	141.9 154.9	44.3 50.0	55.2 60.0	12.2	52 55
966	356.9	281.2	161.8	54.8	64.6	17.5	58
967 968	381.6 411.5	299.2 320.3	172.3 184.3	59.5 66 1	67.4 70.0	20.9 25.1	61 66
069	442.3	339.8	196.4	71.4	72.0	31-1	71
970	474.4 525.1	356.7 395.2	208.3 236.2	74.1	74.4	38.3	79
971	598.1	450.8	273.6	83.4 100.2	75.5 76.9	46.3 54.5	83 92
973 974	673.4 734.0	506.3 544.1	305.0 324.2	120.1	81.3	64.7	102
075	793.5	582.9	324.2 355.8	133.6 137.9	86.2 89.2	82.2 101.1	107 109
976	880.3	649.3	404.6	153 1	91.6	116.7	114
977	1.012.0 1.164.6	747.0 849.8	469.4 528.0	180.8 215.7	96.8 106.2	140.5 170.6	124 144
979	1,330.0	939.9	574.6	246.9	118.4	216.0	174
980	1,464.8 1,590.1	998.6 1,042.8	603.1 618.5	264.5 286.5	131.1 137.7	256.8 289.4	209 257
982	1,675.5	1,042.8	578.1	303.4	142.0	355.4	296
983	1,869.1	1,109.9 1,247.8	626.6 709.7	332.3 381.4	151.0	433.3	325
984 985	2,113.1 2,376.8	1,363.5	760.5	431.2	156.7 171.8	490.6 580.9	374 432
986 987	2,663.3 3.001.5	1,476.5 1.667.6	778.0 860.5	504.7 594.8	193.8 212.4	733.7 857.9	453 475
988	3,319.6	1,834.3	924.5	676.9	232.9	937.8	547
989	3,591.3	1,935.2	910.3	770.7	254.2	1,067.3	588
990	3,807.4 3,952.9	1,918.8 1,846.2	801.6 705.4	849.3 881.3	267.9 259.5	1,258.9 1,422.5	629 684
992	4,062.5	1,770.4	627.9	900.5	242.0	1,558.1	733
93 94	4,195.7 4.363.4	1,770.1 1.824.7	598.4 596.2	947.8 1.012.7	223.9 215.8	1,682.8 1.788.0	742 750
195	4,550.2	1,900.1	596.8	1,090.2	213.1	1,878.7	771
96 97	4,819.5 5,133.1	1,981.9 2,084.0	628.3 631.8	1,145.4 1,245.3	208.2 206.8	2,006.1	831 937
98	5,611.5	2,194.6	644.0	1,337.0	213.6	2,310.9	1,106
99	6,215.2	2,394.3	668.1	1,495.4	230.8	2,613.3	1,207
00	6,760.5 7.421.0	2,619.0 2,790.9	723.0 758.0	1,660.1	235.9 243.0	2,834.4 3,205.0	1,307 1,425
02	8.243.0	3,089.4	781.0	2,058.4	250.0	3,592.2	1,561
03	9.235.0 10,463.2	3,387.2 3,925.7	870.2 1.057.0	2,256.0 2,595.3	260.9 273.3	4,026.3 4,096.0	1,821 2,441
004: 1	9.490.1	3.517.8	926.3	2.329.3	262.2	4.053.3	1.919
11	9,776.7	3,665.3	965.3	2,435.9	264.1	4,067.0	2,044
IIIIV	10,142.1 10,463.2	3,793.2 3,925.7	1,007.9 1,057.0	2,517 4 2,595.3	267.9 273.3	4,092.1 4,096.0	2,256 2,441
005: 1	10,716.1	4.033.1	1.068.0		274.7	4.101.7	2.581
II	11,093.9	4.181.2	1,112.9	2,690.4 2,790.4	277.8	4,121.1	2,791
111 P	11,499.7	4,317.5	1,140.8	2,896.2	280.5	4,167.3	3,014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, based on data from various Government and private organizations.

<sup>Includes savings banks and savings and loan associations. Data reported by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation-insured institutions include loans in process for 1987 and exclude loans in process beginning 1988.
Includes loans held by nondeposit frust companies, but not by bank trust departments.
Includes Ginnie Mae—Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Resolution Trust Corporation, 1955, and in earlier years Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Homeowners Loan Corporation, Resolution Trust Corporation, and Public Housing Administration Also includes U.S.-sponsored agencies such as Fannie Mae—Federal National Mortgage Association (FMMA), Federal Land Banks, Freddie Mac—Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fell-MC), Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (beginning 1994), Federal Home Loan Banks (beginning 1997), and mortgage pass-through securities issued or guaranteed by GNMA, FILMC, FNMA or FmHA. Other U.S. agencies (amounts small or current separate data not readily available) included with "individuals and others."

\*Includes private mortgage pools.</sup> 

TABLE B-77.—Consumer credit outstanding, 1955-2005 [Amount outstanding (end of month); millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted]

Year and month	Total consumer credit <sup>1</sup>	Revolving	Nonrevolving <sup>2</sup>
cember.	41.000.0		41.000
1955	41,869.0 45,448.2		41,869 45,448
1957	48,078.3		45,448 48,078
1957 1958 1959	48,394.3 56.010.7		48,394 56.010
959			
960	60,025.3		60,025
962	62,248.5 68,126.7		62,248 68,126
963	76,581.4 85,959.6		76,581 85,959
964	95.954.7		95,954
966	101,788.2		101,788
967	106,842.6 117,399.1	2.041.5	106,842 115,35
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967	127,156.2	2,041.5 3,604.8	123,55
970	131,551.6	4,961.5	126,590
971	146,930.2	8,245.3 9,379.2	138 684
972	166,189.1 190,086.3	11,342.2	156,809 178,74
974	198,917.8	13.241.3	185,67
975	204,002.0 225,721.6	14,495.3 16,489.1	189,50 209,23
977	260,562.7	37,414.8	223,14
978	306,100.4 348,589.1	45,691.0 53.596.4	260,40 294,99
373			
180 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	351,920.1 371,301.4	54,970.1 60,928.0	296,95 310,37
982	389,848.7	66,348.3	323,50
983 984	437,068.9 517,279.0	79,027.2 100,385.6	358,04 416,89
985	599,711.2	124,465.8	475,24
386	654,750.2	141,068.2 160,853.9	513,68
987 988 <sup>3</sup>	686,318.8 731,917.8	184,593.1	525,46 547,32
989	794,612.2	211,229.8	583,38
990 991 992 993 994	808,230.6	238,642.6	569,58
991	798,029.0 806,118.7	263,768.6 278,449.7	534,260 527,66
993	865,650.6	309,908.0	555.742
994 995	997,126.9 1,140,994.5	365,569.6 443,491.8	631,55 697,50
996	1,242,862.5	499,624.6	743,23
997 998	1,320.091.3	536.721.0	783,370
996 997 998 999	1,415,787.3 1,528,029.3	576,468.3 604,468.1	839,319 923,56
	1.704.510.1	675,653.3	1,028,856
001 002	1,835,563.3	713.328.0	1,122,23
000 001 002 002	1,921,852.1	732,665.2 752,792.4	1,189,18
J04	2,009,850.0 2,098,996.3	781,056.6	1,257,05 1,317,93
1 Jan	2 019 751 2	755,543.9	1 264 20
Feb	2,023,358.1 2,032,067.5	756,004.8	1,267,35 1,272,45
Mar	2,032,067.5 2,029,622.2	759,615.4 750,513.3	1,272,45 1,279,10
May	2,025,622.2 2,034,662.6 2,046,968.9	751,621.6	1,283,04
June	2,046,968.9	759,878.4	1,287,09
July	2,055,657.4	766,641.2	1,289,01
Sept	2,063.693.1 2,076,716.0	769,423.1 777,305.3	1,294,27 1,299,41
Oct .	2,094,537.5 2,092,756.0	/86.238.3	1,308,29
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Occ Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept	2,092,756.0 2,098,996.3	779,498.5 781,056.6	1,308,29 1,313,25 1,317,93
5: Jan			
5-Jan Feb Mar Apr Apr May June	2,104,393.5 2,109,642.4	786,449.1 783,443.8	1,317,94 1,326,19 1,332,97
Mar	2.113.397.8	780,426.9	1,332,970
May	2,124,650.7 2,125,589.9	785,864.5 784,684.4	1,338,78 1,340,90
June	2,136,441.6	789,323.1	1,347,11
July . Aug	2 149 412 0	790,680.1	1,357,732
Sept	2,160,082.4 2,165,048.7	795,340.6 800,665.2	1,364,74
Oct	2.130.044.4	798,802.8	1,364,383 1,357,84
Nov P	2,155,995.6	799,138.0	1,356,85

Source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Covers most short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals. Credit secured by real estate is excluded.
<sup>2</sup> Includes automobile loans and all other loans not included in revolving credit, such as loans for mobile homes, education, boats, trailers, or vacations. These loans may be secured or unsecured. Beginning 1977 includes student loans extended by the Federal Government and by SLM Holding Corporation.
<sup>3</sup> Data newly available in January 1989 result in breaks in these series between December 1988 and subsequent months.

## GOVERNMENT FINANCE

TABLE B-78.—Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years, 1940-2007 [Billions of dollars; fiscal years]

		Total			On-budge	t		Off-budge	t	Federa (end of		Adden- dum:
Fiscal year or period	Re- ceipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (-)	Re- ceipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (-)	Re- ceipts	Outlays	Surplus or deficit (-)	Gross Federal	Held by the public	Gross domes- tic prod- uct
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944 1945 1946 1947 1947	6.5 8.7 14.6 24.0 43.7 45.2 39.3 38.5 41.6 39.4	9.5 13.7 35.1 78.6 91.3 92.7 55.2 34.5 29.8 38.8	-2.9 -4.9 -20.5 -54.6 -47.6 -47.6 -15.9 4.0 11.8	6.0 8.0 13.7 22.9 42.5 43.8 38.1 37.1 39.9 37.7	9.5 13.6 35.1 78.5 91.2 92.6 55.0 34.2 29.4 38.4	-3.5 -5.6 -21.3 -55.6 -48.7 -48.7 -17.0 2.9 10.5 7	0.6 .7 .9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.7	-0.0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 4	0.6 .7 .8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2	50.7 57.5 79.2 142.6 204.1 260.1 271.0 257.1 252.0 252.6	42.8 48.2 67.8 127.8 184.8 235.2 241.9 224.3 216.3 214.3	96 8 114 1 144 3 180 3 209 2 221 4 222 7 233 2 256 0 271 1
1950	39.4 51.6 66.2 69.6 69.7 65.5 74.6 80.0 79.6	42.6 45.5 67.7 76.1 70.9 68.4 70.6 76.6 82.4 92.1	-3.1 6.1 -1.5 -6.5 -1.2 -3.0 3.9 3.4 -2.8 -12.8	37.3 48.5 62.6 65.5 65.1 60.4 68.2 73.2 71.6 71.0	42.0 44.2 66.0 73.8 67.9 64.5 65.7 70.6 74.9 83.1	-4.7 4.3 -3.4 -8.3 -2.8 -4.1 2.5 2.6 -3.3 -12.1	2.1 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.1 6.4 6.8 8.0 8.3	1.3 1.7 2.3 2.9 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.5 9.0	1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.1 1.5 .8 .5 7	256.9 255.3 259.1 266.0 270.8 274.4 272.7 272.3 279.7 287.5	219.0 214.3 214.8 218.4 224.5 226.6 222.2 219.3 226.3 234.7	273.0 320.0 348.0 372.0 377.0 394.0 427.0 450.0 460.0
1960	92.5 94.4 99.7 106.6 112.6 116.8 130.8 148.8 153.0 186.9	92.2 97.7 106.8 111.3 118.5 118.2 134.5 157.5 178.1 183.6	.3 -3.3 -7.1 -4.8 -5.9 -1.4 -3.7 -8.6 -25.2 3.2	81.9 82.3 87.4 92.4 96.2 100.1 111.7 124.4 128.1 157.9	81.3 86.0 93.3 96.4 102.8 101.7 114.8 137.0 155.8 158.4	.5 -3.8 -5.9 -4.0 -6.5 -1.6 -3.1 -12.6 -27.7 5	10.6 12.1 12.3 14.2 16.4 16.7 19.1 24.4 24.9 29.0	10.9 11.7 13.5 15.0 15.7 16.5 19.7 20.4 22.3 25.2	-2 4 -1.3 -8 .6 .2 6 4.0 2.6 3.7	290.5 292.6 302.9 310.3 316.1 322.3 328.5 340.4 368.7 365.8	236.8 238.4 248.0 254.0 256.8 260.8 263.7 266.6 289.5 278.1	517.9 530.8 567.6 598.7 640.4 687.7 752.9 811.8 866.6
1970	192.8 187.1 207.3 230.8 263.2 279.1 298.1 298.1 355.6 399.6 463.3	195.6 210.2 230.7 245.7 269.4 332.3 371.8 96.0 409.2 458.7 504.0	-2.8 -23.0 -23.4 -14.9 -6.1 -53.2 -73.7 -14.7 -53.7 -59.2 -40.7	159.3 151.3 167.4 184.7 209.3 216.6 231.7 63.2 278.7 314.2 365.3	168.0 177.3 193.5 200.0 216.5 270.8 301.1 77.3 328.7 369.6 404.9	-8.7 -26.1 -26.1 -15.2 -7.2 -54.1 -69.4 -14.1 -49.9 -55.4 -39.6	33.5 35.8 39.9 46.1 53.9 62.5 66.4 18.0 76.8 85.4 98.0	27.6 32.8 37.2 45.7 52.9 61.6 70.7 18.7 80.5 89.2	5.9 3.0 2.7 3 1.1 9 -4.3 7 -3.7 -3.8 -1.1	380 9 408.2 435.9 466.3 483.9 541.9 629.0 643.6 706.4 776.6 829.5	283.2 303.0 322.4 340.9 343.7 394.7 477.4 495.5 549.1 607.1 640.3	1,012. 1,079. 1,178. 1,307. 1,439. 1,560. 1,736. 456. 1,974. 2,217. 2,500.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985 1986 1987 1988	517.1 599.3 617.8 600.6 666.5 734.1 769.2 854.4 909.3 991.2	590.9 678.2 745.7 808.4 851.9 946.4 990.4 1,004.1 1,064.5 1,143.8	-73.8 -79.0 -128.0 -207.8 -185.4 -212.3 -221.2 -149.7 -155.2 -152.6	403.9 469.1 474.3 453.2 500.4 547.9 569.0 641.0 667.8 727.5	477.0 543.0 594.9 660.9 685.7 769.4 806.9 809.3 860.1 932.9	-73.1 -73.9 -120.6 -207.7 -185.3 -221.5 -237.9 -168.4 -192.3 -205.4	113.2 130.2 143.5 147.3 166.1 186.2 200.2 213.4 241.5 263.7	113.9 135.3 150.9 147.4 166.2 176.9 183.5 194.8 204.4 210.9	7 -5.1 -7.4 1 1 9.2 16.7 18.6 37.1 52.8	909.0 994.8 1,137.3 1,371.7 1,564.6 1,817.4 2,120.5 2,346.0 2,601.1 2,867.8	711.9 789.4 924.6 1.137.3 1.307.0 1,507.3 1,740.6 1.889.8 2,051.6 2,190.7	2,726. 3,054. 3,227. 3,440. 3,840. 4,141. 4,412. 4,647. 5,008. 5,400.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1997	1,032.1 1,055.1 1,091.3 1,154.5 1,258.7 1,351.9 1,453.2 1,579.4 1,722.0 1,827.6	1,253.1 1,324.3 1,381.6 1,409.5 1,461.9 1,515.9 1,560.6 1,601.3 1,652.7 1,702.0	-221.0 -269.2 -290.3 -255.1 -203.2 -164.0 -107.4 -21.9 69.3 125.6	750.4 761.2 788.9 842.5 923.7 1,000.9 1,085.7 1,187.4 1,306.2 1,383.2	1,028.1 1,082.6 1,129.3 1,142.9 1,182.5 1,227.2 1,259.7 1,290.7 1,336.1 1,381.3	-277.6 -321.4 -340.4 -300.4 -258.8 -226.4 -174.0 -103.2 -29.9	281.7 293.9 302.4 311.9 335.0 351.1 367.5 392.0 415.8 444.5	225.1 241.7 252.3 266.6 279.4 288.7 300.9 310.6 316.6 320.8	56.6 52.2 50.1 45.3 55.7 62.4 66.6 81.4 99.2 123.7	3,206.3 3,598.2 4,001.8 4,351.0 4,643.3 4,920.6 5,181.5 5,369.2 5,478.2 5,605.5	2,411.6 2,689.0 2,999.7 3,248.4 3,433.1 3,604.4 3,734.1 3,772.3 3,721.1 3,632.4	5,735. 5,935. 6,239. 6,575. 6,961 7,325. 7,694. 8,182 8,627. 9,125.
2000	2,153.9 2,285.5 2,415.9	2,472.2 2,708.7 2,770.1		1,544 9 1,483.9 1,338.1 1,258.7 1,345.5 1,576.4 1,675.5 1,773.5	1,458.5 1,516.4 1,655.5 1,797.1 1,913.5 2,070.0 2,277.7 2,317.0	86.4 -32.4 -317.4 -538.4 -568.0 -493.6 -602.1 -543.4	480.6 507.5 515.3 523.8 534.7 577.5 610.0 642.3	453.1	149.8 160.7 159.7 160.8 155.2 175.3 179.0 189.2	5,628 7 5,769.9 6,198.4 6,760.0 7,354.7 7,905.3 8,611.5 9,295.4	3,409.8 3,319.6 3,540.4 3,913.4 4,295.5 4,592.2 5,018.9 5,391.5	9,709. 10,057 10,377 10,805. 11,546. 12,290. 13,030. 13,760.

Note.—Through fiscal year 1976, the fiscal year was on a July 1-lune 30 basis, beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis. The transition quarter is the 3-month period from July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976 See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007, for additional information.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management and Budget.

Table B-79.—Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, as percent of gross domestic product, fiscal years 1934-2007

[Percent; fiscal years]

		Outla	Iys	6	Federal debt (en	d of period)
Fiscal year or period	Receipts	Total	National defense	Surplus or deficit (—)	Gross Federal	Held by public
1934 1935	4 8 5.2 5 0	10.7 9.2 10.5		-5.9 -4.0		
1936 1937	5 0 6.1 7.6	10 5 8.6 7 7		-5.5 -2.5 -1		
1938	7.6 7.1	7 7 10.3		-3.2	54.2	46.6
1940 1941	6.8 7.6	9.8 12.0	1.7 5.6	-3.0 -4.3 -14.2 -30.3 -22.7	52.4 50.4	44.2 42.3 47.0
1942 1943	10.1 13.3	24.3 43.6	17.8 37.0	-14.2 -30.3	54.9 79.1	70.9
1944 1945	20.9 20.4	43.6 41.9	37.8 37.5 19.2	-22.7 -21.5	97.6 117.5 121.7	88.3 106.2
1946 1947	17.6 16.5 16.2	24 8 14 8	5.5	-22.7 -21.5 -7.2 1.7	110.3	108.6 96.2 84.5
1948	16.2 14.5	11.6 14.3	3 6 4 9	4.6	98.4 93.2	84.5 79.1
1950 . 1951	14 4 16.1	15.6 14.2	5.0 7.4	$-1.1 \\ 1.9$	94.1 79.6	80.2 66.9
1952	19.0 18.7	19.4 20.4	13.2 14.2	4 -1 7	74.3 71.3	66.9 61.6 58.6
1954 1955	18.5 16.6	18.8	13.1 10.8	3 8	71.8 69.5	58.6 59.5 57.4
1956	17.5 17.8	16.5 17.0	10.0 10.1	.8	63.8 60.5 60.7	52.0 48.7
1958 1959	17.3 16.1	17.9 18.7	10.2 10.0	6 -2.6	60.7 58.5	49.2 47.8
1960	17.9	17.8 18.4	9.3	.1 6	56 1 55.1	45.7 44.9
1962 1963	17.8 17.6 17.8	18.8 18.6	9.2	-1.3 8	53.4 51.8	44.9 43.7 42.4
1964 1965	17.6 17.0	18.5 17.2	8.6 7.4	9 2	49.4 46.9	40.1 38.0
1966	17.4 18.3	17.9 19.4	7.7 8.8	5 -1.1	43.6 41.9	35.0 32.8
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1968	17.7 19.7	20.6 19.4	9.5 8.7	-2.9 .3	42.5 38.6	33.4 29.3
1970 1971	19.0 17.3	19.3	8.1 7.3	3	37.6 37.8	28.0
1972 1973	17.6 17.7	19.5 19.6 18.8	6.7 5.9	-2.1 -2.0 -1.1	37.0 35.7	28.1 27.4 26.1
1974	18.3 17.9	18.7	5.5 5.5 5.2		33.6	23.9 25.3
1976 Transition quarter	17.2 17.8	21.3 21.4 21.0	4 9	-4.2 -3.2	36.2 35.2 35.8	27.5 27.1
1977	18 0 18.0	20.7 20.7	4.9	-3.4 -4.2 -3.2 -2.7 -2.7 -1.6	35.0	27.8 27.4
1979	18.5 19.0	20.2	4.7	-1.6	33.2	25.6 26.1
1981	19 6 19 1	22.2	5.2 5.7	-2.7 -2.6 -4.0	32.6 35.2	25.8 28.6
1983	17.5 17.4	23.1 23.5 22.2	6.1	-6.0 -4.8	39.9 40.7	33.1 34.0
1985 1986	17.7 17.4	22.9 22.4	6.1	-5.1 -5.0	43.9 48.1	36.4 39.4
1987 .	18.4 18.2	22.9 22.4 21.6 21.3 21.2	6 1 5.8	-3.2 -3.1 -2.8	50.5 51.9	40.7 41.0
1989	18.4 18.0	21 2 21.8	5.6 ' 5.2 '	-2.8 -3.9	53.1 55.9	40.6 42.0
1990 1991 1992	17.8 17.5	22.3 22.1	4.6 4.8	-3.9 -4.5 -4.7	60.6 64.1	42.0 45.3 48.1
1993 1994	17.6 18.1	21.4 21.0	4.4 4.0	-3.9 -2.9	66.2 66.7	49.4
1995 1996	18.5	20.7	3.7 3.5	-2.2 -1.4	67.2 67.3	49.3 49.2 48.5
1997	19 3 20.0	19.6 19.2	3.3	3 .8	65.6 63.5 61.4	46.1 43.1
1999	20.0	18.7	3.0	1.4	61.4 58.0	39.8 35.1
2001 2002	19 8 17.9	18 5 19 4	3.0 3.4	1.3	57.4 59.7	33.0 34.1
2003 2004	16.5 16.3	20. <b>0</b> 19.9	3.7 3.9	-1.5 -3.5 -3.6	62.6 63.7	36.2 37.2
2005 2006 (estimates) 2007 (estimates)	17.5 17.5	20 1 20.8	4 0 4 1	-3 6 -2 6 -3.2	64.3 66.1	37.4
2007 (estimates)	176	20.1	3.8	-2.6	67.5	38.5 39.2

Note -- See Note, Table B-78

Sources. Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE B-80.—Federal receipts and outlays, by major category, and surplus or deficit, fiscal years 1940-2007

[Billions of dollars: fiscal years]

						formons	UI 001	lars; fisca	_							
	Receip	ts (on-bi	udget ar		idget)				ays (on-l	budget	and off-	budget	)			Surplus
Fiscal year or period	Total	Indi- vid- ual in- come taxes	Cor- pora- tion in- come taxes	Social insur- ance and retire- ment re- ceipts	Other	Total		Depart- ment of Defense, military	Inter- na- tion- al at- tairs	Health	Medi- care	In- come secu- rity	Social secu- rity	Net inter- est	Other	or deficit (-) (on- budget and off- budget)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949	6.5 8.7 14.6 24.0 43.7 45.2 39.3 38.5 41.6 39.4	0.9 1.3 3.3 6.5 19.7 18.4 16.1 17.9 19.3 15.6	1.2 2.1 4.7 9.6 14.8 16.0 11.9 8.6 9.7 11.2	1.8 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.8 3.8	2.7 3.3 4.2 4.9 5.7 7.3 8.2 8.5 8.8 8.9	9.5 13.7 35.1 78.6 91.3 92.7 55.2 34.5 29.8 38.8	1.7 6.4 25.7 66.7 79.1 83.0 42.7 12.8 9.1 13.2		0.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.9 5.8 4.6 6.1	.1 .2 .2 .2		1.5 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.1 2.4 2.8 2.5 3.2	0.0 .1 .1 .2 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6	0.9 .9 1.1 1.5 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.5	5.3 4.1 5.4 7.0 6.6 3.1 3.6 8.2 8.5 11.1	-2.9 -4.9 -20.5 -54.6 -47.6 -15.9 4.0 11.8
1950	39.4 51.6 66.2 69.6 69.7 65.5 74.6 80.0 79.6 79.2	15.8 21.6 27.9 29.8 29.5 28.7 32.2 35.6 34.7 36.7	10.4 14.1 21.2 21.2 21.1 17.9 20.9 21.2 20.1 17.3	4.3 5.7 6.4 6.8 7.2 7.9 9.3 10.0 11.2 11.7	8.9 10.2 10.6 11.7 11.9 11.0 12.2 13.6 13.5	42.6 45.5 67.7 76.1 70.9 68.4 70.6 76.6 82.4 92.1	13.7 23.6 46.1 52.8 49.3 42.7 42.5 45.4 46.8 49.0		4.7 3.6 2.7 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.1	.3 .3 .3 .3		4.1 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.4 5.1 4.7 5.4 7.5 8.2	.8 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.4 5.5 6.7 8.2 9.7	4.8 4.7 4.7 5.2 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.6 5.8	14.2 8.4 8.1 9.1 7.1 8.9 10.1 10.1 10.3 15.5	-3.1 6.1 -1.5 -6.5 -1.2 -3.0 3.9 3.4 -2.8 -12.8
1960	92.5 94.4 99.7 106.6 112.6 116.8 130.8 148.8 153.0 186.9	40.7 41.3 45.6 47.6 48.7 48.8 55.4 61.5 68.7 87.2	21.5 21.0 20.5 21.6 23.5 25.5 30.1 34.0 28.7 36.7	14.7 16.4 17.0 19.8 22.0 22.2 25.5 32.6 33.9 39.0	15.6 15.7 16.5 17.6 18.5 20.3 19.8 20.7 21.7 23.9	92.2 97.7 106.8 111.3 118.5 118.2 134.5 157.5 178.1 183.6	48.1 49.6 52.3 53.4 54.8 50.6 58.1 71.4 81.9 82.5	50.1 51.1 52.6 48.8 56.6 70.1 80.4 80.8	3.0 3.2 5.6 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.3 4.6	.8 .9 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.4 5.2	0.1 2.7 4.6 5.7	7.4 9.7 9.2 9.3 9.7 9.5 9.7 10.3 11.8 13.1	11.6 12.5 14.4 15.8 16.6 17.5 20.7 21.7 23.9 27.3	6.9 6.7 6.9 7.7 8.2 8.6 9.4 10.3 11.1 12.7	14.4 15.2 17.2 18.3 22.6 25.0 28.5 32.1 35.1 32.6	.3 -3.3 -7.1 -4.8 -5.9 -1.4 -3.7 -8.6 -25.2 3.2
1970	192.8 187.1 207.3 230.8 263.2 279.1 298.1	90.4 86.2 94.7 103.2 119.0 122.4 131.6	32.8 26.8 32.2 36.2 38.6 40.6 41.4	44.4 47.3 52.6 63.1 75.1 84.5 90.8	25.2 26.8 27.8 28.3 30.6 31.5 34.3	195.6 210.2 230.7 245.7 269.4 332.3 371.8	81.7 78.9 79.2 76.7 79.3 86.5 89.6	80.1 77.5 77.6 75.0 77.9 84.9 87.9	4.3 4.2 4.8 4.1 5.7 7.1 6.4	5.9 6.8 8.7 9.4 10.7 12.9 15.7	6.2 6.6 7.5 8.1 9.6 12.9 15.8	15.7 22.9 27.7 28.3 33.7 50.2 60.8	30.3 35.9 40.2 49.1 55.9 64.7 73.9	14.4 14.8 15.5 17.3 21.4 23.2 26.7	37.2 40.0 47.3 52.8 52.9 74.8 82.7	-2.8 -23.0 -23.4 -14.9 -6.1 -53.2 -73.7
Transition quarter 1977 1978 1979	81.2 355.6 399.6 463.3	38.8 157.6 181.0 217.8	8.5 54.9 60.0 65.7	25.2 106.5 121.0 138.9	8.8 36.6 37.7 40.8	96.0 409.2 458.7 504.0	22.3 97.2 104.5 116.3	21.8 95.1 102.3 113.6	2.5 6.4 7.5 7.5	3.9 17.3 18.5 20.5	4.3 19.3 22.8 26.5	15.0 61.1 61.5 66.4	19.8 85.1 93.9 104.1	6.9 29.9 35.5 42.6	21.4 93.0 114.7 120.2	-14.7 -53.7 -59.2 -40.7
1980	517.1 599.3 617.8 600.6 666.5 734.1 769.2 854.4 909.3 991.2	244.1 285.9 297.7 288.9 298.4 334.5 349.0 392.6 401.2 445.7	64.6 61.1 49.2 37.0 56.9 61.3 63.1 83.9 94.5 103.3	157.8 182.7 201.5 209.0 239.4 265.2 283.9 303.3 334.3 359.4	50.6 69.5 69.3 65.6 71.8 73.1 73.2 74.6 79.3 82.8	590.9 678.2 745.7 808.4 851.9 946.4 990.4 1,004.1 1,064.5 1,143.8	134.0 157.5 185.3 209.9 227.4 252.7 273.4 282.0 290.4 303.6	130.9 153.9 180.7 204.4 220.9 245.1 265.4 273.9 281.9 294.8	12.7 13.1 12.3 11.8 15.9 16.2 14.2 11.6 10.5 9.6	23.2 26.9 27.4 28.6 30.4 33.5 35.9 40.0 44.5 48.4	32.1 39.1 46.6 52.6 57.5 65.8 70.2 75.1 78.9 85.0	86.6 100.3 108.2 123.0 113.4 129.0 120.6 124.1 130.4 137.4	118.5 139.6 156.0 170.7 178.2 188.6 198.8 207.4 219.3 232.5	52.5 68.8 85.0 89.8 111.1 129.5 136.0 138.6 151.8 169.0	131.3 133.0 125.0 121.8 117.9 131.0 141.4 125.3 138.8 158.4	-73.8 -79.0 -128.0 -207.8 -185.4 -212.3 -221.2 -149.7 -155.2 -152.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995	1,032.1 1,055.1 1,091.3 1,154.5 1,258.7 1,351.9 1,453.2 1,579.4 1,722.0 1,827.6	466.9 467.8 476.0 509.7 543.1 590.2 656.4 737.5 828.6 879.5	93.5 98.1 100.3 117.5 140.4 157.0 171.8 182.3	380.0 396.0 413.7 428.3 461.5 484.5 509.4 539.4 571.8 611.8	91.7 93.2 101.4 99.0 113.8 120.2 115.5 120.3 132.9 151.7	1,253.1 1,324.3 1,381.6 1,409.5 1,461.9 1,515.9 1,560.6 1,601.3 1,652.7 1,702.0	299.3 273.3 298.4 291.1 281.6 272.1 265.8 270.5 268.5 274.9	289.7 262.3 286.8 278.5 268.6 259.4 253.1 258.3 256.1 261.3	13.8 15.9 16.1 17.2 17.1 16.4 13.5 15.2 13.1 15.2	57.7 71.2 89.5 99.4 107.1 115.4 119.4	98.1 104.5 119.0 130.6 144.7 159.9 174.2	148.7 172.5 199.6 210.0 217.2 223.8 229.7 235.0	248.6 269.0 287.6 304.6 319.6 335.8 349.7 365.3	184.3 194.4 199.3 198.7 202.9 232.1 241.1 244.0	202.6 223.6 172.2 158.0 171.7 160.3 167.3 157.4 188.8	-221.0 -269.2 -290.3 -255.1 -203.2 -164.0 -107.4 -21.9 69.3 125.6
2000 2001 2002	2,025.5 1,991.4 1,853.4 1,782.5 1,880.3 2,153.9 2,285.5 2,415.9	1,004.5 994.3 858.3	207.3 151.1 148.0	652.9 694.0 700.8 713.0 733.4 794.1 841.1 884.1	160.9 152.0 146.2 144.1 148.5 154.2 169.7 174.8	1,789.2 1,863.2 2,011.2 2,160.1 2,293.0 2,472.2 2,708.7 2,770.1	294.5 304.9 348.6 404.9 455.9 495.3 535.9 527.4	281.2 290.3 332.0 387.3 436.5 474.2 512.1 504.9	17.2 16.5 22.4 21.2 26.9 34.6 34.8 33.3	154.5 172.3 196.5 219.6 240.1 250.6	197.1 217.4 230.9 249.4 269.4 298.6	253.7 269.8 312.7 334.6 333.1 345.8	409.4 433.0 456.0 474.7	222.9 206.2 170.9 153.1 160.2 184.0	239.8 243.3 273.2 302.6 311.9 339.9	236.2 128.2 -157.8 -377.6 -412.7 -318.3 -423.2 -354.2

<sup>1</sup> Estimates.

Note.—See Note, Table B-78.

Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget.

TABLE B-81.—Federal receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and debt, fiscal years 2002-2007 [Millions of dollars; fiscal years]

[Milli0	ins of dollars;	fiscal years)				
		Act	ual		Estima	ates
Description	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS Total receipts Total outlays	1,853,395	1,782,532	1,880,279	2,153,859	2.285.491	2.415.852
	2,011,153	2,160,117	2,293,006	2,472,205	2,708,677	2.770.097
Total surplus or deficit (-) .	-157,758	-377,585	-412.727	-318,346	-423.186	-354,245
On-budget receipts	1.338.074	1.258.690	1,345,534	1,576,383	1.675.526	1,773,533
	1.655.491	1.797.108	1,913,495	2,069,994	2.277.667	2,316,952
On-budget surplus or deficit (-)	-317.417	-538,418	-567,961	-493,611	-602,141	-543,419
Off-budget receipts	515,321	523,842	534.745	577.476	609,965	642,319
	355,662	363,009	379,511	402.211	431,010	453,145
Off-budget surplus or deficit (-)	159,659	160,833	155,234	175,265	178,955	189,174
OUTSTANDING DEBT, END OF PERIOD Gross Federal debt	6,198,401	6.760.014	7,354.673	7,905.316	8.611.473	9,295,438
Held by Federal Government accounts Held by the public	2,657,974	2,846,570	3,059,129	3,313,088	3,592,551	3,903,951
	3,540,427	3,913,443	4,295,544	4,592,229	5,018,922	5,391,487
Federal Reserve System Other	604,191 2,936,235	656.116 3.257.327	700,341 3,595,203	736,360 3,855,869		
RECEIPTS: ON-BUDGET AND OFF-BUDGET	1,853,395	1.782,532	1,880,279	2,153,859	2.285,491	2,415,852
Individual income taxes	858,345	793,699	808,959	927,222	997,599	1,096,366
	148,044	131,778	189,371	278,282	277,122	260,567
	700,760	712,978	733,407	794,125	841,087	884,126
On-budget Off-budget	185,439	189,136	198,662	216,649	231,122	241,807
	515,321	523,842	534,745	577,476	609,965	642,319
Excise taxes Estate and gift taxes Customs duties and fees Miscellaneous receipts Deposits of earnings by Federal Reserve System All other	66.989	67.524	69,855	73,094	73.511	74,608
	26,507	21.959	24,831	24,764	27.523	23,700
	18,602	19.862	21,083	23,379	25,887	28,069
	34,148	34,732	32,773	32,993	42,762	48,416
Reserve System	23,683	21,878	19,652	19,297	27,455	32,679
	10,465	12,854	13,121	13,696	15,307	15,737
OUTLAYS: ON-BUDGET AND OFF-BUDGET	2,011,153	2,160,117	2,293,006	2,472,205	2,708,677	2,770,097
National defense International affairs General science, space and technology Energy Natural resources and environment Agriculture Commerce and housing credit	348,555	404,920	455,908	495.335	535,943	527,428
	22,351	21,209	26,891	34.592	34,750	33,274
	20,767	20,873	23,053	23.674	23,996	25,445
	475	-735	-166	429	2,621	972
Natural resources and environment Agriculture Commerce and housing credit	29.454	29,703	30,725	28,023	32,731	31,049
	21.966	22,497	15,440	26,566	26,846	25,733
	-399	735	5,273	7,574	9,087	11,177
On-budget	252	5,980 -5,245	9,403 -4,130	9,365 -1,791	7,665 1,422	7,749 3,428
Transportation Community and regional development Education, training, employment, and social services Health Medicare Income security Social security	61,833	67,069	64,627	67.894	71,637	76,294
	12,981	18,850	15,822	26.264	52,025	28,159
	70,544	82,568	87,948	97.526	109,651	87,576
	196,544	219,576	240,134	250.612	268,789	280,941
	230,855	249,433	269,360	298.638	342,987	392,000
	312,720	334,632	333,059	345.847	360,632	367,206
	455,980	474,680	495,548	523.305	554,740	585,940
On-budget Off-budget	13,969	13,279	14,348	16,526	16,032	18,314
	442,011	461,401	481,200	506,779	538,708	567,626
Veterans benefits and services Administration of justice General government Net interest	50,984	57.022	59,779	70,151	70,410	73.946
	35,061	35.340	45,576	40,019	41,342	44.344
	16,925	23.054	22,321	16,994	19,085	20.170
	170,949	153.073	160,245	183,986	220,053	247,315
On-budget	247,769	236.618	246,473	275,822	317.496	353,063
Off-budget	-76,820	-83,545	-86,228	-91,836	-97,443	-105.748
Allowances Undistributed offsetting receipts	-47,392	-54,382	-58,537	-65.224	3,726 -72,374	5,464 -94,336
On-budget Ott-budget	$-38,514 \\ -8,878$	-44.780 -9.602	-47,206 -11,331	$-54,283 \\ -10,941$	-60,697 -11,677	$-82,175 \\ -12,161$
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Note —See Note, Table B-78

Sources Department of the Treasury and Office of Management and Budget

Table B-82.—Federal and State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959–2005

	То	tal governm	ent	Fed	eral Governr	nent	State a	nd local gov	ernment	Adden- dum:
Year or quarter	Current receipts	Current expendi- tures	Net govern- ment saving (NIPA)	Current receipts	Current expendi- tures	Net Federal Govern- ment saving (NIPA)	Current receipts	Current expendi- tures	Net State and local govern- ment saving (NIPA)	Grants- In-aid to State and local govern- ments
959	123.0	115.8	7.1	87.0	83.6	3.3	40.6	36 9	3.8	3.
960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 968	134.4 139.0 150.6 162.2 166.6 180.3 202.8 217.6 252.0 283.4	122.9 132.1 142.8 151.1 159.2 170.4 192.8 220.0 246.8 266.7	11.5 6.9 7.8 11.1 7.4 9.9 10.0 -2.4 5.2 16.7	93.9 95.5 103.6 111.8 111.8 120.9 137.9 146.9 171.2 192.5	86.7 92.8 101.1 106.4 110.8 117.6 135.7 156.2 173.5 183.8	7.2 2.6 2.5 5.4 1.0 3.3 2.3 -9.4 -2.3 8.7	44.5 48.1 52.0 56.0 61.3 66.5 74.9 82.5 93.5	40.2 43.8 46.8 50.3 54.9 60.0 67.2 75.5 86.0 97.5	4 3 4.3 5.2 5.7 6.4 6.5 7.8 7.0 7.5 8.0	4.1 5.5 5.6.7.10.11.12.14.
970	286.7 303.4 346.8 390.0 431.3 441.6 505.5 566.8 645.6 728.2	294.8 325.3 355.5 385.6 435.8 508.2 549.9 597.7 653.4 726.5	-8.1 -21.9 -8.8 4.4 -4.4 -66.6 -44.4 -31.0 -7.8 1.7	186.0 191.7 220.1 250.4 279.5 277.2 322.5 363.4 423.5 486.2	201.1 220.0 244.4 261.7 293.3 346.2 374.3 407.5 450.0 497.5	-15.2 -28.4 -24.4 -11.3 -13.8 -69.0 -51.7 -44.1 -26.5 -11.3	120.1 134.9 158.4 174.3 188.1 209.6 233.7 259.9 287.6 308.4	113.0 128.5 142.8 158.6 178.7 207.1 226.3 246.8 268.9 295.4	7.1 6.5 15.6 15.7 9.3 2.5 7.4 13.1 18.7 13.0	19 23 31 34 36 45 50 56 65 66
980 981 982 982 983 984 985 985 986 987	798.0 917.2 938.5 999.4 1,112.5 1,213.5 1,289.3 1,403.2 1,502.2 1,626.3	842.8 962.9 1,072.6 1,167.5 1,256.6 1,366.1 1,459.1 1,535.8 1,618.7 1,735.6	-44.8 -45.7 -134.1 -168.1 -144.1 -152.6 -169.9 -132.6 -116.6 -109.3	532.1 619.4 616.6 642.3 709.0 773.3 815.2 896.6 958.2 1,037.4	585.7 672.7 748.5 815.4 877.1 948.2 1,006.0 1,041.6 1,092.7 1,167.5	-53.6 -53.3 -131.9 -173.0 -168.1 -175.0 -190.8 -145.0 -134.5 -130.1	338.2 370.2 391.4 428.6 480.2 521.1 561.6 590.6 635.5 687.3	329.4 362.7 393.6 423.7 456.2 498.7 540.7 578.1 617.6 666.5	8.8 7.6 -2.2 4.9 23.9 22.3 21.0 12.4 17.9 20.8	72 72 69 71 76 80 87 83 91
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 997	1,707.8 1,758.8 1,843.7 1,945.8 2,089.0 2,212.6 2,376.1 2,551.9 2,724.2 2,895.0	1,872.6 1,976.7 2,140.4 2,218.4 2,290.8 2,397.6 2,492.1 2,568.6 2,633.4 2,741.0	-164.8 -217.9 -296.7 -272.6 -201.9 -184.9 -116.0 -90.8 154.0	1,081.5 1,101.3 1,147.2 1,222.5 1,320.8 1,406.5 1,524.0 1,653.1 1,773.8 1,891.2	1,253.5 1,315.0 1,444.6 1,496.0 1,533.1 1,603.5 1,665.8 1,708.9 1,734.9 1,787.6	-172.0 -213.7 -297.4 -273.5 -212.3 -197.0 -141.8 -55.8 38.8 103.6	737.8 789.2 845.7 886.9 942.9 990.2 1,043.3 1,097.4 1,163.2 1,236.7	730.5 793.3 845.0 886.0 932.4 978.2 1,017.5 1,058.3 1,111.2 1,186.3	7.2 -4.2 .7 .9 10.5 12.0 25.8 39.1 52.0 50.4	111 131 149 163 174 184 191 198 212 232
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 p	3,125.9 3,113.1 2,958.7 3,018.1 3,208.2	2,886.5 3,061.6 3,240.8 3,424.7 3,620.6 3,875.6	239.4 51.5 -282.1 -406.5 -412.3	2,053.8 2,016.2 1,853.2 1,868.6 1,974.8	1,864.4 1,969.5 2,101.1 2,251.4 2,381.3 2,547.5	189.5 46.7 -247.9 -382.7 -406.5	1,319.5 1,373.0 1,410.1 1,488.6 1,581.7	1,269.5 1,368.2 1,444.3 1,512.4 1,587.5 1,685.9	50.0 4.8 -34.2 -23.8 -5.9	247 276 304 339 348 357
2002: I	2,934.2 2,947.4 2,972.3 2,981.1	3,178.0 3,223.9 3,251.0 3,310.5	-243.8 -276.5 -278.7 -329.5	1,845.9 1,854.1 1,856.1 1,856.6	2,054.4 2,095.5 2,103.4 2,151.1	-208.5 -241.4 -247.3 -294.6	1,379.7 1,396.4 1,422.7 1,441.7	1,415.0 1,431.5 1,454.2 1,476.6	-35.3 -35.1 -31.4 -34.9	291 303 306 317
1003: I	3,001.3 3,026.3 2,972.1 3,072.9	3,365.1 3,426.2 3,442.1 3,465.4	-363.8 -399.9 -469.9 -392.5	1,881.4 1,896.3 1,808.9 1,887.9	2,177.4 2,270.1 2,265.1 2,292.9	-296.0 -373.8 -456.2 -405.0	1,433.1 1,474.6 1,507.6 1,539.0	1,500.9 1,500.7 1,521.4 1,526.5	-67.8 -26.1 -13.8 12.5	313 344 344 354
2004: I	3,122.0 3,181.2 3,208.0 3,321.6	3,557.8 3,596.3 3,638.9 3,689.2	-435.8 -415.0 -430.9 -367.7	1,917.8 1,951.4 1,975.4 2,054.6	2,347.2 2,364.9 2,387.0 2,426.2	-429.3 -413.4 -411.6 -371.6	1,546.8 1,579.7 1,574.5 1,625.7	1,553.2 1,581.3 1,593.8 1,621.7	-6.5 -1.6 -19.3 4.0	342 349 341 358
2005: 1          V P	3,497.2 3,564.3 3,478.8	3,788.1 3,840.3 3,900.4 3,973.7	-290.9 -276.1 -421.6	2,196.6 2,227.9 2,148.5	2,494.9 2,525.2 2,563.7 2,606.2	-298.3 -297.3 -415.2	1,656.7 1,694.9 1,684.3	1,649.4 1,673.7 1,690.8 1,729.9	7.4 21.3 -6.4	356 358 354 362

Note.—Federal grants-in-aid to State and local governments are reflected in Federal current expenditures and State and local current receipts. Total government current receipts and expenditures have been adjusted to eliminate this duplication.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-83.—Federal and State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), by major type, 1959–2005

				Curr	ent rece	ipts					Current	expendi	tures		
Year or quarter	Total	Total <sup>1</sup>	Per- sonal current taxes	Taxes on produc- tion and im- ports	Taxes on corpo- rate in- come	Con- tribu- tions for govern- ment social insur- ance	In- come re- ceipts on assets	Current trans- fer re- ceipts	Current surplus of govern- ment enter- prises	Total <sup>2</sup>	Con- sump- tion ex- pendi- tures	Current trans- fer pay- ments	Interest pay- ments	Sub- sidies	Net govern- ment saving
1959	123.0	107.1	42 3	411	23 6	13 8	0 3	0.8	10	115.8	80.7	26.8	7.3	1.1	7 1
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	134 4 139 0 150 6 162 2 166 6 180 3 202 8 217 6 252 0 283 4	113 4 117 1 126.1 134 4 137.6 149 5 163.5 173.9 203 2 228 5	46 1 47 3 51 6 54 6 52 1 57 7 66 4 73 0 87 0 104 5	44 6 47 0 50 4 53 4 57 3 60 8 63 3 68 0 76 5 84 0	22 7 22 8 24 0 26.2 28 0 30.9 33.7 32 7 39 4 39 7	16 4 17.0 19 1 21.7 22.4 23 4 31 3 34 9 38.7 44 1	2 7 2 9 3 2 3 4 3.7 4 1 4 7 5.5 6 4 7 0	9 1 1 1 2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7	9 8 9 1 4 1.3 1 3 1 0 9 1 2 1.0	122 9 132 1 142 8 151 1 159 2 170 4 192 8 220 0 246 8 266 7	83.3 88.2 96.8 102.7 108.6 115.9 132.0 149.7 165.8 178.2	28.0 31.8 32.6 34.1 34.9 37.8 41.8 50.1 58.1 63.7	10.4 10.2 11.1 12.0 12.9 13.7 15.1 16.4 18.8 20.2	1.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.5	11.5 6.8 7.8 11.1 7.4 9.9 10.0 -2.4 5.2 16.7
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	286.7 303.4 346.8 390.0 431.3 441.6 505.5 566.8 645.6 728.2	229 3 240 4 274 0 299 4 328 3 334 4 383 8 431.2 485.0 538.2	103.1 101.7 123.6 132.4 151.0 147.6 172.3 197.5 229.4 268.7	91 5 100 6 108 1 117 3 125 0 135.5 146 6 159 9 171 2 180 4	34 4 37 7 41 9 49 3 51 8 50 9 64 2 73 0 83 5 88 0	46 4 51 2 59.2 75 5 85.2 89.3 101.3 113 1 131 3 152.7	8 2 9.0 9.5 11.6 14 4 16.1 16 3 18 4 23 2 30 8	2.9 3.1 3.6 3.9 4.5 5.1 5.8 6.8 8.0 9.1	0 2 .5 - 4 9 -3 2 -1.8 -2.6 -1 9 -2 6	294.8 325.3 355.5 385.6 435.8 508.2 549.9 597.7 653.4 726.5	190.2 204.7 220.8 234.8 261.7 294.6 316.6 346.6 376.5 412.3	76.8 91.6 102.2 114.2 134.7 169.2 181.9 193.3 207.9 232.6	23.1 24.5 26.3 31.3 35.6 40.0 46.3 50.8 60.2 72.9	4.8 4.7 6.6 5.2 3.3 4.5 5.1 7.1 8.9 8.5	-8.1 -21.9 -8.8 4.4 -4.4 -66.6 -44.4 -31.0 -7.8
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989	798 0 917 2 938 5 999 4 1.112 5 1.213 5 1.289 3 1.403 2 1.502 2 1.626.3		298 9 345.2 354 1 352.3 377 4 417 4 437.3 489 1 505 0 566 1	200 7 236 0 241 3 263 7 290 2 308 5 323 7 347 9 374 9 399 3	84.8 81 1 63 1 77.2 94.0 96.5 106.5 127.1 137 2 141 5	166.2 195.7 208.9 226.0 257.5 281.4 303.4 323.1 361.5 385.2	39 9 50.2 58 9 65.3 74.3 84 0 89.8 86 1 90.5 94 3	10.7 12.3 14.8 16.8 19.6 23.0 25.6 26.8 28.2 32.2	-3.1 -1.9 8 1.3 1.2 2.5	842.8 962.9 1.072.6 1.167.5 1.256.6 1.366.1 1.459.1 1.535.8 1.618.7 1.735.6	465.9 520.6 568.2 610.6 657.6 720.2 776.1 815.2 852.8 901.4	278.0 314.2 350.5 378.4 390.9 415.7 441.9 459.7 488.8 533.1	89.1 116.7 138.9 156.9 187.3 208.8 216.3 230.8 247.7 274.0	9.8 11.5 15.0 21.2 21.0 21.3 24.8 30.2 29.4 27.2	-44.8 -45.7 -134.1 -168.1 -144.1 -152.6 -169.9 -132.6 -116.6 -109.3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	1.707 8 1.758 8 1.843 7 1.945 8 2.089 0 2.212 6 2.376.1 2.551 9 2.724 2 2.895 0	1.180.3 1.240.2 1.318.2 1.426.1 1.517.2 1.642.0 1.780.5 1.911.7	592 8 586.7 610 6 646 6 690 7 744 1 832.1 926 3 1.027 0 1 107 5	425 5 457 5 483 8 503 4 545 6 558 2 581 1 612.0 639 8 674 0	140 6 133.6 143.1 165 4 186.7 211 0 223 6 237 1 239 2 248 8	410.1 430.2 455.0 477.7 508.2 532.8 555.2 587.2 624.2 661.4	98.7 98.1 90.5 87.6 86.6 92.1 100.2 103.7 102.4 106.8	35.6 44.6 50.5 55.1 59.5 59.1 66.0 67.9 75.5 80.6	5 7 7 6 7 2 8.6 11.4 12.7 12 6 10.3	1.872.6 1.976 7 2.140 4 2.218.4 2.290 8 2.397 6 2.492 1 2.568.6 2.633.4 2.741.0	964 4 1.014 1 1.047 8 1.072 2 1.104 1 1.136 5 1.171 1 1.216 6 1.256.0 1.334 0	586.1 622.5 749.5 796.3 831.2 872.5 921.4 947.8 969.6 1.005.5	295.3 312.7 313.2 313.6 323.4 354.6 365.3 371.4 372.4 357.3	26.8 27.3 29.9 36.4 32.2 34.0 34.3 32.9 35.4 44.2	-164.8 -217.9 -296.7 -272.6 -201.9 -184.9 -116.0 -16.7 90.8 154.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005	3.125 9 3.113 1 2.958 7 3.018 1 3.208.2	2.168 0 2.004 5 2.031 8 2.169 9	1.235 7 1.237 3 1.051 8 999 9 1.049.1 1.206 9	708 9 728 6 762 8 801 4 852 8 903 2	255 0 194 9 182 6 221.9 258 9	702 7 731 1 750.0 776 6 822 2 869 4	117.4 113.7 98.4 97.6 99.0 102.2	93 7 101 8 104.9 110.9 120.1 108.4	-1 4 .9 1 3 -3 0	2.886 5 3.061.6 3.240 8 3.424 7 3.620 6 3.875 6	1.417 1 1.501 6 1.616.9 1.736.7 1.843 4 1,959.8	1.160.6 1.270.4 1.340.0 1.423.4	362.8 344.1 315.1 301.4 310.3 341.3	44.3 55.3 38.4 46.7 43.5 56.1	239 4 51.5 -282.1 -406.5 -412.3
2002            	2.934 2 2.947 4 2.972 3 2.981 1	1.994 0 2.015 5	1.050 3 1.050 0	746 0 757 9 771 6 775 5	165.4 178.6 186.7 199.9	747.1 751.1 751.1 750.9	103.4 99.1 96.4 94.9	103 8 104.3 105 2 106.1	-1 2 4 0	3.178.0 3.223.9 3.251.0 3.310 5	1.573 1 1.604 3 1.624 9 1.665.2	1,263.0 1,274.1	316.4 319.5 313.6 311.0	39.9 37.0 38.3 38.3	-243.8 -276.5 -278.7 -329.5
2003            	3.001 3 3.026 3 2.972 1 3.072 9	2.043 7 1.980 3	1.026 9 940 8	783 8 794 7 806 6 820 6	214 1 212 3 225 2 236 3	765.8 773.6 780.7 786.3	94 6 97 3 98 7 99 6	107 7 109 8 112 1 114 2	18	3.365.1 3.426.2 3.442.1 3.465.4	1.705 5 1.735 4 1.746.1 1.759 7	1.334 2 1.353 1	302.8 300.7 298.4 303.7		-363.8 -399.9 -469.9 -392.5
2004   	3.122 0 3.181 2 3.208 0 3.321 6	2.152 3 2.168 6	1.034 0 1.058 4	837 1 847 8 855 5 870 9	246 5 262 1 246 9 280 1	806 3 813 0 825 9 843 5		117 5 119 9 117 2 125 7	-2 2 -3.0	3,596 3 3,638 9	1,805 8 1,830.1 1,859 6 1,878 2	1.416.2 1.422.2	304 2 306 8 313 8 316 5	42.3 41.8 43.2 46.5	-435.8 -415.0 -430.9 -367.7
2005 I II III IV	3,497 2 3,564 3 3,478 8	2.473 2 2.481 6	1.206 0	883 8 900 1 909.5 919 3	348 1 358 5 346 2	861 0 864 9 872 6 879 2	103 1 102.2	128 2 130 1 45 1 130.3	-7 0 -22.8	3.840.3 3.900 4	1.918 6 1.938 5 1.988 6 1.993.7	1.507 1 1.512.4	317.8 342.6 343.3 361.4	56.1	-290.9 -276.1 -421.6

Includes taxes from the rest of the world, not shown separately

Source Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis

Includes an item for the difference between wage accruals and disbursements, not shown separately

TABLE B-84.—Federal Government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959-2005

				Curre	nt receip	ts					Current	expenditi	ures		
Year or quarter	Total	Total 1	Per- sonal current	Taxes on produc- tion and	Taxes on corpo- rate	Con- tribu- tions for govern- ment social	In- come re- ceipts on	Current trans- fer re- ceipts	Current surplus of govern- ment enter-	Total <sup>2</sup>	Con- sump- tion ex- pendi-	Current trans- fer pay- ments 3	inter- est pay- ments	Sub- si- dies	Net Federal Govern- ment saving
			taxes	im- ports	come	insur- ance	assets	ccipts	prises		tures	illents.			
1959	87.0	73.3	38.5	12.2	22.5	13.4	0.0	0 4	-0.1	83.6	50.0	26.2	6 3	1.1	3.3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	93.9 95.5 103.6 111.8 111.8 120.9 137.9 146.9 171.2 192.5	76.5 77.5 83.3 88.6 87.8 95.7 104.8 109.9 129.8 146.1	41.8 42.7 46.5 49.1 46.0 51.1 58.6 64.4 76.4 91.7	13.1 13.2 14.2 14.7 15.5 15.5 14.5 17.0 17.9	21.4 21.5 22.5 24.6 26.1 28.9 31.4 30.0 36.1 36.1	16.0 16.5 18.6 21.0 21.7 22.7 30.5 34.0 37.8 43.1	1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.7	.4 .5 .5 .6 .7 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1	3 5 3 3 3 6 6 3	86.7 92.8 101.1 106.4 110.8 117.6 135.7 156.2 173.5 183.8	51.6 57.8 60.8 62.8 65.7 75.9 87.1	27.5 31.3 32.3 34.1 35.2 38.3 44.2 52.6 59.3 65.1	8.4 7.9 8.6 9.3 10.0 10.6 11.6 12.7 14.6 15.8	1.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.5	10
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	186.0 191.7 220.1 250.4 279.5 277.2 322.5 363.4 423.5 486.2	138.0 138.7 158.4 173.1 192.2 187.0 218.1 247.4 286.9 326.2	88.9 85.8 102.8 109.6 126.5 120.7 141.2 162.2 188.9 224.6	18.2 19.1 18.6 19.9 20.2 22.2 21.6 22.9 25.6 26.0	30.6 33.5 36.6 43.3 45.1 43.6 54.6 61.6 71.4 74.4	45.3 50.0 57.9 74.0 83.5 87.5 99.1 110.3 127.9 148.9	3.1 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.9 5.9 6.7 8.5 10.7	1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.8	-1.5 -1.6 -1.1 -1.8 -1.8 -3.6 -2.2 -2.9 -2.1 -2.3	201.1 220.0 244.4 261.7 293.3 346.2 374.3 407.5 450.0 497.5	107.7 108 9 118.0 129.6 137.2 150.7 163.3	80.0 95.5 111.9 124.9 145.7 183.5 198.5 212.9 232.7 254.6	17.7 17.9 18.8 22.8 26.0 28.9 33.8 37.1 45.3 55.7	4.8 4.6 6.6 5.1 3.2 4.3 4.9 6.9 8.7 8.2	-15.2 -28.4 -24.4 -11.3 -13.8 -69.0 -51.7 -44.1 -26.5 -11.3
1980	532.1 619.4 616.6 642.3 709.0 773.3 815.2 896.6 958.2 1,037.4	355.9 408.1 386.8 393.6 425.7 460.6 479.6 544.0 566.7 621.7	250.0 290.6 295.0 286.2 301.4 336.0 350.1 392.5 402.9 451.5	34.0 50.3 41.4 44.8 47.8 46.4 44.0 46.3 50.3 50.2	70.3 65.7 49.0 61.3 75.2 76.3 83.8 103.2 111.1 117.2	162.6 191.8 204.9 221.8 252.8 276.5 297.5 315.9 353.1 376.3	13.7 18.3 22.2 23.8 26.6 29.1 31.4 27.9 30.0 28.6	3.5 3.8 5.2 6.0 7.3 9.4 8.2 10.7 10.8 12.4	-3.6 -2.5 -2.4 -2.9 -3.4 -2.4 -1.5 -2.0 -2.3 -1.6	585.7 672.7 748.5 815.4 877.1 948.2 1,006.0 1,041.6 1,092.7 1,167.5	238.3 263.3 286.5 310.0 338.4 358.2 374.3 382.5	299.1 329.5 358.8 383.0 396.5 419.3 445.1 452.9 481.9 522.0	69.7 93.9 111.8 124.6 150.3 169.4 178.2 184.6 199.3 219.3	20.8 20.6	-53.3 -131 9 -173.0 -168.1 -175.0
1990	1,081.5 1,101.3 1,147.2 1,222.5 1,320.8 1,406.5 1,524.0 1,653.1 1,773.8 1,891.2	642.8 636.1 660.4 713.4 781.9 845.1 932.4 1,030.6 1,116.8 1,195.7	470.2 461.3 475.3 505.5 542.7 586.0 663.4 744.3 825.8 893.0	51.4 62.2 63.7 66.7 79.4 75.9 73.2 78.2 81.1 83.9	118.1 109.9 118.8 138.5 156.7 179.3 190.6 203.0 204.2 213.0	400.1 418.6 441.8 463.6 493.7 519.2 542.8 576.4 613.8 651.6	30.2 30.1 25.7 26.2 23.4 23.7 26.9 25.9 21.5 21.5	13.5 17.9 19.4 21.1 22.3 19.1 23.1 19.9 21.5 22.7	-5.1 -1.4 1 -1.8 4 6 -1.2 .3 .1	1,253.5 1,315.0 1,444.6 1,496.0 1,533.1 1,603.5 1,665.8 1,708.9 1,734.9 1,787.6	439.5 445.2 441.9 440.8 440.5 446.3 457.7 454.6	569.9 597.6 718.7 764.7 799.2 839.0 888.3 918.8 946.5 986.1	237.5 250.9 251.3 253.4 261.3 290.4 297.3 300.0 298.8 282.7	26.4 26.9 29.5 36.0 31.8 33.7 34.0 32.4 35.0 43.8	-297.4
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 pr	2,053.8 2,016.2 1,853.2 1,868.6 1,974.8	1,313.6 1,252.2 1,075.5 1,059.2 1,122.4	999.1 994.5 830.5 774.3 801.8 932.2	87.8 85.8 87.3 89.7 94.0 97.2	219.4 164.7 150.5 186.7 217.4	691.7 717.5 734.3 759.1 802.5 849.5	25.2 24.9 20.2 22.7 21.9 23.1	25.7 27.1 24.8 25.7 28.6 7.4	-2.3 -5.5 -1.6 1.9 5 -3.7	1,864.4 1,969.5 2,101.1 2,251.4 2,381.3 2,547.5	499.3 531.9 591.5 661.9 725.7 767.2	1,038.1 1,131.4 1,243.0 1,327.7 1,391.2 1,475.6	283.3 258.6 229.1 215.2 221.5 249.1	43.8 47.6 37.5 46.5 43.0 55.6	189.5 46.7 -247 9 -382 7 -406.5
2002: I II III IV	1,845.9 1,854.1 1,856.1 1,856.6	1,071.3 1,077.5 1,075.4 1,078.0	843.1 835.2 825.8 818.0	84.9 87.7 88.5 88.0	136.3 147.4 153.9 164.2	732.1 735.5 735.0 734.4	21 1 20.1 19.8 19.9	25.7 24.9 24.5 24.0	-4.3 -3.9 1.4 .3	2,054.4 2,095.5 2,103.4 2,151.1	571.3 585.0 591.4 618.5	1,215.1 1,240.7 1,247.6 1,268.5	229 9 233 3 227.7 225.4	38 1 36.5 36.7 38 7	-208.5 -241.4 -247.3 -294.6
2003: I II III IV	1,881.4 1,896.3 1,808.9 1,887.9	1,084.4 1,089.6 994.5 1,068.2	806.7 811.2 708.8 770.6	90.1 89.7 88.8 90.2	180.7 178.8 189 1 198 1	749.0 756.4 762.9 768.0	19.5 22.8 24.0 24.6	24 8 25.5 26.2 26.5	3.7 2.1 1.4 6	2,177.4 2,270.1 2,265.1 2,292.9	634.7 667.6 668.4 676.8	1,285.0 1,332.1 1,339.0 1,354.8	217 0 214 9 212.2 216 8	42.0 54.2 45.5 44.4	-296.0 -373.8 -456.2 -405.0
2004: I II III IV	1,917.8 1,951.4 1,975.4 2,054.6	1.080.7 1.108.1 1.119.4 1.181.3	771.3 786.3 810.0 839.7	93.4 93.4 94.0 95.1	206.9 219.9 207.5 235.3	787.2 793.5 806.0 823.4	22.0 21.5 21.8 22.2	27.6 28.1 28.7 30.0	.3 3 - 4 -2 3	2,347.2 2,364.9 2,387.0 2,426.2	710 7 721 1 735 7 735.1	1.379 3 1.382.6 1.384 0 1 419 0	216 9 218.4 224 5 226 1		-429 3 -413 4 -411 6 -371 6
2005: I II III IV P	2,196.6 2,227.9 2,148.5		908.3 924.3 940.5 955.7	95.4 98.3 97.5 97.5	291.7 300.8 290.7	841 1 845.1 852 6 859.1	23.0 24.3 22.8 22.4	30.4 30.2 -61 4 30 6	-2 9 -3 6 -4 3 -3 8	2.494 9 2.525 2 2.563.7 2.606.2	759 6 762 8 782 9 763.6	1.458 7 1.459 9 1 474 4 1.509 2	226 6 250 8 250 8 268 3	516	-298 3 -297 3 -415 2

Includes taxes from the rest of the world, not shown separately
 Includes an item for the difference between wage accruals and disbursements, not shown separately
 includes Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments. See Table B–82 for data on Federal grants-in-aid

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-85.—State and local government current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959-2005

				Curre	ent recei	pts					Current 6	expenditui	es		
Year or quarter	Total	Total	Per- sonal current taxes	Taxes on produc- tion and im- ports	Taxes on corpo- rate in- come	Con- tribu- tions for govern- ment social insur- ance	In- come fe- ceipts on assets	Current trans- fer- re- ceipts <sup>1</sup>	Current surplus of govern- ment enter- prises	Total <sup>2</sup>	Con- sump- tion ex- pendi- tures	Govern- ment social benefit pay- ments to persons	Inter- est pay- ments	Sub- sı- dies	Net State and local govern- ment saving
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1966 1967 1972 1973 1974 1977 1977 1977 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 198	40.6 44.5 48.1 52.0 56.0 661.3 665.5 74.9 82.5 93.5 105.5 120.1 1334.9 158.4 174.3 188.1 209.6 233.7 259.9 287.6 308.4 428.6 561.6 5	33 8 37.0 39.7 42.8 45.8 45.8 45.3 49.8 64.0 101.7 115.6 126.3 136.0 114.7 126.3 136.0 136.7 126.3 136.7 136	3 8 8 4 2 2 4 6 6 5 0 6 1 1 2 8 8 6 6 6 1 1 2 8 8 6 6 1 1 2 8 9 6 6 1 1 2 9 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	28.8 31.5 33.8 36.3 38.7 41.8 45.3 45.9 59.5 66.0 73.3 81.5 59.5 69.7 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0	1 2 2 1 2 3 1 5 5 1 1 5 5 1 1 8 8 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 6 6 3 3 7 3 4 5 3 3 6 6 0 7 7 3 6 9 11 4 4 1 1 5 9 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 1 1.1 1.2 1 1 5 1 1 7 7 1 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 8 4 4 1 1 4 9 0 1 1 6 6 0 0 1 1 6 6 6 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	111 133 141 151 161 161 199 222 266 300 330 433 525 599 711 201 117 7147 744 747 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 7	4 2 5 5 5 8 8 6 7 3 3 8 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 4 8 5 6 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 9 0 0	36.9 40.2 43.8 56.3 56.4 96.0 97.5 86.0 97.5 113.0 97.5 1128.5 128.5 128.7 226.3 246.8 229.5 426.3 239.5 456.7 540.7 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 57.5 5	30.7 33.5 36.6 39.0 41.9 45.8 50.2 56.1 62.6 70.4 79.9 91.5 102.7 113.2 213.2 213.2 213.3 258.4 304.9 324.7 381.8 440.9 470.4 502.1 544.6 602.7 630.3 663.3	4.3 4.60 5.3 5.7 6.2 6.7 6.2 6.7 9.2 11.4 13.2 11.2 12.0 22.1 12.5 33.4 13.7 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2	1 8 8 2 1 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 9 3 3 1 4 3 3 7 7 5 5 8 9 5 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 1 9 4 8 2 7 1 1 1 7 2 4 4 8 4 6 4 6 6 1 2 0 6 6 0 2 0 6 6 0 2 0	0.0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0	3.3. 4.4. 5.5. 6.6. 6.7. 7.7. 7.7. 7.8. 8.8. 7.6. 6.15. 15. 15. 15. 12. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2
995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003	990.2 1.043 3 1.097 4 1.163.2 1.236.7 1.319.5 1.373 0 1.410.1 1.488 6	672 1 709 6 749 9 794 9 840 4 893 2 915 8 929 0 972 6 1.047 6	158 1 168 7 182 0 201 2 214 5 236 6 242 7 221 3 225 6 247 2	482 4 507.9 533.8 558 8 590.2 621.1 642.8 675.5 711.7 758 8	31.7 33.0 34.1 34.9 35.8 35.5 30.2 32.2 35.3 41.5	13 6 12.5 10.8 10.4 9.8 11.0 13.6 15.8 17.5	68.4 73.3 77.8 80.9 85.3 92.2 88.8 78.2 74.9	224.1 234.1 246.6 266.8 290.8 315.4 350.8 384.7 424.3 439.8	12.0 13.9 12.3 10.2 10.4 7.7 4.0 2.5	978.2 1,017.5 1,058.3 1,111.2 1,186.3 1,269.5 1,368.2 1,444.3 1,512.4 1,587.5	696.1 724.8 758.9 801.4 858.9 917.8 969.8 1,025.3 1.074.8 1.117.7	217.6 224.3 227.6 235.8 252.4 271.7 305.2 332.0 351.3 380.5	64.2 68.1 71.4 73.6 74.6 79.5 85.5 86.0 86.2 88.9	.3 .3 .4 .4 .4 .5 7.7 .9	12. 25. 39. 52. 50. 4. -34. -23. -5.
2005 // 2002: I III IV 2003: I	1.379 7 1.396.4 1.422.7 1.441.7 1.433 1 1.474 6	910.3 916.5 940.1 949.0 944.7 954.1	274 7 220 1 215-1 224 2 225 8 217 7 215.8	806.0 661 1 670 2 683 2 687 5 693.7 705 0	29 1 31 2 32.8 35 6 33 4 33.4	19.9 15.0 15.6 16.1 16.5 16.7	79 1 82.3 79.0 76.5 75.0 75.1 74.6	458.8 369.5 382.5 387.4 399.3 396.1 428.9	-25 -7.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.0 .4	1,685.9 1,415.0 1,431.5 1,454.2 1,476.6 1,500.9 1,500.7	1.192.6 1.001.8 1.019.4 1.033.6 1.046.7 1.070.8 1.067.8	300.7 324.9 325.4 333.0 344.7 344.3 346.7	92.1 86.5 86.2 85.9 85.7 85.8 85.8	1.8 1.6 1.7 4	-35.3 -35.3 -31.4 -34.5 -67.8 -26.3
2004 I II . III . III . IV	1.507.6 1.539 0 1.546 8 1.579 7 1.574 5 1.625.7	985.8 1.005.7 1.021.5 1.044.2 1.049.3	231 9 237.0 238 3 247 7 248 4 254 6	717.8 730.5 743.7 754.3 761.5 775.8	36.0 38.2 39.5 42.2 39.4 44.8	17 2 17.7 18.3 19 1 19 6 19 9 20 1	74 7 75.0 75.6 76.7 77 4 78.8	430.4 441.7 432.5 441.8 430.5 454.5	-1.0 -1.7 -1.9 -2.5 -2.6 -2.9	1,521.4 1,526.5 1,553.2 1,581.3 1,593.8 1,621.7	1,077.7 1,082.9 1,095.1 1,108.9 1,123.9 1,143.1	358.5 355.8 370.4 383.5 380.2 387.7	86.2 86.9 87.3 88.4 89.3 90.4	9 1.0 .5 .5 .5	-13. 12. -6. -1. -19.
1005   	1.694 9 1.684 3	1.1414	263 1 281 8 275 4 278.6	788.4 801.8 812.0 821.9	56 4 57 7 55.5	19 9 19 8 19 9 20.1	78.2 78.8 79.4 79.9	453.9 458.4 460.6 462.1	-3.2 -3.5 -18.5 -4 9	1,649.4 1,673.7 1,690.8 1,729.9	1.159.0 1.175.7 1.205.7 1.230 1	398.6 405.7 392.1 406.3	91.2 91.8 92.4 93.0	.5 .5 5	21 -6

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes Federal grants-in-aid. See Table B-82 for data on Federal grants-in-aid. <sup>2</sup> Includes an item for the difference between wage accruals and disbursements, not shown separately.

TABLE B-86.—State and local government revenues and expenditures, selected fiscal years, 1927-2003 [Millions of dollars]

					LIMITITOTIS	s or dollars	)					
			General r	evenues b	y source <sup>2</sup>			Ge	neral expe	enditures t	by function	?
Fiscal year <sup>1</sup>	Total	Property taxes	Sales and gross receipts taxes	Indi- vidual income taxes	Corpo- ration net income taxes	Revenue from Federal Govern- ment	All other <sup>3</sup>	Total	Edu- cation	High- ways	Public welfare	All other <sup>4</sup>
1927	7,271	4,730	470	70	92	116	1.793	7,210	2.235	1.809	151	3,015
932 934 936 938 940	7,267 7,678 8,395 9,228 9,609 10,418	4,487 4,076 4,093 4,440 4,430 4,537	752 1,008 1,484 1,794 1,982 2,351	74 80 153 218 224 276	79 49 113 165 156 272	232 1,016 948 800 945 858	1,643 1,449 1,604 1,811 1,872 2,123	7,765 7,181 7,644 8,757 9,229 9,190	2,311 1,831 2,177 2,491 2,638 2,586	1,741 1,509 1,425 1,650 1,573 1,490	444 889 827 1.069 1,156 1,225	3,269 2,952 3,215 3,547 3,862 3,889
946 948 950	10,908 12,356 17,250 20,911 25,181	4,604 4,986 6,126 7,349 8,652	2,289 2,986 4,442 5,154 6,357	342 422 543 788 998	451 447 592 593 846	954 855 1,861 2,486 2,566	2,269 2,661 3,685 4,541 5,763	8,863 11,028 17,684 22,787 26,098	2,793 3,356 5,379 7,177 8,318	1,200 1,672 3,036 3,803 4,650	1,133 1,409 2,099 2,940 2,788	3,737 4,591 7,170 8,867 10,342
953	27,307 29,012 31,073 34,667 38,164 41,219 45,306 50,505	9,375 9,967 10,735 11,749 12,864 14,047 14,983 16,405	6,927 7,276 7,643 8,691 9,467 9,829 10,437 11,849	1,065 1,127 1,237 1,538 1,754 1,759 1,994 2,463	817 778 744 890 984 1,018 1,001	2,870 2,966 3,131 3,335 3,843 4,865 6,377 6,974	6,252 6,897 7,584 8,465 9,252 9,699 10,516 11,634	27,910 30,701 33,724 36,711 40,375 44,851 48,887 51,876	9,390 10,557 11,907 13,220 14,134 15,919 17,283 18,719	4,987 5,527 6,452 6,953 7,816 8,567 9,592 9,428	2,914 3,060 3,168 3,139 3,485 3,818 4,136 4,404	10,619 11,557 12,197 13,399 14,940 16,547 17,876 19,325
960 961 962 963 962-63	54,037 58,252 62,890 62,269	18,002 19,054 20,089 19,833	12,463 13,494 14,456 14,446	2,613 3,037 3,269 3,267	1,266 1,308 1,505	7,131 7,871 8,722 8,663	12,563 13,489 14,850 14,556	56,201 60,206 64,816 63,977	20,574 22,216 23,776 23,729	9,844 10,357 11,136	4,720 5,084 5,481 5,420	21,063 22,549 24,423 23,678
963-64 964-65	68,443 74,000	21,241 22,583	15,762	3,791 4,090	1,695	10,002	15,951 17,250	69,302 74,678	26,286 28,563	11,664	5,766	25,586 27,579
965-66 966-67 967-68 968-69	83,036 91,197 101,264 114,550	24,670 26,047 27,747 30,673 34,054	19,085 20,530 22,911 26,519 30,322	4,760 5,825 7,308 8,908	2,038 2,227 2,518 3,180 3,738	13,214 15,370 17,181 19,153 21,857	19,269 21,198 23,599 26,117 29,973	82,843 93,350 102,411 116,728 131,332	33,287 37,919 41,158 47,238 52,718	12,770 13,932 14,481 15,417 16,427	6,757 8,218 9,857 12,110 14,679	30,029 33,281 36,915 41,963 47,508
969-70 970-71 971-72 972-73 973-74 974-75	130,756 144,927 167,535 190,222 207,670 228,171	37,852 42,877 45,283 47,705 51,491	33,233 37,518 42,047 46,098 49,815	10,812 11,900 15,227 17,994 19,491 21,454	3,424 4,416 5,425 6,015 6,642	26,146 31,342 39,264 41,820 47,034	32,372 36,156 40,210 46,542 51,735	150,674 168,549 181,357 198,959 230,722	59,413 65,813 69,713 75,833 87,858	18.095 19.021 18.615 19.946 22,528	18.226 21.117 23,582 25,085 28.156	54,940 62,590 69,440 78,090 92,180
975-76 976-77 977-78 978-79 979-80	256,176 285,157 315,960 343,236 382,322	57,001 62,527 66,422 64,944 68,499	54,547 60,641 67,596 74,247 79,927	24,575 29,246 33,176 36,932 42,080	7,273 9,174 10,738 12,128 13,321	55,589 62,444 69,592 75,164 83,029	57,191 61,125 68,435 79,822 95,467	256,731 274,215 296,984 327,517 369,086	97,216 102,780 110,758 119,448 133,211	23,907 23,058 24,609 28,440 33,311	32,604 35,906 39,140 41,898 47,288	103,004 112,472 122,478 137,732 155,278
980-81 981-82 982-83 983-84 984-85	423,404 457,654 486,753 542,730 598,121	74,969 82,067 89,105 96,457 103,757	85.971 93,613 100,247 114,097 126,376	46,426 50,738 55,129 64,529 70,361	14,143 15,028 14,258 17,141 19,152	90,294 87,282 90,007 96,935 106,158	111,599 128,925 138,008 153,571 172,317	407,449 436,733 466,516 505,008 553,899	145.784 154.282 163,876 176,108 192,686	34,603 34,520 36,655 39,419 44,989	54.105 57.996 60.906 66.414 71,479	172,953 189,935 205,080 223,068 244,745
985-86 986-87 987-88 988-89 989-90	641,486 686,860 726,762 786,129 849,502	111,709 121,203 132,212 142,400 155,613	135,005 144,091 156,452 166,336 177,885	74,365 83,935 88,350 97,806 105,640	19,994 22,425 23,663 25,926 23,566	113,099 114,857 117,602 125,824 136,802	187,314 200,350 208,482 227,838 249,996	605,623 657,134 704,921 762,360 834,818	210,819 226,619 242,683 263,898 288,148	49,368 52,355 55,621 58,105 61,057	75,868 82,650 89,090 97,879 110,518	269,568 295,510 317,527 342,479 375,094
990-91 991-92 992-93 993-94 994-95	902,207 979,137 1,041,643 1,100,490 1,169,505	167,999 180,337 189,744 197,141 203,451	185,570 197,731 209,649 223,628 237,268	109,341 115,638 123,235 128,810 137,931	22,242 23,880 26,417 28,320 31,406	154,099 179,174 198,663 215,492 228,771	262,955 282,376 293,935 307,099	908,108 981,253 1,030,434 1,077,665 1,149,863	309,302 324,652 342,287 353,287 378,273	64,937 67,351 68,370 72,067 77,109	130,402 158,723 170,705 183,394 196,703	403,467 430,526 449,072 468,916 497,779
995-96 996-97 997-98 998-99	1,222,821 1,289,237 1,365,762 1,434,464 1,541,322	209,440 218,877 230,150 240,107 249,178	248,993 261,418 274,883 290,993 309,290	146,844 159,042 175,630 189,309 211,661	32,009 33,820 34,412 33,922 36,059	234,891 244,847 255,048 270,628 291,950	350,645 371,233 395,639 409,505	1,193,276 1,249,984 1,318,042 1,402,369 1,506,797	398,859 418,416 450,365 483,259 521,612	79,092 82,062 87,214 93,018 101,336	197,354 203,779 208,120 218,957 237,336	517,971 545,727 572,343 607,134 646,512
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03	1,647,161 1,684,879 1,763,212	263,689 279,191 296,683	320,217 324,123	226,334 202,832	35,296 28,152 31,369	324,033 360,546 389,264	490,035	1,626,066 1,736,866 1,821,917	563,575 594,694 621,335	107,235 115,295 117,696	261,622 285,464 310,783	693,634 741,413 772,102

Fiscal years not the same for all governments. See Note.
 Excludes revenues or expenditures of publicly owned utilities and liquor stores, and of insurance-trust activities. Intergovernmental receipts and payments between State and local governments are also excluded.
 Includes other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Includes other taxes and charges and miscellaneous revenues.
<sup>4</sup> Includes expenditures for libraries, hospitals, health, employment security administration, veterans' services, air transportation, water transport and terminals, parking facilities, transit subsidies, police protection, thre protection, correction, protective inspection and regulation, sewerage, natural resources, parks and recreation, housing and community development, solid waste management, financial administration, judicial and legal, general public buildings, other government administration, interest on general expenditures, nec.
Note.—Except for States listed, data for fiscal years listed from 1962-63 to 2002-03 are the aggregation of data for government fiscal years that ended in the 12-month period from July 1 to June 30 of those years (Texas used August and Alabama and Michigan used September). Data tor 1963 and earlier years include data for governments fiscal years ending during that particular calendar year.
Data prior to 1952 are not available for intervening years.
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE B-87.—U.S. Treasury securities outstanding by kind of obligation, 1967-2005 [Billions of dollars]

	Total			M	arketable					N	onmarketa	ble	
End of year or month	Treasury securities out- stand-	Total <sup>2</sup>	Treas- ury bills	Treas- ury notes	Treas- ury bonds	ınflat	Treasury tion-prote securities	cted	Total	securi-	Foreign series <sup>4</sup>	Govern- ment account	Other
	ing 1		DHIZ	110162	DOITUS	Total	Notes	Bonds		ties 3		series	
iscal year: 1967	200.2	6010.7		49 1	97 4				111.6	51.2	1.5	56.2	2.
1968	322.3 344.4	6210 7 226 6	58.5 64.4	71.1 78.9	91 1 78.8				117.8 125.6	51.7 51.7	37	59.5 66.8	2.
1969 1970	351.7 369 0	226.1 232.6	68.4 76.2	93 5	63 0				136.4	51.3	4.8	76.3	4.
1971 1972	396.3 425.4	245 5 257.2	86.7 94.6	104.8 113.4	54.0 49.1				150.8 168.2	53.0 55.9	9.3 19.0	82.8 89.6	5.
1973 1974	456.4 473.2	263.0 266.6	100.1 105.0	117.8 128.4	45.1 33.1				193 4 206.7	59.4 61.9	28.5 25.0	101.7 115.4	3.
1975 1976	532.1 619.3	315.6 392.6	128.6 161.2	150.3 191.8	36 8 39 6				216.5 226.7	65.5 69.7	23.2 21.5	124.2 130.6	3.
1977	697 6	443.5 485.2	156 1 160.9	241.7 267.9	39 6 45.7 56.4				254 l 281.8	75.4 79.8	21.8	140.1 153.3	16 27
1978	767 0 819.0	506.7	161 4	274 2	71.1				312.3	80.4	28.1	176.4	27
1980	906.4 996.5	594 5 683.2	199 8 223.4	310.9 363.6	83.8 96.2				311.9 313.3	72.7 68.0	25.2 20.5	189.8 201.1	24.
1982 1983	1.140.9 1.375.8	824 4 1,024.0	277.9 340.7	442.9 557.5	103.6 125.7				316.5 351.8	67.3 70.0	14.6 11.5	210.5 234.7	24 35
1984	1,559.6	1,176.6	356.8	661.7	158.1				383.0	72.8	8.8	259.5	41
1985 1986	1.821.0 2.122.7 2.347.8	1,360.2 21,564.3	384.2 410.7	776.4 896.9	199 5 241.7				460.8 558.4	77.0 85.6	6.6 4.1	313.9 365.9	63 102
1987 1988	2,347.8 2,599.9	<sup>2</sup> 1.676.0 <sup>2</sup> 1.802 9	378.3 398.5	1.005.1 1.089.6	277.6 299.9				797.0	97.0 106.2	4.4 6.3	440.7 536.5	129 148
1989	2,836.3 3,210.9	21.892.8 22.092.8	406.6 482.5	1.133.2 1.218 1	338.0 377.2				943.5 1.118.2	114.0	6.8	663.7 779.4	159 180
1991	3,662 8	<sup>2</sup> 2,390.7 <sup>2</sup> 2,677.5	564 6	1.387.7	423.4 461.8				1,272.1	133.5	41.6 37.0	908.4	188 188
1992	4,061 8 4,408.6	2 2.904 9	634 3 658 4 697.3	1,566.3	497.4				1.503.7	167.0	42.5	1,114.3	179
1994	4,689.5 4,950.6	<sup>2</sup> 3,091 6 <sup>2</sup> 3,260.4	742.5	1,867.5	511.8				1,597.9 1,690.2	176.4 181.2	42.0 41.0	1,211.7 1,324.3	167
1996	5,220.8 5,407.5	<sup>2</sup> 3,418.4 <sup>2</sup> 3,439.6	7612 701.9	2,098.7 2,122.2	543.5 576.2	24.4	24 4		1,802.4 1,967.9	184.1 182.7	37.5 34.9	1,454.7 1,608.5	126 141
1998	5,407.5 5,518.7 5,647.2	<sup>2</sup> 3,331.0 <sup>2</sup> 3,233 0	637.6	2,009.1 1,828.8	610.4 643.7	58 8 92.4	41 9 67.6	17.0 24.8	2,187.7 2,414.2	180.8 180.0	35.1 31.0	1,777.3 2,005.2	194 198
2000	5.622.1	2 2 992 8	616.2	1,611.3	635.3	115.0	81.6	33.4	2,629.3	177.7	25.4	2,242.9	183
2001	5,807.5 6,228.2	<sup>2</sup> 2.930.7 <sup>2</sup> 3.136.7	734.9 868.3	1,433.0 1,521.6	613.0 593.0	134.9 138.9	95.1 93.7	39.7 45.1	2,629.3 2,876.7 3,091.5	186.5 193.3	18.3 12.5	2,492.1 2,707.3	179 178
2003	6.783.2 7,379.1	3,460.7 3,846.1	918.2 961.5	1,799.5 2,109.6	576.9 552.0	166.1 223.0	120.0	46.1	3,322.5 3,533.0	201.6 204.2	11.0 5.9	2,912.2 3,130.0	197 192
2005	7,932.7	2 4,084.9	914.3	2,328.8	520.7	307.1			3,847.8	203.6	3.1	3,380.6	260
004. Jan Feb	7,009.2 7,091.9	3,581.8 3,662.9	907.9 958.2	1,921.8 1,952.7	564.4 564.4	187.7 187.5	141.5 141.3	46.2 46.2	3,427.4 3,429.1	204.3 204.5	5.9 6.7	3,016.8 3,019.7	200 198
Mar	7,133.8	3,662.9 3,721.2 3,697.4	985.0 933.4	1,983.5 2,001.1	564.4 564.4	188.4 198.5	142.0 151.8	46.4 46.7	3,409.9 3,436.4	204.5 204.5	6.7 6.7	3,008.6 3,029.0	190 196
May . June	7,196.4 7,274.3	3,744.6 3,755.5	958.1 946.8	2,030.7 2,052.3	556.1 556.1	199.7	152.8	47.0	3,451.8 3,518.8	204.7 204.6	6.4	3,045.2 3,111.7	195 196
July	7,316.6	3,808.5 3,840.7	962.5 976.8	2.067.3	556.1 552.1	222.6 223.3			3,508.1	204.6 204.2	6.4 5.9	3,105.7 3,110.6	191 189
Aug Sept	7,351 0 7,379 1	3,846.1	961.5 981.9	2,088.6 2,109.6 2,124.6 2,134.4 2,157.1	552.0	223.0	**********		3 533 0	204.2	5.9	3,130.0	192
Oct Nov	7,429.7 7,525.2 7,596.1	3,902.7 23,963.6 23,959.8	1.030.8	2,124 6	552.0 539.6	244.2 244.7			3,301.0	204.3 204.4	5.9 5.9	3,121.6 3,158.9	195
0ec 005-Jan	7,596.1	2 3 975 0	1,003.2 986.8	2,157.1	539.5 539.5	245.9 267.3	*********		3,636.4 3.652.8	204.5	5.9 6.2	3,230.6 3,243.6	195
Feb Mar	7,713.1 7,776.9	<sup>2</sup> 4.054 3 <sup>2</sup> 4.103.8	1,030.9	2.205.9	537.2 537.2	266.3 266.8			3,658.8 3,673.1	204.5 204.2	6.2	3,249.4 3,248.9	198
Apr May	7,764.5	<sup>2</sup> 4,070.7 <sup>2</sup> 4,050.2	991.3 961.3	2.167.3 2.205.9 2.226.7 2.241.7 2.256.1 2.273.1	537.2 530.1	286.5			3,693.9 3,727.7	204.2 204.3	6.0 5.9	3,259.6 3,282.2	224
June .	7,836.5	2 4,031 1	923.4	2,273.1	530.0		***********		3,805.4	204.2	3.0	3,356.3	241
July . Aug	7.887.6 7.926.9	<sup>2</sup> 4,077.9 <sup>2</sup> 4,106.5	942.2 953.3	2,286.1 2,312.7	530.0 520.7	305.6 305.8			3,809.7 3,820.5	204.1	3.0 3.0	3,354.4 3,360.9	248 252
Sept Oct	7.932.7 8,027.1	<sup>2</sup> 4.084.9 <sup>2</sup> 4.131.3	914.3 936.6	2,286.1 2,312.7 2,328.8 2,336.0 2,339.8 2,360.8	520.7 520.7	307 1 324.0			3,847.8 3,895.8	203.6 203.9	3.1 3.1	3,380.6 3,426.7	252 260 262
Nov Dec	8,092.3 8,170.4	<sup>2</sup> 4.185.3 <sup>2</sup> 4.184.0	986.9	2.339.8	516.6 516.6	327.9 328.7		,		204.6 205.2	3.0	3,432.8 3,506.6	266 270

<sup>1</sup> Data beginning January 2001 are interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing securities; prior data are interest-bearing securities only.
2 Includes Federal Financing Bank securities, not shown separately.
3 Through 1996, series is U.S. savings bonds, Beginning 1997, includes U.S. retirement plan bonds, U.S. individual retirement bonds, and U.S. savings notes previously included in "other" nonmarketable securities.
4 Nonmarketable certificates of indebtedness, notes, bonds, and bills in the Treasury foreign series of dollar-denominated and foreigncurrency denominated issues.

Sincludes depository bonds, retirement plan bonds, Rural Electrification Administration bonds, State and local bonds, special issues held only by U.S. Government agencies and trust funds and the Federal home loan banks and for the period July 2003 through February 2004, depositary compensation securities.
6 Includes \$5,610 million in certificates not shown separately

Note —Through fiscal year 1976, the fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis; beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis.

Source. Department of the Treasury

Table B-88.—Maturity distribution and average length of marketable interest-bearing public debt securities held by private investors, 1967-2005

	Amount out-		M	aturity class				
End of year or month	standing, privately held	Within 1 year	l to 5 years	5 to 10 years	10 to 20 years	20 years and over	Average	length <sup>1</sup>
			Millions of	dollars			Years	Months
riscal year: 1967 1968 1969	159,671	56,561 66,746 69,311	53,584 52,295 50,182	21,057 21,850 18,078	6,153 6,110 6,097	12,968 12,670 12,337	5 4 4	1 5 2
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	161,863 165,978 167,869	76,443 74,803 79,509 84,041 87,150	57,035 58,557 57,157 54,139 50,103	8,286 14,503 16,033 16,385 14,197	7,876 6,357 6,358 8,741 9,930	8.272 7,645 6,922 4,564 3,481	3 3 3 3 2	8 6 3 1
1975 1976 1977 1977 1978	279,782 326,674 356,501	115,677 150,296 161,329 163,819 181,883	65,852 90,578 113,319 132,993 127,574	15,385 24,169 33,067 33,500 32,279	8,857 8,087 8,428 11,383 18,489	4,611 6,652 10,531 14,805 20,304	2 2 2 3 3	1
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984	. 549,863 . 682,043 . 862,631	220,084 256,187 314,436 379,579 437,941	156,244 182,237 221,783 294,955 332,808	38,809 48,743 75,749 99,174 130,417	25,901 32,569 33,017 40,826 49,664	22,679 30,127 37,058 48,097 66,658	3 4 3 4 4	1
1985 1986 1987 1988	. 1,354,275 . 1,445,366 . 1,555,208	472,661 506,903 483,582 524,201 546,751	402,766 467,348 526,746 552,993 578,333	159,383 189,995 209,160 232,453 247,428	62,853 70,664 72,862 74,186 80,616	88,012 119,365 153,016 171,375 201,532	4 5 5 5 6	1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994	1,841,903 2,113,799 2,363,802 2,562,336	626,297 713,778 808,705 858,135 877,932	630,144 761,243 866,329 978,714 1,128,322	267,573 280,574 295,921 306,663 289,998	82.713 84,900 84,706 94,345 88,208	235,176 273,304 308,141 324,479 335,401	6 6 5 5 5	1 1
1995 1996 1997 1998	2,870,781 3,011,185 2,998,846 2,856,637	1,002,875 1,058,558 1,017,913 940,572 915,145	1,157,492 1,212,258 1,206,993 1,105,175 962,644	290,111 306,643 321,622 319,331 378,163	87,297 111,360 154,205 157,347 149,703	333,006 322,366 298,113 334,212 322,356	5 5 5 6	. 1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	2,328,302 2,492,821 2,804,092	858,903 900,178 939,986 1,057,049 1,127,850	791,540 650,522 802,032 955,239 1,150,979	355,382 329,247 311,176 351,552 414,728	167,082 174,653 203,816 243,755 243,036	296,246 273,702 235,811 196,497 208,652	6 6 5 5 4	. 1
2005		1,100,783	1,279,646	499,386	281,229	173,367	4	1
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	2,967,133 3,046,725 3,019,341 3,035,769	1,086,110 1,149,251 1,178,142 1,125,763 1,153,189 1,136,300	1,000,107 998,984 1,038,873 1,054,136 1,043,862 1,082,581	363,307 378,812 389,481 389,995 398,095 408,129	243,755 243,520 243,520 243,520 243,436 243,436	196,611 196,566 196,709 196,928 197,187 197,323	5 4 4 4 4 4	1 1 1 1 1
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	3,088,164 3,145,333 3,145,244 3,166,311 3,233,704	1,147,439 1,148,585 1,127,850 1,143,145 1,177,963 1,149,591	1,070.294 1,137,991 1,150,979 1,137,251 1,159,725 1,170,576	418,436 406,590 414,728 434,604 444,697 453,993	243,436 243,436 243,036 242,636 250,625 250,625	208,560 208,731 208,652 208,675 200,694 200,868	4 4 4 4 4	1
2005: Jan	3,240,748 3,322,699 3,372,393 3,310,933 3,311,486	1,132,991 1,184,006 1,211,253 1,143,168 1,132,636 1,095,354	1,195,479 1,231,825 1,244,945 1,253,939 1,250,391 1,260,365	452,642 456,120 465,335 462,850 477,013 485,465	269,863 269,036 269,072 268,951 269,100 268,443	189,773 181,712 181,789 182,025 182,346 182,629	4 4 4 4 4	1
July	3,314,952 3,361,958 3,334,411 3,376,594 3,426,982	1,130,292 1,143,059 1,100,783 1,136,101 1,201,621 1,176,549	1,233,071 1,273,564 1,279,646 1,278,315 1,248,485 1,237,702	494.373 490.944 499.386 508.135 526,593 534.929	274,618 281,161 281,229 280,839 276,571 276,633	182,599 173,230 173,367 173,203 173,712 173,815	4 4 4 4 4	1

 $<sup>^{1}\,\</sup>mathrm{ln}$  2002, the average length calculation was revised to include Treasury inflation-protected securities.

Source: Department of the Treasury

Note.—Through fiscal year 1976, the fiscal year was on a July 1-June 30 basis, beginning October 1976 (fiscal year 1977), the fiscal year is on an October 1-September 30 basis.

TABLE B-89.—Estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, 1994-2005 [Billions of dollars]

			Fadaral				1	Held by pr	ivate inves	tors			
		Takal	Federal Reserve		De-		Pensio	n funds			State		
E	nd of month	Total public debt <sup>1</sup>	and Govern- ment ac- counts 2	Total privately held	posi- tory insti- tu- tions 3	U.S savings bonds 4	Pri- vate 5	State and local govern- ments	insur- ance compa- nies	Mutual tunds <sup>6</sup>	and local govern- ments	Foreign and inter- nation- al <sup>7</sup>	Other inves- tors <sup>8</sup>
1994	Mar	4,575 9 4,645.8 4,692.8 4,800 2	1,476.0 1,547.5 1,562.8 1,622.6	3,099.9 3,098.3 3,130.0 3,177.6	397.4 383.8 364.0 339.6	175.0 177.1 178.6 179.9	120.1 129.4 136.4 140.1	224.3 220.6 217.4 215.6	233.4 238.0 243.7 240.1	212.8 204.6 201.6 209.4	443.4 425.2 398.2 370.0	661.1 659.9 682.0 667.3	632.3 659.7 708.1 815.6
1995	Mar June Sept Dec	4,864 1 4,951 4 4,974.0 4,988.7	1,619.3 1,690.1 1,688.0 1,681.0	3,244 8 3,261.3 3,286.0 3,307.7	353.0 340.0 330.8 315.4	181 4 182.6 183.5 185.0	141 8 142.7 142.1 142.9	225.0 217.2 211.3 208.2	244.2 245.0 245.2 241.5	210.6 202.5 211.6 225.1	350.5 313.7 304.3 289.8	707.0 762.5 820.4 835.2	831.4 855.2 836.8 864.6
1996	Mar	5,117.8 5,161.1 5,224.8 5,323.2	1,731.1 1,806.7 1,831.6 1,892.0	3,386.7 3,354.4 3,393.2 3,431.2	322 1 318.7 310.9 296.6	185 8 186.5 186.8 187.0	144.5 144.8 141.5 140.2	213.5 221.1 213.4 212.8	239.4 229.5 226.8 214.1	240.9 230.6 226.8 227.4	283.6 283.3 263.7 257.0	908.1 929.7 993.4 1,102.1	848.7 810.3 829.9 794.0
1997	Mar June Sept Dec	5,380.9 5,376.2 5,413.1 5,502.4	1,928.7 1,998.9 2,011.5 2,087.8	3,452.2 3,377.3 3,401.6 3,414.6	317.3 300.1 292.8 300.3	186.5 186.3 186.2 186.5	141.7 142.2 143.2 144.4	211.1 214.9 223.5 219.0	181.8 183.1 186.8 176.6	221.9 216.8 221.6 232.4	248.1 243.3 235.2 239.3	1,157.6 1,182.7 1,230.5 1,241.6	786.2 707.8 681.7 674.5
1998.	Mar June Sept Dec	5,542.4 5,547.9 5,526.2 5,614.2	2,104.9 2,198.6 2,213.0 2,280.2	3,437.5 3,349.3 3,313.2 3,334.0	308.3 290.9 244.4 237.4	186.2 186.0 186.0 186.6	136.9 129.9 121.5 113.6	212.1 213.2 207.8 212.6	169.4 160.6 151.3 141.7	234.7 230.7 231.8 253.5	238.1 258.5 271.8 280.8	1,250.5 1,256.0 1,224.2 1,278.7	701.3 623.4 674.3 629.3
1999	Mar Sept Dec	5,651 6 5,638 8 5,656.3 5,776.1	2,324.1 2,439.6 2,480.9 2,542.2	3,327.5 3,199.2 3,175.4 3,233.9	247.4 240.6 241.2 248.6	186.5 186.5 186.2 186.4	110.8 114.1 117.2 118.9	211.5 213.8 204.8 198.8	137.5 133.6 128.0 123.4	254.0 227.9 224.4 228.7	288.6 298.8 299.6 305.1	1,272.3 1,258.8 1,281.4 1,268.7	619.0 525. 492.0 555.
2000	Mar	5,773 4 5,685.9 5,674 2 5,662.2	2,590.6 2,698.6 2,737.9 2,781.8	3,182.8 2,987.3 2,936.3 2,880.4	237.7 222.2 220.5 201.5	185.3 184.6 184.3 184.8	114.7 115.3 115.2 113.7	196.9 194.9 185.5 179.1	120.0 116.5 113.7 110.2	222.2 204.5 205.7 221.8	307.1 310.1 308.7 310.9	1,106.9 1,082.0 1,057.9 1,034.2	691.5 557.5 544.5 524.5
2001	Mar June Sept Dec	5,773.7 5,726.8 5,807.5 5,943.4	2,880.9 3,004.2 3,027.8 3,123.9	2,892.8 2,722.6 2,779.7 2,819.5	188.0 188.1 189.1 181.5	184.8 185.5 186.4 190.3	115.6 116.3 119.7 121.1	177.3 183.1 166.8 155.1	109.1 108.1 106.8 105.7	221.8 218.7 232.5 259.4	317.9 325.7 321.9 329.3	1,029.9 1,000.5 1,005.5 1,051.2	548.4 396.8 450.9 426.1
2002	Mar June Sept Dec	6,006.0 6,126.5 6,228.2 6,405.7	3,156.8 3,276.7 3,303.5 3,387.2	2,849.2 2,849.8 2,924.8 3,018.5	187.6 204.6 210.4 222.8	191.9 192.7 193.3 194.9	123 7 125.6 131.2 135.0	163.3 153.9 156.3 158.9	114.0 122.0 130.4 139.7	266.0 253.8 256.6 280.9	328.7 334.4 339.3 355.6	1.067.1 1,135.4 1,200.8 1.246.8	407.0 327.3 306.1 283.1
2003	Mar June Sept Dec	6,460 8 6,670 1 6,783.2 6,998.0	3,390.8 3,505.4 3,515.3 3,620.1	3,069.9 3,164.7 3,268.0 3,377.9	153.1 145.4 146.9 154.0	196.9 199.1 201.5 203.8	139.0 138.2 139.9 141.2	162.1 161.3 162.7 162.8	139.5 138.7 137.4 136.5	296.5 302.8 287.8 281.5	350.7 348.7 357.9 363.9	1,286.3 1,382.8 1,454.2 1,533.0	345.3 347.0 379.0 401.
2004	Mar June Sept Dec	7,131 1 7,274 3 7,379 1 7,596 1	3,628.3 3,742.8 3,772.0 3,929.0	3,502.8 3,531.5 3,607.0 3,667.1	165.0 161.6 141.0 128.1	204.5 204.6 204.2 204.4	143.3 146.4 150.8 151.5	164.9 163.3 159.0 158.7	141.0 144.1 147.4 149.7	281.6 259.4 255.7 254.9	373.7 379.7 379.4 386 1	1,677.1 1,777.5 1,836.6 1,890.7	351.1 294.1 332.1 343.
2005	Mar June Sept	7.776 9 7.836 5 7.932.7	3,921.6 4,033.5 4,067.8	3,855.4 3,803.0 3,864 9	142.9 127.9	204.2 204.2 203.6	153 8 157.6	158.6 159.3	153.4 154.6	262.3 249.1	407.1 430.6	1,983.5 2,016.2 2,069.0	389. 303.

<sup>1</sup> Face value

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Federal Reserve holdings exclude Treasury securities held under repurchase agreements.

<sup>3</sup> Includes commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Includes commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit surpose.

\*Current accrual value.

\*Includes Treasury securities held by the Federal Employees Retirement System Thrift Savings Plan "G Fund"

\*Includes money market mutual funds, mutual funds, and closed-end investment companies.

\*Includes nonmarketable loreign series Treasury securities and Treasury deposit funds. Excludes Treasury securities held under repurchase agreements in custody accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Estimates reflect benchmarks to this series at differing intervals.

\*Includes individuals, Government-sponsored enterprises, brokers and dealers, bank personal trusts and estates, corporate and noncorporate businesses, and other investors.

Note —Data shown in this table are as of December 2005

Source Department of the Treasury

## CORPORATE PROFITS AND FINANCE

Table B-90.—Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, 1959-2005

[Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Corporate		Corporate profits a and capital	ofter tax with invei consumption adju	ntory valuation stments
Year or quarter	profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments	Taxes on corporate income	Total	Net dividends	Undistributed profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments
959	55.7	23.7	32.0	12 6	19
960 961 982 963 964 965 966 966 969	53.8 54.9 63.3 69.0 76.5 87.5 93.2 91.3 98.8 95.4	22.8 22.9 24.1 26.4 28.2 31.1 33.9 32.9 39.6 40.0	31 0 32.0 39.2 42.6 48.3 56.4 59.3 58.4 59.2	13.4 13.9 15.0 16.2 18.2 20.2 20.7 21.5 23.5 24.2	17 18 24 26 30 36 38 36 35
970 971 972 973 973 974 975 975 977	83.6 98.0 112.1 125.5 115.8 134.8 163.3 192.4 216.6 223.2	34.8 38.2 42.3 50.0 52.8 51.6 65.3 74.4 84.9 90.0	48.9 59.9 69.7 75.5 63.0 83.2 98.1 118.0 131.8	24.3 25.0 26.8 29.9 33.2 33.0 39.0 44.8 50.8 57.5	24 34 42 45 50 55 73
980	201.1 226.1 209.7 264.2 318.6 330.5 368.8 432.6 426.6	87.2 84.3 66.5 80.6 97.5 99.4 109.7 130.4 141.6	113.9 141.8 143.2 183.6 221.1 230.9 209.8 238.4 291.0 280.5	64.1 73.8 77.7 83.5 90.8 97.6 106.2 112.3 129.9 158.0	44 66 60 100 133 133 100 121 16
90 91 92 93 93 94 95 96 97	437.8 451.2 479.3 541.9 600.3 696.7 786.2 868.5 801.6	145.4 138.6 148.7 171.0 193.7 218.7 231.7 246.1 248.3 258.6	292.4 312.6 330.9 406.5 478.0 554.5 622.4 553.3 592.6	169.1 180.7 187.9 202.8 234.7 254.2 297.6 334.5 351.6 337.4	12 13 14 16 17 22 25 28 20 25
000 001 002 003 003 004	817.9 767.3 886.3 1,031.8 1,161.5	265.2 204.1 192.6 232.1 271.1	552.7 563.2 693.7 799.7 890.3	377.9 370.9 399.2 423.2 493.0 514.2	17- 19- 29- 37- 39
002:1 	829.4 864.3 895.4 956.1	174.9 188.5 196.9 210.2	654 5 675.8 698.5 746.0	382.5 396 1 406.1 412.0	27: 27: 29: 33:
)03:       	951.5 1,005.0 1,057.5 1,113.1	223.9 221.7 235.3 247.5	727 6 783.3 822.2 865.6	416.3 419 9 424.6 432.0	31 36 39 43
104:	1,147,3 1,162,0 1,117,2 1,219,5 1,288,2	257.9 274.7 259.0 293.0 362.6	889.4 887.3 858.2 926.4 925.6	445 9 460 9 475.9 589.3 494 9	44 42 38 33 43
005: 1	1,288.2 1,347.5 1,293.1	372.5 360.3	975.0 932.8	506.3 520 1 535 4	46 41

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-91.—Corporate profits by industry, 1959-2005

		Corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment and without capital consumption adjustment  Domestic industries												
Year or quarter	Total		Financial			Nonfinancial								
		Total		Total	Total	Fed- eral Re- serve banks	Other	Total	Manu- tac- tur- ing 1	Trans- porta- tion 2	Utili- ties	Whole- sale trade	Retail trade	In- tor- ma- tion
SIC . 3 1959	53.5	50.8	7.6	0.7	6.9	43.2	26.5	7.1		2.9	3.3		3.4	2.7
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	51.5 51.8 57.0 62.1 68.6 78.9 84.6 82.0 88.8 85.5	48.3 48.5 53.3 58.1 64.1 74.2 80.1 77.2 83.2 78.9	8 4 8 3 8 6 8 3 10.7 11.2 12.8 13.6	9 8 9 1.0 1 1 1 3 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.1	7.5 7.6 7.7 7.3 7.6 8.0 9.1 9.2 10.3 10.5	39.9 40.2 44.7 49.8 55.4 64.9 69.3 66.0 70.4 65.3	23.8 23.4 26.3 29.7 32.6 39.8 42.6 39.2 41.9 37.3	7.5 7.9 8.5 9.5 10.2 11.0 12.0 10.9 11.0		2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.9	2.8 3.0 3.4 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.9 5.7 6.4 6.4		3.3 3.4 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.4 5.9 6.1 6.6 6.1	3.1 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.8 5.6 6.6
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	74 4 88.3 101 2 115.3 109.5 135.0 165.6 194.7 222.4 231.8	67.3 80.4 91.7 100.4 92.1 120.4 149.0 175.6 199.6 197.2	15.4 17.6 19.1 20.5 20.2 20.2 25.0 31.9 39.5 40.3	3.5 3.3 3.3 4.5.7 5.6 5.9 6.1 7.6 9.4	11.9 14.3 15.8 16.0 14.5 14.6 19.1 25.8 31.9 30.9	52.0 62.8 72.6 79.9 71.9 100.2 124.1 143.7 160.0 156.8	27.5 35.1 41.9 47.2 41.4 55.2 71.3 79.3 90.5 89.6	8.3 8.9 9.5 9.1 7.6 11.0 15.3 18.6 21.8 17.0		4.4 5.2 6.9 8.2 11.5 13.8 12.9 15.6 15.6 18.8	6.0 7.2 7.4 6.6 2.3 8.2 10.5 12.4 12.3 9.8		5.8 6.4 7.0 8.7 9.1 12.0 14.0 17.8 19.8 21.6	7.1 7.9 9.5 14.9 17.5 14.6 16.5 19.1 22.9 34.6
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988	211.4 219.1 191.0 226.5 264.6 257.5 253.0 301.4 363.9 367.4	175.9 189.4 158.5 191.4 228.1 219.4 213.5 253.4 306.9 300.3	34 0 29 1 26.0 35.5 34.4 45.9 56.8 59.8 68.7 77.9	11.8 14.4 15.2 14.6 16.4 16.3 15.5 15.7 17.6 20.2	22.2 14.7 10.8 20.9 18.0 29.5 41.2 44.1 51.1 57.8	141.9 160.3 132.4 155.9 193.7 173.5 156.8 193.5 238.2 222.3	78.3 91.1 67.1 76.2 91.8 84.3 57.9 86.3 121.2	18.4 20.3 23.1 29.5 40.1 33.8 35.8 41.9 48.4 43.3		17.2 22.4 19.6 21.0 29.5 23.9 24.1 18.6 20.1 21.8	6.2 9.9 13.4 18.7 21.1 22.2 23.5 23.4 20.3 20.8		21.8 16.7 9.2 10.4 11.1 9.2 15.5 23.4 28.3 25.5	35.5 29.7 32.6 35.1 36.6 38.1 39.5 48.0 57.0 67.1
1990	396.6 427.9 458.3 513.1 564.6 656.0 736.1 812.3 738.5 776.8 759.3	320.5 351.4 385.2 436.1 487.6 563.2 634.2 701.4 635.5 655.3 613.6	94.4 124.2 129.8 136.8 119.9 162.2 172.6 193.0 165.9 196.4 203.8	21 4 20.3 17.8 16.2 18.1 22.5 22.1 23.8 25.2 26.3 30.8	73.0 103.9 111.9 120.6 101.8 139.7 150.5 169.2 140.7 170.1 173.0	226.1 227.3 255.4 299.3 367.7 401.0 461.6 508.4 469.6 458.9 409.8	113.1 98.0 99.5 115.6 147.0 173.7 188.8 209.0 173.5 175.2 166.3	44.2 53.3 58.4 69.5 83.2 85.8 91.3 84.2 78.9 56.8 43.8		19.2 21.7 25.1 26.3 30.9 27.3 39.8 47.6 52.3 52.6 56.9	20.7 26.7 32.6 39.1 46.2 43.1 51.9 64.2 73.4 74.6 70.1		29.0 27.5 39.7 48.9 60.4 71.2 89.7 103.4 91.5 99.7 72.8	76.1 76.5 73.1 76.9 77.1 92.8 101.9 110.9 103.0 121.5 145.7
NAICS 3 1998 1999	738.5 776.8	635.5 655.3	165.4 194.3	25.2 26.3	140.2 168.0	470.1 461.1	157.0 150.6	21.0 16.1	32.7 33.1	53.2 55.5	66.4 65.2	20.1 10.5	119.8 130.1	103.0 121.5
2000	759.3 719.2 766.2 923.9 1,019.7	613.6 549.5 610.4 747.9 834.8	200.2 227.6 276.4 313.0 300.6	30.8 28.3 23.7 20.2 20.3	169.4 199.3 252.7 292.8 280.3	413.4 322.0 334.0 434.9 534.2	144.3 52.6 48.2 80.7 118.9	14.9 1.3 9 8.1 8.4	24 4 24 7 10.6 11.4 12.1	59.7 52.1 49.3 56.3 63.5	59.6 71.0 79.4 87.7 90.0	-17.6 -25.6 -8.5 -1.9 17.0	128.2 145.9 155.8 192.4 224.3	145.7 169.7 155.8 176.0 184.9
2003. I II III IV .	858.0 891.0 944.0 1,002.6	703.5 721.2 769.2 797.6	304.8 309.0 320.4 317.9	22.0 20.9 19.5 18.5	282.8 288.2 300.9 299.4	398.7 412.2 448.9 479.7	70.9 68.0 79.2 104.8	4 6 9 8 8 9 9 3	12.3 10.4 10.7 12.3	48.6 50.3 62.1 64.1	81.4 90.4 90.3 88.8	-7.0 -4.3 4.9 -1.1	187.9 187.7 192.6 201.5	154.5 169.8 174.7 205.0
2004 I II IV .	1,001.2 1,016.5 981.3 1,079.7	803 0 839.7 795.5 901 1	324 1 316.1 242.8 319.4	19 4 19.3 20.2 22.2	304 7 296.8 222.7 297 1	479.0 523.6 552.7 581.7	97.3 107.3 116.2 154.7	11.0 15.0 6.1 1.7	11.0 11.7 11.4 14.1	56.8 61.3 69.1 66.9	97.5 92.9 81.9 87.7	-6.5 20.3 33.0 21.0	211.8 215.1 235.0 235.6	198.2 176.9 185.9 178.6
2005 I II . III .	1,339.2 1,393.3 1,365.1	1,145.7 1,196.1 1,142.0	377 2 349.5 278.7	23 1 26.2 27 0	354 2 323.2 251.7	768 5 846.6 863.3	170.2 204.7 218.6	22.9 27.9 32.9	23.7 26.4 19.7	81.4 98.1 95.4	104.6 109.1 116.9	46.7 53.5 50.2	318.9 326.9 329.6	193.5 197.2 223.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Table B-92 for industrial detail.

<sup>2</sup> Data on SIC basis include transportation and utilities. On NAICS basis included transportation and warehousing. Utilities classified separately in NAICS (as shown beginning 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Industry data for SIC are based on the 1987 SIC for data beginning 1987 and on the 1972 SIC for earlier data shown. Data on NAICS basis are based on the 1997 NAICS.

Note.—Industry data on SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) basis and NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) basis are not necessarily the same and are not strictly comparable.

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-92.—Corporate profits of manufacturing industries, 1959-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

	Corporate profits with inventory valuation adjustment and without									t capital consumption adjustment					
	Total manu- fac- turing	Ourable goods <sup>2</sup>								Nondurable goods <sup>2</sup>					
Year or quarter		Total <sup>1</sup>	Fabri- cated metal prod- ucts	Ma- chinery	Compu- ter and elec- tronic prod- ucts	Elec- trical equip- ment, appli- ances, and compo- nents	Motor vehi- cles, bodies and trail- ers, and parts	Other	Total	Food and bev- erage and tobacco prod- ucts	Chem- ical prod- ucts	Petro- leum and coal prod- ucts	Other		
SIC: 3 1959	26.5	13.7	1.1	2.2		1.7	3.0	3.5	12.9	2.5	3.5	2.6	4 3		
1960	23.8 23.4 26.3 29.7 32.6 39.8 42.6 39.2 41.9 37.3	11.6 11.3 14.1 16.4 18.1 23.3 24.1 21.3 22.5 19.2	.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.0	1.8 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.3 4.0 4.6 4.2 4.2 3.8		1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.3	3.0 2.5 4.0 4.9 4.6 6.2 5.2 4.0 5.5 4.8	2.7 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.4 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.6 4.9	12.2 12.1 12.3 13.3 14.5 16.5 18.6 18.0 19.4 18.1	2.2 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1	3 1 3.3 3.2 3 7 4 1 4.6 4.9 4 3 5.3	2.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.8 3.4	4.2 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.3 6.1 6.9 6.4 7.1 7.0		
1970	27.5 35.1 41.9 47.2 41.4 55.2 71.3 79.3 90.5 89.6	10.5 16.6 22.7 25.1 15.3 20.6 31.4 37.9 45.4 37.1	1.1 1.5 2.2 2.7 1.8 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.3	3.1 3.1 4.5 4.9 3.3 5.1 6.9 8.6 10.7 9.5		1.3 2.0 2.9 3.2 .6 2.6 3.8 5.9 6.7 5.6	1.3 5.2 6.0 5.9 7 2.3 7.4 9.4 9.0 4.7	2.9 4.1 5.6 6.2 4.0 4.7 7.3 8.5 10.5	17.0 18.5 19.2 22.0 26.1 34.5 39.9 41.4 45.1 52.5	3.2 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.6 8.6 7.1 6.9 6.2 5.8	3.9 4.5 5.3 6.2 5.3 6.4 8.2 7.8 8.3 7.2	3.7 3.8 3.3 5.4 10.9 10.1 13.5 13.1 15.8 24.8	6.1 6.6 7.6 7.9 7.3 9.5 11 1 13.6 14.8 14.7		
1980	78.3 91.1 67.1 76.2 91.8 84.3 57.9 86.3 121.2 110.9	18.9 19.5 5.0 19.5 39.3 29.7 26.3 40.7 54.1 51.2	4.4 4.5 2.7 3.1 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 6.5	8.0 9.0 3.1 4.0 6.0 5.7 .8 5.4 11.1 12.2		5.2 5.2 1.7 3.5 5.1 2.6 2.7 5.9 7.7 9.3	-4.3 .3 .0 5.3 9.2 7.4 4.6 3.7 6.2 2.7	2.7 -2.6 2.1 8 4 14.6 10.1 12.1 17.6 16.5 14.2	59.5 71.6 62.1 56.7 52.6 54.6 31.7 45.6 67.1 59.7	6 1 9.2 7.3 6.3 6.8 8.8 7.5 11.4 12.0	5.7 8.0 5.1 7.4 8.2 6.6 7.5 14.4 18.6 18.2	34.7 40.0 34.7 23.9 17.6 18.7 -4.7 -1.5 12.7 6.5	13 1 14.5 15.0 19.1 20.1 20.5 21.3 23.7 23.7		
1990	113.1 98.0 99.5 115.6 147.0 173.7 188.8 209.0 173.5 175.2 166.3	43.8 34.4 40.6 55.8 74.4 80.9 90.6 103.1 87.3 78.8 64.8	6.0 5.3 6.2 7.4 11.1 11.8 14.5 17.0 16.4 16.2	11.8 5.7 7.5 7.5 9.1 14.8 16.9 16.7 19.5 12.4 16.3		8.5 10.0 10.4 15.2 22.8 21.5 20.1 25.3 8.9 5.3 4.7	-1.9 -5.4 -1.0 6.0 7.8 .0 4.2 4.8 5.9 7.3 -1.5	15.9 17.3 17.4 19.4 21.3 25.8 29.2 33.0 30.1 35.3 28.8	69.2 63.6 59.0 59.7 72.6 92.8 98.2 105.9 86.2 96.4 101.5	14 3 18.1 18 2 16 4 19.9 27.1 22 1 24 6 21.9 28.1 25.7	16.8 16.0 15.9 23.2 27.9 26.4 32.3 26.5 25.2 16.0	16 4 7.3 9 2.7 1.2 7.1 15.0 17.3 6.7 4.3 29 1	21.7 22.0 25.6 24.7 28.3 30.6 34.7 31.1 38.9 30.7		
NAICS: 3 1998 1999	157.0 150.6	83.4 72.3	16.7 16.5	15.6 12.4	3.9 -6.5	6.1 6.3	6.4 7.3	34.6 36.4	73.6 78.3	21-8 30.7	25.1 23.0	4 9 1.8	21.8 22.7		
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	144.3 52.6 48.2 80.7 118.9	60.0 -25.4 -9.9 -4.1 34.8	15.5 9.9 8.9 8.5 10.3	8.2 2.7 1.7 1.4 1.0	4.0 -48.5 -35.3 -16.1 -3.2	5.6 1.9 1 1.9	-1.0 -9.2 -5.0 -11.6 -3.4	27.7 17.8 20.0 11.9 29.9	84.3 78.0 58.1 84.8 84.0	25 4 28 0 24 9 23.5 24.0	14.2 12.6 18.4 20.8 13.5	26.9 29.6 1.6 23.6 31.0	17.8 7.8 13.2 16.9 15.6		
2003: I II III IV	70.9 68.0 79.2 104.8	-7.3 -10.4 -8.7 10.1	6.0 9.2 8.4 10.5	-1.1 1.2 3.0 2.4	-20.9 -18.0 -16.1 -9.7	3.3 2.6 .9	-2.3 -14.1 -17.9 -12.4	7.6 8.7 12.9 18.5	78.3 78.3 88.0 94.6	20.2 21.6 22.9 29.3	20.3 18.8 23.8 20.3	24 6 21 6 22.1 25 9	13 2 16.3 19 1 19 1		
2004: I II III IV	97.3 107.3 116.2 154.7	11.2 27.1 42.2 58.8	9.3 9.1 9.8 13.1	1 8 1 4 3.4 -2.6	-8 0 -5.8 1.3 2	-4.7 2.0 -3.0 6.8	-6.6 -7.7 7 1.3	19 4 28 1 31 4 40 5	86.2 80.3 73.9 95.9	28.1 23.7 23.4 20.5	15 I 14 4 16 3 8 4	27.7 27.6 19.5 49.2	15 2 14 6 14 7 17 8		
2005: 1	170.2 204.7 218.6	35.5 59.9 62.0	8.8 11.4 15.7	.9 2.9 7.6	.5 4.2 6.7	-1.3 5.5 8.6	-20.8 -15.7 -25.3	47.3 51.6 48.8	134 7 144 8 156 6	39.6 37.7 40.8	18 8 20.5 22.7	62 8 66.3 70 8	13 5 20 3 22 3		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For SIC data, includes primary metal industries, not shown separately <sup>2</sup> Industry groups shown in column headings reflect NAICS classification for data beginning 1998. For data on SIC basis, the industry groups would be, machinery—industrial machinery and equipment; electrical equipment, appliances, and components—electronic and other electric equipment; motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts—motor vehicles and equipment; food and beverage and tobacco products—food and kindred products, and chemical products—chemicals and allied products.

<sup>3</sup> See tootnote 3 and Note, Table 8–91

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-93.—Sales, profits, and stockholders' equity, all manufacturing corporations, 1965-2005 [Billions of dollars]

	All m	anutacturi	ng corpora	itions	D	urable go	ods indust	ries	Nondurable goods industries				
Year or		Pro	tits	0		Pro	fits	Stock		Pro	tits	Stook	
quarter	Sales (net)	Before income taxes 1	After income taxes	Stock- holders' equity?	Sales (net)	Betore income taxes 1	After income taxes	Stock- holders' equity <sup>2</sup>	Sales (net)	Before income taxes 1	Atter income taxes	Stock- holders' equity?	
965 966 967 968 969	492 2 554 2 575.4 631 9 694 6	46.5 51.8 47.8 55.4 58.1	27 5 30.9 29 0 32.1 33 2	211.7 230.3 247.6 265.9 289.9	257.0 291.7 300.6 335.5 366.5	26.2 29.2 25.7 30.6 31.5	14.5 16.4 14.6 16.5 16.9	105.4 115.2 125.0 135.6 147.6	235.2 262.4 274.8 296.4 328.1	20.3 22.6 22.0 24.8 26.6	13.0 14.6 14.4 15.5 16.4	106.3 115.1 122.6 130.3 142.3	
970 971 972 973	708 8 751 1 849 5 1,017 2	48.1 52.9 63.2 81.4	28 6 31 0 36.5 48 1	306.8 320.8 343.4 374.1	363.1 381.8 435.8 527.3	23.0 26.5 33.6 43.6	12.9 14.5 18.4 24.8	155.1 160.4 171.4 188.7	345.7 369.3 413.7 489.9	25.2 26.5 29.6 37.8	15.7 16.5 18.0 23.3	151. 160. 172. 185.	
973. IV	275 1	21 4	13.0	386.4	140.1	10.8	6.3	194 7	135.0	10.6	6.7	191.	
ew series.										10.5	7.0	100	
973. IV 974 975 976 977 978 979	236 6 1,060.6 1,065.2 1,203 2 1,328 1 1,496 4 1,741.8	20 6 92 1 79.9 104 9 115.1 132.5 154.2	13.2 58.7 49.1 64.5 70.4 81.1 98.7	368.0 395.0 423.4 462.7 496.7 540.5 600.5	122.7 529.0 521.1 589.6 657.3 760.7 865.7	10 1 41.1 35.3 50.7 57 9 69.6 72.4	6.2 24.7 21.4 30.8 34.8 41.8 45.2	185.8 196.0 208.1 224.3 239.9 262.6 292.5	531.6 544.1 613.7 670.8 735.7 876.1	10.5 51.0 44.6 54.3 57.2 62.9 81.8	7.0 34.1 27.7 33.7 35.5 39.3 53.5	182. 199. 215. 238. 256. 277. 308.	
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	1,912.8 2,144 7 2,039 4 2,114 3 2,335.0 2,331 4 2,220.9 2,378.2 2,596 2 2,745.1	145.8 158.6 108.2 133.1 165.6 137.0 129.3 173.0 215.3 187.6	92.6 101.3 70.9 85.8 107.6 87.6 83.1 115.6 153.8 135.1	668.1 743.4 770.2 812.8 864.2 874.7 900.9 957.6 999.0	889.1 979.5 913.1 973.5 1.107.6 1.142.6 1.125.5 1.178.0 1.284.7 1,356.6	57 4 67.2 34.7 48.7 75.5 61.5 52.1 78.0 91.6 75.1	35.6 41.6 21.7 30.0 48.9 38.6 32.6 53.0 66.9 55.5	317.7 350.4 355.5 372.4 395.6 420.9 436.3 444.3 468.7 501.3	1,023.7 1,165.2 1,126.4 1,140.8 1,227.5 1,188.8 1,095.4 1,200.3 1,311.5 1,388.5	88.4 91.3 73.6 84.4 90.0 75.6 77.2 95.1 123.7 112.6	56.9 59.6 49.3 55.8 58.8 49.1 50.5 62.6 86.8 79.6	350. 393. 414. 440. 468. 445. 438. 456. 488. 497.	
1990	2,810.7 2,761 1 2,890.2 3,015.1 3,255.8 3,528.3 3,757.6 3,920.0 4,148.9 4,548.2	158 1 98 7 31.4 117.9 243.5 274.5 306.6 331 4 314.7 355.3 381.1	110.1 66.4 22.1 83.2 174.9 198.2 224.9 244.5 234.4 257.8 275.3	1,043.8 1,064.1 1,034.7 1,039.7 1,110.1 1,240.6 1,348.0 1,462.7 1,482.9 1,569.3 1,823.1	1,357.2 1,304.0 1,389.8 1,490.2 1,657.6 1,807.7 1,941.6 2,075.8 2,168.8 2,314.2 2,457.4	57.3 13.9 -33.7 38.9 121.0 130.6 146.6 167.0 175.1 198.8 190.7	40.7 7.2 -24.0 27.4 87.1 94.3 106.1 121.4 127.8 140.3 131.8	515.0 506.8 473.9 482.7 533.3 613.7 673.9 743.4 779.9 869.6 1,054.3	1.453.5 1.457.1 1.500.4 1.524.9 1.598.2 1.720.6 1.816.0 1.844.2 1.780.7 1.834.6 2.090.8	100.8 84.8 65.1 79.0 122.5 143.9 160.0 164.4 139.6 156.5	69.4 59.3 46.0 55.7 87.8 103.9 118.8 123.1 106.5 117.5	528. 557. 560. 557. 576. 627. 674. 719. 703. 699.	
2000: IV	1,163.6	69.2	46.8	1,892.4	620 4	31 2	19.3	1,101.5	543.2	38.0	27.4	790.	
VAICS 5 2000: IV	1,128 8	62 1	41.7	1,833.8	623.0	26.9	15.4	1,100.0	505.8	35.2	26.3	733.	
2001 2002 2003 2004	4.295 0 4.216 4 4.397.2 4.935 2	83.2 195.5 305.7 446.5	36.2 134.7 237.0 347.1	1,843 0 1,804.0 1,952.2 2,200.9	2,321.2 2,260.6 2,282.7 2,539.0	-69.0 45.9 117.6 199.2	-76.1 21.6 88.2 155.8	1,080.5 1,024.8 1,040.8 1,207.3	1,973.8 1,955.8 2,114.5 2,396.3	152.2 149.6 188.1 247.3	112.3 113.1 148.9 191.4	762 779 911 993	
2003 I	1,072.0 1,096.9 1,109.4 1,118.8	77.2 77.1 70.4 81.0	58.2 57.8 52.6 68.4	1,842 3 1,937.8 1,956 1 2,072 8	548.3 572.9 569.7 591.8	21.8 29.9 29.0 36.9	14.6 21.8 22.0 29.7	991.0 1.019.7 1.032.5 1,119.8	523.7 524.0 539 8 527.0	55.4 47.2 41.4 44.1	43.6 36.0 30.6 38.7	851 918 923 953	
2004    }     	1.145.9 1,248.7 1,251.0 1,289.7	97.3 122.3 117.7 109.2	75.3 94.6 89.8 87.4	2.113.0 2.177.1 2.220.9 2.292.4	593.6 644.6 638.9 661.8	44.2 57.7 49.8 47.5	34 3 45.8 37.2 38.5	1,157 4 1,197.8 1,216.9 1,257.1	552.3 604.1 612.0 627.9	53.1 64.6 67.9 61.7	41.0 48.8 52.6 49.0	955 979 1,004 1,035	
2005     -  11	1,269.0 1,376.5 1,409.4	116.0 136.6 136.3	89 8 105.9 103.6	2,315.3 2,366.8 2,411.5	641 4 690.7 686.1	44.9 61.9 54.6	34.1 47.2 41.2	1,260.7 1,286.2 1,303.4	627.7 685.8 723.3	71.0 74.6 81.8	55.7 58.7 62.4	1,054 1,080 1,108	

<sup>1</sup> in the old series, "income taxes" refers to Federal income taxes only, as State and local income taxes had already been deducted. In the new series, no income taxes have been deducted.

<sup>2</sup> Annual data are average equity for the year (using tour end-of-quarter figures).

the lirst quarter of the year in which the change is adopted

5 Data based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Other data shown are based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)

Note—Data are not necessarily comparable from one period to another due to changes in accounting principles, industry classifications, sampling procedures, etc. For explanatory notes concerning compilation of the series, see "Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations," Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Source Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

<sup>\*</sup>Annual data are average equity for the year (using tour end-or-quarter lightes).

3 Beginning 1988, profits before and after income taxes reflect inclusion of minority stockholders' interest in net income before and after income taxes.

4 Data for 1992 (most significantly 1992:I) reflect the early adoption of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement 106 (Employer's Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits Other Than Pensions) by a large number of companies during the tourth quarter of 1992. Data for 1993 (1993) also reflect adoption of Statement 106 Corporations must show the cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle in

TABLE B-94.—Relation of profits after taxes to stockholders' equity and to sales, all manufacturing corporations, 1955-2005

	Ratio of profits rate) to stock	after income ta holders' equity-	xes (annual percent <sup>1</sup>	Profits after	income taxes per sales—cents	dollar of
Year or quarter	All manufacturing corporations	Durable goods industries	Nondurable goods industries	All manufacturing corporations	Durable goods industries	Nondurab goods industrie
55 56	12.6 12.3	13.8 12.8	11.4 11.8	5.4 5.3	5.7 5.2	5 5 4
57	10.9	11.3	10.6	4.8	4.8	4
58	8.6	8.0	10.6 9.2	4.2	3.9	4
59	10.4	10.4	10.4	4.8	4.8	4
60	9.2	8.5	9.8	4.4	4.0	4
61	8.9 9.8	8 1 9 6	9.6 9.9	4.3 4.5	3.9 4.4	4
63	10.3	10.1	10.4	4.7	4.5	4
64	11.6	11.7	11.5	5.2	5.1	
65 66	13.0 13.4	13.8 14.2	12.2 12.7	5.6 5.6	5.7 5.6	
67	11.7	11.7	11.8	5.0	4.8	1
68	12.1	12.2	11.9	5.1	4.9	
69	11.5	11.4	11.5	4.8	4.6	
70	9.3	8.3	10.3	4.0	3.5	
71	9.7	9.0	10.3	4 1	3.8 4.2	
72 73	10.6 12.8	10.8 13.1	10.5 12.6	4.3 4.7	4.2	
				4.7	4.5	
73: IV	13.4	12.9	14.0	4 /	4.5	1
w series: 73: IV	14.3	13.3	15.3	5.6	5.0	
74	149	12.6	17.1	5.5	4.7	
747	11.6	10.3	12.9	4.6	4.1	
75 76	13.9	13.7	14.2	5.4	5.2 5.3	
77	14.2	14.5	13.8	5.3	5.3 5.5	
78 79	15.0 16.4	16.0 15.4	14.2 17.4	5.4 5.7	5.2	
			16.3	4.8	4.0	
8081	13.9 13.6	11.2	15.2	4.0	4.0	
82	9.2	6.1	11.9	3.5	2.4	
83	10.6	8.1	12.7	4.1	3 1	
84 85	12.5 10.1	12.4 9.2	12.5 11.0	4.6 3.8	4.4 3.4	
86	9.5	7.5	11.5 13.7	3.7	2.9	
86 87 88 <sup>2</sup>	12.8	11.9	13.7	4.9	4.5 5.2	
88 <sup>2</sup>	16.1 13.5	14 3 11.1	17.8 16.0	5.9 4.9	4 1	
90	10.6	7.9 1.4	13.1 10.6	3.9 2.4	3.0	
191	6.2 2.1	-5.1	8.2	.8		
91 92 <sup>3</sup> 93	8.0	5.7	10.0	2 8	8.1	
94	15.8	16.3	15.2	5.4 5.6		
95 96	16.0 16.7	15.4 15.7	16.6 17.6	6.0		
197	16./	16.3	17.1	6.2	5.8	
98	15.8	16.4 16.1	15.2 16.8	5.9 6.2	5.9 6.1	
99	16.4 15.1	12.5	18.7	6.1		
000:1V	9.9	7.0	13.9	4.0	3.1	
4/CS-4				2.3	2.5	
000: IV	9.1	5.6	14.3	3.7		
001	2.0 7.5	-7.0 2.1	14.7	3.2	1.0	
003	12.1	8.5	16.3	5.4	3.9	
004	15.8	12.9	19.3	7.0		
003:1	12.6	5.9	20.5	5.4	2.7	
 	11.9	8.6	15.7	5.3	3.8 3.9	
 	10.8 13.2	8.5 10.6	13.3 16.3	6.1		
004:	14.2 17.4	11.8	17.2 19.9	6.6 7.6		
11	16.2	15.3 12.2	21.0	7.2	5.8	
iV	15.3	12.2	18.9	6.8	5.8	
005:1	15.5	10.8	21.1 21.7 22.5	7.1	5.3	
	17.9	14.7	01.7	7.7		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Annual ratios based on average equity for the year (using four end-of-quarter figures). Quarterly ratios based on equity at end of quarter.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Table B-93.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Table B-93.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Table B-93.

Note.—Based on data in millions of dollars. See Note, Table B-93.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

TABLE B-95.—Historical stock prices and yields, 1949-2003

					Comi	mon stock	prices 1				Common st (S&P) (pe	tock yields ercent) <sup>5</sup>
	Year	Com- posite	New Yor		xchange ind mber 31, 19			Dow Jones industrial average <sup>2</sup>	Standard & Poor's composite index	Nasdaq composite index (Feb. 5.	Dividend- price	Earnings- price
		(Oec. 31 2002= 5.000) <sup>3</sup>	Com- posite	Indus- trial	Transpor- tation	Utility <sup>4</sup>	Finance	average?	(1941- 43=10) <sup>2</sup>	1971= 100) <sup>2</sup>	ratio 6	ratio 7
949			9.02					179 48	15 23		6.59	15.48
950 951 952 953 954			10 87 13 08 13 81 13 67 16 19					216 31 257.64 270 76 275 97 333.94	18.40 22.34 24.50 24.73 29.69		6.57 6.13 5.80 5.80 4.95	13.99 11.82 9.47 10.26 8.57
955 956 957 958 959			21 54 24 40 23 67 24 56 30 73					442 72 493 01 475.71 491 66 632.12	40.49 46.62 44.38 46.24 57.38		4.08 4.09 4.35 3.97 3.23	7.95 7.55 7.89 6.23 5.78
960 961 962 963 964			30 01 35 37 33 49 37.51 43 76					618.04 691.55 639.76 714.81 834.05	55 85 66 27 62.38 69.87 81 37		3.47 2.98 3.37 3.17 3.01	
965 966 967 968 969		487 92 536.84 585.47 578.01	47 39 46 15 50 77 55.37 54.67	46.18 51.97 58.00 57.44	50.26 53.51 50.58 46.96	90.81 90.86 88.38 85.60	44 45 49.82 65.85 70.49	910 88 873.60 879 12 906.00 876.72	88 17 85.26 91.93 98 70 97 84		3.00 3.40 3.20 3.07 3.24	6.63 5.73 5.67 6.08
970 971 972 973 974		483 39 573.33 637 52 607.11 463.54	45 72 54.22 60.29 57.42 43 84	48 03 57.92 65.73 63.08 48.08	32 14 44.35 50.17 37 74 31.89	74.47 79.05 76.95 75.38 59.58	60.00 70.38 78.35 70.12 49.67	753.19 884.76 950.71 923.88 759.37	83.22 98.29 109.20 107.43 82.85	107.44 128.52 109.90 76.29	3.83 3.14 2.84 3.06 4.47	7.12 11.59
975 976 977 978 979		483.55 575.85 567.66 567.81 616.68	45.73 54.46 53.69 53.70 58.32	50 52 60 44 57 86 58 23 64 76	31 10 39 57 41 09 43 50 47.34	63.00 73.94 81.84 78.44 76.41	47.14 52.94 55.25 56.65 61.42	802.49 974.92 894.63 820.23 844.40	86.16 102.01 98.20 96.02 103.01	77.20 89.90 98.71 117.53 136.57	4.62 5.28 5.47	9.15 8.90 10.79 12.03 13.46
980 981 982 983 984		720.15 782.62 728.84 979.52 977.33	68 10 74.02 68 93 92.63 92.46	78.70 85.44 78.18 107.45 108.01	60.61 72.61 60.41 89.36 85.63	74.69 77.81 79.49 93.99 92.89	64.25 73.52 71.99 95.34 89.28	891 41 932.92 884.36 1,190.34 1,178.48	118.78 128.05 119.71 160.41 160.46	168.61 203.18 188.97 285.43 248.88	5.26 5.20 5.81 4.40 4.64	12.66 11.96 11.60 8.03 10.02
985 986 987 988 989		1.142.97 1,438.02 1,709.79 1,585.14 1,903.36	108.09 136.00 161.70 149.91 180.02	123.79 155.85 195.31 180.95 216.23	104.11 119.87 140.39 134.12 175.28	113 49 142.72 148 59 143.53 174.87	114.21 147.20 146.48 127.26 151.88	1,328.23 1,792.76 2,275.99 2,060.82 2,508.91	186.84 236.34 286.83 265.79 322.84	290.19 366.96 402.57 374.43 437.81	4.25 3.49 3.08 3.64 3.45	5.48 8.01
990 991 992 993 994		1.939 47 2.181.72 2.421 51 2.638.96 2.687.02	183 46 206 33 229 01 249 58 254 12	225.78 258.14 284.62 299.99 315.25	158 62 173 99 201.09 242 49 247.29	181.20 185.32 198.91 228.90 209.06	133.26 150.82 179.26 216.42 209.73	2,678.94 2,929.33 3,284.29 3,522.06 3,793.77	334.59 376.18 415.74 451.41 460.42	409.17 491.69 599.26 715.16 751.65	3.61 3.24 2.99 2.78 2.82	5.83
995 996 997 998 999		3.078.56 3.787.20 4.827.35 5.818.26 6.546.81	291 15 358.17 456.54 550.26 619 16	367.34 453.98 574.52 681.57 774.78	269 41 327.33 414 60 468.69 491.60	220 30 249.77 283.82 378.12 473.73	238.45 303.89 424.48 516.35 530.86	4,493.76 5,742.89 7,441.15 8,625.52 10,464.88	541.72 670.50 873.43 1,085.50 1,327.33	925.19 1.164.96 1.469.49 1.794.91 2.728.15	2.56 2.19 1.77 1.49 1.25	4.57 3.46
2000 2001 2002 2003		6,805.89 6,397.85 5,578.89 5,447.46	643.66 605.07 527.62 (3)	810.63 748.26 657.37 633.18	413.60 443.59 431.10 436.51	477.65 377.30 260.85 237.77	553.13 595.61 555.27 565.75	10,734,90 10,189,13 9,226,43 8,993,59	1.427.22 1.194.18 993.94 965.23	3,783.67 2,035.00 1,539.73 1,647.17	1.15 1.32 1.61 1.77	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Averages of daily closing prices.

Sources: New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Nasdag Stock Market.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Averages of daily closing prices.
<sup>2</sup> Includes stocks as follows for NYSE all stocks listed, for Dow Jones industrial average, 30 stocks; for S&P composite index, 500 stocks, and for Nasdaq composite index, over 5,000.

<sup>3</sup> The NYSE relaunched the composite index on January 9, 2003, incorporating new definitions, methodology, and base value. (The composite index based on December 31, 1956=50 was discontinued.) Subset indexes on financial, energy, and health care were released by the NYSE on January 8, 2004 (see Table B=96). NYSE indexes shown in this table for industrials, utilities, transportation, and finance were discontinued. continued

<sup>4</sup> Effective April 1993, the NYSE doubled the value of the utility index to facilitate trading of options and futures on the index. Annual indexes prior to 1993 reflect the doubling

<sup>5</sup> Based on 500 stocks in the S&P composite index

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices. Monthly data are averages of weekly figures, annual data are averages of monthly figures.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Pourretry data are ratio of earnings (after taxes) for 4 quarters ending with particular quarter to price index for last day of that quarter.

Annual data are averages of quarterly ratios

-Common stock prices and yields 2000-2005

			Соп	nmon stock p	rices 1			Common sto (S&P) (pe	ock yields
Year or month	New	York Stock Ex (December 31	change indexe , 2002=5,000)	2S <sup>2</sup> <sup>3</sup>	Dow Jones Industrial	Standard & Poor's composite index	Nasdaq composite index (Feb. 5,	Dividend- price	Earnings-
	Com- posite	Financial	Energy	Health Care	average <sup>2</sup>	(1941- 43=10) <sup>2</sup>	1971 = 100) <sup>2</sup>	ratio 5	ratio 6
20002001	6,805.89 6,397.85				10,734.90 10,189.13	1.427.22 1.194.18	3.783.67 2.035.00	1 15 1.32	3 63
2001	5,578.89				9,226.43	993.94	1.539 73	1.52	2 99 2.97
2003	5,447.46	5,583.00	5,273.90	5,288.67 5,924.80	8,993.59	965.23	1,647.17	1 77	3 8
20042005	6,612.62 7,349.00	6,822.18 7,383.70	6,952.36 9,377.84	6.283.96	10,317.39 10,547.67	1,130.65 1,207.23	1,986.53 2,099.32	1 72 1 83	4 8
2001: Jan	6,878.79				10,682.74	1,335.63	2,656 86	1 16	
Feb	6,852.31 6,380.65		****************		10,774.57 10,081.32	1,305.75 1,185.85	2.449.57 1.986.66	1 22 1 33	3 9
Mar Apr	6,418.94				10.234.52	1.189.84	1.933.93	1 33	3 9
May	6,814.16				11,004 96	1,189.84 1,270.37	2.181.13	1 32 1 23	
June	6,670.56				10,767.20	1.238.71	2.112 05	1.27	3.0
July Aug	6,485.53 6,391.99				10.444.50 10,314.68	1,204.45 1,178.51	2,033.98	1.30 1.34	
Sept	5,756.20		***************************************		9,042.56	1,044.64	1,929.71 1,573.31	1.48	2.7
0ct	5,879.37		***************************************		9,220.75 9,721.82	1,076.59 1,129.68	1,656.43 1.870.06	1.45 1.38	
Nov Dec	6,083.09 6,162.59				9,979.88	1,129.00	1,870.06	1.36	2.1
2002: Jan	6,151.15	,			9,923.80	1.140.21	1,976.77	1.38	2000
Feb	6,022.23				9,891.05	1,100.67	1,799 72	1.43	0.1
Mar Apr	6,352.08 6,212.88				10,500.95 10,165.18	1,153 79 1,112.03	1,863.05 1,758.80	1.37 1.42	2.1
May	6,087.85				10,080.48	1,079.27	1,660.31	1.47	
June	5,755.89				9,492.44	1,014.05	1,505.49	1.58	2.7
July	5,139.94 5,200.62				8,616.52 8,685.48	903 59 912.55	1,346.09 1,327.36	1.76 1.72	
Aug Sept	4,980.65				8,160.78	867.81	1,251.07	1.80	3.6
Oct	4,862.70				8,048.12	854.63	1,241.91	1 86 1.73	
Nov Dec	5,104.89 5,075.76			***************************************	8.625.72 8,526.66	909.93 899.18	1,409.15 1,387.15	1./3	3.1
2003: Jan	5,055.78	5,092.08	4,900.65	5.043.19	8.474.59	895.84	1,389.56	1 80	
Feb	4.738.56	4,723.86	4,802.42	4,788.19	7,916.18	837.62	1.313.26	1.95	2.5
Mar Apr	4,724.22 4,977.45	4,685.40 5,036.82	4,855.44 4,916.44	4,854.73 5,078.71	7,977.73 8,332.09	846.62 890.03	1,348.50 1,409.83	1.93 1.83	3.5
May	5,269.96	5,357.20	5,190.65	5,316.27	8,623.41	935.96	1,524 18	1 75	
June	5,583.42	5,690.39	5,522.45	5,557.87	9,098.07	988.00	1,631.75	1 66	3.5
July	5,567.94 5,580.87	5,790.61	5,276.08 5,368.25	5,457.98 5,263.19	9,154.39 9,284.78	992.54 989.53	1,716 85 1,724.82	1 71 1.78	
Aug Sept	5,748.42	5,776.36 5,897.76	5,453.23	5,402.56	9,492.54	1.019.44	1,856.22	1.73	3.8
0ct	5,894.39	6,187.33	5,552.99	5,428.31	9,682.46	1,038.73	1,907.89	1.71	
Nov Dec	5,989.42 6,239.14	6,282.53 6,475.68	5,474.84 5,973.31	5,521.85 5,751.14	9,762.20 10,124.66	1,049.90 1,080.64	1,939.25 1,956.98	1 69 1 67	4 3
2004: Jan	6,569.76	6.827.35	6.323.29	6.000.57	10,540.05	1,132.52	2,098.00	1.62	
Feb	6,661.38	6,978.62	6,337.87	6,134.16	10,601.50	1 143 36	2,048.36	1 63	
Mar	6,574.75 6,600.77	6,914.60 6,792.05	6,455.53	5,908.76	10,323.73 10,418.40	1,123.98	1,979.48 2,021.32	1.68 1.68	4 6
Apr May	6,371.44	6,495.19	6,638.65 6,572.79	6,028.53 6,022.12	10,083.81	1,102.78	1,930 09	1 74	
June	6,548.06	6,683.10	6,780.86	6,063.65	10,364.90	1,132.76	2,000 98	1.70	4 9
July	6,443.45	6,569.52	6,971.57	5,823.34	10,152.09 10,032.80	1,105.85 1,088.94	1,912.42 1,821.54	1 77 1.81	
Aug Sept	6,352.83 6,551.90	6,566.19 6,773.95	6,866.75 7,270.08	5,733.68 5,890.05	10,032.60	1,117.66	1,884 73	1.78	5 1
Oct	6,608.98	6,792.44	7,593.71	5,668.02	10,001.60	1,118 07	1,938.25	1.79	
Nov Dec	6,933.75 7,134.42	7.118.40	7,773.26 7,843.99	5,818.20 6,006.46	10,411.76 10,673.38	1,168.94 1,199.21	2,062.87 2,149.53	1.74 1.72	4.8
2005: Jan	7.056.85	7,282.65	7,841.24	5,970.34	10,539.51	1,181.41	2,071.87	1.77	
Feb	7,241.89	7,377 10	8,646.71	6,052.78	10,723.82	1,199.63	2,065.74	1.76	C 1
Mar	7,275.51	7,274.12	9,077.38	6,148.03 6,253.05	10,682.09 10,283.19	1,194.90 1,164.42	2,030.43 1,957.49	1.79 1.86	5.1
Apr May	7,077.97	7,014.98 7,092.20	8,793.74 8,513.39	6,432.30	10,377.18	1,178.28	2,005.22	1.86	
June	7,238.96	7,199.86	9,122.87	6,408.88	10,486.68	1.202.26	2,074 02	1 83	5.3
July	7,389.23	7,373.25	9,607.53	6,342.76	10.545.38	1,222.24	2,145.14	1 82 1.82	
Aug Sept	7,482.93 7,584.49	7,374.01 7,435.85	10,034.26	6,383.81 6,412.24	10,554.27 10.532.54	1,224.27 1,225.91	2.157.85 2,144.61	1.84	5.4
0ct	7,373.23	7,368.60	9,915.63 9,998.62	6.270.83 6.297.57	10.324.31 10.695.25	1.191 96	2.087 09	1.90	
Nov Dec	7,585.75 7,787.22	7,800.01 8,011.76	9,998.62 10,310.18	6,297.57 6,434.97	10,695.25 10,827.79	1.237.37 1.262.07	2,202.84 2.246.09	1.85 1.84	

Sources: New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Nasdaq Stock Market

<sup>1</sup> Averages of daily closing prices
2 Includes stocks as follows: for NYSE, all stocks listed (in 2005, about 2,800); for Dow Jones Industrial average, 30 stocks, for S&P composite index, 500 stocks, and for Nasdaq composite index, in 2005, over 3,100
3 The NYSE relaunched the composite index on January 9, 2003, incorporating new definitions, methodology, and base value. Subset indexes on financial, energy, and health care were released by the NYSE on January 8, 2004.
4 Based on 500 stocks in the S&P composite index
5 Aggregate cash dividends (based on latest known annual rate) divided by aggregate market value based on Wednesday closing prices Monthly data are averages of weekly figures, annual data are averages of monthly figures.
6 Quarterly data are ratio of earnings (after taxes) for 4 quarters ending with particular quarter to price index for last day of that quarter Annual data are averages of quarterly ratios.

Sources, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Diow longs & Co. Inc. Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Nasdao Stock Market

## **AGRICULTURE**

TABLE B-97.—Farm income, 1945-2005 [Billions of dollars]

	Income of farm operators from farming  Gross farm income											
			Gross far	m income								
Year		Cash	marketing rec	eipts	Value of	Oirect	Produc- tion	Net farm				
	Total	Total	Livestock and products	Crops <sup>2</sup>	inventory changes <sup>3</sup>	Government payments 4	expenses	income				
945 346 947 948 948	25.4 29.6 32.4 36.5 30.8	21.7 24.8 29.6 30.2 27.8	12.0 13.8 16.5 17.1 15.4	9.7 11.0 13.1 13.1 12.4	-0.4 .0 -1.8 1.7 9	0.7 .8 .3 .3 .2	13.1 14.5 17.0 18.8 18.0	12. 15. 15. 17. 12.				
50 51 52 53 54	33.1 38.3 37.7 34.4 34.2	28.4 32.8 32.5 31.0 29.8	16.1 19.6 18.2 16.9 16.3	12.4 13.2 14.3 14.1 13.6	.8 1.2 .9 6 .5	.3 .3 .3 .2 .3	19.5 22.3 22.8 21.5 21.8	13. 15. 14. 13. 12.				
1555	33.4 33.9 34.8 39.0 37.9	29.5 30.4 29.7 33.5 33.6	16.0 16.4 17.4 19.2 18.9	13.5 14.0 12.3 14.2 14.7	.2 5 .6 .8	.2 .6 1.0 1.1 .7	22.2 22.7 23.7 25.8 27.2	11. 11. 11. 13. 10.				
960	38.6 40.5 42.3 43.4 42.3	34.0 35.2 36.5 37.5 37.3	19.0 19.5 20.2 20.0 19.9	15.0 15.7 16.3 17.4 17.4	.4 .3 .6 .6 8	.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.2	27.4 28.6 30.3 31.6 31.8	11 12 12 11 10				
965 966	46.5 50.5 50.5 51.8 56.4	39 4 43.4 42.8 44.2 48.2	21.9 25.0 24.4 25.5 28.6	17.5 18.4 18.4 18.7 19.6	1.0 1 .7 .1 .1	2.5 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.8	33.6 36.5 38.2 39.5 42.1	12 14 12 12 14				
970 971 972 973	58.8 62.1 71.1 98.9 98.2	50.5 52.7 61.1 86.9 92.4	29.5 30.5 35.6 45.8 41.3	21.0 22.3 25.5 41.1 51.1	.0 1.4 .9 3.4 -1.6	3.7 3.1 4.0 2.6 .5	44.5 47.1 51.7 64.6 71.0	14 15 19 34 27				
975 176 177 177 178	100.6 102.9 108.8 128.4 150.7	88.9 95.4 96.2 112.4 131.5	43.1 46.3 47.6 59.2 69.2	45.8 49.0 48.6 53.2 62.3	3.4 -1.5 1.1 1.9 5.0	.8 .7 1.8 3.0 1.4	75.0 82.7 88.9 103.2 123.3	25 20 19 25 27				
980 981 982 983	149.3 166.3 164.1 153.9 168.0	139.7 141.6 142.6 136.8 142.8	68.0 69.2 70.3 69.6 72.9	71.7 72.5 72.3 67.2 69.9	-6.3 6.5 -1.4 -10.9 6.0	1.3 1.9 3.5 9.3 8.4	133.1 139.4 140.3 139.6 142.0	16 26 23 14 26				
985 986 987 988 989	161.1 156.1 168.4 177.9 191.6	144.0 135.4 141.8 151.3 160.5	70.1 71.6 76.0 79.6 83.6	73.9 63.8 65.8 71.6 76.9	-2.3 -2.2 -2.3 -4.1 3.8	7.7 11.8 16.7 14.5 10.9	132.6 125.0 130.4 138.3 145.1	28 31 38 39 46				
990 991 992 993 994	197.8 192.0 201.1 205.0 216.1	169.3 168.0 172.0 178.3 181.4	89.1 85.8 85.8 90.5 88.3	80.2 82.2 86.3 87.8 93.1	3.3 2 4.2 -4.2 8.3	9.3 8.2 9.2 13.4 7.9	151.5 151.8 150.4 158.3 163.5	46 40 50 46 52				
95 96 97 98 99	210.9 235.8 238.0 232.6 235.0	188 2 199 4 207 8 196 5 187.8	87 2 92.9 96.5 94 2 95.7	101.0 106.5 111.3 102.2 92.1	-5.0 7.9 .6 6 2	7.3 7.3 7.5 12.4 21.5	171.1 176.9 186.7 185.5 187.2	39 59 51 47				
000 001 002 002 003	242.0 248.7 229.9 259.8 292.3	192 1 200 1 195.0 216 6 241.2	99.6 106.7 94.0 105.6 123.5	92.5 93.3 101.0 111.0 117.8	1.6 1.1 -3.4 -2.5 7.0	22.9 20.7 11.2 17.2 13.3	193.1 197.1 193.4 200.3 209.8	48 51 36 59 82				
005 r	293 4	239 6	123 7	115.9	-1.3	22.7	221.9	71				

Source Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Cash marketing receipts, Government payments, value of changes in inventories, other farm related cash income, and nonmoney income produced by farms including imputed rent of operator residences.

<sup>2</sup>Crop receipts include proceeds received from commodities placed under Commodity Credit Corporation loans.

<sup>3</sup>Physical changes in beginning and ending year inventories of crop and livestock commodities valued at weighted average market prices during the year.

<sup>4</sup>Includes only Government payments made directly to farmers

Note -- Data for 2005 are forecasts.

TABLE B-98.—Farm business balance sheet, 1950-2004 [Billions of dollars]

				As	sets						Claim	18	
			Phys	sical assets	5		Fin	ancial as	sets				
End of year	Total assets	Real estate	Live- stock and poul- try <sup>1</sup>	Machin- ery and motor vehicles	Crops 2	Pur- chased in- puts 3	Total 4	Invest- ments in cooper- atives	Other 4	Total claims	Real estate debt <sup>5</sup>	Non- real estate debt <sup>6</sup>	Proprietors' equity
1950	121.6	75.4	17.1	12.3	7.1		9.7	2.7	7.0	121 6	5.2	5.7	110.
1951	136.0	83.8	19.5	14.3	8.2		10.2	2.9	7.3	136.0	5.7	6.9	123
1952	133.1	85.1	14.8	15.0	7.9		10.3	3.2	7.1	133.1	6.2	7 1	119.
1953	128.7	84.3	11.7	15.6	6.8		10.3	3.3	7.0	128.7	6.6	6.3	115.
1954	132.6	87.8	11.2	15.7	7.5		10.4	3.5	6.9	132.6	7.1	6.7	118.
955	137.0	93.0	10.6	16.3	6.5		10.6	3.7	6.9	137 0	7 8	7.3	121
956	145.7	100.3	11.0	16.9	6.8		10.7	4.0	6.7	145.7	8.5	7.4	129
957	154.5	106.4	13.9	17.0	6.4		10.8	4.2	6.6	154.5	9.0	8.2	137
958	168.7	114.6	17.7	18.1	6.9		11.4	4.5	6.9	168.7	9.7	9.4	149
959	172.9	121.2	15.2	19.3	6.2		11.0	4.8	6.2	172.9	10.6	10.7	151
960	174.4	123.3	15.6	19.1	6.4		10.0	4.2	5.8	174.4	11.3	11.1	151
961	181.6	129.1	16.4	19.3	6.5		10.4	4.5	5.9	181.6	12.3	11.8	157
962	188.9	134.6	17.3	19.9	6.5		10.5	4.6	5.9	188.9	13.5	13.2	162
963	196.7	142.4	15.9	20.4	7.4		10.7	5.0	5.7	196.7	15.0	14.6	167
964	204.2	150.5	14.5	21.2	7.0		11.0	5.2	5.8	204.2	16.9	15.3	172
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	220.8 234.0 246.1 257.2 267.8	161.5 171.2 180.9 189.4 195.3	17.6 19.0 18.8 20.2 22.8	22.4 24.1 26.3 27.7 28.6	7.9 8.1 8.0 7.4 8.3			5.4 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.4	6.0 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.4	220.8 234.0 246.1 257.2 267.8	18.9 20.7 22.6 24.7 26.4	16.9 18.5 19.6 19.2 20.0	185 194 203 213 221
1970	278.8	202.4	23.7	30.4	8.7		13.7	7.2	6.5	278.8	27.2	21.3	230
1971	301.8	217.6	27.3	32.4	10.0		14.5	7.9	6.7	301.8	28.8	24.0	248
1972	339.9	243.0	33.7	34.6	12.9		15.7	8.7	6.9	339.9	31.4	26.7	281
1973	418.5	298.3	42.4	39.7	21.4		16.8	9.7	7.1	418.5	35.2	31.6	351
1974 <sup>7</sup>	449.2	335.6	24.6	48.5	22.5		18.1	11.2	6.9	449.2	39.6	35.1	374
975	510.8	383.6	29.4	57.4	20.5		19.9	13.0	6.9	510.8	43.8	39.8	427
976	590.7	456.5	29.0	63.3	20.6		21.3	14.3	6.9	590.7	48.5	45.7	496
977	651.5	509.3	31.9	69.3	20.4		20.5	13.5	7.0	651.5	55.8	52.6	543
977	777.7	601.8	50.1	78.8	23.8		23.2	16.1	7.1	777.7	63.4	60.4	653
978	914.7	706.1	61.4	91.9	29.9		25.4	18.1	7.3	914.7	75.8	71.7	767
980	1,000.4	782.8	60.6	97.5	32.8	2.0	26.7	19.3	7.4	1,000.4	85.3	77.2	838
981	997.9	785.6	53.5	101.1	29.5		28.2	20.6	7.6	997.9	93.9	83.8	820
982	962.5	750.0	53.0	103.9	25.9		29.7	21.9	7.8	962.5	96.8	87.2	778
983	959.3	753.4	49.5	101.7	23.7		30.9	22.8	8.1	959.3	98.1	88.1	773
984	897.8	661.8	49.5	125.8	26.1		32.6	24.3	8.3	897.8	101.4	87.4	709
985 986 987 1988	775.9 722.0 756.5 788.5 813.7	586.2 542.4 563.7 582.3 600.1	46.3 47.8 58.0 62.2 66.2	86.1 79.0 78.7 81.0 84.1	22.9 16.3 17.8 23.7 23.9	1.2 2.1 3.2 3.5 2.6	33.3 34.4 35.2 35.9 36.7	24.3 24.4 25.3 25.6 26.3	9.0 10.0 9.9 10.4 10.4	775.9 722.0 756.5 788.5 813.7	94.1 84.1 75.8 70.8 68.8	78.1 67.2 62.7 62.3 62.3	603 570 618 655 687
1990	840.6	619.1	70.9	86.3	23.2	2.8	38.3	27.5	10.9	840.6	67.6	63.5	709
1991	844.2	624.8	68.1	85.9	22.2	2.6	40.5	28.7	11.8	844.2	67.4	64.4	712
1992	867.8	640.8	71.0	84.8	24.2	3.9	43.0	29.4	13.6	867.8	67.9	63.7	736
1993	909.2	677.6	72.8	85.4	23.3	3.8	46.3	31.0	15.3	909.2	68 4	65.9	774
1994	934.7	704.1	67.9	86.8	23.3	5.0	47.6	32.1	15.5	934.7	69 9	69.0	795
1995 1996 1997 1998	965.7 1,002.9 1,051.3 1,083.4 1,138.8	740.5 769.5 808.2 840.4 887.0	57.8 60.3 67.1 63.4 73.2	87.6 88.0 88.7 89.8 89.8	27.4 31.7 32.7 29.9 28.3	3.4 4.4 4.9 5.0 4.0	49.1 49.0 49.6 54.7 56.5	34.1 34.9 35.7 40.5 41.9	15.0 14.1 13.9 14.2 14.6	965.7 1,002.9 1,051.3 1,083.4 1,138.8	71.7 74.4 78.5 83.1 87.2	71 3 74 2 78.4 81.5 80 5	822 854 894 918 971
2000 2001 2002 2003	1,203.2 1,255.9 1,304.0 1,378.8 1,500.8	946.4 996.2 1,045.7 1,111.8 1,227.1	76 8 78.5 75.6 78.5 79.4	90.1 92.8 93.6 95.9 98.7	27.9 25.2 23.1 24.4 24.4	4.9 4.2 5.6 5.6 5.7	57.1 58.9 60.4 62.4 65.5	43.0 43.6 44.7 45.6	14 1 15.3 15.8 16.9	1,203 2 1,255.9 1,304.0 1,378.8 1,500 8	91.1 96.0 103.4 108.0 114.3	86.5 89.7 90.0 90.0 92.7	1,025 1,070 1,110 1,180 1,293

Note.—Data exclude operator households. Beginning 1959, data include Alaska and Hawaii.

Source: Oepartment of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

<sup>Excludes commercial profilers, excludes horses and mules beginning 1959, excludes turkeys beginning 1986.
Non-Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) crops held on farms plus value above loan rate for crops held under CCC
Includes fertilizer, chemicals, fuels, parts, feed, seed, and other supplies.
Beginning in 2004, data available only for total financial assets. Data through 2003 for other financial assets are currency and demand</sup> deposits.

Includes CCC storage and drying facilities loans.

Obes not include CCC crop loans.

Beginning 1974, data are for farms included in the new farm definition, that is, places with sales of \$1,000 or more annually

Table B-99.—Farm output and productivity indexes, 1948-2004 [1996=100]

		Farm o	utput		Produc	tivity
		Primary	output		Farm	Farm
Year	Total	Livestock and products	Crops	Secondary output	output per unit of total factor input	output per unit of labor input
1948	41 41	44 47	42 40	20 18	42 40	13 13
1950 1951 1952 1953	41 43 44 45 45	49 52 53 54 56	38 40 41 42 41	17 18 20 21 21	40 41 42 43 44	13 15 15 16 17
1955 1956 1957	46 47 46 49 51	58 59 58 59 62	42 42 41 46 46	23 25 29 35 53	44 45 45 47 48	11 11 20 21 21
960	53 53 54 56 55	62 65 65 67 69	49 48 49 51 49	57 56 55 56 51	50 51 51 52 53	2 2 2 2 3
965 966 967 968	57 56 58 59 60	67 68 70 70 70	52 51 53 55 57	51 50 52 48 46	54 53 56 56 56	3 3 3 3 4
970 971 972 973 974	60 64 64 67 63	73 74 75 76 75	54 61 61 65 59	40 40 39 42 40	56 60 60 62 58	4 4 4 4
975	66 67 71 73 78	70 74 75 75	67 67 72 75 82	41 41 40 45 44	64 63 67 65 67	
980	75 81 82 71 81	80 82 81 83 82	75 86 87 67 85	39 32 51 53 51	64 72 74 65 77	{ {
985 986	85 82 84 80 86	84 84 86 88 88	89 83 84 74 84	60 58 68 84 91	82 80 83 80 87	
990 . 991 . 992 . 993	90 90 96 91 101	89 92 94 95	90 89 97 88 104	92 97 95 100 98	91 90 98 92 98	
995 996 997 998 999	96 100 104 105 108	101 100 101 104 107	92 100 105 104 105	108 100 111 126 133	92 100 101 101 102	10 10 1 1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	108 108 107 108 112	108 107 110 110	107 106 102 105 114	120 126 126 126 122 116	107 107 107 111 111	12 12 12 13

Note —Farm output includes primary agricultural activities and certain secondary activities that are closely linked to agricultural production for which information on production and input use cannot be separately observed. See Table 8–100 for farm inputs.

Source Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

TABLE B-100.—Farm input use, selected inputs, 1948-2005

			Crops											
	Self-em-		vested		Capita	i input	La	abor inp	ut		Mat	erials in	put	
Total	and unpaid family work- ers <sup>2</sup>	Hired workers	(mil- lions of acres) <sup>3</sup>	Total farm input	Total	Dur- able equip- ment	Total	Hired labor	Self- em- ployed	Total	Feed and seed	Ener- gy	Agri- cul- tural chem- icals	Pur- chased serv- ices
9,759 9,633	7,433 7,392	2,326 2,241	356 360	97 101	108 109	66 78	326 318	279 259	349 347	48 54	60 62	77 86	20 21	43 41
9,283 8,653 8,441 7,904 7,893	6,965 6,464 6,301 5,817 5,782	2,318 2,189 2,140 2,087 2,111	345 344 349 348 346	102 103 104 104 102	112 115 117 119 120	90 100 109 114 120	306 294 287 275 270	270 261 255 248 234	324 311 304 289 288	55 57 58 58 56	62 65 64 66 61	88 93 94 97	25 25 26 26 27	43 47 51 48 47
7,719 7,367 6,966 6,667 6,565	5,675 5,451 5,046 4,705 4,621	2,044 1,916 1,920 1,962 1,944	340 324 324 324 324	105 105 104 105 107	120 120 119 118 118	122 124 122 121 121	264 247 229 219 217	230 210 201 203 198	281 267 244 227 227	60 63 64 68 71	69 71 75 79 80	101 101 99 105 106	28 30 29 30 34	49 51 52 54 74
6,155 5,994 5,841 5,500 5,206	4,260 4,135 3,997 3,700 3,585	1,895 1,859 1,844 1,800 1,621	324 302 295 298 298	106 104 106 106 105	118 118 118 118 119	123 121 119 119 121	205 200 201 192 181	198 197 197 196 177	208 201 202 190 182	71 70 72 74 74	80 77 80 83 81	109 112 113 116 123	34 37 41 45 49	72 70 71 70 68
4,964 4,574 4,303 4,207 4,050	3,465 3,224 3,036 2,974 2,843	1,499 1,350 1,267 1,233 1,207	298 294 306 300 290	104 105 105 106 107	119 119 120 121 121	123 126 131 137 139	176 164 154 153 151	167 150 139 135 136	181 170 161 162 158	74 78 80 81 85	80 86 87 88 92	121 120 119 123 126	55 62	69 77 7
3,951 3,868 3,870 3,947 3,919	2,727 2,665 2,664 2,702 2,588	1,224 1,203 1,206 1,245 1,331	293 305 294 321 328	107 106 107 108 108	120 120 119 119 120	140 142 142 145 153	144 142 141 140 140	137 136 135 137 146	147 145 144 141 136	86 86 88 91 90	95 92 95 96 96	126 122 118 111 97	94 110	6: 6: 6:
3,818 3,741 3,660 3,682 3,549	2,481 2,369 2,347 2,410 2,320	1,337 1,372 1,313 1,272 1,229	336 337 345 338 348	104 107 106 113 116	121 123 124 126 127	159 164 170 175 182	137 135 131 129 131	148 150 146 137 143	131 128 124 125 126	83 88 86 97 102	91 95 91 104 110	102 111 112 119 107	89 88 92	7.
3,512 3,328 3,267 3,082 2,943	2,302 2,241 2,142 1,991 1,930	1,210 1,087 1,125 1,091 1,013	352 366 362 306 348	116 112 111 110 106	130 128 127 125 120	189 190 187 178 170	128 128 119 117 114	141 141 126 139 130	121 121 114 106 105	102 96 96 97 93	116 111 113 114 103	98 91 88 88 92	94 83 77	7: 8: 8:
2,723 2,686 2,681 2,685 2,627	1,753 1,740 1,717 1,725 1,709	970 946 964 960 918	342 325 302 297 318	103 102 100 100 98	119 115 111 109 107	161 150 139 131 125	103 105 107 109 105	113 109 112 117 108	98 103 105 105 103	92 91 90 91 90	104 104 101 99 95	101	81 78 78	7: 8 8
2,541 2,548 2,506 2,367 2,614	1,649 1,682 1,640 1,510 1,774	892 866 866 857 840	322 318 319 308 321	99 100 98 99 103	105 105 103 103 101	121 118 114 110 106	99 100 97 92 107	109 110 103 101 101	93 94 94 88 111	94 96 95 100 102	102 103 102 105 106	94 97	93 93 95	8 8 9
2,598 2,434 2,434 2,285 2,255	1,730 1,602 1,557 1,405 1,326	868 832 877 880 929	314 326 333 327 327	105 100 103 104 105	101 100 100 99 99	103 100 98 98 98	107 100 99 94 93	103 100 105 106 112	110 100 96 87 84	106 100 106 113 115	111 100 107 116 122	100 104 115	100 103 105	10 10 11 11
2,139 2,084 2,129 2,017	1,249 1,211 1,243 1,181	890 873 886 836 825	324 321 316 324 321	102 101 100 97 96	98 98 98 97	98 98 99 100 102	89 87 88 83 78	104	78	110 110 108 105 104	120 116 114 116 117	99 106 85	100 99 93	11 10 10
	7.759 9.759 9.633 8.653 8.653 8.641 7.893 7.716,966 6.565 5.841 5.500 6.155 5.841 5.500 4.964 4.574 4.050 3.868 3.870 3.368 2.688 3.680 2.688 2.688 2.685 2.	Self-employed   Indianal   Indi	Total   Ployed and pand family works   Hired works   Ployed   Pl	Total   Self-employed analytic   Crops   har-wested   workers   P.759   P.7433   2.326   356   2.318   344   340   7.904   5.817   2.087   7.893   5.782   2.111   346   7.904   5.817   2.087   7.893   5.782   2.111   346   7.904   5.817   2.087   7.893   5.782   2.111   346   7.904   5.817   2.087   7.893   5.782   2.111   346   7.904   5.817   2.087   7.867   5.451   1.916   324   6.966   5.046   1.920   324   6.966   5.046   1.920   324   6.966   5.046   1.920   324   6.966   5.046   1.920   324   6.956   5.046   1.962   324   6.555   4.621   1.944   324   6.155   4.621   1.962   324   4.135   1.859   302   2.988   4.135   1.859   302   2.988   4.135   1.859   302   2.988   4.135   1.859   3.24   4.135   1.257   3.258   3.258   3.258   3.258   3.258   3.258   3.258	Total   Self-employed annual property   Self-employed   Self	Total   Self-employed and uppaid farmly work-ers2   Hired workers   Self-employed and uppaid farmly work-ers2   Self-employed acres)   Total farm farmly work-ers2   Self-employed acres)   Total farm farmly work-ers2   Self-employed acres)   Self-employed acres)   Total farm farm farmly morkers   Self-employed acres)   Self-employed acres)	Total   Self-employed annoyed property   Total   Crops   Hired unpaid family work-ers   P.7.433   P.7.43	Total   Self-employed and uppaid family work-ers   Hired unpaid family work-ers   1,241   100	Total   Self-employed and unpaid the series   Self-employed and unpaid unpaid the series   Self-employed and unpaid the series   Self-employed and unpaid the series   Self-employed the self-employed	Total	Total   Self-employed and played family workers   Possible   Pos	Total   Tota	Total   Deliver   Delive	Total

<sup>1</sup> Persons involved in farmwork. Total farm employment is the sum of self-employed and unpaid family workers and hired workers shown

Source: Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

here.
20ata from *Current Population Survey* (CPS), Department of Commerce (Census Bureau), adjusted for multiple jobholders by Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
3 Acreage harvested plus acreages in fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables and minor crops. Includes double-cropping

TABLE B-101.—Agricultural price indexes and farm real estate value, 1975-2005 [1990-92=100, except as noted]

	Price	s receive	ed by					Prices p	aid by fari	mers					Adden-
		farmers -		All commod-				Pro	duction ite	ms					dum: Average farm
Year or month	All farm prod- ucts	Crops	Live- stock and prod- ucts	ities, services, interest, taxes, and wage rates 1	Total <sup>2</sup>	Feed	Live- stock and poul- try	Fertil- izer	Agri- cul- tural chemi- cals	Fuels	Farm ma- chin- ery	Farm serv- ices	Rent	Wage rates	real estate value per acre (dol- lars) <sup>3</sup>
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979	73 75 73 83 94	88 87 83 89 98	62 64 64 78 90	47 50 53 58 66	55 59 61 67 76	83 83 82 80 89	39 47 48 65 88	87 74 72 72 77	72 78 71 66 67	40 43 46 48 61	38 43 47 51 56	48 52 57 60 66		44 48 51 55 60	340 397 474 531 628
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984	98 100 94 98 101	107 111 98 108 111	89 89 90 88 91	75 82 86 86 89	85 92 94 92 94	98 110 99 107 112	85 80 78 76 73	96 104 105 100 103	71 77 83 87 90	86 98 97 94 93	63 70 76 81 85	81 89 96 82 86		65 70 74 76 77	737 819 823 788 801
1985 1986 1987 1988	91 87 89 99 104	98 87 86 104 109	86 88 91 93 100	86 85 87 91 96	91 86 87 90 95	95 88 83 104 110	74 73 85 91 93	98 90 86 94 99	90 89 87 89 93	93 76 76 77 83	85 83 85 89 94	85 83 84 85 91		78 81 85 87 95	713 640 599 632 668
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994	. 104 100 98 101 100	103 101 101 102 105	105 99 97 100 95	99 100 101 104 106	99 100 101 104 106	103 98 99 102 106	102 102 96 104 94	97 103 100 96 105	95 101 103 109 112	100 104 96 93 89	96 100 104 107 113	96 98 103 110 110	96 100 104 100 108	96 100 105 108 111	683 703 713 736 798
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999	102 112 107 102 96	112 127 115 107 97	92 99 98 97 95	109 115 118 115 115	108 115 119 113 111	103 129 125 111 100	82 75 94 88 95	121 125 121 112 105	116 119 121 122 121	89 102 106 84 93	120 125 128 132 135	115 116 116 115 116	117 128 136 120 113	114 117 123 129 135	844 887 926 974 1,030
2000	96 102 98 107 119	96 99 105 111 117	97 106 90 103 122	120 123 124 128 134	116 120 119 124 132	102 109 112 114 121	110 111 102 109 128	110 123 108 124 141	120 121 119 121 120	134 119 112 140 163	139 144 148 151 162	119 121 120 123 124	110 117 119 120 120	140 146 153 157 161	1,090 1,150 1,210 1,270 1,360
2005	116	113	120	140	139	116	140	163	120	224	171	128	123	165	1,51
2004 Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	112 117 122 125 129 128	114 122 122 124 124 123	110 112 122 126 133 133	130 131 132 133 135 135	127 127 129 131 133 133	117 121 124 131 135 130	113 110 115 121 126 134	131 134 137 137 136 137	121 121 121 121 120 120	145 137 142 151 159 151	156 156 161 161 161 161	123 123 123 123 124 125	120 120 120 120 120 120	163 163 163 159 159 159	1,360
July . Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	124 120 116 114 115	120 119 114 111 112 104	128 122 118 118 119 120	135 135 135 136 135 134	133 133 133 134 133 132	128 119 116 111 109 109	136 137 138 141 137 133	138 142 143 148 151 153	120 120 120 119 119 119	161 170 175 204 196 167	161 161 164 165 167 167	125 125 125 124 124 124	120 120 120 120 120 120	162 162 162 161 161 161	
2005. Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	112 114 119 122 120 120	117 122 118	121 119 121 122 122 118	137 137 139 139 139	134 134 136 138 138 139	113 110 114 116 117 120	134 134 138 141 140 139	156 156 157 158 159 159	118 118 117 120 120 120	173 184 210 210 203 216	167 169 171 171 171	126 127 127 127 127 127	123 123 123 123 123 123	169 169 169 161 161	1,510
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec	118 117 117 111 113 114	117 116 112 103 105	118 117 122 122 121 119	141 141 142 144 143 143	140 140 141 144 142 142	123 120 116 116 114 115	136 133 138 148 149 147	160 159 163 167 176 186	120 121 121 122 122 123	224 241 264 302 240 226	171 172 171 171 172 172	129 129 129 129 128 128	123 123 123 123 123 123	162 162 162 166 166	

Source Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service.

Includes items used for family living not shown separately. Includes other production items not shown separately. Average for 48 States. Annual data are: March 1 for 1975, February 1 for 1976-81, April 1 for 1982-85, February 1 for 1986-89, and January 1 for 1990-2005.

Note —Data on a 1990-92 base prior to 1975 have not been calculated by Department of Agriculture.

TABLE B-102.—U.S. exports and imports of agricultural commodities, 1945-2005 [Billions of dollars]

				Exports						Imports			
Year	Total <sup>1</sup>	Feed grains	Food grains <sup>2</sup>	Oil- seeds and prod- ucts	Cot- ton	To- bacco	Ani- mals and prod- ucts	Total 1	Fruits, nuts, and vege- tables <sup>3</sup>	Ani- mals and prod- ucts	Cof- fee	Cocoa beans and prod- ucts	Agri- cultura trade balanc
945	2.3 3.1 4.0 3.5 3.6	0.1 .4 .1 .3	0.4 .7 1.4 1.5 1.1	(4) (4) 0.1 .2 .3	0.3 .5 .4 .5	0.2 .4 .3 .2 .3	0.9 .9 .7 .5	1.7 2.3 2.8 3.1 2.9	0.1 .2 .1 .2 .2	0.4 4 4 .6	0.3 .5 .6 .7	(4) 0 1 .2 .2	0.
950 951 952 953 954	2.9 4.0 3.4 2.8 3.1	.2 .3 .3 .3	.6 1.1 1.1 .7 .5	.2 .3 .2 .2 .3	1.0 1.1 .9 .5	.3 .2 .3	.3 .5 .3 .4 .5	4.0 5.2 4.5 4.2 4.0	.2 .2 .2 .2	.7 1.1 .7 .6 .5	1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5	.2 .2 .2 .2 .2	-1. -1. -1. -1.
955	3.2 4.2 4.5 3.9 4.0	.3 .4 .3 .5	.6 1.0 1.0 .8 .9	.5 .5 .4 .6	.5 .7 1.0 .7 .4	.4 .3 .4 .4	.6 .7 .7 .5	4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1	.2 .2 .2 .2	.5 4 .5 .7 8	1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1	.2 .2 .2 .2 .2	 (4
960 961 962 963 964	4.8 5.0 5.0 5.6 6.3	.5 .5 .8 .8	1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.7	.6 .7 .8 1.0	1.0 .9 .5 .6 .7	.4 .4 .4 .4	.6 .6 .7	3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1	.2 .2 .2 .3	.6 .7 .9 .9	1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0	.2 .2 .2 .2	1. 1. 1. 1. 2.
965 966 967 968 969	6.2 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.0	1.1 1.3 1.1 .9	1.4 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2	1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3	.5 .4 .5 .5	.4 .5 .5 .5	.8 .7 .7 .7	4.1 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0	.3 .4 .4 .5	.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4	1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2	.1 .2 .2	2. 2. 1. 1.
970 971 972 973	7.3 7.7 9.4 17.7 21.9	1.1 1.0 1.5 3.5 4.6	1.4 1.3 1.8 4.7 5.4	1.9 2.2 2.4 4.3 5.7	.4 .6 .5 .9	.5 .5 .7 .7	1.0 1.1 1.6 1.8	5.8 5.8 6.5 8.4 10.2	.5 .6 .7 .8	1.6 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.2	1.2 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.6	.3 .2 .2 .3	1. 1. 2. 9. 11.
975 976 977 978	21.9 23.0 23.6 29.4 34.7	5.2 6.0 4.9 5.9 7.7	6.2 4.7 3.6 5.5 6.3	4.5 5.1 6.6 8.2 8.9	1.0 1.0 1.5 1.7 2.2	.9 1.1 1.4 1.2	1.7 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.8	9.3 11.0 13.4 14.8 16.7	.8 .9 1.2 1.5 1.7	1.8 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.9	1.7 2.9 4.2 4.0 4.2	.5 .6 1.0 1.4 1.2	12. 12. 10. 14. 18.
980	41.2 43.3 36.6 36.1 37.8	9.8 9.4 6.4 7.3 8.1	7.9 9.6 7.9 7.4 7.5	9.4 9.6 9.1 8.7 8.4	2.9 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.4	1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5	3.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 4.2	17.4 16.9 15.3 16.5 19.3	1.7 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.1	3.8 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.1	4.2 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.3	.9 .9 .7 .8 1.1	23.8 26.4 21.3 19.6 18.5
985	29.0 26.2 28.7 37.1 40.1	6.0 3.1 3.8 5.9 7.7	4.5 3.8 3.8 5.9 7.1	5.8 6.5 6.4 7.7 6.4	1.6 .8 1.6 2.0 2.2	1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3	4.1 4.5 5.2 6.4 6.4	20.0 21.5 20.4 21.0 21.9	3.5 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.4	4.2 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.0	3.3 4.6 2.9 2.5 2.4	1.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0	9.1 4.7 8.3 16.1 18.2
90 91 92 93 94	39.5 39.3 43.1 42.9 46.2	7.0 5.7 5.7 5.0 4.7	4.8 4.2 5.4 5.6 5.3	5.7 6.4 7.2 7.3 7.2	2.8 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.7	1.4 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.3	6.6 7.1 8.0 8.0 9.2	22.9 22.9 24.8 25.1 27.0	4.9 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.9	5.6 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.7	1.9 1.9 1.7 1.5 2.5	1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0	16.5 16.5 18.3 17.7 19.2
995 996 997 998	56.3 60.3 57.2 51.8 48.4	8.2 9.4 6.0 5.0 5.5	6.7 7.4 5.2 5.0 4.7	9.0 10.8 12.1 9.5 8.1	3.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 1.0	1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5	10.9 11.1 11.3 10.6 10.4	30.3 33.5 36.1 36.9 37.7	6.4 7.2 7.5 8.4 9.3	6.0 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.3	3.3 2.8 3.9 3.4 2.9	1.1 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.5	26.0 26.8 21.0 14.9 10.7
000 001 002 003	51.2 53.7 53.1 59.4 61.4	5.2 5.2 5.5 5.4 6.4	4.3 4.2 4.5 5.0 6.3	8.6 9.2 9.6 11.7 10.4	1.9 2.2 2.0 3.4 4.3	1 2 1.3 1.0 1.0	11.6 12.4 11.1 12.2 10.4	39.0 39.4 41.9 47.4 54.0	9.4 9.9 10.6 11.9 13.3	8.3 9 1 9.0 8.9 10.6	2.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.3	1.4 1.5 1.8 2.4 2.5	12.3 14.3 11.2 12.0 7.4
in-Nov: 2004 2005	55.7 57.4	5.9 5.2	5.9 4.8	9.1 9.3	3.9 3.6	1.0	9.4 11.1	49.1 53.9	11.9 13.2	9.6 10.3	2.1 2.7	2.3 2.5	6.6 3.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Total includes items not shown separately.

Note.—Data derived from official estimates released by the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce. Agricultural commodities are defined as (1) nonmarine food products and (2) other products of agriculture which have not passed through complex processes of manufacture. Export value, at U.S. port of exportation, is based on the selling price and includes inland freight, insurance, and other charges to the port. Import value, defined generally as the market value in the foreign country, excludes import duties, ocean freight, and marine insurance

Source: Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

<sup>2</sup> Rice, wheat, and wheat flour.

3 Includes fruit, nut, and vegetable preparations. Beginning in 1989, includes bananas.

4 Less than \$50 million.

## INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS

TABLE B-103.—U.S. international transactions, 1946-2005 [Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted. Credits (+), debits ( - )]

		Goods 1			Services			Income re	ceipts and	payments	-	
Year or quarter	Exports	Imports	Balance on goods	Net military transac- tions <sup>2</sup>	Net travel and transpor- tation	Other services, net	Balance on goods and services	Receipts	Payments	Balance on income	Unilateral current transfers, net <sup>2</sup>	Balance on current account
1946 1947 1948 1949	11.764 16.097 13.265 12.213	-5.067 -5.973 -7.557 -6.874	6.697 10.124 5.708 5.339	-424 -358 -351 -410	733 946 374 230	310 145 175 208	7.316 10.857 5.906 5.367	772 1.102 1.921 1.831	-212 -245 -437 -476	560 857 1.484 1,355	-2,991 -2,722 -4,973 -5,849	4,885 8,992 2,417 873
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958	10.203 14.243 13.449 12.412 12.929 14.424 17.556 19.562 16.414 16.458	-9.081 -11.176 -10.838 -10.975 -10.353 -11.527 -12,803 -13.291 -12,952 -15,310	1.122 3,067 2.611 1.437 2.576 2.897 4.753 6.271 3.462 1.148	-56 169 528 1,753 902 -113 -221 -423 -849 -831	-120 298 83 -238 -269 -297 -361 -189 -633 -821	242 254 309 307 305 299 447 482 486 573	1.188 3.788 3.531 3.259 3.514 2.786 4.618 6.141 2.466 69	2.068 2.633 2.751 2.736 2.929 3.406 3.837 4.180 3.790 4.132	-559 -583 -555 -624 -582 -676 -735 -796 -825 -1,061	1,509 2,050 2,196 2,112 2,347 2,730 3,102 3,384 2,965 3,071	-4.537 -4.954 -5.113 -6.657 -5.642 -5.086 -4.990 -4.763 -4.647 -4.422	-1.840 884 614 -1.286 219 430 2.730 4.762 784 -1,282
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 1967 1968 1969	19.650 20.108 20.781 22.272 25.501 26.461 29.310 30.666 33.626 36.414	-14,758 -14,537 -16,260 -17,048 -18,700 -21,510 -25,493 -26,866 -32,991 -35,807	4,892 5,571 4,521 5,224 6,801 4,951 3,817 3,800 635 607	-1.057 -1.131 -912 -742 -794 -487 -1.043 -1.187 -596 -718	-964 -978 -1.152 -1.309 -1.146 -1.280 -1.331 -1,750 -1.548 -1,763	639 732 912 1,036 1,161 1,480 1,497 1,742 1,759 1,964	3.508 4.195 3.370 4.210 6,022 4.664 2.940 2,604 250 91	4.616 4.999 5.618 6.157 6.824 7.437 7.528 8.021 9.367 10,913	-1.238 -1.245 -1.324 -1.560 -1.783 -2.088 -2.481 -2.747 -3.378 -4.869	3,379 3,755 4,294 4,596 5,041 5,350 5,047 5,274 5,990 6,044	-4.062 -4.127 -4.277 -4.392 -4.240 -4.583 -4.955 -5.294 -5.629 -5,735	2,824 3,822 3,387 4,414 6,823 5,431 3,031 2,583 611 399
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	42,469 43,319 49,381 71,410 98,306 107,088 114,745 120,816 142,075 184,439	-39,866 -45,579 -55,797 -70,499 -103,811 -98,185 -124,228 -151,907 -176,002 -212,007	2.603 -2.260 -6.416 911 -5.505 8.903 -9.483 -31.091 -33,927 -27,568	-641 653 1.072 740 165 1.461 931 1.731 857 -1.313	-2,038 -2,345 -3,063 -3,158 -3,184 -2,812 -2,558 -3,565 -3,573 -2,935	2.330 2,649 2,965 3,406 4,231 4,854 5,027 5,680 6,879 7,251	2.254 -1,303 -5,443 1,900 -4,292 12,404 -6,082 -27,246 -29,763 -24,565	11,748 12,707 14,765 21,808 27,587 25,351 29,375 32,354 42,088 63,834	-5,515 -5,435 -6,572 -9,655 -12,084 -12,564 -13,311 -14,217 -21,680 -32,961	6.233 7.272 8.192 12.153 15.503 12.787 16,063 18,137 20,408 30,873	-6.156 -7,402 -8.544 -6.913 -9.249 -7.075 -5.686 -5.226 -5.788 -6.593	2,331 -1,433 -5,795 7,140 1,962 18,116 4,295 -14,335 -15,143 -285
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989	224,250 237,044 211,157 201,799 219,926 215,915 223,344 250,208 320,230 359,916	-249,750 -265,067 -247,642 -268,901 -332,418 -338,088 -368,425 -409,765 -447,189 -477,665	-25,500 -28,023 -36,485 -67,102 -112,492 -122,173 -145,081 -159,557 -126,959 -117,749	-1.822 -844 112 -563 -2.547 -4.390 -5.181 -3,844 -6.320 -6.749	-997 144 -992 -4,227 -8,438 -9,798 -8,779 -8,010 -3,013 3,551	8.912 12.552 13.209 14.124 14.404 14.483 20.502 19.728 21.725 27,805	-121,880 -138 538	72.606 86.529 91.747 90.000 108.819 98.542 97.064 108.184 136.713 161.287	-56,583 -53,614 -73,756 -72,819 -81,571 -93,891 -118,026	30,073 32,903 35,164 36,386 35,063 25,723 15,494 14,293 18,687 19,824	-8,349 -11,702 -16,544 -17,310 -20,335 -21,998 -24,132 -23,265 -25,274 -26,169	2,317 5,030 -5,536 -38,691 -94,344 -118,155 -147,177 -160,655 -121,153 -99,486
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	387.401 414.083 439.631 456.943 502.859 575.204 612.113 678.366 670.416 683.965	-498.438 -491.020 -536.528 -589.394 -668.690 -749.374 -803.113 -876.470 -917.103 -1.029.980	-111.037 -76.937 -96.897 -132.451 -165.831 -174.170 -191.000 -198.104 -246.687 -346,015	-7.599 -5.275 -1.448 1.383 2.570 4.600 5.385 4.968 5.220 2.593	7.501 16.560 19.969 19.714 16.305 21.772 25.015 22.152 10.210 7.085	62,674	-31.136 -39.212 -70.311 -98.493 -96.384 -104.065 -108.310 -165.009	149 214	-110,741 -149,375 -189,353 -203,811 -244,195 -257,554	28.550 24.131 24.235 25.316 17.146 20.891 22.318 12.609 4.265 13.888	-26.654 9.904 -35.100 -39,811 -40.265 -38.177 -43.147 -45.205 -53.320 -50.554	-78,968 2,897 -50,078 -84,805 -121,612 -113,670 -124,894 -140,906 -214,064 -300,060
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	718.712 682.422 713.421	-1.224.408 -1.145.900 -1.164.720 -1.260,717 -1.472.926	-452,414 -427,188 -482,298 -547,296 -665,390	317 -2.296 -7.158 -12.527 -14.485	2.486 -3.254 -4.245 -11.736 -13.304	71.339 70.009 72.520 76.745 75.596	-362.729 -421.181 -494.814	350.918 288.303 270.792 309.830 379.527	-263.120 -260.776 -263.526	21.054 25.183 10.016 46.304 30.439	-58.781 -51.910 -64.046 -71.169 -80.930	-415,999 -389,456 -475,211 -519,679 -668,074
2004 I II III IV	193.789 200.072 204.801 208.874	-345.241 -364.059 -372,576 -391.050	-151.452 -163.987 -167.775 -182.176	-3,200 -3,643 -3,829 -3,813	-3,212 -3,014 -3,394 -3,684	19.012 18.602 17.533 20.452	-152.042 -157.465	86.401 91.465 95.504 106.154	-85.543	15.022 5.922 6.254 3.236	-22.271 -20.515 -15,771 -22,374	$\begin{array}{c} -146.101 \\ -166.635 \\ -166.982 \\ -188.359 \end{array}$
2005            P	213,840 223,540 225,226	-410.469	-186,329 -186,929 -197,925	-3,020 -3,066 -2,652	-4.499 -2.770 -1.676	19.166 19.458	-173.599 -182.795	111.147	-106.308 -112.688 -118.220	643 -1.541 512	-26,259 -22,641 -13,538	-198.668 -197.781 -195.821

 $<sup>^1\</sup>mathrm{Adjusted}$  from Census data for differences in valuation, coverage, and timing, excludes military  $^2\mathrm{Includes}$  transfers of goods and services under U.S. military grant programs

See next page for continuation of table

TABLE B-103.—U.S. international transactions, 1946-2005—Continued [Millions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted. Credits (+), debits (-)]

Canital			F	inancial acco	unt			Statis		
V	Capital account	U.S (inc	owned ass rease/financ	ets abroad, r cial outflow (	net -)]	Foreign-owne (increase	ed assets in th /financial infl	e U.S., net ow (+)]	discrep	0f
Year or quarter	trans- actions, net	Total	U.S. official reserve assets <sup>3</sup>	Other U.S. Govern- ment assets	U.S. private assets	Total	Foreign official assets	Other foreign assets	(sum of the items with sign reversed)	which. Seasonal adjust- ment discrep- ancy
946			-623	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,						
947			-3,315 $-1,736$						. (	
948 949			-1,736							
950			1.758							
51			-33							
3/			-415 1,256							
953 954	***************************************		480							
955			182							
456			-869							
957 958			-1,165 2,292							
959			1,035							
960		-4.099	2,145	-1,100	-5,144	2,294	1,473	821	-1,019	
961		-5,538	607	-910	-5,235	2,705	765	1,939	-989	
962		-4,174	1,535	-1,085	-4,623	1,911	1,270	641	-1,124	
963 964		-7,270 -9,560	378 171	-1,662 -1,680	-5,986 -8,050	3,217 3,643	1,986	1,231 1,983	-360 -907	
900		-9,560 -5,716	1,225	-1,605	-5.336	742	134	607	-457	
966		-7,321	570	-1,543	-6,347	3,661	-672	4,333	629	
4h/	·····	-9,757 -10,977	-870	-2,423 -2,274	-7,386 -7,833	7,379 9,928	3,451 -774	3,928 10,703	-205 438	
968 969		-10,577	-1,179	-2,200	-8,206	12,702	-1,301	14,002	-1,516	
		-8,470	3,348	-1,589	-10,229	6,359	6,908	-550	-219	
970i 971		-11,758	3,066	-1.884	-12.940	22,970	26,879	-3,909	-9,779	
9/2		-13,787	706	-1,568	-12,925	21,461	10,475	10,986	-1.879	
9/3		-22,874	158	-2,644	-20,388	18,388 35,341	6,026 10,546	12,362 24,796	-2,654 -2,558	
974 975		-34,745 -39,703	-1,467 -849	366 -3.474	-33,643 -35,380	17.170	7.027	10.143	4,417	
976		-51,269	-2.558	-4.214	-44,498	38.018	17,693	20,326	8,955	
977		-34,785	-375	-3,693	-30,717	53,219 67,036	36,816	16,403 33,358	-4,099 9,236	
978 979		-61,130 -64,915	732 6	-4,660 -3,746	-57,202 -61,176	40,852	33,678 -13,665	54,516	24,349	
			-7.003	-5.162	-73,651	62.612	15.497	47,115	20,886	
980 981		-85,815 -113,054	-7,003 -4,082	-5,162	-103,875	86,232	4,960	81.272 92.997	21,792	
	199	-127,882	-4,965	-6,131	-116,786	96,589	3,593	92,997	36,630	
983	209	-66,373 -40,376	-1,196	-5,006 -5,489	-60,172 -31,757	88,694 117,752	5,845 3,140	82,849 114,612	16,162 16,733	
984 985	235 315	-40,376 -44,752	-3,131 -3,858	-2,821	-31,737	146,115	-1,119	147,233	16,478	
HAD	301	-111.723	312	-2,022	-110.014	230,009	35,648	194,360	28,590	
98/	365	-79,296 -106,573	9,149 -3,912	1,006	-89,450	248,634	45,387 39,758	203,247	-9,048 -19,289	
988 989	493 336	-106,573 -175,383	-3,912 -25,293	2,967 1,233	-105,628 -151,323	246,522 224,928	8,503	216,425	49,605	
	-6.579	-81,234	-2,158	2.317	-81,393	141,571	33,910	107,661	25,211	
991	-4,479	-64,389	5,763	2,923	-73,075	110,809	17,388	93,421	-44,840	100000000
99/	-557	-74,410	3.901	-1,667	-76,644	170,663	40,476	130,185	-45,617	
993	-1,299 -1,723	-200,551	-1,379	-351 -390	-198,823 -183,893	282,041 305,989	71,753 39,583	210,288 266,406	4.617 -3,717	
994	-1,723 -927	-178,937 -352,264	5,346 -9,742	-984	-341,538	438,562	109,880	328,682	28,299	
930	-631	-413,409	6,668	-989	-419,088	551.096	126,724	424,372	28,299 -12,162	
997	-1,014	-485,475	-1,010	68 -422	-484,533	706,809 423,569	19,036 -19,903	687,773 443,472	-79,414 145,026	
998 999	-702 -4,888	-353,829 -504,062	-6,783 8,747	2,750	-346,624 -515,559	740,210	43,543	696,667	68.800	
000	-929	-560,523	-290	-941	-559,292	1.046.896	42,758	1.004.138	-69,445	
001	-1.223	-382,616	-4,911	-486	-377,219	782,859 794,343	28,059	754.800	-9,564	
001	-1,363 -3,214	-294.027	-3.681	345	-290,691	794,343	115,945	678,398	-23,742 -37,753	
003	-3,214 -1,648	-328,397 -855,509	1,523 2,805	537 1,215	-330,457 -859,529	889,043 1,440,105	278,275 394,710	610,768 1,045,395	85,126	
	-428	-295,140	557	727	-296,424	423,023	147,401	275,622	18,646	11,01
004: I	-428 -372	-133.886	1.122	-2	-135.006	304,937	77 039	227,898	-4,044	-3,74
III	-393	-133,886 -137,525	429	-11	-135,006 -137,943	254.228	75,792	178,436	50,672	-12.97
IV	-455	-288,957	697	501	-290,155	457,915	94,478	363,437	19,856	5,71
005: 1	-4,466	-81,510	5,331	4,487 971	-91,328 -225,376	243,451	25,277 82,646 38,394	218,174 293,170	41.193 47.482	15.23 -7,71
!!	-315	-225,202	-797	0.71	-225 3/6	375,816	82.546	233,170	-76,767	-16,26

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Consists of gold, special drawing rights, foreign currencies, and the U.S. reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table B-104.—U.S. international trade in goods by principal end-use category, 1965-2005 [Billions of dollars; quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

				Exports							Imports			
		-		Nonagrio	ultural pr	oducts					Nonpetro	leum prod	ucts	
Year or quarter	Total	Agri- cul- tural prod- ucts	Total	Indus- trial supplies and mate- rials	Capital goods except auto- motive	Auto- motive	Other	Total	Petro- leum and prod- ucts	Total	Indus- trial supplies and mate- rials	Capital goods except auto- motive	Auto- motive	Other
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969	26.5 29.3 30.7 33.6 36.4	6.3 6.9 6.5 6.3 6.1	20.2 22.4 24.2 27.3 30.3	7 6 8 2 8.5 9.6 10.3	8 1 8.9 9.9 11.1 12.4	1.9 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.9	2 6 2 9 3.0 3.2 3.7	21 5 25 5 26 9 33.0 35.8	2.0 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.6	19.5 23.4 24.8 30.6 33.2	9 1 10.2 10 0 12.0 11.8	1.5 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.4	0.9 1.8 2.4 4.0 4.9	8 0 9.2 9.9 11.8 13.0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974	42.5 43.3 49.4 71.4 98.3	7 4 7 8 9.5 18.0 22 4	35 1 35 5 39 9 53 4 75 9	12.3 10.9 11.9 17.0 26.3	14.7 15.4 16.9 22.0 30.9	3 9 4 7 5.5 6.9 8.6	4.3 4.5 5.6 7.6 10.0	39.9 45.6 55.8 70.5 103.8	2 9 3.7 4.7 8.4 26.6	36.9 41.9 51.1 62.1 77.2	12.4 13.8 16.3 19.6 27.8	4.0 4.3 5.9 8.3 9.8	5.5 7.4 8.7 10.3 12.0	20.2 23.9
1975 1976 1977 1978 <sup>1</sup>	107.1 114.7 120.8 142.1 184.4	22.2 23.4 24.3 29.9 35.5	84.8 91.4 96.5 112.2 149.0	26.8 28.4 29.8 34.2 52.2	36.6 39.1 39.8 47.5 60.2	10.6 12.1 13.4 15.2 17.9	10.8 11.7 13.5 15.3 18.7	98.2 124.2 151.9 176.0 212.0	27 0 34 6 45.0 42.6 60 4	71.2 89.7 106.9 133.4 151.6	24.0 29.8 35.7 40.7 47.5	10.2 12.3 14.0 19.3 24.6	11.7 16.2 18.6 25.0 26.6	38.6 48.4
1980 1981 1982 1983	224 3 237.0 211.2 201.8 219.9	42.0 44.1 37.3 37.1 38.4	182.2 193.0 173.9 164.7 181.5	65.1 63.6 57.7 52.7 56.8	76.3 84.2 76.5 71.7 77.0	17.4 19.7 17.2 18.5 22.4	23.4 25.5 22.4 21.8 25.3	249.8 265.1 247.6 268.9 332.4	79.5 78.4 62.0 55.1 58.1	170.2 186.7 185.7 213.8 274.4	53.0 56.1 48.6 53.7 66.1	31.6 37.1 38.4 43.7 60.4	28.3 31.0 34.3 43.0 56.5	62.4 64.3 73.3
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989	215.9 223.3 250.2 320.2 359.9	29.6 27.2 29.8 38.8 41.1	186.3 196.2 220.4 281.4 318.8	54.8 59.4 63.7 82.6 90.5	79.3 82.8 92.7 119.1 136.9	24.9 25.1 27.6 33.4 35.1	27.2 28.9 36.4 46.3 56.3	338.1 368.4 409.8 447.2 477.7	51.4 34.3 42.9 39.6 50.9	286.7 334.1 366.8 407.6 426.8	83.1	61.3 72.0 85.1 102.2 112.3	64.9 78.1 85.2 87.9 87.4	114 2 125.7 134.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994	387.4 414.1 439.6 456.9 502.9	40.2 40.1 44.1 43.6 47.1	347.2 374.0 395.6 413.3 455.8	97.0 101.6 101.7 105.1 112.7	153.0 166.6 176.4 182.7 205.7	36.2 39.9 46.9 51.6 57.5	61.0 65.9 70.6 74.0 79.9	498.4 491.0 536.5 589.4 668.7	62.3 51.7 51.6 51.5 51.3	436.1 439.3 484.9 537.9 617.4	89.1 100.8	116.4 121.1 134.8 153.2 185.0	85.5 91.5 102.1	169.6 182.0
1995 1996 1997 1998	575.2 612.1 678.4 670.4 684.0	57.2 61.5 58.5 53.2 49.7	518 0 550.6 619.9 617.3 634.3	135.6 138.7 148.6 139.4 140.3	234.4 254.0 295.8 299.8 311.2	61.4 64.4 73.4 72.5 75.3	86.5 93.6 102.0 105.5 107.5	749.4 803.1 876.5 917.1 1.030.0	56.0 72.7 71.7 50.6 67.8	693.3 730.4 804.7 866.5 962.2	136.1 144.9 151.6	222 1 228.4 253.6 269.8 295.7	123.7 128.7 139.4 148.6 179.0	266.8 296.4
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004	772.0 718.7 682.4 713.4 807.5	52.8 54.9 54.5 60.9 62.9	719.2 663.8 627.9 652.5 744.6	163.9 150.5 147.6 162.5 192.3	357.0 321.7 290.4 293.6 331.5	80.4 75.4 78.9 80.7 89.3	117.9 116.2 110.9 115.8 131.5	1,224 4 1,145.9 1,164 7 1,260.7 1,472 9	133.1	1,104.2 1,042.3 1,061.2 1.127.6 1,292.5	172.5 164.6 181.4	347.0 298.0 283.3 295.8 343.5	189.8 203.7	382.0
2003:            	173.2 174.7 178.2 187.4	14 2 14 7 15.7 16.2	158.9 160.0 162.4 171.2	40.3 40.3 40.1 41.7	70.5 70.9 73.6 78.7	20.0 20.4 19.6 20.7	28.1 28.4 29.2 30.1	311.0 309.8 313.5 326.5	35.6 31.2 32.9 33.4	275.4 278.5 280.6 293.1	44.5 45.9	71.4 73.2 73.6 77.7	52.7 51.3	1083
2004: I II III IV	193.8 200.1 204.8 208.9	15.9 16.0 15.4 15.6	177.9 184.1 189.4 193.2	44.8 47.0 49.1 51.4	80.7 82.3 84.2 84.3	23.1	31 4 32.9 33.1 34 1	345.2 364.1 372.6 391.1	41.5 45.1 53.8	305.2 322.5 327.4 337.3	56.9 60.8	80.8 85.5 87.8 89.4	57.2 57.5 58.1	123.0 121.3 126.2
2005: I	213.8 223.5 225.2	15 6 17.1 16.8	198 3 206 4 208 4	56 1 55 7	85.4 90.2 90.8	23.5 24.6	36.0 36.6 37.3	400 2 410.5 423 2	67.5	347.2 353.1 355.6	65.3	90.7 95.9 96.1	58.1 60.6	133.2

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$ End-use commodity classifications beginning 1978 and 1989 are not strictly comparable with data for earlier periods. See Survey of Current Business, June 1988 and July 2001

Note.—Data are on a balance of payments basis and exclude military In June 1990, end-use categories for goods exports were redefined to include reexports, beginning with data for 1978, reexports (exports of foreign goods) are assigned to detailed end-use categories in the same manner as exports of domestic goods.

Source. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

TABLE B-105.—U.S. international trade in goods by area, 1999-2005 [Millions of dollars]

ltem	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 first 3 quarters at annual rate 1
EXPORTS	683,965	771,994	718,712	682,422	713,421	807,536	883,475
Industrial countries	401,525	438,292	406,148	381.132	398.763	441.562	479.901
Euro area <sup>2</sup>	166,713 56,073 37,657	115,826 178,877 63,473 40,725 39,391	111,049 163,259 55,879 39,701 36,260	103,860 160,916 49,670 32,085 34,601	109.958 169.929 50.253 32.871 35.752	124.798 189.982 52.288 35.120 39.374	133,411 210,192 53,364 37,813 45,121
Other countries	282,440	333,701	312,564	301.290	314.658	365.974	403.573
OPEC 4 Other 5 Of which:	264,125	17,625 316.076	19,503 293,061	17.808 283.482	16.556 298,102	21.592 344.382	29.309 374.264
Čhina Mexico	86.758	16,141 111,172	19,108 101,181	22,040 97,242	28,287 97,224	34.639 110.698	40,009 118,364
International organizations and unallocated IMPORTS		1 1,224,408	1.145.900	1.164.720	1.200.717	1.472.026	1.046.060
Industrial countries		636.311	599.330	591.844	1,260,717	1,472,926 702,264	1,645,052 759,656
Euro area <sup>2</sup>	144,928 201,287 130,873 38,789	164.002 233,676 146,492 43,388 48,753	166,190 218,726 126,478 40,982 46,954	172,474 211,756 121,426 40,464 45,724	187.608 224.249 118.034 42.574 49.608	209.393 259.034 129.807 46.032 57,998	226.392 284.217 137.704 49.248 62.095
Other countries	472,731	588,097	546,570	572.876	638,644	770,662	885,396
OPEC 4 Other 5 Of which:	430,779	66,995 521,102	59.752 486,818	53.246 519,630	68,346 570,298	94.105 676,557	120,357 765,039
China Mexico	110,550	100,021 136,811	102,279 132,205	125,189 135,496	152,426 139,036	196.674 157.105	237.275 168.492
International organizations and unallocated							
BALANCE (excess of exports +)		-452,414	-427,188	-482,298	-547.296	-665.390	-761.577
Industrial countries		-198,019	-193,182	-210,712	-223,310	-260,702	-279.755
Euro area <sup>2</sup>	-34,574 -74,800 -1,132	-48,176 -54,799 -83,019 -2,663 -9,362	-55,141 -55,467 -70,599 -1,281 -10,694	-68,614 -50,840 -71,756 -8,379 -11,123	-77,650 -54,320 -67,781 -9,703 -13,856	-84,595 -69,052 -77,519 -10,912 -18,624	-92,981 -74,025 -84,340 -11,435 -16,973
Other countries	-190,291	-254,396	-234.006	-271,586	-323,986	-404,688	-481.823
OPEC 4Other 5Of which:	-166,654	-49,370 -205,026	-40.249 -193.757	-35,438 -236,148	-51,790 -272,196	-72,513 -332,175	-91.048 -390.775
China	-23,792	-83,880 -25,639	$ \begin{array}{r} -83.171 \\ -31.024 \end{array} $	-103,149 -38,254	-124,139 -41,812	-162,035 -46,407	-197,265 -50,128

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Preliminary; seasonally adjusted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Preliminary; seasonally adjusted.
<sup>2</sup> Euro area includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and beginning 2001, Greece.

<sup>3</sup> Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa and other western Europe.

<sup>4</sup> Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, consisting of Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Previously included Ecuador (through 1992) and Gabon (through 1994).

<sup>5</sup> Includes mainly Latin America, other Western Hemisphere, and other countries in Asia and Africa, less members of OPEC

Note.—Data are on a balance of payments basis and exclude military.

For further details regarding these data, see Survey of Current Business, July 2005

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-106.—U.S. international trade in goods on balance of payments (BOP) and Census basis, and trade in services on BOP basis, 1981-2005

[Billions of dollars; monthly data seasonally adjusted]

			Good (f.a s	s: Expo . value)	rts 12						: Impor ns valu				Serv (80P	
		Cen	sus bas	sis (by e	nd-use	catego	ry)		Cer	isus bas	is (by e	end-use	catego	ry)		
Year or month	Total, 80P basis <sup>3</sup>	Total, Census basis <sup>3 4</sup>	Foods, feeds, and bev- er- ages	Indus- trial sup- plies and ma- terials	Cap- ital goods except auto- mo- tive	Auto- mo- tive vehi- cles, parts, and en- gines	Con- sumer goods (non- food) except auto- mo- tive	Total, 80P basis	Total, Census basis <sup>4</sup>	Foods, feeds, and bev- er- ages	Indus- trial sup- plies and ma- terials	Cap- ital goods except auto- mo- tive	Auto- mo- tive vehi- cles, parts, and en- gines	Con- sumer goods (non- food) ex- cept auto- mo- tive	Ex- ports	lm- ports
			Fa.	s. value	2					Custo	ıms valı	ne				
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987	237.0 211.2 201.8 219.9 215.9 223.3 250.2 320.2 359.9	238.7 216.4 205.6 224.0 7218.8 7227.2 254.1 322.4 363.8	30.9		72.7 67.2 72.0 73.9 75.8 86.2 109.2 138.8	15.7 16.8 20.6 22.9 21.7 24.6 29.3 34.8	14.3 13.4 13.3 12.6 14.2 17.7 23.1 36.4	265.1 247.6 268.9 332.4 338.1 368.4 409.8 447.2 477.7	261.0 244.0 258.0 6 330.7 6 336.5 365.4 406.2 441.0 473.2	17.1 18.2 21.0 21.9 24.4 24.8 24.8	112.0 107.0 123.7 113.9 101.3 111.0 118.3 132.3	35.4 40.9 59.8 65.1 71.8 84.5 101.4 113.3	33.3 40.8 53.5 66.8 78.2 85.2 87.7 86.1	39.7 44.9 60.0 68.3 79.4 88.7 95.9 102.9	57.4 64.1 64.3 71.2 73.2 86.7 98.7 110.9 127.1	45.5 51.7 55.0 67.7 72.9 80.1 90.8 98.5 102.5
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	387.4 414.1 439.6 456.9 502.9 575.2 612.1 678.4 670.4 684.0	393.6 421.7 448.2 465.1 512.6 584.7 625.1 689.2 682.1 695.8		104.4 109.7 109.1 111.8 121.4 146.2 147.7 158.2 148.3 147.5	152.7 166.7 175.9 181.7 205.0 233.0 253.0 294.5 299.4 310.8	37.4 40.0 47.0 52.4 57.8 61.8 65.0 74.0 72.4 75.3	43.3 45.9 51.4 54.7 60.0 64.4 70.1 77.4 80.3 80.9	498.4 491.0 536.5 589.4 668.7 749.4 803.1 876.5 917.1 1,030.0	495.3 488.5 532.7 580.7 663.3 743.5 795.3 869.7 911.9 1,024.6	26.5 27.6 27.9 31.0 33.2 35.7 39.7 41.2	213.8	116.4 120.7 134.3 152.4 184.4 221.4 228.1 253.3 269.5 295.7	87.3 85.7 91.8 102.4 118.3 123.8 128.9 139.8 148.7 179.0	105.7 108.0 122.7 134.0 146.3 159.9 172.0 193.8 217.0 241.9	147.8 164.3 177.3 185.9 200.4 219.2 239.5 256.3 263.1 282.5	117.7 118.5 119.6 123.8 133.1 141.4 152.6 166.5 181.4
2000	772.0 718.7 682.4 713.4 807.5	781.9 729.1 693.1 724.8 818.8	47.9 49.4 49.6 55.0 56.6	172.6 160.1 156.8 173.0 204.0	356.9 321.7 290.4 293.6 331.5	80.4 75.4 78.9 80.7 89.3	89.4 88.3 84.4 89.9 103.1	1,224.4 1,145.9 1,164.7 1,260.7 1,472.9	1,218.0 1,141.0 1,161.4 1,257.1 1,469.7	46.6 49.7	299.0 273.9 267.7 313.8 412.8	347.0 298.0 283.3 295.8 343.5	195.9 189.8 203.7 210.2 228.2	281.8 284.3 307.8 333.9 372.9	299.5 288.4 294.9 309.1 343.9	225.3 224.0 233.7 256.7 296.1
2004: Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	62.2 64.8 66.8 66.1 68.2 65.8	63.1 65.7 67.8 67.1 69.1 66.8	4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.6	15.3 15.9 16.7 16.4 17.2 16.5	25.9 27.2 27.6 27.2 28.3 26.8	6.8 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.2	7.8 8.2 8.6 8.5 8.5	112.1 114.7 118.5 118.9 120.8 124.4	111.9 114.4 118.2 118.7 120.5 124.1	5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3	28.7 30.9 31.7 31.0 32.4 35.1	26.9 26.5 27.4 28.0 28.2 29.3	18.0 18.7 18.8 19.0 19.2 19.0	29.4 29.2 31.0 31.4 31.2 31.3	27.3 27.6 28.4 28.3 28.2 28.5	23.5 23.6 23.7 23.9 24.4 24.8
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Oec	67.8 68.1 69.0 69.3 68.6 71.0	68.5 68.9 70.0 70.2 69.5 71.9	4.5 4.8 4.8	17.4 17.0 17.4 17.9 17.8 18.4	28.0 28.1 28.1 28.1 27.6 28.6	7.5 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.6 8.0	8.4 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.9 9.3	122.8 125.2 124.6 128.7 131.8 130.5	122.5 124.9 124.4 128.4 131.5 130.3	5.2 5.1 5.2 5.4	34.0 36.6 35.2 38.0 40.6 38.6	29.1 29.0 29.6 29.9 29.7 29.8	19.0 19.1 19.4 19.5 19.2 19.4	31.0 30.7 30.9 31.6 32.6 32.7	28.4 28.5 28.7 29.3 30.0 30.7	24 7 25.5 25.0 25.4 25.8 25.9
2005. Jan Feb Mar Apr May June	71.6 70.7 71.5 74.6 74.5 74.5	72.4 71.5 72.5 75.5 75.5 75.6	4 8 5.0 5.5	18.5 18.7 18.7 19.5 19.8 19.6	28.5 28.0 28.9 30.5 29.6 30.1	8.2 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.8	9.4 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.7 9.5	134.3 135.5 130.4 136.9 135.3 138.3	134.0 135.2 130.1 136.6 134.9 138.1	5.5 5.5 5.5 5.7	38.4 40.0 39.9 41.8 39.4 41.5	31.1 30.0 29.6 31.9 31.3 32.6	19.9 19.8 18.5 18.8 19.7 19.6	34.4 35.5 32.1 33.8 34.1 34.2	30.6 30.7 31.3 31.2 31.2 31.3	26.5 26.4 26.5 26.8 26.7 26.9
July Aug Sept Oct Nov?	75.1 76.7 73.5 75.2 77.4	76.1 78.4	5.1 4.9 5.0 4.9	19.0 19.4	30.3 31.4 29.1 30.9 32.0	8.0 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.7	9.6 9.5 9.9 9.4 10.0	137.6 140.8 144.8 148.4 146.2	137.4 140.5 144.5 148.1 145.9	5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8	42.1 44.1 47.1 50.0 48.8	31.8 32.0 32.3 32.1 32.1	19.7 20.8 20.1 20.8 21.0	33.5 33.3 34.2 34.5 33.5	31.6 31.6 32.3 32.2 31.9	26.9 26.5 27.0 27.1 27.3

<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense shipments of grant-aid military supplies and equipment under the Military Assistance Program are excluded from

Source: Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis).

Pepartiment or betteres symptoms of grant-and immary supplies and equipment under the mintary Assistance Program are excluded from total exports through 1985 and included beginning 1986.

For as, (free alongside ship) value basis at U.S. port of exportation for exports.

Beginning 1989, exports have been adjusted for undocumented exports to Canada and are included in the appropriate end-use categories. for prior years, only total exports include this adjustment.

Total includes "other" exports or imports, not shown separately.

<sup>5</sup> Total arrivals of imported goods other than intransit shipments 6 Total includes revisions not reflected in detail.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Total exports are on a revised statistical month basis; end-use categories are on a statistical month basis.

Note —Goods on a Census basis are adjusted to a 80P basis by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in line with concepts and definitions used to prepare international and national accounts. The adjustments are necessary to supplement coverage of Census data, to eliminate duplication of transactions recorded elsewhere in international accounts, and to value transactions according to a standard definition.

Oata include international trade of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Foreign Trade Zones.

TABLE B-107.—International investment position of the United States at year-end, 1997-2004 [Billions of dollars]

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004 P
-820.7 -822.7	-895.4 -1,070.8	-766.2 -1,037.4	-1,381.2 -1,581.0	-1,919.4 -2,339.4	-2,107.3 -2,455 1	-2,156.7 $-2,372.4$	-2,484.2 -2,542.2
4,567.9 5,379.1	5,095.5 6,179.1	5,974.4 7,3 <b>9</b> 9.7	6,238.8 7,401.2	6,308.7 6,930.5	6,645.7 6,807.8	7,641.0 ° 8,296.6	9,052.8 9,972.8
134.8	146.0	136.4	128.4	130.0	158.6	183.6	189 6
10.0	10.6	10.3	10.5	10.8	12.2	12.6	113.9 13.6
18.1	24.1	18.0	14.8	17.9	22.0	22.5	19.5
30.8	36.0	32.2	31.2	29.0	33.7	39.5	42.5
86.2	86.8	84.2	85.2	85.7	85.3	84.8	83.6
83.8	84.5	81.4	82.3	82.9	82.4	81.7	80.8 80.5
2.1	1.9	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.8	2.8
4,346.9 5,158.1	4,862.8 5,946.4	5,/53./ 7,179.0	7,187.6	6,714.9	6,563.9	8,028.3	8,779.6 9,699.6
1,068.1	1,196.0	1,414.4	1,531.6	1,693.1	1,860.4	2,062.6	2,367.4
1,879.3	2,279.6	2,839.6	2,694.0	2,314.9	2,022.6	2,718.2	3,287.4 3,436.7
543.4	594.4	548.2	572.7	557.1	705.2	874.4	916.7
					,		2,520.1
							801.5
982.1	1,009.0	1,082.9	1,231.5	1,390.9	1,559.5	1,/59.3	2,174.0
5,388.6 6.201.9	5,990.9 7,249.9	6,740.6 8,437.1	7,620.0 8.982.2	8,228.1 9,269.9	8,752.9 9,263.0	9,797.7 10,669.0	11,537.0 12,515.0
873.7	896.2	951.1	1,030.7	1.109.1	1,251.0	1,567.1	1,982.0
648.2 615.1	622.9	693.8 617.7	639.8	720.1	812.0	990.4	1,499.6 1,260.5
33.1 21.7	46.8 18.4	76.1 21.1		126.9 17.0	158.4 17.1	201.8 16.6	239.1 17.1
						201.1	271.5
68.4	82.1	97.3	101.8	110.4	107.6	157.2	193.8
4.514.9	5.094.7	5.789.5	6.589.3	7.119.0	7.502.0	8.230.6	9,555.0
5,328.1	6,353.7	7,486.0	7,951.5	8,160.9	8,012.0	9,101.9	10,533.0
824.1	920.0	1.101.7	1.421.0	1.518.5	1.517.4	1,585.9	1,708.9
1,637.4	2,179.0	2,798.2	2,783.2	2,560.3	2,027.4	2,457.2	2,686.9 639.7
							3,987.8
618.8	724.6	825.2	1,068.6	1,343.1	1,531.0	1,707.2	2,059.3
				1,478.3 279.8			1,928.5
			738.9	798.3	892.6	454.3	581.3
968.8	1,014.0	1,067.2	1,168.7	1,326.1	1,538.2	1,921.1	2.304.6
	-820.7 -822.7 4,567.9 5,379.1 134.8 75.9 10.0 18.1 30.8 86.2 84.1 83.8 4 2.1 4,346.9 5,158.1 1,068.1 1,879.3 1,751.2 543.4 1,207.8 545.5 982.1 5,388.6 6,201.9 873.7 648.2 6,201.9 1,533.1 21.7 135.4 68.4 4,514.9 5,328.1 1,537.4 538.1 1,512.7 618.8 893.9 211.6 459.4	-820.7 -895.4 -822.7 -1,070.8   4,567.9 5,379.1 6,179.1   134.8 146.0 75.9 170.6   18.1 24.1 30.8 36.0   86.2 86.8 84.1 84.9 83.8 84.5   4 .3 2.1 1.9   4,346.9 5,946.4 1,068.1 1,751.2 5,946.4 1,207.8 1,475.0   545.5 588.3 982.1 1,009.0   5,388.6 5,940.4 1,207.8 1,475.0 545.5 588.3 982.1 1,009.0   5,388.6 65.9 6,201.9 7,249.9 873.7 648.2 669.8 615.1 662.9 33.1 46.8 21.7 18.4 4.8 21.7 18.4 4.8 21.7 18.4 68.8 21.7 18.4 68.8 21.7 18.4 68.8 21.7 18.4 68.8 21.7 18.4 68.8 21.7 18.8 21.6 63.9 1,178.8 21.6 63.9 1,178.8 21.6 63.9 1,178.8 21.6 63.9 1,178.8 21.6 63.9 1,178.8 21.16 22.8 3 459.4 485.7	-820.7	-820.7	-820.7	-820.7	-820.7

 $<sup>^{1}\,\</sup>mathrm{Valued}$  at market price.

Note.—For details regarding these data, see Survey of Current Business, July 2005.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

TABLE B-108.—Industrial production and consumer prices, major industrial countries, 1980-2005

Year or quarter	United States <sup>1</sup>	Canada	Japan	France	Germany <sup>2</sup>	Italy	United Kingdom
-			Industrial pro	oduction (Index.	2002=100) <sup>3</sup>		
1980	56 2 56.9 54 0 55 4 60 4 61.2 61.8 64.9 68.2 68.8	57.2 57.5 53.1 56.0 63.0 66.2 65.7 68.4 73.0 72.8	72.2 72.9 73.1 75.5 82.5 85.5 85.4 88.3 96.5 102.1	76.7 75.9 75.3 75.4 76.7 77.2 79.1 80.5 83.4 86.3	75.8 74.4 72.0 72.5 74.7 78.3 79.7 80.0 82.9 87.0	78.7 76.9 74.5 72.8 75.2 75.3 78.4 80.4 86.0 89.3	76.8 73.7 73.8 75.8 76.3 80.2 81.9 85.3 89.7 91.6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997	69.4 68.3 70.3 72.6 76.5 80.2 83.6 89.7 94.9	70.8 68.2 69.1 72.4 77.0 80.5 81.4 86.0 89.0 94.3	106.4 108.4 102.2 98.6 99.8 103.1 105.5 109.3 102.1	87.5 87.2 86.0 82.6 85.9 87.4 90.9 94.2 96.5	91.5 94.1 92.0 85.1 87.6 88.1 88.3 91.0 94.4 95.5	88.7 87.9 87.0 85.0 90.1 95.4 93.8 97.5 98.6 98.5	91.6 88.6 89.0 90.9 95.7 97.3 98.7 100.0 101.1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	103.5 99.9 100.0 100.6 104.7 108.1	102.4 98.3 100.0 101.0 105.0	108.0 101.2 100.0 103.0 108.5	100.2 101.5 100.0 99.5 101.8	100.8 101.1 100.0 100.4 103.5	102.7 101.6 100.0 99.4 98.8	104.2 102.6 100.0 99.5 100.2
2004: I	103.1 104.4 105.1 106.2	102.8 104.5 106.2 106.5	107.0 109.3 109.1 107.9	101.1 101.8 101.5 101.8	102.2 103.6 104.1 104.1	99.9 99.7 99.2 98.3	100.3 100.8 99.8 100.2
2005:	107.2 107.6 108.0 109.0	106.7 106.7 108.0	110.0 109.6 109.3	101.8 101.3 101.8	105.0 106.0 107.5	97.3 98.4 99.0	99.2 99.1 98.6
			Consumer p	rices (Index, 19	82-84=100)		
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987	82.4 90.9 96.5 99.6 103.9 107.6 109.6 118.3 124.0	76.1 85.6 94.9 100.4 104.7 109.0 113.5 118.4 123.2 129.3	91.0 95.3 98.1 99.8 102.1 104.2 104.9 104.9 105.6 108.0	72.2 81.8 91.7 100.3 108.0 114.3 117.2 121.1 124.3 128.7	86.7 92.2 97.0 100.3 102.7 104.8 104.6 104.9 106.3 109.2	63 9 75.5 87.8 100.8 111.4 121.7 128.9 135.1 141.9 150.7	78.5 87.9 95.4 99.8 104.8 111.1 114.5 119.7 125.6 135.4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1997	130.7 136.2 140.3 144.5 148.2 152.4 156.9 160.5 163.0 166.6	135.5 143.1 145.3 147.9 148.2 151.4 153.8 156.3	111.4 115.0 117.0 118.5 119.3 119.2 119.3 121.5 122.2 121.8	132.9 137.2 140.4 143.4 145.8 148.4 151.4 153.2 154.2 155.0	112.2 116.3 122.2 127.6 131.1 133.3 135.3 137.8 139.1 140.0	160.4 170.5 179.5 187.7 195.3 205.6 213.8 218.2 222.5 226.2	148.2 156.9 162.7 165.3 175.2 179.4 185.1 191.4
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 r	172.2 177.1 179.9 184.0 188.9 195.3	164.9 169.1 172.9 177.7 181.0 184.9	121.0 120.1 119.0 118.7 118.7 118.3	157.6 160.2 163.3 166.7 170.3 173.2	142.0 144.8 146.7 148.3 150.8 153.7	231.9 238.3 244.3 250.8 256.3 261.3	200.1 203.6 207.0 213.0 219.4 225.6
2004:	186.3 188.9 189.6 190.7	179.0 181.1 181.5 182.2	118.3 118.6 118.6 119.2	168.8 170.3 170.6 171.4	149.6 150 7 151.2 151.5	254.2 256.1 257.2 257.8	216.0 218.9 220.2 222.3
2005: I	191.9 194.5 196.9 197.9	182.9 184.6 186.2 186.3	118.0 118.5 118.3 118.5	171.7 173.2 173.8 174.2	152.3 153.2 154.4 154.9	259.1 260.9 262.4 263.3	222.8 225.5 226.3 227.5

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Note, Table B-51 for information on U.S. industrial production series.
 <sup>2</sup> Prior to 1991 data are for West Germany only
 <sup>3</sup> All data exclude construction. Quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.

Note.—National sources data have been rebased for industrial production and consumer prices.

Sources: National sources as reported by each country; Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

TABLE B-109.—Civilian unemployment rate, and hourly compensation, major industrial countries, 1980-2005

[Quarterly data seasonally adjusted]

Year or quarter	United States	Canada	Japan	France	Ger- many <sup>1</sup>	Italy	United Kingdom
			Civilian uner	nployment rat	e (Percent) <sup>2</sup>		
980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988	7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.3	7.3 7.3 10.7 11.6 10.9 10.2 9.3 8.4 7.4 7.1	2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.3	6.5 7.6 3 8.3 8.6 10.0 10.5 10.6 10.8 10.3 9.6	2.8 4.0 5.6 3 6.9 7.1 7.2 6.6 6.3 6.3 5.7	4.4 4.9 5.4 5.9 5.9 6.0 37.5 7.9 7.9 7.8	6.9 9 10.1 11.1 11.1 11.0 8.9
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997	3 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 3 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2	7.7 9.8 10.7 10.8 9.6 8.7 8.9 8.4 7.7 7.0	2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.1 4.7	3 8.6 9.1 10.0 11.3 11.9 11.3 11.8 11.7 11.2 10.5	5.0 3 5.6 6.7 8.0 8.5 8.2 9.0 9.9 9.3 3 8.5	7.0 3 6.9 7.3 3 9.8 10.7 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.0	7. 8. 10. 10. 8. 8. 8. 7. 6. 6.
000 001 002 003 003 004	4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1	6.1 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.4	4.8 5.1 5.4 5.3 4.8	9.1 8.4 9.0 9.6 9.8	7.8 7.9 8.6 9.3 9.9	10.2 9.2 8.7 8.5 8.1	5. 5. 5. 5. 4.
004: I	5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4	6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3	4.9 4.7 4.8 4.6	9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8	9.7 9.8 10.0 10.0	8.3 8.1 8.0 8.0	4. 4. 4.
005: I	5.2 5.1 5.0 5.0	6.2 6.0 6.0	4.6 4.4 4.4	9.9 9.9 9.7	10.0 9.9 9.4	7.9 7.8 7.8	4.4.4.
	Ma	anufacturing h	ourly compe	nsation in U.S	. dollars (Inde	, 1992=10	0) 4
980 981 982 882 983 984 985 986 987	56.0 61.5 67.5 69.3 71.7 75.6 79.0 81.3 84.1 86.6	49.5 54.7 60.2 64.4 64.8 64.0 63.8 68.4 76.5 84.5	32.8 36.0 33.5 36.1 37.1 38.5 57.1 68.2 78.4 77.4	51.7 46.6 45.6 43.5 41.2 43.4 58.5 69.8 72.8 71.4	46.1 39.3 38.8 38.6 36.3 37.2 52.4 66.0 70.4 69.1	43.8 39.1 38.4 39.4 39.1 40.7 54.4 66.0 70.6 72.7	46.46.44.41.638.939.960.70.069.4
990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997	90.5 95.6 100.0 102.0 105.3 107.3 109.3 112.2 118.7 123.4	91.6 100.2 100.0 95.6 91.9 93.7 95.2 94.6 91.9 94.9	79.2 90.9 100.0 117.2 129.9 146.1 127.2 117.9 111.7 128.0	88.4 90.4 100.0 96.2 101.9 117.4 116.2 101.5 101.4 100.8	86.4 86.0 100.0 100.3 107.0 127.6 127.2 112.5 112.5 110.3	90.1 93.5 100.0 82.8 81.7 84.2 95.0 88.9 86.7 84.1	84. 94. 100. 88. 93. 97. 96. 105. 114.
000 001 002 003 004	134.7 137.8 147.9 160.1 163.6	98.0 97.4 99.2 114.9 123.5	133.7 119.5 116.2 126.3 136.0	91.9 91.5 102.2 127.2 143.2	100.5 100.5 108 7 132.9 147.0	75.1 75.5 81.7 101.0 113.8	117. 116. 128. 147. 170.

2005.

4 Hourly compensation in manufacturing, U.S. dollar basis, data relate to all employed persons (employees and self-employed workers). For details on manufacturing hourly compensation, see U.S. Department of Labor International Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity and Unit Labor Cost Trends, 2004, October 27, 2005.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Prior to 1991 data are for West Germany only.

<sup>2</sup>Civilian unemployment rates, approximating U.S. concepts. Quarterly data for Japan, France, Germany, and Italy should be viewed as less precise indicators of unemployment under U.S. concepts than the annual data.

<sup>3</sup>There are breaks in the series for France (1982 and 1990), Germany (1983, 1991 and 1994), Italy (1986, 1991 and 1993), and United States (1990 and 1994). For details on break in series in 1990 and 1994 for United States, see fooinote 5, Table B-35. For details on break in series for other countries, see U.S. Department of Labor Comparative Civilian Labor Force Statistics, Ten Countries 1960–2004. May 13

TABLE B-110.—Foreign exchange rates, 1984-2005

[Foreign currency units per U.S. dollar, except as noted; certified noon buying rates in New York]

Period	Canada (dollar)	EMU Members (euro) 1 2	Belgium (franc) <sup>1</sup>	France (franc) 1	Germany (mark) <sup>[</sup>	Italy (lira) <sup>1</sup>	Nether- lands (guild- er) <sup>1</sup>	Japan (yen)	Sweden (krona)	Switzer- land (franc)	United Kingdom (pound) <sup>2</sup>
March 1973	0.9967		39 408	4.5156	2 8132	568 17	2.8714	261.90	4.4294	3 2171	2.4724
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	1.2952 1.3659 1.3896 1.3259 1.2306 1.1842 1.1668 1.1460 1.2085 1.2902 1.3664 1.3725 1.3638 1.3849 1.4836 1.4836	1.0653	57.752 59.337 44.664 37.358 36.785 39.409 33.424 34.195 32.148 34.581 33.426 29.472 30.970 35.807 36.310	8 7356 8.9800 6 9257 6.0122 5.9595 6.3802 5 4467 5 6468 5 2935 5.6669 5.5459 4.9864 5.1158 5.8393 5.8995	2 8455 2 9420 2.1705 1.7981 1.7570 1 8808 1.6166 1.6610 1.5618 1.6545 1 6216 1 4321 1.5049 1.7348 1 7597	1756 11 1908 88 1491 16 1297 03 1302 39 1372 28 1198 27 1241 28 1232 17 1573 41 1611 49 1629 45 1542 76 1703 81 1736 85	3 2085 3 3185 2 4485 2 0264 1 9778 2 1219 1 8215 1 8720 1 7587 1 8585 1 8190 1 6044 1 6863 1 9525 1 9837	237 46 238 47 168.35 144.60 128.17 138.07 145.00 134.59 126.78 111.08 93.96 108.78 121.06 130.99 113.73	8 2708 8 6032 7 1273 6 3469 6 1370 6 4559 5 9231 5 8258 7 7956 7 7161 7 1406 6 7082 7 6446 7 9522 8 2740	2 3500 2.4552 1.7979 1 4918 1.4648 1.6369 1.3901 1 4356 1 4064 1 4781 1 1812 1.2361 1.4514 1.45045	1.3368 1.2974 1.4677 1.6398 1.7813 1.6382 1.7841 1.7663 1.5016 1.5319 1.5785 1.5607 1.6573 1.6573
2000	1 4855 1.5487 1.5704 1 4008 1.3017 1.2115 1.3184 1.3590 1.3078 1.2208	.9232 .8952 .9454 1.1321 1.2438 1.2449 1.2499 1.2047 1.2227						107.80 121.57 125.22 115.94 108.15 110.11 107.24 109.69 109.94 105.67	9.1735 10.3425 9.7233 8.0787 7.3480 7.4710 7.3533 7.5968 7.4922 6.9436	1.6904 1.6891 1.5567 1.3450 1.2428 1.2459 1.2552 1.2768 1.2569 1.1818	1.5156 1.4396 1.5025 1.6347 1.8330 1.8204 1.8385 1.8063 1.8193
2005:	1.2262 1.2438 1.2014 1.1733	1.3112 1.2591 1.2196 1.1890						104.54 107.53 111.24 117.28	6.9225 7.3190 7.6788 7.9699	1.1817 1.2270 1.2742 1.3015	1.8911 1.8560 1.7847 1.7486
	1			Tr	ade-weighte	d value of t	he U.S. dolla	,			
			No	minal					Real 7		
	G-10 in		road index	Major		OITP index	Broad (Ma		Major cur- rencies inde	, UI	TP index (March

		Nom	ınal	Real 7					
	G-10 index (March 1973=100) 3	Broad index (January 1997=100) 4	Major cur- rencies index (March 1973=100) 5	01TP index (January 1997=100) <sup>6</sup>	Broad index (March 1973=100) 4	Major cur- rencies index (March 1973=100) 5	OITP index (March 1973=100) 6		
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989	138.2 143.0 112.2 96.9 92.7 98.6	60.1 67.2 62.3 60.4 60.9 66.9	128.7 133.6 109.9 97.2 90.4 94.2	9.8 13.1 16.5 19.9 24.1 29.6	117.2 122.0 106.6 97.9 91.4 93.0	118.2 122.0 99.6 89.0 83.9 88.2	114.3 122.1 126.2 123.6 113.1 107.7		
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	89.1 89.8 86.6 93.2 91.3 84.2 87.3 96.4 98.8	71 4 74.3 76 9 83 8 99 9 92.7 97.5 104.4 115.9	89.9 88.5 87.0 89.9 88.4 83.5 87.2 93.9 98.4 96.8	40.1 46.7 53.1 63.4 80.5 92.5 98.2 104.6 125.9 129.2	91.4 90.0 88.1 89.5 89.3 86.9 93.7 101.6	84.8 83.1 82.0 85.2 84.8 81.0 85.9 93.2 98.2 97.9	110.8 110.3 106.6 104.0 104.2 104.2 101.1 102.2 115.6 114.2		
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004		119 4 125.9 126 7 119.1 113.6 110.8	101.6 107.7 106.0 93.0 85.4 83.8	129.8 135.9 140.4 143.5 143.4 138.9	104.9 111.0 111.2 104.5 99.8 98.3	104 7 112.2 110 6 97.6 90.6 90.5	114.4 119.0 121.6 123.2 121.9 118.1		
2004      .    .    .		113.2 115.8 114.8 110.5	85.3 88.0 86.4 81.7	142.4 144.3 144.6 142.1	99.0 102.0 101.1 97.2	90.0 93.4 92.0 87.1	120.6 123.4 123.1 120.3		
2005: I II III IV		109.4 110 7 111 1 112.0	81 2 83.5 84.6 85.8	139.9 139.1 138.3 138.2	96.2 98.1 99.2 99.7	87.1 89.9 91.8 93.3	117.9 118.5 118.4 117.5		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> European Economic and Monetary Union members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and beginning in 2001. Greece

<sup>2</sup> U.S. dollars per foreign currency unit.

<sup>3</sup> G-10 comprises the individual countries shown in this table. Discontinued after December 1998.

<sup>4</sup>Weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the dollar against the currencies of a broad group of U.S. trading partners.

5Subset of the broad index. Includes currencies of the euro area. Australia. Canada. Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

6Subset of the broad index. Includes other important U.S. trading partners (OITP) whose currencies are not heavily traded outside their home markets

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Adjusted for changes in consumer price indexes for United States and other countries

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

TABLE B-111.—International reserves, selected years, 1962-2005 [Millions of SDRs; end of period]

Area and country	1962	1972	1982	1992	2002	2004	200	)5
Area and country	1302	19/2	1902	1992	2002	2004	Oct	Nov
All countries	62,851	146,658	361,239	752,566	1,889,307	2,520,724	2,913,251	
Industrial countries 1	53,502	113,362	214,025	424,229	757,942	930,204	952,991	
United StatesCanada	17,220 2,561	12,112 5,572	29,918 3,439	52,995 8,662	59,160 27,225	58.022 22,173	50,083 23,633	49,690 23,980
Euro area:								
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg	1,081 1,753 237 4,049 6,958 287 359 4,068	2,505 3,564 664 9,224 21,908 950 1,038 5,605	5,544 4,757 1,420 17,850 43,909 916 2,390 15,108	9,703 10,914 3,862 22,522 69,489 3,606 2,514 22,438	7,480 9,010 6,885 24,268 41,516 6,083 3,989 23,798	5,406 6,962 7,987 26,098 35,301 888 1,829 20,698	5,803 6,660 6,991 23,738 36,440 686 1,741 20,285	5,636 6,656 7,001 24,197 36,006 623 670 21,432
Netherlands Portugal Spain	1,943 680 1,045	4,407 2,129 4,618	10,723 1,179 7,450	17,492 14,474 33,640	7,993 8,889 25,992	7,380 3,852 8,566	7,620 3,550 7,129	7,378 3,626 7,507
Australia Japan New Zealand Denmark Iceland Norway	1,168 2,021 251 256 32 304	5,656 16,916 767 787 78 1,220	6,053 22,001 577 2,111 133 6,273	8,429 52,937 2,239 8,090 364 8,725	15,307 340,088 2,750 19,924 326 23,579	23,143 537,813 3,409 25,241 676 28,530	27,716 575,084 4,593 23,064 657 29,301	29,662 584,424 22,487 693 30,383
San Marino Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom	802 2,919 3,308	1,453 6,961 5,201	3,397 16,930 11,904	16,667 27,100 27,300	135 12,807 31,693 29,305	229 14,458 37,259 29,548	14,854 26,280 29,455	14,966 26,673 30,262
Developing countries: Total 2	9,349	33,295	147,213	328,337	1,131,365	1,590,525	1,960,261	
By area:								
Africa Asia <sup>2</sup> Europe Middle East Western Hemisphere	2,110 2,772 381 1,805 2,282	3,962 8,130 2,680 9,436 9,089	7,737 44,490 5,359 64,039 25,563	13,044 190,363 16,006 44,149 64,774	54,155 720,289 139,325 98,645 118,953	82,599 1,041,653 214,557 108,899 142,817	105,958 1,268,949 277,398 133,354 174,602	
Мето:					1			
Oil-exporting countries Non-oil developing countries 2	2,030 7,319	9,956 23,339	67,108 80,105	46,144 282,193	110,079 1,021,287	139,674 1,450,851	175,138 1,785,124	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Includes data for Luxembourg 1962-92. Includes data for European Central Bank (ECB) beginning 1999. Detail does not add to totals

Note.—International reserves is comprised of monetary authorities' holdings of gold (at SDR 35 per ounce), special drawing rights (SDRs), reserve positions in the International Monetary Fund, and foreign exchange.

U.S. dollars per SDR (end of period) are: 1962—1.00000; 1972—1.08571; 1982—1.10311; 1992—1.37500; 2002—1.3595; 2004—1.5530; October 2005—1.4458; and November 2005—1.44241.

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

shown.
<sup>2</sup> Includes data for Taiwan Province of China.

TABLE B-112.—Growth rates in real gross domestic product, 1987-2005 [Percent change at annual rate]

Area and country	198796	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 1
World	3.3	4 2	28	3 7	4.7	2 4	3.0	4.0	5.1	4.3
Advanced economies	3 0	3 5	2.6	3.5	3 9	1.2	1.5	1.9	3 3	2.5
Of which: United States	2.9 3.2 2.4 2.2	4 5 1 8 3 2 4 2	42 -1.0 32 41	4 5 - 1 3 0 5.5	3.7 2.4 4.0 5.2	. 8 . 2 2 2 1 . 8	1.6 3 2.0 3.1	2.7 1.4 2.5 2.0	4.2 2.7 3.2 2.9	3.5 2.0 1.9 2.9
Euro area Germany France Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium Austria Finland Greece Portugal Ireland Luxembourg	2.6 1.9 1.9 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.5 1.3 1.4 4.0 5.2	2 6 1.7 2.3 2 0 4.0 3.8 3 8 1 8 6.2 3.6 4 0 10.8 8.3	2.8 2.0 3.4 1.8 4.3 4.3 2.1 3.6 5.0 3.4 4.6 8.5 6.8	2.7 1.9 3.2 1.7 4.2 4.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 7.3	3.8 3.1 4.1 3.0 5.8 3.5 3.7 3.4 5.0 4.5 3.4 9.2 9.2	1.7 1.2 2.1 1 8 3 5 1 4 .9 8 1 0 4 3 1 7 6 2 2 2	.9 .1 1 3 4 2 7 .1 9 1.0 2.2 3.8 4 6.1 2.3	.7 -2 .9 .3 2.9 -1 1.3 1.4 2.4 4.7 -1.1 4.4 2.4	2.0 1.6 2.0 1.2 3.1 1.7 2.7 2.4 3.6 4.2 1.0 4.5 4.4	1.2 .8 1.5 5 3.2 .7 1.2 1.9 1.8 3.2 .5 5.0 3.1
Memorandum: Major advanced economies <sup>2</sup> Newly industrialized Asian econo-	27	3.3	2.8	3.1 7.3	3.5 7.9	1.0	1.1	1.8	3.2 5.6	2.5
mies <sup>3</sup>	7.9	5.5 5.2	-2.6 3.0	4.0	5.8	4 1	4.8	6.5	7.3	6.4
Regional groups. Atrica	2.2	3.4 4.2	3.2 2.8	2.8	3.3 4.9	4 1	3.6 4.4	4.6 4.6	5.3 6.5	4.5
Commonwealth of Independent States 4 Russia Developing Asia China India Middle East Western Hemisphere Brazil Mexico	7.8	1.1 1.4 6.5 8.8 5.0 4.7 5.2 3.3 6.7	-3.5 -5.3 4.2 7.8 5.8 4.2 2.3 1 4.9	5.1 6.3 6.2 7.1 6.7 2.0 4 .8 3.9	9.1 10.0 6.7 8.0 5.4 4.9 3.9 4.4 6.6	6.3 5.1 5.6 7.5 3.9 3.7 .5 1.3	5.3 4.7 6.6 8.3 4.7 4.2 5	7.9 7.3 8.1 9.5 7.4 6.5 2.2 .5	8.4 7.2 8.2 9.5 7.3 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.4	6.0 5.5 7.8 9.0 7.1 5.4 4.1 3.3 3.0

Note —For details on data shown in this table, see World Economic Outlook published semiannually by the International Monetary Fund. Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and International Monetary Fund

<sup>All figures are forecasts as published by the International Monetary Fund. For United States, advance estimates by the Department of Commerce show that real GDP grew 3.5 percent in 2005.
Includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.
Includes Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region of China). Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.
Includes Mongolia, which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, but is included for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.

Figure is zero or negligible.</sup> 





